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Abstract
Using analytical and empirical general equilibrium models, this thesis discusses 
the economic instruments of pollution control, e.g. emission taxes and tradable 
permits, with special reference to CO2 emissions control in China. In addition to 
the introduction and conclusion chapters, it consists of two parts: discussions on 
the choice of economic instruments for general environmental problems (Chapters 
2-3) together with the evaluation of China’s environmental policies (Chapter 4); 
and specific discussions on climate change policies (Chapters 5-8).
Economic instruments may differ in the way they generate government revenue. 
A pollution tax can generate revenue, while a permit trading scheme cannot, unless 
the permits are auctioned by the government. If an environmental policy generates 
revenue, how to use the revenue is thus an integral part of that policy. The anal­
ysis starts with discussion of the uses for such revenue and their impact on policy 
choices. It is found that earmarking such revenue for environmental activities could 
be a better choice if marginal utility of the environment is high and the amount of 
revenue small. If the possibility of earmarking is taken into account, the conven­
tional interpretation of Pigouvian tax is incomplete: an optimal emission tax rate 
should also be in line with the marginal benefit from financing public environmental 
projects and, is not necessarily equal to the marginal damage cost of emissions. An 
implication of this finding for policy design is that, given the difficulty of finding 
individual firms’ behavioural information, policy-makers may be more confident in 
policy design if they can plan projects according to certain environmental targets 
and set a pollution tax rate based on the cost analysis of these projects. Another
iv
implication is that the “double-dividend” hypothesis is weakened if the earmark­
ing of pollution charge revenues for environmental spending is justified by a higher 
marginal benefit of environmental spending.
Economic instruments, i.e. emission taxes and tradable permits, may also differ 
if there are uncertainties about the costs and benefits of pollution and pollution 
abatement. This issue is examined in a general equilibrium setting. It is found that 
Weitzman’s rule, i.e., choosing instruments based on the relative slopes of marginal 
benefit and cost curves, is not applicable in a general equilibrium setting, except 
when restrictions are imposed on consumers’ preference. Such restrictions include 
risk neutrality and utility separability. Introducing risk aversion and environmen­
tal spending changes the relative advantage of one instrument over the other. A 
tradable permit system is more likely favourable in these two situations, ceteris 
paribus.
Applying the theory of equilibrium pollution, China’s environmental policies, 
especially the pollution levy system, are examined by the use of an econometrically 
estimated pollution demand and supply system. Contrary to the usual criticism, 
it is found that China’s pollution control policies have been effective because firms 
respond well to emission taxes in the demand function. However, the pollution 
supply functions are not well-behaved, suggesting that the government sets envi­
ronmental controls without reference to the preference of households. In that sense, 
the policies may not be efficient and could be improved.
As regards climate change policy, the analysis focuses on the promotion of in­
ternational cooperation. One major difference among economic instruments is their 
distributional effect. A tradable emission permits system allows wealth transfers 
across countries, while an emission tax system generally does not. Because interna­
tional economies are not integrated and income transfers are not allowed, a differ­
ential international emission tax system works better than a uniform tax system. 
The main reason for this result is that a uniform emission tax rate in fact causes 
different relative prices of pollution control, and thus, imposes different burdens on
individual countries. On the other hand, emission permit trading could improve 
welfare because income transfers occur along with the trade of permits. However, 
the allocation of permits among countries is a sensitive and debatable issue. The 
thesis discusses several allocation arrangements, i.e., allocations based on the prin­
ciple of equal per capita permits, or the principle of equal proportional reduction 
in emissions, and finds that these arrangements are usually in the bargaining set.
To examine some of these findings, a dynamic general equilibrium model, G- 
Cubed-T, is developed, using China’s newest input-output information and allowing 
feedback effects of climate change on production. Based on the understanding of 
China’s population, economic and technological growth, several scenarios of baseline 
projections about China’s future CO2 emissions are made. The projections show 
that, given the currently available information, it is not likely for China to have 
lower emissions than the current level. It is also shown that, in most scenarios, 
China will become the number one CO2 emitter in the world during the first half 
of the 21st century, although per capita emissions will still be quite low.
Several alternative options for possible CO2 emission control targets in China 
are examined. Simulations show that a better argument for China would be to 
adopt an emission control target which would bring about economic losses no larger 
than for other countries. As regards policy instruments, simulations confirm that 
a differential international carbon tax system is better than a uniform tax system 
if wealth transfers are restricted. Depending on the way CO2 emission permits are 
allocated, a tradable permit system could further improve China’s welfare. How­
ever, the associated wealth transfers are so huge that such a proposal would arouse 
resistance in permit-buying countries.
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Chapter 1
Economic Instruments of Pollution Control: 
An Introduction
This chapter gives a brief introduction to the economic instruments and related 
problems and sets the scope of the thesis. It is organised as follows. The first sec­
tion raises the questions this thesis tries to answer. Section 1.2 gives a textbook 
description of economic instruments and identifies some factors affecting their suc­
cess. Section 1.3 introduces El practices in China and their applications in the area 
of global warming policy. It is followed by the discussion of choosing economic in­
struments in certain circumstances. Finally the structure of this thesis is described 
and a brief conclusion of the findings is given.
1.1 Research Questions
Environmental policies usually consist of two components: setting a goal and choos­
ing instruments to achieve that goal. Policy instruments in turn take two forms: 
“command and control” (CAC) and economic (or market-based) instruments.1 Con-
1 Huber, Ruitenbeek, and Seroa da Motta (1998) divide environmental policy instruments into 
three categories: control-oriented, market-oriented and litigation-oriented instruments based on 
decentralisation and flexibility in individual decisionmaking. Control-oriented instruments are the 
most centralised system and has the lowest flexibility, while litigation-oriented instruments are 
at the other end. In addition to CAC and economic instruments, Industry Commission (1997) 
suggests another type of instrument: suasive measures, i.e., addressing environmental problems
1
ventionally, authorities tend to set specific standards for firms in order to achieve 
certain environmental goals. These standards are either technology-based, i.e., spec­
ifying methods or even equipment that firms should employ; or performance-based, 
i.e., setting specific control targets for firms while allowing them to decide how to 
achieve these targets (Stavins 2000a, 2000b). As these instruments allow very little 
flexibility in the means of achieving environmental goals, they are often referred to 
as “command and control” instruments.
On the contrary, economic instruments (El) provide firms and/or individuals 
higher flexibility of compliance. If properly designed and implemented, they can 
achieve the environmental objectives with least cost and provide incentives for firms 
and/or individuals to comply with environmental regulations based on their self in­
terest. Because of these advantages, recent years have witnessed growing popularity 
for economic instruments.
However, the use of Els does face some limitations in institutional and organi­
sational capacity and information availability, etc. Moreover, different types of Els 
may have different consequences under certain circumstances, i.e., uncertainty, pre­
existing distortion, and income transfers across agents. So choosing an appropriate 
instrument is an important issue of policy design. This thesis analyses the instru­
ment choices under imperfections, with special references to China’s environmental 
policy instruments and to the climate change policies. More specifically, it attempts 
to answer the following questions:
What are the consequences if the possibility of earmarking pollution charges for en­
vironmental activities is considered? Many economic instruments, e.g., emission taxes 
and auctioned emission permits, generate revenues to the government. However, the 
existing literature overlooks the use of such revenues, except the “double-dividend 
hypothesis” that suggests using such revenues to replace existing distortional taxes. 
This thesis suggests another use of such revenues: earmarking them for environ-
through education, training, social pressure and negotiation.
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mental activities. It analyses the impact of earmarking on optimal emission tax 
rates and compares this arrangement with the “double-dividend hypothesis” .
What is the appropriate policy instrument in a stochastic general equilibrium setting? 
The existing literature develops the rule of choosing instruments under uncertainty 
in a partial equilibrium setting, i.e., the so called Weitzman’s rule. This thesis 
analyses this issue in a general equilibrium setting and asks: Is Weitzman’s rule 
applicable in a general equilibrium setting? If not, what restrictions should be 
imposed to validate it?
Are China's environmental policies, especially the pollution levy system, effective 
and efficient? China’s environmental policies have been criticised as being ineffec­
tive and inefficient. This thesis presents a quantitative analysis on this issue and 
concludes that China’s pollution levy system has been effective in the sense that 
firms respond well to effective levy rates, but not efficient because the government 
sets environmental controls without reference to the preferences of households.
What are the appropriate economic instruments for global warming policy? One 
complication of choosing economic instruments emerges in the arena of interna­
tional cooperation like global warming policy because there may exist huge income 
transfers across different countries. This has not been paid due attention in the 
existing literature. This thesis examines several instruments, i.e., a tradable permit 
system, an international uniform emission tax and a differential emission tax, in 
this context.
What will be China’s future CO2 emissions? Despite the fact that there have been 
many projections about China’s future CO2 emissions, this thesis revisits the issue 
by formulating scenarios about China’s economic, demographic and technological 
development based on new data set and a new economic model of China.
What is the appropriate policy options of CO2 emission control for China? The 
existing literature has been focusing on the instruments of achieving a certain CO2 
emission control target in China. This thesis tries to find an appropriate policy 
target for China in addition to the policy instruments to achieve such a target.
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Before answering the above questions, it is useful to give a brief introduction to
economic instruments.
1.2 Economic Instruments for Pollution Control
1.2.1 A Textbook Interpretation of Economic Instruments
Economic instruments are regulations that encourage behaviour through market 
signals rather than explicit directives regarding pollution control levels or methods 
(Stavins 2000a, 2000b). The idea of economic instruments is closely related to the 
theory of externality. An economic instrument tries to internalise the externality 
into private decision procedure.
As shown in the upper panel of Figure 1.1, the benefits of emitting pollutants 
could be depicted by a downward sloping marginal benefit schedule.2 Discharging 
pollutants may incur private cost to firms, e.g. transportation costs of wastes, costs 
of building and operating pipelines, etc. In addition, pollution causes environmental 
damage. Therefore, the full cost of pollution, the marginal social cost (MSC), is the 
sum of marginal private cost (MPC) and marginal external cost (MEC).3 Without 
governmental intervention, firms would operate at a situation with over-polluting, 
Q°. Taking account of full costs, the socially optimal pollution would be Q*.
The same idea is shown in the lower panel of Figure 1.1, where the marginal 
external cost is depicted against firms’ marginal net benefit (MNB) or marginal 
ibatement cost (MAC). MNB is the difference between MB and MPC depicted 
n the upper panel. If MNB incorporates behaviour adjustments by firms as the 
pollution level changes, the schedules of MNB and MAC are identical (Perman, Ma,
2This is mainly determined by two factors: diminishing marginal product at firm level and 
lownward sloping demand curve at market level.
3MEC should be interpreted in a broader way, i.e., including both marginal environmental 
lamage cost and, marginal user cost in the case of using non-renewable resources (Pearce and 
Varford 1993; Panayotou 1994, 1995).
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Figure 1.1: Private Cost, External Cost and Social Cost
MPC*'
MNB, MAC
Figure 1.2: Economic Instruments of Pollution Control
.MAC\
and McGilvray 1996, p.204).4 Again, firms would emit pollution of Q° without
4This can be shown as follows. Suppose the benefit of polluting is B(Q) where Q is the amount 
of pollutant discharged, and the private cost of shipping the pollutant is C(Q), then the net benefit 
is B(Q) — C(Q). If the firm is allowed to discharge pollutant up to the amount of Q, it has to 
abate the pollution at the cost of AC(Q — Q) for any pollution Q above the allowed amount Q. A
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governmental intervention, while the socially optimal pollution level is Q*. A well- 
designed economic instrument would let market forces induce firms to emit the 
socially optimal level Q*.
To that end, a tax or charge at the rate of t* = MEC* could be imposed on 
emissions. Figure 1.2 illustrates this idea. Two firms, with individual marginal 
abatement costs M AC\ and M AC 2 , respectively, operate in the economy. Without 
any intervention, firm one would emit pollution up to and firm two q®. The 
socially optimal pollution is Q* which is less than the sum of emissions from the 
two firms. With the tax, firms will determine their emissions (or abatement level 
in other direction) based on the marginal condition: M A C * = t*.  At the margin, 
a firm has two options: paying tax t* = M E C * without further abatement, or 
abating emissions at the cost of MAC* to save tax. If the MAC is lower than the 
tax rate, the firm would abate pollution. On the other hand, if the MAC is higher 
than the tax rate, the firm would be willing to pay the tax for an additional unit 
of emission. Eventually, all firms will have an identical marginal abatement cost 
which is equal to the tax rate, although their pollution or abatement level may be 
different. Figure 1.2 shows that this leads to the lowest total abatement cost, while 
CAC arrangements, e.g. equal pollution cap, usually incur higher abatement costs 
(the shaded triangle).
Alternatively, permits totaled Q* could be issued and a market created to allow 
firms to trade their permits. Suppose each firm is allocated with half the optimal 
number of pollution permits in a two-firm economy as shown in Figure 1.2. Initially, 
firm 2’s marginal abatement cost is higher than firm l ’s, therefore it pays for firm 2 
to buy the additional permit from firm 1 at a cost no higher than M AC2 (^ ), and 
firm 1 is willing to sell the permit at a price no less than M A C \{^p). Eventually, 
if trade costs are negligible, the same optima q{ and q% are reached. Furthermore, 
Coase’s (1960) Theorem says that if trade is allowed and costs of trade are negligible
profit maximisation firm would operate to  meet the condition B'(Q) — C'(Q) — AC' (Q — Q) =  0, 
th a t is, M B  -  M P C  -  M AC  =  0, or M N B  = MAC.
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and in the absence of significant income effects, the optima q\ and will be achieved 
no matter how the permits are initially allocated.
The above discussion illustrates two important characteristics of Els. First, eco­
nomic instruments are efficient in the sense that they can achieve particular envi­
ronmental goals with least cost. They not only reduce compliance costs of firms, but 
also administrative burdens (Huber, Ruitenbeek, and Seröa da Motta 1998).5 Sec­
ond, Els provide powerful incentives for firms to develop and employ better and 
cheaper pollution-control technologies because to do so can increase their profits. 
The experience of economic instruments in many countries has demonstrated these 
characteristics (for example, see Panayotou 1994, 1995; Industry Commission 1997; 
James 1997; OECD and NEPA 1997; Huber, Ruitenbeek, and Seröa da Motta 1998; 
Stavins 2000a, 2000b).
1.2.2 Factors Limiting the Success of Economic Instruments
Although economic theory assures the cost-effectiveness and incentives of economic 
instruments, there are counter-arguments. The use of Els will not automatically re­
sult in least cost solutions, and there are evidences that poorly designed Els can cost 
as much as CACs (Hufschmidt et al. 1983). As regards to incentives, if environmen­
tal control costs do not represent a large proportion of total cost, there may be little 
incentive for firms to respond to price signals (James 1997). Moreover, Els have 
been criticised as resulting in little environmental gain, weaker regulatory controls, 
and legitimising pollution by providing a license to pollute, especially when the 
pollution charge is not high enough or permits are grandfathered. Although these 
criticisms may be a misconception about Els, they do represent one of the major 
factors limiting their successful implementation (Industry Commission 1997).
Even a well-designed instrument may not guarantee its success. One important
theoretically, CAC instruments could achieve cost-effectiveness by specifying desired pollution 
target for each firm. However, doing so requires very detailed information which, in general, is not 
available to the government. The costs of gathering such information would be prohibitively high.
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cause is that firms are simply not well equipped internally to make the decisions 
necessary to fully utilise Els. Since Els have only been used on a limited basis, and 
firms are not certain about their endurance, most have chosen not to reorganise their 
internal structure to fully exploit the cost savings these instruments offer (Stavins 
2000a).
Els may be information demanding and result in higher administrative costs. 
The design of Els needs to identify and value environmental damage costs, and 
sometimes, firms’ abatement costs. These tasks are usually complex and surrounded 
by uncertainty, and impossible in some cases. Some critics argue that administrative 
costs will be increased because of an additional outlay of regulation, and also direct 
regulations required to support the use of Els (James 1997).6
Economic instruments are also facing constraints due to limited institutional 
capacity to oversee them. Experience in many countries has shown that local au­
thorities and strong institutional support play an important role in the success of 
economic instruments (Huber, Ruitenbeek, and Seroa da Motta 1998). This is es­
pecially important for developing countries and transitional economies which may 
adopt Els designed in developed countries with different institutional arrangement 
(Panayotou 1995).
Some of these limitations will be explored later in the discussion of difference 
between price-based and quantity-based instruments and their selection.
1.2.3 Categories of Economic Instruments
Economic instruments can take many forms, for example, OECD (1989) identifies 
more than 100 different types of economic instruments. These instruments can be di­
vided into two broad categories: price instruments and market creation (Table 1.1),
6This argument does not contradict the previous statement that Els require less information 
and lower administrative cost than CACs. The previous statement is established in the case where 
both Els and CACs are required to achieve the social optimum. However, if comparing an El with 
an existing CAC which does not intend to achieve the social optimum, it might be the case that 
the El requires more information and incurs higher administrative cost.
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Table 1.1: Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection and Natural Resource 
Management^
Category Sub-category Instruments
Price Charge Systems Pollution charges; User charges; Betterment charges;
Instru- Impact fees; Access fees; Road tolls; Administrative
merits charges
Fiscal Instruments Pollution taxes (effluent taxes, emission taxes); In­
put taxes; Product taxes; Export taxes; Import tar­
iffs; Tax differentiation; Insurance premium taxes; 
Royalties and resource taxes; Land use taxes; Invest­
ment tax credits; Accelerated depreciation; Subsidies
Financial Financial subsidies; Soft loans; Grants; Location/ re-
Instruments location incentives; Subsidised interest rates; Hard 
currency at below equilibrium exchange rate; Revolv­
ing funds; Sectoral funds; Ecofunds/Environmental 
funds; Green funds
Bond & Deposit- Environmental performance bonds; Land reclama-
Refund Systems tion bonds; Waste delivery bonds; Environmental 
accident bonds; Deposit-refund systems; Deposit- 
refund shares
Market Tradable Permit Tradable emission permits; tradable catch quo-
Creation Systems tas; Tradable development quotas; Tradable wa­
ter shares; tradable resource shares; Tradable land 
permits; Tradable offsets/credits; Credit programs; 
Cap-and-trade programs
Property Rights Ownership rights (land titles, water rights, mining 
rights); Use rights (stewardship, licensing, conces­
sion/bidding, turfs); Development rights
Reducing Market Liability rules; Information programs (product label-
Barriers ing, reporting)
tßased on Panayotou (1995), Huber, Ruitenbeek, and Seroa da Motta (1998) and Stavins (2000a)
or roughly equivalent, price-based and quantity-based instrum ents.7
Originated from Pigou’s (1920) idea of taxing or subsidising externality-gene- 
rating activities, economic instruments in the first category directly change price 
signals. These instruments include pollution charges, levies, fees or taxes, subsidies,
7There is little consensus in the literature about categories of economic instruments. For exam­
ple, Panayotou (1994, 1995) divides the instruments into seven categories: property rights, market 
creation, fiscal instruments, charge systems, financial instruments, liability instruments, and perfor­
mance bonds and deposit refund systems; Industry Commission (1997) distinguishes five categories: 
charges and taxes, subsidies and tax: concessions, financial enforcement incentives, deposit refund 
systems, and property rights and market creation; Stavins (2000a, 2000b) identifies four categories: 
pollution charge, tradable permits, market barrier reductions and government subsidy reductions. 
The classification in the text is close to that in Huber, Ruitenbeek, and Seroa da Motta (1998).
9
tax differentiation, etc. Financial instruments, e.g. soft loans, grants, and subsidised 
interest rates, are also in this category because they provide incentives for firms to 
take on environmental-friendly activities through changing the price of financial 
goods.
A special case of pollution charges is a deposit-refund system, whereby con­
sumers pay a surcharge when purchasing potentially polluting products and receive 
a refund when returning them for recycling and disposal. A parallel instrument for 
firms is an environmental performance bond system. Another important variant 
of pollution charges is a “presumptive tax”. A firm is compelled to pay the tax 
based on a presumed level of pollution, and no specific monitoring is conducted. 
If the firm wishes to reduce its tax burden, it must conduct monitoring at its own 
expense to demonstrate that its actual pollution loads are less than the presumed 
level (Huber, Ruitenbeek, and Seröa da Motta 1998).
The most notable instrument in the market creation category is the tradable 
permit or quota system. It can be traced to Coase’s (1960) discussion of negotiated 
solutions to externalities. The example in Figure 1.2 has shown how it operates. 
Another important instrument of market creation is defining and assigning property 
rights. It is used to address the excessive resource depletion and environmental 
degradation resulting from the absence (or thinness) of markets in resource and 
environmental assets (Panayotou 1995). Tradable permit can also be viewed as a 
special type of property rights. Market creation also includes measures reducing 
market barriers, for example, liability rules that encourage firms to consider the 
potential environmental damage of their decisions; and information programs such 
as product labeling (Stavins 2000a).
1.3 Application of Economic Instruments
Economic instruments have wide application. In many cases, they are not designed 
to replace existing CAC instruments, but to complement them and enhance their
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effectiveness. The main motivation behind many economic instruments has been to 
raise revenue for environmental management rather than to achieve environmental 
quality goals, and to reduce environmental impacts, or improve the cost-effectiveness 
of existing regulations (Huber, Ruitenbeek, and Seroa da Motta 1998). Rather than 
discussing broad application of economic instruments worldwide, this section focuses 
on El practices in China and their application in the field of global warming policy.
1.3.1 Economic Instruments for Environmental Policy in China
Almost every category of Els can be found in China (Table 1.2), but the most 
notable economic instrument for environmental policy is the pollution levy sys­
tem which is administered by the State Environmental Protection Administration 
(SEPA).8 It aims to achieve two objectives: (1) provide firms with incentives to 
economically use energy and resources and reduce pollutant discharges; (2) collect 
funds for pollution treatment and disposal (Yang, Wang, and et al 1998).
China’s pollution levy system dates from the late 1970s. Clause 15 of China’s 
Environmental Protection Law (Provisional) promulgated in 1979 specifies that “in 
a case where the discharge of pollutants exceeds the limit set by the state, a pollution 
levy shall be charged according to the quantities and concentration of pollutants 
released.”9 The nationwide implementation of this system began in 1982 when the 
“Provisional Regulations for Collection of Compensation Fees for Pollutant Dis­
charge” was issued by the State Council. In the beginning, only over-standard 
discharge of wastewater, waste gas and solid wastes were subject to the levy. Af­
ter several amendments, with the most significant in 1991, the system now covers 
113 pollutants in five media, i.e., wastewater (both over-standard and total volume), 
waste gas, solid wastes, noise, and radiation. Several regions have also collected fees
8SEPA, with the ministerial authority in the central government, was restructured in 1998 from 
the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), signalling China’s serious concern about 
environmental issues.
9The formal China’s Environmental Protection Law promulgated in 1989 specifies similar re­
quirements in Clause 28.
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Table 1.2: Economic Instruments for Environmental Policy in China^
Category Sub-category Instruments Coverage
Price Charge Systems Pollution levy (“over-standard” dis- National
Instru- charge fee, effluent charge based on vol-
ments ume)
SO2 charge Regional
User charge for sewage network National
Wastewater treatment charge Regional
Ecological destruction compensation Regional
Mineral resource compensation Regional
Fiscal Instruments Resource taxes National
Tax differentiation for treatment, reuse 
and recycling of waste
National
Financial Financing pipeline for environmental National
Instruments protection
Subsidy to environmental protection 
projects
National
Bond & Deposit- Deposit for the “Three Simultaneous Regional
Refund Systems Steps”
Deposit for clean-up operations Regional
Deposit for solid wastes National
Market Tradable Permit Tradable permits Regional
Creation Systems Waste-trading market Regional
tReconstructed based on Wang and Lu (1997, Table 1, page 17).
for SO2 discharged from industrial coal burning since 1992. Approximately 650,000 
factories have been charged for their emissions, and about 5 billion RMB yuan of 
levies were collected per year in recent years (Tables 1.3-1.5). About 80 percent 
of the funds have been used to finance industrial pollution prevention and control, 
accounting for about 15 percent of total investment in these activities (NEPA 1994, 
1997).
China’s pollution levy system has its peculiar characteristics. On the collection 
side, the government sets an emission standard for the firm and the firm is subject 
to an emission levy if its emission violates the standard.10 The system uses a 
“markup” based on the percentage deviations from discharge standards for effluent
10It is not an offence to discharge pollutants exceeding the limit set by standards. SEPA regula­
tions specify variations in effluent standards by sector and fees by pollutant. With the approval of 
SEPA, local authorities may raise both standards and fees above the nationally-mandated level.
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Table 1.3: Number of Firms Charged of Pollution Levy
Year Total Metall. Chem. Light Textile Power Coal TVEt Other
1985 89246 2425 4928 13397 3913 831 1707 15945 45982
1986 108645 4557 5674 14955 4534 845 2039 24377 51064
1987 135837 3400 6013 16507 4547 880 1977 34217 68296
1988 160383 3546 6480 17375 4731 880 2034 46840 78497
1989 183256 4070 6838 17501 4872 866 2447 58197 88465
1990 188142 3890 6687 18132 4687 940 2838 58934 92034
1991 205892 3971 6882 19112 4563 1054 3116 63690 103080
1992 223655 4886 7994 19443 4853 1081 3438 72098 109862
1993 254274
1994 300437
1995 368213 6134 11143 24497 4959 1345 5024 119662 195449
1996 496324
1997 563488
1998 652863
t Township and village enterprise
Source: Yang, Wang, and et al (1998); China Environmental Yearbook, various issues.
Table 1.4: Pollution Levy from Different Media (RMB million yuan)
Year Total
Over-Standard Charges Waste
Water OtheRWater Gas Solid Noise Radiation
1984 756 504 224 15 4 1 1 7
1985 929 594 251 23 11 1 50
1986 1190 711 329 25 19 1 8 97
1987 1428 821 380 34 24 1 21 147
1988 1610 869 441 33 31 1 29 206
1989 1674 858 453 33 36 1 32 261
1990 1753 900 448 31 34 1 52 287
1991 2006 996 494 40 41 1 62 372
1992 2381 1181 510 33 87 1 83 486
1993 2681 1228 561 38 119 1 126 608
1994 3098 1319 647 33 155 1 201 742
1995 3713 1504 743 48 190 2 254 972
1996 4096 1551 818 37 214 2 288 1185
1997 4543 1642 902 50 244 2 305 1398
1998 4902 1637 1170 44 264 1 283 1503
^The so-called “four small items”, including revenue from (1) raising levy rates for firms
who failed to meet the discharge standard within three years after the collection of 
pollution levy; (2) doubling levy rates for newly established firms who failed to meet 
the standard; (3) overdue fine; and (4) fines for firms violating standards and causing 
damages.
Source: Yang, Wang, and et al (1998); China Environmental Yearbook, various issues.
concentrations. If one source discharges multiple pollutants, levies are charged only 
on the pollutant which incurs the highest levy from each source. As this pollutant
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Table 1.5: Pollution Levy from Different Sectors (RMB million yuan)
Year Total M etall. Chem. Light Textile Power Coal TVE* O ther
1985 931 172 184 175 79 38 22 35 226
1986 1190 217 231 216 101 55 25 60 281
1987 1427 233 285 277 112 64 31 72 353
1988 1610 252 326 312 119 77 35 102 387
1989 1675 256 346 309 115 79 42 117 411
1990 1752 212 370 311 116 83 42 132 425
1991 2006 308 407 345 120 96 51 169 510
1992 2379 353 446 418 129 105 55 231 642
1993 2680 890 389 330 106 89 46 252 580
1994 3098 634 412 387 112 117 466 343 627
t Township and village enterprise 
Source: Yang, Wang, and et al (1998).
is cleaned up, the levy will shift to the next pollutant in order of levies.
On the outlay side, the revenue collected is earmarked for environmental pro­
tection. Initially 80 percent of the fee was freely returned to individual contributing 
enterprises to finance pollution abatement activities. The authority moves to col­
lectively subsidise some “important” projects, and gradually turns the subsidy into 
a loan, although it is exempt of repayment in certain circumstances.
This system has received heavy critiques. For example, it is argued that the 
levy rate is too low to give firms an incentive to comply with the environmental 
regulation. Thus, from some critics’ point of view, the levy is merely a local financing 
mechanism and ineffective as a regulation instrument. Moreover, the strictness of 
enforcement is thought to vary widely, so factories in different regions may face very 
different penalties for polluting (Qu 1991; NEPA 1994; Shibli and Markandya 1995; 
Wang and Lu 1997). However, some studies show that the pollution levy system 
has played an important role in protecting China’s water environment from further 
deterioration (Dasgupta et al. 1996; Wang and Wheeler 1996). The econometric 
analysis in Chapter 4 of this thesis also confirms the effectiveness of China’s pollution 
levy system.
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1.3.2 Economic Instruments for Global Warming Policy
Before discussing economic instruments for greenhouse policy, several characteris­
tics of the global warming problem should be mentioned. The first is that “it is 
a global problem”; and the second is that “both the extent of any climate change 
and the nature of its effects are uncertain” (Fisher et al. 1996). In addition, it is a 
dynamic process and has very long time horizons. These features have important 
implications for global warming policy. Because global warming policy can be clas­
sified as national, regional and global policies, almost all the economic instruments 
mentioned in Table 1.1 can be candidates to address the issue. However, only those 
frequently discussed instruments is introduced in this subsection.
International Carbon Tax
Two types of carbon taxes have been proposed to tackle the global warming prob­
lem. First, an international agency would be established to collect taxes from nation 
states according to an international agreement. For the reason of cost-effectiveness 
in achieving CO2 emissions target, the tax rate should be equal across countries 
(Fisher et al. 1996). As the tax is collected by an international agency, national 
sovereignty and tax revenue distribution are big concerns. Therefore, the second 
type, a harmonised domestic carbon tax system is proposed, i.e., all countries could 
levy a domestic carbon tax at the same rate. This arrangement could eliminate the 
headache issue of allocating the tax revenues into participating countries under the 
first system. However, a uniform carbon tax system may have different effects on in­
dividual countries’ economic development, although it may achieve cost-effectiveness 
for a certain environmental target. That is, taking account of the indirect cost of 
the carbon tax, a uniform tax may not be an optimal choice. Chapter 5 of this 
thesis takes a closer look at this issue.
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Tradable Emission Permit
CO2 emission permit trading is a well ploughed area of global warming policy, 
for example, see Tietenberg and et al (1998) for a collection of literature on this 
issue. Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol explicitly states that parties from Annex B 
countries could “participate in emissions trading for the purpose of fulfilling their 
commitments under Article 3.” It is also proposed that non-Annex B countries 
could participate in the trading if they agree to cap their emissions to a certain 
level.
Simulations show that CO2 emission trading could effectively reduce the costs 
of abatement, especially when more countries, including developing countries, par­
ticipate in the trading (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 1994; Zhang 2001). However, there 
are at least two practical questions related to the implementation of CO2 emission 
trading.
First, emission trading would cause large cash flows between countries, thus 
heavily affecting international trade and financial markets (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 
1997). Second, because a tradable permit system could have huge distributional 
effects on countries, how to allocate the permit is a heavily debated issue and 
little consensus has been achieved, especially when the developing countries are in­
cluded.11 While scholars from developing countries argue that such permits should 
be allocated on the basis of equal per capita emissions (Gupta and Bhandari 2000), 
this is objected to by developed countries. Moreover, the Protocol does not de­
fine how to allocate permits at the sub-national level. Zhang (1999) argues that 
individual governments should be free to devise their own methods of allocating 
the permits due to concerns about international competitiveness. McKibbin and 
Wilcoxen (2000) also suggest that it should be up to individual governments to de­
termine how to allocate permits (in their proposal, such permits are termed emission
11 Presumably the allocation of permits among Annex B countries has been specified in Kyoto 
Protocol, i.e., their quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment is defined in the Annex 
B.
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endowments).
Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism
Although joint implementation (JI) is not specifically defined by the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, its Article 4.2(a) is often referred to as 
the provision of JI: “• • • developed country Parties and other Parties included in 
Annex I • • • may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties 
and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of 
the Convention • • • ”
In the Kyoto Protocol, the concept of JI was narrowed down to refer to joint 
activities carried out among Annex I countries (Article 6), while the activities involv­
ing both Annex I and non-Annex I countries were referred to as clean development 
mechanism (CDM, Article 12).
Joint implementation and clean development mechanism can be broadly defined 
as an attempt to reduce the overall cost of achieving a given level of global green­
house gas emission abatement. There are three possible ways to implement JI or 
CDM. First, countries could pool their resources in a fund, from which investment 
would then be made. Second, investment arrangements could be made directly 
between countries on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Third, investment could be 
made by private sectors to meet emission targets set by national governments (Jones 
1994). In some sense, JI and CDM can be viewed as a barter trade of CO2 reduction 
credits, with countries making investment in exchange for credits of net emission 
reduction in host countries.
Theoretically, JI and CDM could greatly save developed countries’ abatement 
cost (Barrett 1992; Burniaux et al. 1992a). Developing countries could also benefit 
from JI and CDM through increased access to more advanced pollution control 
technologies and funds. JI and CDM also help reduce carbon emission leakage 
that can result from unilateral abatement actions (Jones 1994). It seems a flexible 
instrument that avoids the distribution problems associated with tradable emissions
17
permits or taxation.
However, because of asymmetric information, participants (both investing and 
host countries) in JI or CDM projects have an incentive to misreport emission re­
ductions. As a result, hypothetical reductions may be large while actual reductions 
are most likely to be small (Wirl, Huber, and Walker 1998). In addition, although 
CDM seems a win-win-win instrument for developed and developing countries and 
the environment, developing countries are concerned about (1) lack of capacity to 
negotiate fair contracts with CDM investors from Annex I countries; (2) using up 
all low-cost abatement options while leaving them only high-cost options when they 
are required to reduce their own emissions; (3) offsetting reductions in current devel­
opment aid budgets; and (4) affects on national sovereignty as developed countries 
may use CDM to interfere in their internal affairs (Zhang 2000a). In addition, as 
CDM involves searching out partners, negotiating terms and getting approval from 
certain international agencies, it may incur high transaction costs.
In addition to the above pure forms of economic instruments, some hybrid poli­
cies have been proposed. For example, McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2000) advanced 
the so-called McKibbin-Wilcoxen Proposal to address the issue of encouraging par­
ticipation by developing countries. They suggest a coordinated but decentralised 
system of national permit trading systems with a fixed internationally negotiated 
price for permits. A permanent endowment of emission right is allocated to each 
country; beyond the endowment, the government of each country could sell an an­
nual emission permit to firms at the negotiated price, that is, the permit price is 
equivalent to a tax on additional emissions. The endowment for developing countries 
could be set far higher than the current amount they emit. Therefore developing 
country firms would not need to buy additional permits in the short or medium 
run. However, the endowment has a positive present price, because the holders of 
the endowment foresee that as long as the countries keep growing, the endowment 
will eventually become a binding constraint. This gives incentives for carbon abate­
ment in developing countries through price signals without imposing large short or
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medium term costs in these economies.
1.4 Selection of Economic Instruments
Theoretically, price-based instruments (represented by the emission tax system) 
and quantity-based instruments (represented by the tradable permit system) could 
achieve exactly the same results. As illustrated in Figure 1.2, if the government 
imposes a pollution tax at the rate of t*, firms will discharge the optimal pollution 
q\ and q and total optimal pollution Q* can be achieved. Alternatively, if the gov­
ernment issues emission permits totaled Q* and allows firms to trade their permits, 
firms will end with pollution levels of q\ and q%, and the permit price p* will be the 
same as the tax rate t*. However, in reality, these two types of instruments may 
have different requirements and result in different consequences. As a result, choos­
ing appropriate instruments is an important issue in environmental policymaking. 
Moreover, the first-best outcome, i.e. welfare maximisation, is usually not attain­
able because of uncertainty, pre-existing distortions and etc. Some such factors are 
discussed as follows.
1.4.1 Information Requirement and Uncertainty
The first difference between price- and quantity-based instruments is their require­
ment for information. Environmental policies are often specified by a set of quanti­
tative requirements, e.g. reduction in emissions. To design a quantity-based instru­
ment, a government need only transform the environmental goal into operational 
quantitative rules,12 i.e. total permits and initial allocation of permits, and let the 
market do the rest. On the other hand, designing a price-based instrument requires 
information on firms’ behaviour in order to establish the relationship between tax
12Experiences show that absolute baselines, rather than relative ones, should be used as the point 
of departure for tradable permit systems to avoid “paper trades” (Stavins 2000a).
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or charge and the required quantity target, which is often costly.13
Although designing quantity-based instruments seems to require less informa­
tion, in many cases there are high uncertainties regarding the appropriate quantity 
target. In the case of global warming, opinions about the future trend and impact 
of CO2 emissions and climate change have been very diversified.14 Because of these 
uncertanties, the CO2 emission control target is a highly debatable issue.
Uncertainties about the benefits and costs of reducing CO2 emissions bring about 
different outcomes under these two types of instruments. A tradable permit system 
could maintain the benefit within a certain range by controlling the total amount of 
permits while leaving the cost of achieving the target very uncertain. On the other 
hand, an emission tax may give a clear signal of abatement costs to firms, but leave 
the resultant emissions uncertain. Weitzman (1974) and Fishelson (1976) find that 
the relative advantage of instruments depends on the curvature of marginal cost 
and marginal benefit of reducing emissions. If the marginal benefit curve is steeper 
than the marginal cost curve, a quantity-based instrument is preferred because de­
viation from the desired quantity could result in huge damage; by contrast a steeper 
marginal cost curve favours a price-based instrument because fixing quantity could 
cause very uncertain abatement costs. This result is termed Weitzman’s Rule. If 
only the benefits of abatement are subject to uncertainty, both instruments would
13Another closely related factor is transaction costs, or administrative costs, among which the 
cost of obtaining information is one item. Obviously the two types of instruments have different 
transaction costs and their incidence on governments and firms. It seems that governments bear 
more administrative costs under an emission tax system, while firms bear more costs from a trad­
able emission permit system. Stavins (1995) and Conrad and Kohn (1996) find that transaction 
costs tend to lower the trading volume. Contrary to Coase’s Theorem, Stavins (1995) finds that 
the equilibrium will be affected by the initial allocation of permits because of transaction costs. 
Concerning the impact of transaction costs and market power on the efficiency of permit market, 
Bertram (1992) argues that a tradable permit regime to combat atmospheric pollution is likely to 
work better at global than at national level, whereas carbon taxes are likely to succeed at national 
level. Schmutzler and Goulder (1997) show that the first-best can be achieved with a pure emissions 
tax only if perfect monitoring can be conducted. However, given the fact that perfect monitoring 
is very costly, a pure emission tax is not optimal if monitoring cost is an increasing function of the 
output level.
14The diversified CO2 emission projections and impact estimations can be found in Chapter 7 of 
this thesis.
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be identical. However, if uncertainties to marginal benefit and cost are related, 
Stavins (1996) finds that uncertainty of benefits also matters. Specifically, a pos­
itive (negative) correlation tends to favour the quantity (price) instruments and, 
theoretically, these effects can overwhelm the recommendation based on relative- 
slopes. However, these findings are based on partial equilibrium settings, thus they 
need to be examined in a general equilibrium framework, which will be the task of 
Chapter 3.
1.4.2 Pre-existing Distortions and Use of Pollution Charges
Difference also arises from the revenues generated from both types of instruments 
and their uses. From the aspect of revenue-generation, only a permit trading sys­
tem with initial permits auctioned could be equivalent to a tax system. Because 
revenues from emission taxes can be used to replace existing distorting taxes, they 
can obtain “double dividend”, i.e., less distortion and less environmental damages 
(Pearce 1991). By contrast, a permit trading system, except for auctioned permit 
trading, usually does not have revenue to generate such effects. This issue will be 
explored in Chapter 2 more broadly, i.e. considering the possibility of earmarking 
pollution charges.
Moreover, tax and permit trading systems have different distributional effects. 
Different allocation of initial permits may bring about different cost burdens on 
firms. In the case of an emission tax, the revenues can be used in different ways 
which leads to different consequences for various players in an economy. This will 
be more obvious in the case of international cooperation like global warming policy 
where income flows across country borders, which will be discussed for more details 
in Chapter 5.
1.4.3 International Cooperation
In addition to the distributional effects mentioned above, national sovereignty should 
be taken into account when choosing instruments of international cooperation in the
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field of environmental protection. From this aspect, a more decentralised instru­
ment such as the harmonised domestic tax or even differential domestic tax and the 
decentralised permit trading scheme proposed by McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2000) 
might be superior to those centralised instruments such as international tradable 
permits or the first type of international emission tax;, as will be seen in Chapters 5 
and 8. It should be borne in mind that “Policy instruments that appear impeccable 
from the vantage point of research institutions, but consistently prove infeasible 
in real-world political institutions, can hardly be considered ‘optimal’ ” (Stavins 
2000a).
1.5 The Structure of the Thesis
This study aims at refining the theory of environmental policy choice and develop­
ing feasible and efficient instruments to control carbon dioxide emissions in China, 
taking account of some imperfections, especially the uncertain world environment. 
It consists of two parts: a general analysis of economic instruments, and the appli­
cation in CO2 emission control.
The first part presents the discussion of pollution control policies in general 
equilibrium settings. The focus of this part is on the comparison of pollution taxes 
and tradable permits in certain kind of circumstances with imperfections. It consists 
of three chapters—Chapters 2 to 4.
Chapter 2 systematically discusses the consequences of different uses of pollution 
charges. In addition to examining the “double-dividend” hypothesis, the possibil­
ity of earmarking pollution charges (and permit sales revenues) for environmental 
projects and its implication on the optimal tax rate are also considered. Conditions 
of justifying different uses of pollution charges are developed.
Chapter 3 considers environmental policy choices under uncertainty in a gen­
eral equilibrium framework. Weitzman’s rule is examined and re-established under 
certain conditions, namely, risk neutrality and utility separability. Further compli-
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cations, i.e. risk aversion and earmarking, are also considered.
Chapter 4 reviews China’s environmental policy, especially the pollution levy 
system. Two questions are asked: Are China’s environmental policies effective in 
the sense of giving incentives for firms to reduce their emissions? Are they efficient in 
the sense that they are formulated according to welfare maximisation principles? To 
answer these questions, two methods are employed. First, the changes in pollutant 
discharges are decomposed to find the possible causes of such changes. Second, using 
a panel data model, a system of demand and supply functions of pollution rights 
based on the theory of equilibrium pollution is estimated to capture the behaviour 
of firms and governments.
The second part of the thesis brings the discussion into the area of global warm­
ing policies. It consists of four chapters—Chapters 5 to 8.
Chapter 5 discusses a number of schemes of global warming policies. Tradable 
permits, harmonised domestic tax and differential tax are discussed in a theoretical 
general equilibrium model, and simulated with a simplified numerical model.
Chapter 6 develops a dynamic general equilibrium model, G-Cubed-T, for the 
purpose of analysing proper policy choices of CO2 emissions control in China, and 
describes its structure and parameter estimation and calibration. The model is 
composed of three regions: China, the United States and rest of the World. It 
is based on a reduced version of the G-Cubed model of (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 
1999). For this thesis, a new database for China is used, and more importantly, a 
feedback from climate change to real economic activity is included in the model.
Using the model, Chapter 7 develops several scenarios about China’s future 
CO2 emissions based on different assumptions about China’s future economic, de­
mographic and technological paths.
Chapter 8 investigates two issues. First, what is the appropriate target of CO2 
emission control for China? Second, How to achieve this target? Different policy 
alternatives for China are simulated using the G-Cubed-T model.
The final chapter concludes the findings in this study and provides suggestions
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for future work.
To conclude this introduction, a summary of the main results of this thesis is 
provided as follows. This thesis argues that the use of pollution charges is an integral 
part of environmental policy-making. Earmarking such revenues for environmental 
activities could be a better choice if marginal utility of the environment is high and 
the amount of revenues small. It is found that the conventional interpretation of 
Pigouvian tax is not correct if the possibility of earmarking is taken into account. An 
optimal tax rate is not necessarily equal to the marginal damage cost of pollution. It 
is also found that Weitzman’s rule is not directly applicable in a general equilibrium 
setting unless under strong assumptions, i.e. risk neutrality and utility separability. 
Contrary to the usual criticism, the empirical result in this thesis shows that China’s 
environmental policy has been effective.
In the arena of global warming policy, a differentiated emission tax is a better 
choice than a uniform tax to achieve the second best outcome, and an emission 
trading system could improve the welfare further. Simulations of the G-Cubed-T 
model confirm this argument. Model projections show that China will become the 
world’s largest CO2 emitter in the next twenty to fifty years, although the per capita 
level is still quite low. Moreover, given the current information, it is not likely for 
China to emit less CO2 than the current level in a fairly long period of time, e.g. 
fifty years. In terms of emission control target, one based on the per capita emissions 
standard seems the most favourable target for China, while a target based on the 
equal-burden principle is the minimum that China should accept if it is to join an 
international agreement for targeting CO2 emissions.
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Chapter 2
Earmarking of Pollution Charges and the 
Sub-Optimality of the Pigouvian Tax
2.1 Introduction
One of the textbook approaches to internalise the negative externality of economic 
activities is to impose the so-called Pigouvian tax on such activities. As illustrated 
in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, the standard Pigouvian solution calls for “a tax (subsidy) per 
unit on the externality-generating activity equal to its marginal external damage 
(benefit)” (Baumöl and Oates 1988, p. 55). Under this tax scheme, the social 
cost is embodied in the private cost so that the social optimum can be achieved 
in a competitive market with private ownership. However, this standard version of 
Pigouvian tax overlooks the question of how to use the tax revenue. It treats the tax 
as if the revenue vaporises after it is collected. In his classical work The Economics 
of Welfare, Pigou (1920) presented at least two different revenue schemes. On the 
one hand, he seems to assume externality taxes are fiscal taxes equivalent to the 
damage imposed; on the other hand, he indicates that they work as “extraordinary 
restraints” and are to be earmarked for a special purpose. In his later work (Pigou 
1928, p. 99), he clarifies that the taxation of negative externalities raises revenues 
to be spent on the provision of positive externalities:
When maladjustments have come about • • • it is always possible, on the as­
sumption that no administrative costs are involved, to correct them by imposing 
appropriate rates of tax on resources employed in uses that tend to be pushed
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too far and employing the proceeds to provide bounties, at appropriate rates, 
on use of the opposite class.
Strangely many environmental economists neglect Pigou’s point of view, al­
though they often label a pollution charge in his name. Perhaps Mikael Skou An­
dersen is the only exception. He writes (1994, p. 37):
It is surprising that modern externality theory hardly deals with the question 
of what should happen to the revenue from externality taxes, and that Pigou’s 
tax-bounty scheme has largely been neglected. Externality taxation is instead 
treated in terms of a partial equilibrium analysis, where its implications for 
marginal costs are analysed extensively, but without considering whether or not 
it makes a difference if the revenue is earmarked or not. In fact the possibility 
of earmarking has been subject to much criticism.
In contrast to earmarking the pollution charges in environment, some economists 
propose the use of such revenues in reducing pre-existing distortions. This idea is 
called “double-dividend hypothesis” , which suggests tha t increasing taxes on pol­
luting activities can provide two kinds of benefit. The first is an improvement in the 
environment, and the second an improvement in economic efficiency from the use of 
these revenues to reduce other taxes, such as income taxes tha t distort labour supply 
and savings (Pearce 1991).1 Another related topic is the Solow-Hartwick rule in the 
field of resource economics that discusses the use of resource rents (Hartwick 1977, 
1978; Solow 1974a, 1974b). If exhaustible resources are being extracted efficiently
Mhis hypothesis has attracted heavy criticism. Fullerton and Metcalf (1997) argue that if the 
tax only replaces current command and control regulations (i.e., is environmentally neutral), there 
is no first dividend. Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw (1996) point out that the second dividend is not 
generally guaranteed, because the revenue-recycling effect may well be eroded by the tax-interaction 
effect. However, their numerical result does show that, if the proceeds of an environmental tax 
are used to reduce pre-existing taxes, the gain from the revenue-recycling effect is larger than the 
loss from the tax-interaction effect, implying a net gain in addition to environmental improvement. 
Similar results can be found in studies by Goulder et al. (1999), Parry, William III, and Goulder 
(1996) and Parry and Williams III (1999). But Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) report that the 
substitution of environmentally motivated taxes for traditional income taxes involves a gross cost: 
the double dividend does not materialise. However, both proponents and critics of this hypothesis 
neglect the possibility of earmarking.
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and all rents from resources go to capital accumulation, it is possible for the econ­
omy to have positive and constant consumption over time. Although this rule may 
lead to intergenerational equity, itself and the constant utility criterion are too re­
strictive to be efficient in distributing intertemporal resources (and thereby welfare) 
(Asako 1980). Asako (1980) shows that introduction of pollution-abatement invest­
ment may cure the problem of non-feasible solutions in some cases. However, the 
pollution charges are not explicitly discussed in these works.
According to the above discussion, at least three taxation programs are at hand. 
Firstly, under a pure pollution tax scheme, the revenue from taxing polluting activ­
ities is used as a lump-sum transfer to the public, with no spending on the envi­
ronment. This is suggested by the conventional Pigouvian tax scheme. Secondly, 
by contrast, under a (fully) earmarked pollution levy scheme, the whole of the rev­
enue is used for environmental purposes. Lastly, a general tax-income scheme, or 
following Pigou, a tax-bounty scheme, does not impose these prior restrictions on 
spending. This chapter attempts to examine these arrangements in both partial and 
general equilibrium settings, and to find the optimal pollution tax scheme. The rest 
of the chapter is organised as follows: the next two sections analyse these schemes 
in static partial and general equilibrium settings; the discussion then moves into 
a dynamic general equilibrium analysis of the tax schemes; and the final section 
summarises the findings.
2.2 Static Partial Equilibrium Analysis
2.2.1 Pollution tax/levy imposed on product
It is easier to begin the analysis by assuming that the pollution tax or levy has the 
form of product tax or levy. Suppose a firm’s cost function is C = C(q), where q is 
the quantity of its product, with the property that C  > 0 and C" > 0. The damage 
caused by pollution from the production process is D = D(q) with the property that 
D(0) — 0, D' > 0 and D" > 0. The price of the product is p, and the government
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imposes a product tax on the firm at the rate of t to internalise the external cost. 
To maximise its profit, 7r = (p — t)q — C(q), the firm should meet the following first 
order condition:
V - t  = C'{q).(2.1)
Therefore the firm’s response function to a given tax rate t can be written as 
q = q(t). A reasonable property of this response function is q' < 0. The social 
planner’s problem is to maximise the net social benefit, pq(t) — C (q(t)) — D (q(t)), 
by choosing an appropriate tax rate. And the first order condition gives:
p - D ' ( q )  = C'(q). (2.2)
By comparing Equations 2.1 and 2.2, it can be derived that the optimal tax is
f  =  D'(q’),
which is the origin of the Pigouvian tax: the tax rate should be equal to the marginal 
damage cost. In the above social planner’s problem, the collected tax revenue is 
treated as a lump-sum transfer from the firm to the general public, and the net 
social benefit is not changed by this use of the revenue. However, if the revenue can 
be used on pollution control activities, the optimal tax rate may be different.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the pollution eliminating function is E = E(S),  
where S  is the spending on pollution control, and E  is the reduction in damage in 
monetary terms.2 It is assumed that E(S)  has the following properties:
E ' > 0, E" < 0, E{0) =  0, E'(0) > 1. (2.3)
2Usually the pollution eliminating activity is affected by the pollution level. As the model does 
not specify the pollution level, D may be used as a proxy, that is, the E  function could be written 
as E  = E(S, D ). If so, the optimal tax rate becomes r* =  (1 — E d )D' / ( E s + (Es  — l) /e ) , where 
E d and Es  are, respectively, the partial derivative of E  with respect to D  and S. It is clear that 
the qualitative result from the simplified model does not change, although the marginal cost of 
pollution is adjusted to include the effect on pollution elimination.
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Under this assumption, a pure pollution tax scheme is not optimal because the 
marginal net benefit of environmental spending is positive at least over some range 
of spending. Therefore the social planner has to choose an appropriate level of 
environmental investment in addition to the tax rate. Suppose the levy rate is r, 
the firm’s response function to a certain levy rate can be derived as in the pure tax 
case, q = q{r). Hence the social planner’s problem becomes:
max pq{r) -  C{q{r)) -  D(q(r)) +  E(S) -  S
T, o
s.t. S < rq{r)
The Lagrangian for this problem can be written as:3 4
£  = pq(r) -  C(q(r)) -  D(q(r)) +  E(S) -  S  +  A (rg(r) -  S ) .
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are therefore:
pq'(r) -  C\q)q'{T) -  D\q)q'{r) +  A(q(r) +  rq'{r)) = 0; (2.4)
E \ S )  -  1 -  A =  0; (2.5)
A(rg(r) — S) =  0, A > 0 if S  =  rq{r). (2-6)
There are two possible solutions: the budget constraint is binding or sluggish. If the 
constraint is binding, a fully earmarked levy scheme is optimal, S = rq(r) and A > 0 
according to (2.6),4 which, in turn, implies E' > 1 from (2.5). Using p — C'(q) = r, 
(2.4) becomes:
rq \ r )  -  D\q)q  (r) + (E' -  1 )(q(r) +  rq' (t )) = 0.
3From this Lagrangian, it is clear that a pure pollution tax cannot be a better solution because 
it adds one more constraint to the problem, i.e. S =  0.
4 Accurately speaking, S =  rq{r) and A =  0 are not conditions of binding constraint because the 
interior solution happens to be at the corner. However, as all revenues are used for environment, 
the discussion is included in the fully earmarked scheme.
29
The optimal tax rate can be written as
,  dD , d(rq(T)) dD d(E -  S) dS 
dq dq dq dS dq
The above expression reflects two effects of the changes in production: the impact on 
the pollution damages and the impact on tax revenues. The first effect is captured 
by marginal damage cost, dD/dq , and the second effect is relevant because the 
environmental spending is financed by a pollution tax which is affected by the 
quantity of product. Note that E' is the marginal direct benefit of environmental 
investment, and E' — 1 is the marginal net benefit; while d{rq)/dq = dS/dq is the 
marginal tax revenue of production. Therefore, (E' — 1 )d(rq)/dq or (E' — 1 )dS/dq is 
the marginal net benefit of environmental spending caused by changes in production. 
Thus the above formula just repeats the usual doctrine: the optimal tax rate is equal 
to the marginal (external) cost.
To clearly see the difference between this formula and Pigouvian tax, the optimal 
tax rate can be rewritten as:
E' +  (E> -  l ) /e  ’
where £ =  q'{r)T/q(r) is the output elasticity of the pollution levy rate. It can 
be seen that the usual Pigouvian tax rate is not likely to be justified even in this 
static partial equilibrium setting. If E 1 > 1, i.e. excluding the case discussed in 
footnote (4), the optimal tax/levy rate is not equal to the marginal damage cost, 
unless e = — 1. If e > —1, i.e. the output is inelastic to the tax/levy rate, the social 
planner can get more revenue by raising the tax rate, therefore the optimal tax rate 
is above the marginal damage cost. By contrast, if the output is elastic, the optimal 
tax rate will be below the marginal damage cost.5
5However, the tax rate can not be zero or negative as E' + (E 1 — l)/e  > 0 when e < — 1. 
Intuitively, if there was no revenue used for environmental investment, we would be back to the 
usual problem where the solution is the tax rate equals the marginal damage cost.
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These discussions can be summarised in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. If condition E' (0) > 1, a pure Pigouvian pollution taxis not optimal. 
In addition, if E '(S) > 1, when S = rq, a fully earmarked pollution levy scheme is 
optimal. In this case, if E '(S) > 1, the optimal tax/levy rate is larger than, equal 
to or less than the marginal damage cost if the output is inelastic, unit-elastic or 
elastic to tax/levy.
Proof. See above discussion. ■
When the budget constraint is sluggish, A =  0 according to (2.6). And using 
p — C'(q) = r, conditions (2.4) and (2.5) become:
t * = D \q) and E'(S) = 1.
Because the budget constraint is now not binding, the decision in environmental 
investment has no effect on the production side. Therefore the optimal tax rate 
has the usual form. In this case, only a part of the tax/levy revenue is used for 
environmental purposes. Therefore neither a pure tax scheme nor a fully earmarked 
levy scheme is optimal. However, if the net benefit of spending all levy revenue 
is positive, i.e., E{rq) > rq, an earmarked levy system is better than a pure tax 
system. In combination with Theorem 2.1, the following result can be derived:
Result 2.2. I f E(S)  > Sjs=T(7 holds and the tax can be treated as a pure transfer, 
an earmarked pollution levy is always better than a pure pollution tax.
The above result may seem trivial, however, it is very important to policy mak­
ers. In the real world, there may not be sufficient information to decide the optimal 
tax/levy rate and optimal amount of revenue being used for environmental pur­
poses. The theorems suggest they could be determined by analysing individual 
pollution control projects. This was a popular practice in European countries dur­
ing the 1960’s and 1970’s: “• • - the authorities have employed schedules of fees that 
generate revenues sufficient to cover the costs of public pollution-abatement pro-
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grams” , and criticised as “a most unsatisfactory method for the determination of 
fee schedules, for it is not based on any goal for the changes in behaviour that 
the fees are presumably designed to induce” (Baumöl, Oates, and Blackman 1979, 
p.375). However, according to the discussion here, it is not totally groundless.
In China, only part of the pollution charges (e.g. about 80 percent) goes to 
specific pollution control project, and the remainder goes to local environmental 
protection authorities for subsidizing some environmental protection personnel and 
purchasing related equipment. This practice is still preferable to a pure pollution 
tax system, which can be seen by rewriting the objective function:
W ( t ) = pq{r) — C(q(r)) — aTq(r) +  aE(ra(r))  — D(q(r))
= PQ(t ) -  C{q{r)) -  D(q(r)) +  a{E(ra{r)) -  rq(r))
= V( t ) + ol(E{tcl{t )) -  rq(r )),
where 0 < a  < 1. As long as E{tcl{t )) — rq{r) > 0, it always gives W(r) > V(r). 
2.2.2 Pollution tax/levy imposed on emissions
This subsection tries to emphasise two points. First, the above derived propositions 
are independent of the forms of emission tax/levy. This is obvious because there 
is no other distortions in the production. A levy or tax on product can be trans­
formed into a levy or tax on emissions. Second, from the discussion of a levy/tax 
on emissions, it becomes clearer that, if earmarking of tax/levy revenue for environ­
mental purpose is considered, the pollution damages need not to be fully internalised 
into the producers’ decision making process under certain circumstances. A formal 
discussion is given below.
For given pollution tax rate t , the firm chooses an output level to maximise 
profit, pq — C(q) — tD(q). The first order condition is p — C'(q*) — tD'(q*) = 0; 
and the firm’s response function to that tax is thus q = q(t). Under the pure tax 
scheme, the social planner chooses a tax rate to maximise pq{t) — C(q(t)) — D(q(t)).
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The corresponding first order condition is (p — C'(q) — D'(q))q'(t) =  0.
Comparing these two first order conditions, and assuming q'(t) ^  0, gives t* = 1, 
which is equivalent to the Pigouvian tax: the tax rate is set at a level so that the 
damage caused by pollution is fully embodied in the firm’s decision-making process. 
However, following the same reasoning, as long as condition (2.3) holds, this scheme 
cannot be optimal. The social planner should adopt the general tax-income scheme 
to maximise the net benefit, so that the problem can be written as:
max pq{r) -  C(q{r)) -  D(q(r)) +  E(S) -  S
r, o
s.t. S  < rD(q(r)) .
As before, the condition for a binding constraint is E' (S ) >  1 when S  is equal 
to all tax revenue. In this case, a fully earmarked levy scheme is optimal. Denote 
the pollution elasticity of tax/levy as
dD{q{r)) r  D'q'r
71 = Jr D =
and the optimal levy rate can be written as
E’ + ( E ' -  1 ) / J
If E'  > 1, i.e. strictly binding constraint, the optimal tax rate is larger than, 
equal to, or less than, one when the pollution is inelastic, unit-elastic, or elastic. 
This result has a strong implication: if the tax/levy revenue is required to be 
fully earmarked for an environmental purpose, an optimal tax/levy program does 
not necessarily suggest the pollution damage should be fully internalised into the 
producer’s decision making process.
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2.3 Static General Equilibrium Analysis
2.3.1 The model 
Firm
There is one representative firm in the production side. The firm employs labour 
(L), and environmental capacity whose use may produce harmful pollutants that 
have negative effects on the household’s utility. The unit is carefully chosen such 
that the environmental factor used in the firm can be represented by the pollutant 
emissions (D). For simplicity, as the model is static at this stage, capital is not 
considered and will be included later in a dynamic model. However, it can be 
shown that including capital and other input factors will not affect the analytical 
result. Thus the production function can be written as Y  = f ( L , D ),6 which has 
the usual properties, i.e. ,7
h  >  fLL <  0) Id > 0, foD <  0, Jld  =  I dl  >  0.
Supposing a pollution tax or levy is imposed at the rate of t, and normalising 
the output price, the firm’s profit maximisation problem is:
max f (L, D)  — wL — t D ,
where w is the real wage rate. The first order conditions for the firm’s profit 
maximisation problem are:
fL(L,D) =  w, f D(L, D) =  t. (2.7)
6The usual approach to model a firm’s pollution and abatement activity assumes that pollution 
is a useless by product of the production process, and under certain environmental policies, the 
firm is forced to abate the pollution to some extent at its cost. This approach also captures these 
properties, although the firm’s abatement activity is not explicitly modeled.
7Using subscript to denote the partial derivative, for example, / l =  d f ( L , D ) / d L  and / ll =  
d f L( L , D) / dL ,  and so on.
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Household
A representative household tries to maximise its utility subject to the budget con­
straint. The utility comes from the consumption good (C), leisure (L), and amenity 
of the environment (E ). Leisure is defined as the difference between total time en­
dowment (L) and supply of labour (L). Therefore the utility function can be written 
as:
U ( C , L - L , E ) .  (2.8)
It is assumed that the utility function has the usual properties, that is,
Uc > 0, Ucc  < 0 ,  U i>  0, U n  < 0, Ue  >  0, Ue e  < 0.
It is assumed, that the household owns labour and the firm, therefore its income 
comes from labour income (wL) and profit of the firm (7r(ie,t)). It also receives 
transfers from government (G). Thus the household’s utility maximisation problem 
is to choose C and L to maximise (2.8) subject to
C < n(w, t) + wL +  G. (2-9)
And the first order conditions are:
Uc — A, U£ Xw, (2.10)
where A is the Lagrangian multiplier of constraint (2.9).
Government
The government tries to maximise social welfare which could be represented by the 
household’s utility function (2.8) through various government instruments. One of 
them is the exertion of state ownership over the environment, that is, it decides 
the supply of environment. The government has two options to do this: setting
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the amount of environmental supply and letting the market decide the price of the 
environmental good; or setting the price (i.e. environmental tax) and letting the 
market determine the quantity. They are equivalent in this model with complete 
information. The case where uncertainty exists will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The government also decides how to allocate the environmental charge revenue on 
the environment and whether to transfer to the household.
Similar to leisure, environmental quality is defined as the difference between 
environmental endowment (E ) and supply of environmental absorption capacity 
of pollution (D). Investment on environment can also increase the environmental 
amount. Therefore,
E = E - D  + e{S), (2.11)
where S  is the spending on environmental projects, and e(5) the pollution abate­
ment or environment improvement function. It is assumed that e(0) =  0, e! > 0, 
e" < 0.
In line with the above mentioned pollution tax schemes, the government’s budget 
constraint has three forms:
(1) As the pure tax scheme suggests, all revenue is transferred to the household. 
In this case, the budget constraint is: G = tD and S = 0.
(2) All revenue from supplying environmental capacity is earmarked for the 
environment, thus the budget constraint becomes: S = tD and G — 0.
(3) Following the general tax-income scheme, there are no specific prior re­
strictions on spending on consumption goods and the environment. The budget 
constraint is therefore: S > 0 and S  +  G < tD.8
It is clear that both the pure tax scheme and the fully earmarked levy scheme are 
actually special cases of this general arrangement. The pure tax scheme is reached 
by imposing one more constraint, namely, 5 = 0; similarly, under the earmarked 
levy scheme, another constraint is imposed: 5  =  tD. According to the optimisation
8Note that this constraint could end up with S > tD, therefore the transfer G could be negative. 
This case will be discussed in detail later.
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theory, if more constraints are imposed on a maximisation problem, that is, the 
feasible set for choice variables becomes smaller, then the optima of the objective 
function can not be increased. Therefore this gives the following result.9
Result 2.3. The optima of a pure pollution scheme and a fully earmarked levy 
scheme are no better than the optimum of the general pollution tax/income scheme.
2.3.2 The optimal pollution tax/bounty scheme 
Outlay of pollution tax/levy
In order to compare these three schemes, the government’s problem can be formally 
written as:
max U(C, L - L , E - D  + e(S))
Z?,S,G
s.t. S  T  G ^  tD
C — 7T T  voL T  G 
S >  0, G > 0
Government transfer (G) is set as a choice variable because the government antic­
ipates that G affects the household’s income, thus affecting its utility. The second 
constraint is added in line with this fact. The Lagrangian is:
£  = U { C , L - L , E - D  + e(S)) + \ i { t D - S - G )
+A2(tt +  wL +  G -  C) + X3S  +  A4G
The corresponding first order conditions are:
9It could be made clearer if a centralised model is constructed. Under the general tax-income 
scheme, a social planner chooses C , L , D and S  to maximise U(C,L — L , E  — D + e(S)) subject 
to C -f S < f (L,D) .  Under the pure tax scheme, one more constraint is imposed: 5 = 0, which 
is replaced by 5 = tD under the fully earmarked scheme. Appendix 2.A discusses the equivalence 
and difference between centralised and decentralised models.
37
UE = \ 1t, UEe'(S) = \ 1 - \ 3, A! =  A2 +  A4, A35 =  0, A4G = 0 (2.12)
Note that both A in (2.10) and A2 here are the marginal utility of increasing the 
budget available to the household, and therefore should be equal.
A general tax-income scheme sets no limitation on S, that is the constraint 
G > 0 could be dropped from the above problem, which is equivalent to A4 =  0. 
If an interior solution exists under a general scheme, A3 =  0. Thus the above 
conditions become:
UE =  Ait, UEe \S )  = Ai, Ai =  A2 =  A (2.13)
If there exists a corner solution in the general tax-income scheme, that is, 5 =  0, 
the pure tax scheme is justified. In this case, A3 > 0 and A4 =  0 as G = tD  > 0, 
the first order conditions thus become:
UE = \ l t, UEe '(S )<  Ai, Ai =  A2 =  A (2.14)
Theorem 2.4. A pure pollution tax scheme is optimal if all of the following con­
ditions are satisfied:
(1) UEe\0) < UC =  j f i LLD y  and
W ) - M L ’D) = t -
Proof. Using conditions (2.7), (2.10) and (2.14). ■
The above conditions make sense and are intuitive. Because spending on the 
environment will reduce the spending on consumption, the first part of condition 
(1) states that it is not optimal to invest in environmental projects if the marginal 
utility of environmental quality derived from environmental spending (UEe'(S))  is
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less than the marginal utility of consumption.
Condition (1) also compares the marginal utility of environmental investment 
and the marginal utility of leisure. As spending on the environment increases, the 
household may want to supply more labour to increase its whole income to support a 
certain amount of consumption, and thus enjoy less leisure. / l (L, D) is the marginal 
product of labour, 1 / / l(L, D ) is therefore the amount of labour needed to produce 
an extra (infinitesimal) unit of product or income. Thus this condition says it does 
not pay for society to invest in the environment if the resulting marginal utility is 
less than the marginal utility of leisure forgone to recover the extra unit of income 
(f7L/ f U L , D ) ).
Condition (2) deals with the efficiency of environmental investment. e'(S) is the 
marginal environmental output of spending on environmental projects, so 1 /e'(S) is 
the marginal cost of environmental goods, while f o (L , D)  is the marginal product 
or income of the environmental factor. Certainly it is not optimal to invest in the 
environment if the former is greater than the latter.
It is known that e'(0) is a large number because e'(S) > 0 and e"(S) < 0, 
therefore the marginal utility of the environment (Ue ) should be sufficiently low 
so that condition (1) holds. According to the property of the utility function, a 
very low Ue in turn implies that E should be very large, that is, environmental 
quality should be very good or environmental resources should be very abundant. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case at present. The environmental problem has 
become a global issue and caused great concern, therefore the conditions are not 
likely to be satisfied in the real world.10 As a result, a pure pollution tax system 
may not be optimal.
There is one problem with the general tax-income scheme. Theoretically, opti-
10Curious readers may find that condition (2) is likely to be satisfied in the real world, e.g. in some 
badly polluted regions. In those regions because a huge amount of environmental resources, i.e. 
the pollution absorption capacity, are used in production, the marginal product of environmental 
factor is very low, while the marginal cost of cleansing is very high due to heavy pollution. However, 
condition (2) alone can not justify the pure pollution tax scheme, which requires that all conditions 
are satisfied.
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mal spending on the environment could be larger than the tax revenue from pollu­
tion. Because government has no other taxation revenue, this leads to G < 0, that 
is, there is a net lump sum transfer from the household to government. In a model 
as simple as the one presented here, it seems that transfers from the household to 
government do not cause much trouble. However, in the real world, government 
should find a cost-free way to raise revenue beyond the pollution taxation revenue. 
If it fails to do so, it may be better to set a budget constraint for government, that 
is, S < tD. Clearly this will be a second-best option.
If the fully earmarked scheme is considered, S = tD , which implies A3 =  0. 
From S + G = tD , this is equivalent to G — 0, which implies A4 > 0. Therefore the 
condition 2.12 becomes
Ue  — Ait, Ue ^{S)  =  Ai, Ai > A2 =  A. (2.15)
The conditions justifying a fully earmarked pollution levy scheme are sum­
marised in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.5. All pollution tax/levy revenue should be used in environmental 
projects if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) UEe'(tD ) > U c  = JDfiITy
Uf(2) —  > f D(L , D) =  t; and 
Uc
/ C)  D )  _  f _
UL ~ f L( L, D) w ‘
Proof.  Using conditions (2.7), (2.10) and (2.15). ■
Condition (1), which is opposite to condition (1) in Theorem 2.4, shows that 
it pays for the society to increase investment in the environment if the marginal 
utility of the environment resulting from environmental investment is larger than 
the marginal utility of consumption, or the marginal utility of leisure forgone to 
recover expenditure on the environment. Conditions (2) and (3) show that the
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Table 2.1: Application of Conditions for Earmarking
Environmental
Resources
Development
Degree
Pollution Tax/ 
Levy Revenue
Fully
Earmarking?
Sample
Country
Abundant Low Low ambiguous Some African
countries
High* not likely
High Low ambiguous
High not likely
Scarce Low Low likely China
High* not likely
High Low likely
High ambiguous
*not likely happen in the real world
marginal rate of substitution of consumption or leisure for environmental amenity 
is larger than the related marginal rate of transformation.
If some of the above three conditions are violated, the constraint for the gov­
ernment’s budget is not binding. It turns out that the fully earmarked levy scheme 
is not optimal.
These three conditions are likely to be satisfied when the marginal utility of 
the environment is high, the pollution tax/levy or related income is small (thus 
the marginal output of environmental spending is high) and the marginal utility 
of consumption is also small. To apply these condition, the world can be divided 
into several groups along three dimensions: abundance or scarcity of environmental 
resources; strength of pollution control; and degree of development. A rough idea 
is presented in Table 2.1. China falls into the group with scarce environmental 
resources, low pollution levy revenue and lower-medium development degree, and is 
therefore most likely to earmark all pollution levy revenue into environmental use.
Optimal pollution tax/levy rate
Until now the focus has been on the outlay of pollution tax/levy revenues. It is 
time to turn to another side of the issue: the optimal tax rate. From the first 
order conditions in (2.7), (2.10) and (2.13), the optimal tax rate under a general
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tax-income scheme can be derived as:
Ue w*Ue 1
Most of the above equations merely repeat the usual doctrines, and, are thus not 
worth repeating here, except t* = l/e ', that is, the optimal tax: rate should be 
equal to the marginal cost of public environment-improving or pollution-cleansing 
activities. It shows that the usual interpretation of the Pigouvian tax is conceptually 
incomplete. Typically, a Pigouvian tax rate is set according to the marginal cost 
of pollution damage and, when implemented, leads to an identical marginal cost 
of pollution abatement across firms. However, it does not say anything about the 
public environmental activities. Moreover, the relationship derived here has an 
important implication for policy making, as discussed in partial equilibrium analysis. 
There is an impression that valuing environmental benefit or measuring pollution 
damage is highly subjective and very difficult. However, it is easier to account 
the cost of environmental projects. Policy-makers may be more confident in policy 
design if they can plan projects according to certain environmental targets and set 
the pollution tax rate based on the cost analysis of these projects. It seems that 
most governments in the world follow this approach, although it was doubted by 
some environmental economists (for example, see Baumöl, Oates, and Blackman 
1979).
The above relationships may be changed if there exist corner solutions where 
pure tax schemes or earmarked schemes are justified. If a pure pollution tax scheme 
is justified, most of the relationships are maintained except that
t* < e\oy
This has been indicated by condition (2) of Theorem 2.4. Because the marginal 
cost of public environment-improving or pollution-cleansing activities is very high, 
no tax revenue should be used in such activities, therefore the optimal tax rate is
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no higher than the marginal cost of environmental projects.
If a fully earmarked pollution levy scheme are justified, it is true that
t* = f D =
1
e'{tDY
but t* < Ue
UC
w*UE
~ W '
These have been virtually explained in the discussion of Theorem 2.5, but it 
is worth emphasizing two points. Firstly, analogous to the case where S  =  0, it 
would be expected that t > 1 /e'{tD) because there is an upper limit put on the 
environmental spending. However, tD is not a fixed point like 0. The government 
chooses both D (therefore t) and S  to maximise the objective function, and thus 
achieve the identity between the optimal tax rate and the marginal cost of the 
environmental project. Secondly, the fact that the government can manipulate 
both environmental supply (or tax) and spending results in an imbalance between 
the optimal tax rate and the marginal rates of substitution (UE/Uc  and w*UE/Ui).  
Unlike the pure tax scheme, where S = 0 is a fixed value, the government has the 
incentive to increase the tax revenue if the constraint on its environmental spending 
is binding.
2.3.3 Pollution tax versus emission permit
In the current one-firm, one-household and one-government model, there is no trans­
action cost and uncertainty, therefore the price control mode and quantity control 
mode are equivalent (Weitzman 1974). The government can tax the firm at an 
appropriate rate to get the optimal amount of pollution, or it can directly issue 
this amount of emission permits. However, there are still some problems with the 
permit scheme in the real world.
First, if there are multiple firms the permit should be tradable. The administra­
tive cost might be prohibitively high if the government tries to issue an appropriate 
number of permits to individual firms. Therefore a tradable permit system should 
be developed to ensure that permits are allocated efficiently across firms. However,
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a tradable permit scheme may have higher transaction costs than a levy/tax scheme. 
The government has to monitor firms’ compliance and bear similar costs in both 
schemes. But firms may bear different costs. Generally speaking, the permit price 
is equal to the tax/levy rate. However, individual firms have to search for trading 
partners and bargaining for trade deals in a tradable permit scheme. If there are 
a large number of firms involved, the trading cost could be very large. Therefore a 
tax/levy scheme has advantages over a tradable permit system in this sense.
Second, the method of issuing permits may make a difference. As the model 
implies, the household may not be willing to invest in the environment. If the 
income goes to the household, it will presumably be spent on consumption goods. 
If the emission permits is grandfathered, firms do not have to pay for obtaining the 
permits. In this case, firms may have higher profit and the profit in turn becomes 
households’ income which will be used for consumption. Therefore a grandfathered 
emission permit system works in the same way as a pure pollution tax scheme. 
On the other hand, if the permits are auctioned by the government, firms have 
to pay a price to buy permits and the government receives the revenue of permit 
auctions. This means that a tradable permit system may follow the optimal general 
tax-income scheme.
2.3.4 Pre-existing taxes and “double-dividend”
The analysis is complicated by pre-existing taxes. Before a pollution tax/levy 
scheme was introduced, the government taxed labour income at the rate vo to fi­
nance some public goods G. With this G, the utility function now becomes:
U ( C , L -  L , E - D  + e(S'), G). (2.16)
It is also assumed that there is no control over pollution at the beginning. Now the 
government introduces a pollution tax/levy to tackle the environmental problem. 
To keep things simpler, and more realistic, it is assumed that tax revenues, pollution
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tax or labour income tax, are used to finance the production of public goods and 
are not transferred to the household.11 Therefore the household’s budget constraint 
becomes:
C < 7T +  (w — zu)L.
And the new first order conditions of utility maximisation are:
Uc =  A, U~L — X(w — zu), (2-17)
where A is the Lagrangian multiplier of the new constraint.
The government chooses zu, G, D and S  to maximises (2.16), subject to
G T S zu L T tD,
C = (w — Zü)L + 7T(t, w)
0 < S < t D
The second constraint is added because the government anticipates that the selec­
tion of zu affects the household’s budget and behaviour. The Lagrangian for this 
problem is,
£  =  U{C,L - L , E - D  + e(S),G) +  \\{zuL + tD - G  -  S )
+A2(7t(u;, t) +  (w — zu)L — C) +  X3S  +  A4 (tD — S).
And the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
Uq = Ai, Ue — X\t + A4̂ , Ai =  A2 =  A,
(2.18)
UEe'{S) = X1 - X 3 + A4, A3S = 0, A4(tD -  S) = 0.
The relationship that Ai =  A2 is derived from setting the partial derivative of
11 It is not untrue because if the government had surplus revenues, it would have lowered the 
labour income tax rate.
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Lagrangian with respect to vo and represents the fact that a rise in the government’s 
budget due to changing vo leads to an equivalent decline in the household’s budget, 
while A2 =  A comes from the fact that both A2 and A are the multiplier of the 
household’s budget constraint when maximising the same objective function.
The analysis is focused on the corner solutions for S. One corner solution is -S' — 
0, that is, the whole pollution tax revenue should be used to replace the distortional 
income tax. The above Kuhn-Tucker conditions give the following theorem.
T heorem  2.6. With pre-existing labour income tax, the whole of the pollution 
tax/levy revenue should be used to replace the income tax if all of the following 
conditions are satisfied:
a)
(2)
UEe'(0) < U q =  Uc
e'(0) > t  = f D.
Ul
f t - ™ ’
and
Proof. S =  0 < tD  implies A3 > 0 and A4 =  0. Using other conditions in (2.18) 
gives the result. ■
The first condition is similar to condition (1) in Theorem 2.4, except that the ef­
fect of labour income tax and the utility of public good are now considered. Because 
the public good and environmental investment are jointly financed by environmental 
and income tax, a rise in environmental spending would reduce the funds available 
to public good. Therefore, if the marginal utility from infinitesimal environmental 
spending is less than the marginal utility of public good, no tax revenue should be 
used in environmental projects, that is, all the revenue from pollution tax should 
be used to replace the labour income tax. Because of the existence of income tax, 
the marginal income of labour received by the household should be adjusted by 
extracting the tax rate vo, and Ue '̂{0) < U ^ /(/l — &?) states that if the marginal 
utility of infinitesimal environmental spending is less than the marginal utility of 
leisure forgone to recover that extra unit of income, the environmental spending is 
not justified, thus all pollution tax revenue should be used to replace labour income
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tax.
Another corner solution is S = tD. If this is justified, a fully earmarked scheme 
is required, and is likely to finance environmental spending by increasing income 
tax. The conditions are given in the following theorem.
T heorem  2.7. With pre-existing labour income tax, the whole of the pollution 
tax/levy revenue should be earmarked for environmental purposes if all of the fol­
lowing conditions are satisfied:
(V
(2)
UEe'(tD) > Uq = Uc =
Ue  Ue {w — w ) Ue
U-T
f i - &
; and
UC U -T U~r
> t  = fo-
Proof. S  = tD > 0 implies A3  =  0 and A4  > 0. Using other conditions in (2.18) 
gives the theorem. ■
These conditions are similar to those given in Theorem 2.5, except that the 
marginal labour income is adjusted due to income tax and the marginal utility of 
public good is considered. The new conditions in Theorem 2.7 state that a fully ear­
marked pollution levy scheme is justified if the marginal utility from environmental 
spending is larger than the marginal utility of public good and if the marginal rate 
of substitution of environmental good for public good is larger than the marginal 
product of environmental good.
Checking the real situation against the conditions, it may be found that those 
in Theorem 2.6 are more likely to be violated, whilst those in Theorem 2.7 are more 
likely to be satisfied . Therefore the basis for the “double-dividend hypothesis” is 
eroded.
However, another version of the “double-dividend hypothesis” may be proposed. 
Even without using the revenue to replace pre-existing taxes, an environmental tax 
might help reduce the distortion of labour income tax through the substitution 
effect. After an environmental tax is imposed, the environmental factor is more 
expensive than before, so the firm may demand more labour, that is, the income
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tax base is enlarged, given G , this leads to a less distortional labour income tax 
rate.
H ypothesis 2.1 (New Version of Double-Dividend). In addition to reducing 
pollution, an environmental tax may help lower the distortional pre-existing tax 
rates, as the higher price of environmental factor induces the firm ’s demand for a 
larger amount of other previously taxed factors.
2.4 Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis
In the real world, the environment is a stock of certain elements and provides flows 
of services of which absorbing pollutants is one. More importantly, the environment 
itself has the capacity of natural assimilation over time, which may affect earmarking 
in environmental projects. Therefore the above results should be examined in a 
dynamic setting.
2 .4 .1  T h e  Model
The framework is a modified Ramsey model with environment arguments in both 
production and utility functions.
Firm
The firm employs three factors: labour, capital and environmental absorption ca­
pacity. The effective labour is increasing with an exogenous, constant rate n. And 
economy-wide variables are normalised by this effective labour level.12 Capital is 
accrued by investment (i) made by the firm, and depreciated at a constant rate 5:13
h  = it -  (& + n)kt (2.19)
12Following convention, lower case letters are used to denote these normalised variables.
13For simplicity, the installation cost is not considered here.
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Assuming the production function is constant returns to scale, the per effective 
labour output is
Vt = f ( k t ,dt).
Assuming a pollution tax is imposed at rate r, the firm’s instantaneous profit is
'Kt -  f ( k t , dt) — it — wt — Ttdt.
The firm chooses i and d to maximise its intertemporal profit
7T
subject to the constraint as given in (2.19). The discount rate may vary over time, 
that is,
s — t
r(x)dx.
Household
The representative household owns the firm, supplies labour, and receives dividends 
and government transfers. It can also borrow and lend at the rate r to finance its 
spending on consumption. The dynamic budget constraint is therefore
dt — (r — n)at + wt + vt -  cu (2.20)
where a is the household’s assets and v is government transfer. And the household’s 
debt should also meet the Non-Ponzi-Game condition
lim ate - ^ - n)t > 0. (2.21)
t—KX)
The household chooses consumption path (q ) to maximise its intertemporal utility
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POO
j  e-(0_n)(s_f)u(cs,es)ds (2 .22)
where 9 is the household’s rate of time preference, subject to (2.20).
Government
The government collects pollution tax from the firm and allocates it on environ­
mental spending and transfers. It is assumed that government does not accrue any 
asset or debt, that is,
The environmental stock is eroded by pollution, and improved by environmental 
investment, while the environment itself has natural assimilation ability. Therefore 
the change of environmental stock can be given as:14
where e is environmental stock, d is pollutant discharge, and h{-) is the natural 
assimilation function of the environment, g(-) is the provision function by environ­
mental investment. It is assumed these functions have the usual property.
The government chooses paths of df, St and vt to maximise the intertemporal 
social welfare represented by (2.22) subject to (2.20), (2.23) and (2.24). Constraint 
(2.20) is included because the government anticipates its spending on the environ­
ment affects the household’s budget and, thus, utility.
2.4.2 Analytical Results
The current Hamiltonian and first order conditions for the above model are re­
ported in Table 2.2. Using these results, the conditions to justify pure tax and fully
14The reason why pollution stock is not used as the state variable is that, at steady state, the 
total pollution stock will increase at the rate n, which is not a desirable result.
St +  Vt =  Ttdt . (2.23)
et =  h(et) +  g(s t ) -  net -  du (2.24)
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Table 2.2: First Order Conditions for Dynamic Problem
A g e n t C u r r e n t  H a m i l to n ia n F i r s t  O r d e r  C o n d i t io n
F i r m f(k, d) — i — w — rd fd =  t , fk =  r +  5, A0 =  1,
+  Ao[i — (S + n)k] k =  i — (6 +  n)k
H o u s e h o ld u(c, e) +  A [(r — n)a + w uc =  A, A =  (6 — r)A ,
+ v -  c] ä =  ( r  — n)a +  w +  v — c
G o v e r n m e n t u(c, e) +  Ai (rd — s — v) A i r  =  A2, A i =  A T  A4,
+  A [(r  — n)a +  w +  v — c] A i =  A2 g' +  A3,
+  A2 [/i(e )  +  g(s) - n e -  d\ A3S =  0 , X4V — 0 ,
+  A3S +  X4V A2 =  (0 -  h')X2 -  ue,
e =  h(e) + g(s) — ne — d
earmarked schemes are derived.
Conditions for pure tax and earmarked levy schemes
From the results presented in Table 2.2, the conditions to justify a pure tax scheme, 
or a fully earmarked levy scheme in dynamic setting, can be derived.
Theorem 2.8. Along the optimal path, a pure tax scheme is adopted if X\Tg'{fS) = 
A2 </(0 ) < uc and l/</(0) > fd(k, d) = t at every time; and a fully earmarked scheme 
is optimal if X\ = X2g'(s)|s=Td > uc, and r  =  1 /g'(s)\s=Td at every time.
Proof, s = 0 implies that A3 > 0 and A4 = 0, and s = rd  implies that A3 =  0 and 
A4 > 0, using other first order conditions gives the result. ■
These conditions are virtually the same as those in the static model. Note 
that the Ai is the marginal value of objective function (i.e. marginal utility) if 
the government budget is increased exogenously by one infinitesimal unit, A2 is the 
marginal utility of environmental stock, g'(s) is the marginal environmental product 
of environmental spending, therefore A2</(s) and Airg'(s) are the marginal utility of 
environmental spending, with the former through a direct increase in environmental 
stock, and the latter through savings in government spending. It is clear that no 
tax revenue should be used in the environmental project if the marginal utility 
of such spending is less than the marginal utility of spending it on consumption.
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Table 2.3: Steady State of General Tax/Income Scheme
s = 0 0 < s < rd s — rd
i/g'(s) > f d{k,d) 1 /g'(s) -  fd(k,d) 1 /g'(s) = f d{k,d)
UJi = Ue/(8 -  ft') VcU = ue/($ -  ft') U J d < UJ(8 -  ft')
Uc > Ueg’/(9 -  ft') Uc = Ueg'/(8 -  ft') Uc < Utg’/(9 -  ft')
f k — 9 + 6 fk = 9 + 6 fk = 0 + 6
f(k, d) — (5 + n)k + c f ( k , d) = (6 + n)k + c + s f ( k , d) = (6 + n)k + c + s
h{e) = ne + d g(s) + h(e) — ne + d g{s) + h(e) = ne + d
And if the condition is reversed, even when all pollution tax revenue is used in an 
environmental project, a fully earmarked scheme is justified.
It should also be pointed out that these conditions do not imply that government 
should stick to one particular scheme along the optimal path. It is possible for the 
government to shift from one to another. However, the policy change may follow a 
smooth path, that is, from one extreme (pure tax or fully earmarking) to another 
via the general scheme.
The steady state and stability
The steady state is summarised in Table 2.3. In deriving these results, the following 
relations are used:
wt = f ( k t , dt) -  f k h  -  rdt , and at = kt .
The first comes from the assumption of constant returns to scale production. The 
second comes from the fact that in equilibrium, aggregate private asset (or debt) 
must always be zero: although each household assumes it can freely borrow and 
lend, in equilibrium there is neither lending or borrowing (Blanchard and Fischer 
1989, page 50).
Because a pure pollution tax can only reduce demand for the environment, 
rather than increase its supply, it may be unstable in the dynamic process. How­
ever, environmental investment can increase the environmental stock and thus may 
help improve stability, and be likely to achieve sustainable growth. Therefore the
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following hypothesis is proposed.
H ypothesis 2.2. Spending pollution tax/levy on environmental projects may im­
prove the system stability.
It is difficult to prove this hypothesis formally. Rather a simple example is pre­
sented to demonstrate its validity. Suppose the environmental regeneration function 
is h(e) = ße with 0 < ß < n. According to (2.24), if there is no environmental in­
vestment, e will decrease forever, and a steady state cannot be found where e is 
constant. However, when environmental investment is made the steady state is 
possible.
Adjustment path
From the first order conditions, it can be seen that the Keynes-Ramsey rule becomes
^ c  =  0 +  « - / * - — euc uc
or
c e.
£ 11 “  =  0  +  (5 —  f k  —  £ 12 “  c e
where £n and £ 1 2  are elasticities of marginal utility with respect to consumption 
and environment. The movement of consumption and environment is related. If 
utility separability of consumption and environment is assumed, £ 1 2  is zero, and the 
above expression reverts to the usual Keynes-Ramsey rule.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrates that the usual interpretation of the Pigouvian tax is 
incomplete. An optimal pollution tax/levy program should include the possibility 
of spending the revenue on environment-improving or pollution-cleansing projects. 
A pure tax scheme can not do better than a general tax-income or “tax-bounty” 
scheme, and, in fact, is not sufficient for an optimum. This chapter also finds the
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conditions for a pure tax system and for earmarking all pollution tax/levy revenues 
into environmental projects. A pure tax system might be an optimum only if the 
marginal utility of environment is sufficiently small, that is, environmental resources 
are very abundant. However, this situation is rare in the current world. By contrast, 
a fully earmarked system is likely to be a better choice when the marginal utility 
of environment is high, relative to that of consumption, and the pollution tax/levy 
revenue is small.
Usually, a Pigouvian pollution tax rate is equal to the marginal damage cost of 
this negative externality. However, it is found that this is not necessarily the case if 
the tax revenue can be used for environmental purposes. In the general equilibrium 
setting, under the general tax-income scheme, the optimal pollution tax rate should 
be equal to the marginal cost of producing environmental goods and services. This 
may imply that less information is required than thought to design a tax policy. 
Even in a partial setting, if all revenue is to be used in an environmental project, 
it is not necessary to fully internalise pollution damage to reach an optimum, and 
the optimal rate might be different from the marginal damage cost.
In the case with pre-existing distortional taxes, using all the pollution tax/levy 
revenue to replace the distorting taxes is usually not an optimum. At least some of 
the revenue from the pollution tax/levy should be used in environmental activities. 
And, considering the current situation, it is most likely optimal to earmark the 
whole pollution tax/levy revenue into environmental projects.
These static results survive in the steady state of a dynamic setting. Moreover, 
because a pure pollution tax can only reduce the demand for environment, rather 
than increase its supply, it may be unstable in the dynamic process. However, 
environmental investment may help to improve stability, and be likely to achieve 
sustainable growth.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
2.A Decentralised versus Centralised Models 
Combining household and government together
Because the objective of government is to maximise the household’s utility, it is 
natural to consider the legitimacy of combining household and government together. 
It is now assumed the household can exert the function of government, that is, 
decide the supply of environmental good and collect and allocate pollution tax/levy 
revenue.
Static general equilibrium
Now the household/government chooses C , L , D and S  to maximise (2.8) subject 
to (2.11), C +  S < n(w, t) +  wL +  tD , and 0 < S < tD. And the Lagrangian is:
£  = U ( C , L - L , E - D  + e(S)) + \[ir{w,t) + wL + t D - C - S ]
+ \1S  + \ 2{tD -  S),
which leads to the following first order conditions:
Uc  = A, UL = \w , UE = (A + A2)t, UEe( S)  = X - X 1 + X2.
Under the general tax-income scheme, 0 < S  < tD  implies that Ai =  A2 =  0, 
the above conditions are equivalent to those given by (2.10) and (2.13). If a pure 
tax scheme is required, that is, S = 0, it gives Ai > 0 and A2 =  0, which transforms 
the above conditions to those in (2.14). If a fully earmarked scheme is justified, 
that is, S = tD, it gives Ai = 0 and A2 > 0, which are the same as those in (2.15). 
Therefore combining household with government is the same as separating them in 
this case.
Static general equilibrium with pre-existing income tax
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With pre-existing labour income tax, the combination of household and gov­
ernment makes a difference. In the separation case, the wage rate the household 
receives is only w — zu, and the labour supply is governed by (2.17). However, in 
the case of combining household and government together, labour income tax zu, 
which is just an internal transfer, does not play any role in determining the agent’s 
behaviour: the new entity receives the whole wage rate w, therefore the labour sup­
ply is governed by the old relationship represented by (2.10). Because of this, the 
results are different no matter how the model is constructed. The following example 
illustrates the difference.
Suppose the household/government chooses C , L, D, S , G and zu to maximise 
(2.16) subject to C + S  4- G < tt + wL + tD, and 0 < S  < t D ,15 And the Lagrangian 
is:
£  = U ( C , L - L , E - D  + e(S),G) + X(n + wL + t D - C - S - G )
X 1S  + X2( t D - S ) ,
which leads to the following first order conditions:
Uc — X, = Xw, Ue =  (A +  A2)t,
UEe \S)  = A —Ai + A2, Uq = A.
It is clear that these results are different from those in (2.17) and (2.18).
However, there exists one possibility of equivalence. Suppose the household 
understands that its contribution to public goods via income tax may enhance its 
welfare, and knows government’s behaviour, then its problem could be represented 
by the following Lagrangian:
15It seems that the constraint 0 < G < zaL should be included. However, as the problem 
originates from the discussion of replacing income tax by a pollution tax, such a constraint would 
exclude the possibility at the first instance.
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£  =  U{C, L -  L, E  -  D + e(S),wL  + tD -  S) + A (tt +  (w -  vo)L -  C)
The first condition of labour supply is:
—Ui + UqU7 +  A (w — zu) = 0
Knowing that the government set Uq =  A, the household will supply labour accord­
ing to UL =  Aw, which is identical to the above case.
This possibility is based on the assumption that both household and government 
have full knowledge about each other’s behaviour. If there were only one house­
hold, the government and household could achieve the result simply by negotiation. 
However, as in the real world there are many households, the game will be far more 
complicated, and will be played not only between households and government, but 
also amongst individual households. In this case, an individual can not presume 
others will follow its thinking, and there is no authority to prevent others from 
cheating. Or the household will presume its share in the labour market is so tiny 
that its rational behaviour has no effect on the whole world. Therefore it supplies 
labour simply according to the after tax wage rate.
Dynamic general equilibrium
The household/government’s dynamic budget constraint becomes:
dt = ( r -  n)at + wt + rtdt -  ct -  st , (2.A.1)
Which should also meet the Non-Ponzi-Game condition (2.21). The new entity 
chooses the path of consumption (c*), environmental supply (dt) and environmental 
spending (st) to maximise the intertemporal utility (2.22) subject to (2.24) and 
(2.A.1). The current-Hamiltonian is thus:
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7i. - u{c,e) + \[{r — n)a + w + rd — c — s\
+\i[h(e) +  g(s) -  ne — d] + A2s + As(rd -  s ).
The corresponding first order conditions are:
uc — A, (A + A3)t = Ai, A + A3 =  Aig \s )  + A2,
X = (6 — r)A, Ai =  (6 — — ue,
A2s = 0, A3(rd — s) = 0.
These are essentially the same as those given in Table 2.2, except different symbols 
for Hamiltonian multiplier, leading to the same conditions in Theorem 2.8. There­
fore combining the household with government is equivalent to separating them in 
the dynamic setting.
Centralised modei
In a centralised model, the three agents, firm, household and government, are com­
bined into one social planner. This kind of model is close to a partial equilibrium 
analysis. In the centralised model, all prices are implicit, that is, the distribution 
of income, or payment to factors, are through internal lump-sum transfers; while in 
the decentralised model, all agents make their decisions assuming the prices they 
face are given, that is, they cannot influence the prices, and permit the market 
equilibrium to determine prices. This may have different consequences, which are 
stated as follows.
Result 2.A. Decentralised and centralised models are different when environmental 
spending is bounded by pollution tax revenue, or when the pollution tax interacts with 
pre-existing taxes. As difference arise, a decentralised model is required.
It has been shown that combining household and government together leads to
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different results when a labour income tax exists. The difference should also persist 
with a more centralised model. Therefore the following discussion focuses on the 
first circumstance in the above statement.
Static general equilibrium
A social planner chooses labour supply (L), environmental supply (D), con­
sumption (C) and environmental spending (S) to maximise utility (2.8) subject to 
(2.11), C +  S < /(L , D), and 0 < S < foD.  The corresponding Lagrangian is:
£  = U(C,T -  L,~E -  D + e(S)) +  A(/(L, D) -  C — S)
+A15 + A2( /dD - 5 ) ,
and first order conditions are:
Uc = A, Ui — X/l + A2/ ldT), Ue  =  (A + X2)fD +  \ 2/ ddD,
UEe \S )  = A - A i +  A2, Ai 5  =  0, \ 2{fDD - S )  = 0.
It can be seen they are different to the results derived from the decentralised 
model when S  =  f ED, but the same as the results when 0 < S < f ED (see 
Table 2.A for details). The difference arises from the fact that the social planner 
has the ability to change the pollution tax rate when s/he faces a binding constraint 
on environmental spending, while the government has to treat the tax rate as given 
in the decentralised model.16
Dynamic general equilibrium
In this case, the motion of capital is determined by
16One might be tempted to replace the constraint 0 < S < f o D  by 0 < S < tD and assume that 
t is exogenous. This treatment will lead to the same results as in the decentralised model. However 
it is inappropriate because t is actually endogenous, and should be linked to other variables in the 
model.
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Table 2.A: Centralised versus Decentralised Models^
Case Decentralised Model Centralised Model Comment
5 - 0
^
■
5
II 
II 
A
I
II 
II 
A
I
Equivalent
0 < 5 < W 11 
11 
11
s
s
s 33
3
II 
II 
II Equivalent
S = tD
33
3
II 
IV
 
II U -JU c > h
U e / U c  5  f o  if «Dt = 1*
1 /e'(S) < Sd '
Different
f: Static general equilibrium model;
J: e =  —(dD/dt)( t /d),  the elasticity of environmental demand with respect to tax rate.
h  = f { h ,  dt) -  {6 +  n)kt -  ct -  st , (2.A.2)
and the model is restructured as: the central planner chooses proper paths for c, 
d and s to maximise (2.22) subject to constraints (2.A.2) and (2.24). The current 
value Hamiltonian is:
7i = u(c, e) +  \ \ [ f ( k ,  d) — (5 +  n)k  — c — s]
+A2 [h{e) +  g{s) -  ne -  d] +  A3s +  AA( fdd -  s ).
The first order conditions for this problem are:
uc — Ai;
(Ai +  A4)/d =  A2 -  A4 /ddd;
Ai +  A4 =  A2 g +  A3 ;
A3s =  0, A3 > 0 if s = 0;
A4 {fdd -  s) = 0, A4 >  0 if s =  f dd]
Ai =  Ai (0 + 6 — fk) — A4 fkdd]
A*2 =  A2(0 -  h!) -  ue;
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kt = f ( k t , dt) -  (<5 + n)kt -  ct -  st \ and 
e't =  h(et) + g(st) -  net -  dt -,
Like the static general equilibrium analysis, the centralised model differs from 
the decentralised model when A4 ^  0, that is, a fully earmarked scheme is justified. 
Again the difference arises from the fact that the social planner can influence the 
(shadow) pollution tax rather assume it as given.
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Chapter 3
Stochastic General Equilibrium and 
Environmental Policy Choice
3.1 Introduction
Like other processes, because of natural, technical and political reasons, uncertain­
ties about the benefits and costs of pollution control are a perpetual feature. “.........
the degree of fuzziness could be reduced by research and experimentation, but it 
could never be truly eliminated because new sources of uncertainty are arising all the 
time” (Weitzman 1974). “The true costs will only be known when the production 
is actually underway” (Weitzman 1978).
The importance of uncertainty to the selection of policy instruments was ad­
dressed by Weitzman (1974) for the first time. He argues that in an environment 
of complete knowledge and perfect certainty there is a formal identity between the 
use of prices and quantities as planning instruments, as long as quantities or prices 
are so such that the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost.1,2 But in the 
presence of uncertainty, these two instruments will generate different consequences.
Weitzman (1974) defines the relative advantage of price control over quantity
JHybrid policy, such as proposed by Roberts and Spence (1976), Weitzman (1978) and McKibbin 
and Wilcoxen (1997), is a combination of these two policy options.
2As discussed in Chapter 2, as price instrument, i.e. tax, can generate revenues to the govern­
ment, while quantity instrument, i.e. grandfathered permit system, cannot, they are not equivalent 
even with complete knowledge and perfect certainty. It will be shown in Chapters 5 and 8 that 
they are different because permit trading can generate income transfers across borders while an 
emission tax may not.
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control as the difference of expected net benefit between these two control policies. 
He assumes that the benefit and cost functions of one product have quadratic form 
around some critical quantity:
B{q, e) = a{e) +  \B' +  a ( e ) ] ( < 7  - q )  +  ^ ~ { q -  q) 2 ,
C(q, 8) S  b(8) + [C +  0(8)}(q -  -  <j)2.
where a(e), a(e), b{9) and ß{9) are stochastic functions and B ' , B " , C  and C" are 
fixed coefficients. B" is the slope of the (linear) marginal benefit (or demand) curve, 
C  is the slope of the (linear) marginal cost (or supply) curve. This specification 
assumes additive shocks to marginal benefit and marginal cost. It is also assumed 
that these two types of shocks are independent. Based on these assumptions, he 
derives the following rule to determine the relative advantage of price control over 
quantity control:3
a*{B" + C")
2 ( C ")2 ’
wiere a2 is the variance of vertical shifts in the marginal cost (or supply) curve.
Two important conclusions can be derived from the above rule. First, the un­
certainty in benefit or demand does not appear in the expression. “To a second 
approximation, it affects price and quantity modes equally adversely.” Second, the 
relative advantage depends on the slopes of marginal cost (supply) and marginal 
benefit (demand) functions. If the demand curve is steeper than the supply curve 
(3" +  C" < 0), the quantity mode is preferred; by contrast a steeper supply curve 
fa/ours the price control mode.
Adar and Griffin (1976) present a model of linear marginal benefit and cost 
wth symmetric multiplicative disturbances and show that the choice of the optimal 
instruments depends on more parameters in addition to relative slopes. Following 
tleir idea, Watson and Ridker (1984) use nonlinear marginal cost and benefit func-
3Similar results can be found in Fishelson (1976).
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tions with multiplicative asymmetric errors to analyse the control instrument of 
air and water pollution. Yohe (1976) introduces substitution between clean factor 
and pollutant in production to study the effect of uncertainty. He finds that, as 
the elasticity of substitution increases, the quantity mode becomes more preferred. 
If they are perfect substitutes, the benefit losses of changes in output level would 
disappear, and a quantity mode would be unambiguously favoured.
Stavins (1996) argues that Weitzman’s assumption of independent uncertainties 
in supply and demand is not realistic in many cases. He finds that the uncertain­
ties in both demand and supply affect the relative advantage of price control over 
quantity control if they are correlated. In this case, the rule becomes
where ab and oc  are, respectively, the standard deviation of shocks to marginal 
benefit and marginal cost; and pßc is the correlation coefficient between them. 
According to this new rule, a positive (negative) correlation tends to favour the 
quantity (price) instruments and, theoretically, these effects can overwhelm Weitz­
man’s relative-slopes instrument recommendation.
Because these analyses are of partial equilibrium, it is appropriate to question 
whether Weitzman’s rule and revisions are applicable in the general equilibrium 
setting. Pizer (1997a, 1997b, 1999) presents a numerical general equilibrium frame­
work to determine optimal climate change policy under uncertainty. He finds that 
a tax is preferred to tradable permits, due to the relative flatness of the marginal 
benefit schedule in reducing greenhouse gas emission and a negative correlation be­
tween control costs and benefit. His findings confirm Weitzman’s rule. However, an 
analytical result has not been presented, therefore generality is yet to be developed.
This chapter attempts to analyse the environmental policy choice under uncer­
tainty and Weitzman’s rule in a general equilibrium setting. Even with a very sim­
ple model, it is found that the analytical result is very complicated and Weitzman’s
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rule cannot be applied directly in the general equilibrium setting without certain 
assumptions. The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section 
describes the analytical model and section 3.3 presents the results and discusses 
Weitzman’s rule. A revised model is then introduced in section 3.4 to recapture 
Weitzman’s rule and analyse the impact on policy choice under uncertainty of risk 
aversion of household and earmarking of pollution charges or auction revenues. The 
last section summarises the chapter.
3.2 The Model
There are two agents in the economy: household4 and firm. The household owns 
the firm and an environment endowment (V). It tries to maximise its utility, which 
is the objective of this economy. The utility function is
U = U(C,E),
where C is the amount of consumption good, and E  is the environmental quality. 
The utility function has the usual properties, specifically they are
Uc >  0 , Ue  >  0, Ucc < 0) Ue e  < 0 , Uce  — Uec > 0 .
To produce the consumption good, the firm uses the environmental factor (D) 
supplied by the household.5 The unit of this factor can be carefully selected such 
that environmental quality can be represented by the difference between environ­
mental endowment and the amount used in production: E = V  — D. Production 
is subject to shocks due to various factors, such as weather, etc. The uncertainty
4Here the household also exerts the function of government. As there is no tax on the household’s 
income by government and no environmental spending in the current discussion, it is equivalent to 
a more decentralised three agent firm-household-government model. For details see the appendix 
to Chapter 2.
5Introducing other factors will significantly complicate the analysis. For simplicity and without 
losing generality, this one factor production process is assumed.
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about environmental quality will be introduced later. The production function is 
thus written as:
Y = f(D,e),
where e is the error term with zero mean and variance of 62. And the properties of 
this production function are
/ d > 0, f ö D  < 0 , f £ < 0, f e e  < 0, f De =  feD > 0, 
fDDfee ~ fbe>Qi  /(0, e )  = 0, f D (0,e) =  OO.
3.3 The Policy Options
3.3.1 The First Best Outcome
Before discussing policies, it is necessary to find the first best outcomes.6 From profit 
and utility maximisation and market clearing conditions, the following conditions 
can be derived:
P* = f D( D \ e ), (3.1)
p* _  Ue (C*, V — D*)
Uc {C*, V — D*) ’
C* =  f(D*,e) =  7T* + P*D*. (3.3)
where P  is the price of the environmental good relative to the consumption good, 
and 7T is the firm’s profit after paying environmental cost. The above conditions 
lead to
P* = P(y,£) and D* = D(V,e).
It is clear that, ideally, the price and quantity of environmental input vary 
across states. However, practically, the regulation of environmental management 
should be determined before the uncertainty is resolved, and the policy should
th roughou t this chapter, the first best refers to the ex post optimum, while the policies are 
set at best to achieve the ex ante optimum.
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remain long enough to be effective (Weitzman 1974). The popular approaches are 
either imposing a fixed price (pollution taxes) or setting a fixed quantity (emission 
permits, quotas, etc.)7. In the first best solution, price and quantity are determined 
simultaneously by the economy, so they are equivalent. But this is not the case in 
the following discussion.
How to determine the price or quantity for future regulation? One approach is 
to use the price and quantity determined without uncertainty, that is,
P = P{V, 0), D = D(V, 0).
It may be called the deterministic approach. A more rigorous method is to find the 
price or quantity that maximises the expected utility, that is,
D =  {D I arg max if [U(f(D, e), V — ZD)]}
P =  {P  I axgmax£7 [£/(/(D, e),V -  D)\ and f D(D,e) =  P }
This can be called the expected utility maximisation approach. However, two 
main reasons make this difficult in practice. Firstly, it needs additional information 
about the distribution of the random variable that is usually not known. Secondly, it 
is very complicated to estimate the results. By contrast, the deterministic approach 
is natural because it is known that the mean of errors is zero. It should also be 
pointed out that P  and D are equivalent when there is no uncertainty, while the price 
and quantity determined by the expected utility maximisation approach usually is 
not, that is, a state cannot be found where the two approaches lead to the same 
result.
7In this one-firm economy, it does not matter how the quantity is allocated. However, it is 
important in a multi-firm economy to have the quantity or permit allocated efficiently. This means 
that the quantity approach should be a tradable permit system for it to be comparable with the 
price control approach.
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3.3.2 Shocks and consequences
The case where there is a positive shock, that is, the shock increases the output 
level for given input level, is discussed first. The price control means that a price is 
set beforehand as a commitment that the household will sell as much environmental 
good as the firm demands; while the quantity control turns out that the equilibrium 
price should induce the firm demand at exactly the amount of preset quantity. 
Note that, at any time under price control, the firm should follow fD (D p ,£) = 
P  (= 0)), and because Jdd < 0, foe > 0 and e > 0, it should thus be the
case that D p > D for the above relationship to hold. So, if there is a positive shock, 
the quantity demanded under the price control mode is larger than that set in the 
quantity control mode.
Once the quantity demanded for environmental factor is determined, the output, 
and thus the consumption, is determined. It turns out that the relative advantage 
of these control modes depends on the deviation of environmental supply from the 
first best quantity D*. This gives the following rule
R esult 3.1. With a positive shock,
if D* < D, the quantity control mode is better;
if D* > D p, the price control mode is better; and
if D < D* < D p , further conditions are needed to determine which is the better 
mode.
The situation with negative shock is symmetric to that with positive shock, 
therefore, if there is a negative shock, the quantity demanded under the price control 
mode is smaller than that set in the quantity control mode, i.e. D p < D. The 
corresponding rule to judge a policy option is
Result 3.2. With a negative shock,
if D* > D, the quantity control mode is better;
if D* < D p , the price control mode is better; and
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if D p < D* < D, further conditions are needed to determine which is the better 
mode.
To apply the above rules, it is necessary to find the change in the first best 
outcomes. Taking the total differential of (3.1)-(3.3) and collecting terms lead to
dir____________ { U c f h t-  (UecU - Uc cUb   , .
de( UecUc -  Uc cUe I /u + (Uce -  -
Note that the denominator in the above expression is positive because of the 
properties of production and utility functions. Therefore
dD* 
de
if
or
(U c ffD t  I {Ue cUc- UCCUE)fe
, >  UecUc -  UccUe ,
jE>£ <  (Uc)2 *e‘
Note also that, {Ue c Uc ~ UCcUE)/(Uc )2 =  d{UE/Uc )/dC  = dM R S/dC , is the 
change in the marginal rate of substitution due to a change in consumption. The 
term d M R S/dC fe is therefore the change in the marginal rate of substitution due 
to a change in consumption (i.e. production change) resulting from a change in the 
shock; while f Ee is the change in marginal product due to a change in the shock. 
In the first best equilibrium, the marginal product should be equal to the marginal 
rate of substitution. This condition says that, if the change in M R S  caused by 
the change in shock is greater than the change in M P,  the first best quantity of 
environmental supply will decrease.
Clearly this condition is related to the curvature of indifference curve and 
the production frontier. Loosely speaking, around the deterministic equilibrium, 
the steeper the indifference curve or the flatter the production frontier, the more 
favourable a quantity control policy.
Two problems arise with the application of this condition. First, it is only half 
way to determining which policy is better. If the sign of dD*/de is negative, it can 
be concluded that a quantity policy is better; however, if it is positive, it is not
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possible to tell which is better. Second, the sign will change during the course of 
shocks. That is, as the magnitude of shock changes, the direction of changes in the 
first best quantity will vary.
However, if the shock is small enough, it may be assumed that the direction will 
not change. And because the M P  and M R S  are equal at certainty when D or P  
are set, if the shock is small, M P  and M R S  can be directly compared after the 
uncertainty is resolved.
If at the preset quantity, the marginal rate of substitution is greater than the 
marginal product after a positive shock, that is,
Ue (Cq , V - D )
Uc ( C Q , V - D )
> fp(D,
where C® =  / ( D. e}, the optimal quantity will be smaller than the preset quantity, 
i.e., D* < D . This is illustrated in Figure 3.1(a). Without uncertainty, the price 
control P  and D are equivalent, and both achieve the equilibrium E°. After a 
positive shock, the production frontier shifts above the old frontier. Under the price 
control scheme, the emissions will be Dp , to the right of the emissions under the 
quantity control scheme D. If the marginal rate of substitution is greater than the 
marginal product, the optimal quantity will lie somewhere to the left of D. It turns 
out that the quantity control is better than the price control, which can be seen 
that the indiffernece curve passing through the price control equilibrium E p , C/p , 
lies below the indifference curve passing through the quantity control equilibrium 
EQ , U®. Symmetrically, if the marginal rate of substitution is smaller than the 
marginal product after a negative shock, the optimal quantity will be larger than 
the preset quantity, and the quantity control is better.
Applying equation (3.4), the change of first best price along with a shock can 
be derived as
dP* _  (Ue c Uc -  UccUE){fdfPe  ~  fe fpp)  +  (Uc e Ue ~  ^EE^c )!de >  ~
de (Ue c Uc ~ UccUE)fü  +  (Uc e Ue -  Ue e Uc ) -  {UcYfüe ~
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Figure 3.1: Price- and Quantity-Control after Positive Shock
(a) (b)
(c) ( d )
That is, the first best price cannot decrease after a positive shock, nor increase after 
a negative shock, which gives the following result:
Result 3.3. The first best quantity is less (larger) than quantity demanded under 
price control mode (Dp) after a positive (negative) shock.
Figure 3.1(b) shows that because the first best price is lower than the preset 
price P, the first best emissions will be larger than emissions under the price control
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scheme, D p . Therefore the price control would be better than the quantity control. 
However, according to Result 3.3, this cannot happen.
Needless to say, the above rules are just sufficient conditions. The difficulty arises 
when the marginal product is larger (less) than the marginal rate of substitution at 
the preset quantity and the opposite at D p after a positive (negative) shock. As 
illustrated in Figure 3.1(c) and (d), the optimal quantity falls between these two 
quantities, D and D p , and it is possible for either one of the modes to be better.
It should be pointed out that assuming normality in utility function does not 
provide a clearer indication about the movement of the first best outcome after 
a shock. Suppose there is a positive shock, the production frontier shifts above 
the old one. If the price of environmental good relative to consumption good were 
unchanged, the consumption, C , and the enjoyment of environmental quality, E , 
would increase under the assumption of normal utility, implying lower emissions, 
D. However, according to the discussion leading to Result 3.3, the relative price 
increases at the same time. This increase in relative price will decrease E , i.e., 
increase D, for given amount of wealth. These two opposing effects lead to uncertain 
prediction about the change in the first best quantity.
3.3.3 Is Weitzman’s rule valid in a general equilibrium setting?
The first difficulty in applying Weitzman’s rule in general equilibrium is with the 
concept of marginal benefit and cost. Unlike in partial equilibrium, it is difficult 
to distinguish between benefit and cost. It is possible to argue that an increase in 
consumption due to an increase in the use of environmental factor is a benefit while 
the fall in environmental quality caused by this use is a cost. However, it is equally 
valid to argue that the improvement of environmental quality through the reduction 
in the use of environmental factor is a benefit, while the fall in consumption is a 
cost.
Weitzman (1974) indicates that the supply (demand) curve is equivalent to the 
marginal benefit (cost) function. Therefore an attempt can be made to find the
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supply and demand functions of environmental good in the general equilibrium. 
The demand for the environmental factor is derived from the profit maximisation, 
so, by taking the total differential of the first order condition (3.1), the slope of the 
demand function can be expressed as follows:
—  = t
dD DD + ' d D '
The household’s provision of environmental good is based on utility maximisation. 
Using the first order condition of utility maximisation (3.2) and budget constraint 
(3.3), gives
Uc (n +  P D S, V -  DS)P = Ue (tt +  P D S, V -  D s ).
Taking the total differential of the above equation gives
(Ucc(d7T + DdP  +  PdD ) -  UCEdD) P  +  Uc dP 
=  UEc{dn +  DdP +  PdD) — UEEdD.
A problem arises from dn, the change in profit. In the decentralised general 
equilibrium economy, the household takes the profit as given, although it is actually 
affected by the provision of environmental good. There are two ways to treat dn. 
First, differentiating it further gives the slope of supply function as follows:
dP _  (Uce ~ U cc fp )P  + (Ue c I d ~ Ue e ) 
dD ~  Uc
(Uec ~ PUcc)fe de 
Uc dD'
Alternatively, leaving dir as it is, gives
dP _  (UccP — Uc e )P — (Ue c P  ~  Ue e ) 
dD ~  UECP  ~ UCCPD  -  Uc
UccP — Uec di;
+ UECD - U c c P D - U c dD'
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It is clear that Weitzman’s rule cannot be directly used because the shock to 
production leads to shifts in both the supply of and demand for environmental 
good. And also the shock is not additive. Even if the shock to marginal product 
is additive, the resulting shock to the supply curve is multiplicative (note P  or fp,  
which by assumption is affected by the shock, appears in the above expression).
Using Weitzman’s (or Stavins’) rule may lead to the wrong conclusion. As 
mentioned above, one conclusion in Weitzman’s rule is that only the uncertainty 
in supply matters, that is, if there is uncertainty only in demand, the quantity 
and price controls are equivalent. This is misleading in the general equilibrium 
setting. Suppose there is no uncertainty in production, but there is uncertainty in 
utility. It turns out that there is no uncertainty in demand, but there is uncertainty 
in supply. According to Weitzman’s rule, the two control modes will give different 
results unless the absolute slopes of demand and supply are the same. However, this 
prediction is wrong! From Equation 3.1, it is clear that the price- and quantity- 
control are exactly the same—price and quantity have a unique relationship—if 
there is no uncertainty in production. The reason behind this is quite simple. In 
Weitzman’s (1974) model, the behavioural function is given by the supply function, 
i.e., price is equal to marginal benefit, while, in the current case, the firm’s behaviour 
is governed by P  =  /jr>, which is actually the demand function for environmental 
good.
3.4 A Revised Model
The revised model follows the popular assumption that the utility is separable in 
consumption and environmental quality. Still further, the enjoyment of environmen­
tal quality is represented by the disutility of pollution to avoid the measurement 
problem of environmental endowment. In sum, the household has a money metric 
utility function
U = C — g = f (D,e)  — . ( 3 . 5 )
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Note that C or f { D , e ) is the national product, and g(D,6) is the damage function 
caused by pollution, so f (D,e)  — g(D,6) is the net product. This makes the as­
sumption that the household is risk-neutral to its income or net income. In addition 
to the properties stated above, the damage function has the following properties:
9d > 0, go > 0 , gDo > 0, goo > 0, 9do =  9qd > 0 , g(0, 0) = 0.
Therefore, dD*/de > 0 is guaranteed because Uec — Ucc  — 0.
3.4.1 Weitzman’s Rule Revisited
With the separability and risk neutrality assumption, the relative advantage of price 
over quantity is approximated as
A = -
m  + n 2 
2 m 2 f
1
H---- crm
2
fg (3.6)
where m  and n are, respectively, the slope of marginal product and marginal pollu­
tion damage function around the optimal (or deterministic) quantity; aj- is variance 
of shocks to marginal product; and a jg is the covariance of uncertainties in marginal 
product and marginal damage. The derivation of (3.6) is given in Appendix 3.A.
The expression is similar to Weitzman’s rule, except that the slope of marginal 
damage function is replaced by that of marginal product function; and the variance 
of shocks to marginal damage is replaced by that of marginal product. This is 
because in this case the household exercises the price control via the production 
process, while in Weitzman’s original paper (1974), the behaviour function linking 
price and quantity is expressed by the equation that price is equal to the marginal 
cost. Therefore the shocks to marginal cost are important in his case, while the 
shocks to marginal product are relevant in this case.
The first term is the famous ’’relative-slope” criterion. According to the prop­
erties of production and damage function, it is known that around the optimum, 
m < 0 and n > 0. Therefore this criterion says that, if around the optimum, the
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marginal product is steeper than the marginal damage, a price control is favourable. 
One extreme case will be the linear utility function where n =  0. If in addition there 
is no uncertainty to the damage, the marginal rate of substitution is a fixed ratio 
and independent of quantity and shocks, thus the household can plug the price at 
that ratio to achieve the first best outcome in any states. On the other hand, if the 
marginal damage function is steeper, a quantity control policy is favourable.
The second term is the effect of correlated uncertainties of production and dam­
age, as pointed out by Stavins (1996). A positive correlation tends to favour the 
quantity control mode, while a negative one tends to favour the price control mode.
3.4.2 Risk Aversion
It is clear that the revised model assumes that the household is risk neutral to the 
net product (or income). How about risk aversion? The utility function may be 
rewritten as
U = U ( C -  g ( D , 9)) =  U(f(D,  -  , 9))
where the utility function has the property U' > 0 and U" < 0. Still further, 
because the uncertainty in production is crucial, it may be assumed there is only 
production uncertainty to simplify the derivation process. Specifically, the following 
utility function is assumed8
U = \ n ( f (D , e ) -g ( D) )  (3.7)
In this case, the relative advantage of price control over quantity control is
(m + n)(a — b)ct2 (m2 +  n2)pcr2
2 m2(a — b +  [m — n)pf2)2 4m2(a — b + (m — n)p/2)2
_ a — b +  (m — n)p/2
+ ln -------------- ---------- .
a — b
8The selection of this functional form is purely for simplicity. However, it can be shown that 
other functional forms representing risk aversion will lead to similar results.
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The definition of parameters and the derivation process are given in Appendix 3.B. 
A couple of observations can be made from the above expression.
Note that a > b by definition, so that the first term is similar to the revised 
Weitzman’s rule. It states that a steeper (flatter) marginal product curve tends to 
favour the price (quantity) control approach.
The last two terms are new. Note that p > 0 (see Appendix 3.B) and m — n < 0, 
therefore the last two terms are all negative. This means that a risk averse household 
tends to favour the quantity control mode.
For the current case to be directly comparable with Weitzman’s rule, the def­
inition of relative advantage (3.B.3) can be replaced by (3.A.5), then the relative 
advantage becomes
. m + n  9 m —n A = ------- pr-(T? + --------p.
2 m 2 f  2 y
The first term in the above expression is exactly the same as the first one in (3.6). It 
is very clear that a quantity control mode is more likely desirable for the risk aversion 
utility than the risk neutral utility. Because a price control results in uncertainties 
in both production and damage while a quantity control leads to uncertainty only in 
the production side, it is natural for a risk averse household to favour the quantity 
control, ceteris paribus. For appropriate parameters, this risk aversion effect may 
overwhelm the relative slope judgement.
In the above analysis, only one representative firm is considered. Therefore 
the quantity control and price control can be compared without considering the 
transaction costs involved to implement these policies. However, in a multi-firm 
economy, the preset quantity should be allocated via a tradable permit system if 
a quantity approach is implemented, while only one price is needed for the price 
approach. Therefore the price approach may incur less transaction cost than the 
quantity approach. The transaction cost may cause a quantity approach selected 
according to the relative-slope criterion to be unfavourable, or reinforce a price 
policy recommendation.
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3.4.3 Environmental Investment
As discussed in the previous chapter, environmental investment or pollution cleans­
ing activities cannot be omitted in the analysis. There are two ways to model 
a pollution cleansing activity. First, it can be expressed as a cleansing function 
separable to the damage function, that is,
U = f ( D , e ) - S -  g(D, 6) +  h{S, m), (3.8)
where S  is the spending on cleansing activities, /i is the uncertainty associated with 
the activities. The properties of the cleansing function are
hs (S, / i )> 0, hSs(S, f i )<  0, ^ (5 ,/ i )  > 0, h ^ ( S , / i ) <  0, hSfi(S, p) > 0.
For the cleansing activities to be justified, hs > 1 at least for some small value of 
S. And the budget constraint becomes
C + S < f ( D , e ) (3.9)
S < P D  (3.10)
It can be postulated before detailed analysis that the inclusion of environmental 
investment is relevant to the policy choice of D or P, only if the constraint (3.10) is 
binding. As the condition for a fully earmarked scheme can be found in the previous 
chapter, and holding to the case that (3.10) is binding, (3.8) can be rewritten as
U = f ( D , e ) -  P D -  g(D, 6) +  h(PD, n) (3.11)
Alternatively, the spending can be used to directly reduce the pollution, i.e.,
U = f ( D , e ) - S - g ( D - h ( S , n ) , 8 ) .
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This approach is more like the end-of-pipe treatment by firms. As argued previously, 
the environmental absorption capacity D is a production factor, and the treatment 
by firms is seen as a part of their production process. Therefore the former approach 
is more appropriate. After the messy derivation given in Appendix 3.C, the relative 
advantage of price control over quantity control is approximated as
m +  n ,  1 ,  ( c - d ) a j h ( m - n ) ( o } h)2
2m 2 f  m m( j  — 1) m(j  — l)(2mj — m — n)
The first two terms in the above expression are revised Weitzman’s rule as 
developed in (3.6), while the last two terms are new. Basically, they capture the 
effect of earmarking pollution related revenues. Several observations can be made 
from this expression.
First, because the magnitude of cleansing activity is determined by the pollution 
charges or permit auction revenues which is, in turn, affected by the production, 
the covariance of uncertainties in cleansing and production enters into the relative 
advantage. If there is no uncertainty in cleansing activity, or the uncertainty is 
independent to that in the production process, the inclusion of cleansing activity 
in the model does not change the revised Weitzman’s rule. However, it is highly 
possible they are correlated because the cleansing activity is just another kind of 
production activity.
Second, the relationship between uncertainties in damage and cleansing does 
not affect the relative advantage of price control over quantity control. This seems 
surprising. Although technically there is some relationship between damage and 
cleansing, they have separate effects in this model, and do not interact with each 
other. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the cleansing activity is determined 
by the spending, while the damage is determined by the pollution (or environmental 
factor used).
Last, it is known that, for the pollution tax to be fully earmarked, the condition 
that j  > 1 should be satisfied; and that nn < 0, n > 0 and c > d according to the
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properties of production and utility functions. It turns out that the last term is 
negative, and the sign of the third depends on the correlation between production 
and cleansing uncertainties. If they are positively (negatively) correlated, the sign 
is negative (positive). Therefore, if the pollution tax or permit auction revenue is 
used in environmental protection and the uncertainties in production and cleansing 
are positively correlated, it is more likely for a quantity control to be a better policy 
than in the case where earmarking is not considered. This effect reinforces that of 
correlation between uncertainties in production and damage, and may reverse the 
price control recommendation drawn from relative slopes. Even if the correlation is 
negative, it is still possible for a quantity control to be a better instrument. Because 
the relative advantage has a quadratic form in the covariance between production 
and cleansing uncertainties, cr^, and the coefficient of (cr^)i 2 is negative, given 
other parameters, only a closed range of negative covariance can lead to a positive 
relative advantage. If the absolute value of the covariance is high enough, a quantity 
control is still desirable.
To see whether the effect of earmarking is likely to make a real difference, sim­
ple numerical exercises can be conducted. It is assumed that the production and 
damage uncertainties are independent in order to focus on the effect of earmarking. 
Expression (3.12) can be rearranged in terms of relative slope as
and assume unit value of <r2, set the right-hand side of (3.13) equal to zero and 
solve for the “threshold value” of covariance as follows:
i  1 1 /  i n  / 2 \ 2
+ (j -  1)(2j  -  1 -  n / m ) ° fh
1 — n m
(3.13)
- ( c - d ) ( 2 j  -  1 - r )  
2(1 - r )
y / ( c -  d)2(2j -  1 -  r )2 + 2(j -  1)(1 -  r 2)(2j -  1 -  r) 
2(1 ~ r )
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Table 3.1: Threshold Value of Covariance Reversing Policy Choice
Relative Threshold value of covariance of production and cleansing uncertainties'
slope j  = 1.1 j  = 1.5 j  = 2.0 j  = 2.5
( - 1 / r ) High Low High Low High Low High Low
c — d — 1
0.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
0.2 -0.2712 -0.7622 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
0.5 -0.0526 -1.0141 -0.3333 -1.0000 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1.0 0.0000 -1.1000 0.0000 -1.5000 0.0000 -2.0000 0.0000 -2.5000
2.0 0.0245 -1.1578 0.1168 -1.7835 0.2278 -2.5611 0.3371 -3.3371
5.0 0.0387 -1.2054 0.1819 -2.0153 0.3532 -3.0199 0.5221 -4.0221
10.0 0.0434 -1.2252 0.2033 -2.1124 
c — d =  10
0.3947 -3.2129 0.5836 -4.3109
0.1 -0.0452 -10.1366 -0.2298 -10.6792 -0.4686 -11.3496 -0.7152 -12.0121
0.2 -0.0200 -10.3133 -0.1009 -11.5658 -0.2031 -13.1302 -0.3063 -14.6937
0.5 -0.0050 -10.6617 -0.0250 -13.3083 -0.0502 -16.6165 -0.0753 -19.9247
1.0 0.0000 -11.0000 0.0000 -15.0000 0.0000 -20.0000 0.0000 -25.0000
2.0 0.0025 -11.3358 0.0125 -16.6792 0.0250 -23.3583 0.0375 -30.0375
5.0 0.0040 -11.6707 0.0200 -18.3533 0.0399 -26.7066 0.0599 -35.0599
10.0 0.0045 -11.8227 0.0225 -19.1134 0.0449 -28.2267 0.0674 -37.3401
t Covariance of production and cleansing uncertainties falling between the high and low values will 
justify a price control model. A covariance higher than the high value or lower than the low value will 
make the price control unfavourable.
where r = n /m  is the relative slope.
The numeric results are presented in Table 3.1. The high and low values in the 
table are threshold values of covariance between production and cleansing uncertain­
ties that turn the policy recommendation from one mode to the other. Covariance 
falling between these two values justifies a price control mode, while covariance 
higher than the higher value or lower than the low value will make the price control 
unfavourable. The results confirm the above statement, i.e., a positive correlation 
between production and cleansing uncertainties tends to favour quantity control. 
For example, when the relative slope is the same, it would be the case of “policy 
neutral”—both price and quantity controls lead to the same welfare, however a small 
positive correlation will make a quantity control policy desirable. If the marginal 
product is 10 times steeper than the marginal damage (—1/r =  —m / n  — 10), a 
price control would be highly favourable according to the relative slope rule. How­
ever, when j  = 1.1 and c — d — 1, a covariance as small as 0.0434 will reverse the 
policy recommendation and make a quantity control policy favourable. But there 
is an asymmetry in the result. For example, if the marginal damage is 10 times
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steeper than the marginal product ( — 1/r = 0.1), it is impossible for a quantity 
control policy to become unfavourable for the parameter c — d — 1.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
Weitzman (1974) presents a simple rule to choose the policy options under un­
certainty in a partial equilibrium model. The selection of policies is determined 
by the relative slopes of marginal benefit (demand) and cost (supply) functions. 
However, it is found that the selection of policy options is very complicated in a 
general equilibrium setting, so that Weitzman’s rule cannot be directly applied. The 
complication arises from the interaction between the production and consumption 
sides, and from the confusion of benefits and costs of environmental factor. A re­
vised rule similar to Weitzman’s has been found under strong assumptions, namely, 
risk neutrality and separable utility. Introducing risk aversion and environmental 
spending in the model changes the relative advantages of one policy over the other. 
A quantity control policy is more likely to be favourable in these two situations.
There are several limitations in this analysis and further work is needed. First, 
the analysis is of the type of static general equilibrium. It would be interesting to 
explore the idea in a dynamic setting. Second, more factors and more products could 
be included in the model. Third, the hybrid policy, which combines the quantity 
control and price control, could be compared to the two “pure” policies discussed 
in this paper.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
3.A Derivation of Weitzman's Rule in General Equilibrium
With the new objective function (3.5), under a quantity control mode, the household 
selects a quantity level to maximise the expected value of (3.5):
max E[f (D,e)  -g{D,0) \  
The corresponding first order condition is
E [ f D( B , e ) } = E [ g D(D,9)] (3.A.1)
where D is used to denote a quantity control policy. When a price policy is an­
nounced, as mentioned above, the producer will adjust its production according to 
the following relationship
P  = f o ( D p ,e) (3.A.2)
or
D p = D(P,e) (3.A.3)
Knowing this relationship, the household selects a proper price to maximise the 
expected value of (3.5), that is,
max E[ f ( Dp (P,e),e) -  g(Dp (P,e),d)] . 
The first order condition is
f D{Dp (P,e),e)
dDp
dP
= E gD{Dp (P,e),8)
dDp
which gives
p _  E[gD(Dp (P,e)19) dDp /dP]  
E[dDp /dP]
(3.A.4)
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The relative advantage of price over quantity can be written as
A = E[f (Dp , e) -  g(Dp , 0)] -  £[/(£>, e) -  g(D, 0)] (3.A.5)
Following Weitzman (1974), it is assumed that both functions are of the following 
quadratic form within an appropriate neighborhood of D = D:
f (D,e)  as o(e) + (c + a{e))(D -  D) + -  (3.A.6)
g(D, 6) as b(6) + (d + 0(6)){D -  +  (3.A.7)
where a(e), a(e), b{6) and ß{9) are stochastic functions and c, d, m  and n are fixed 
coefficients. The following assumption has been made:9
£[a(£)] =  0 E[(a(e))2] = a)£J/3(0)] =  0 B[(/3(0))2] =  a2 (3.A.8)
and
£1a(e)/3(fl)] =  o% (3.A.9)
If shocks to production and damage functions are independent, then the covariance 
in the above equation (3.A.9) would be zero.
The stochastic functions a(e) = f (D,e)  and b{6) = g(D,9) translate different 
values of e and 9 into pure vertical shifts of the functions. Differentiate (3.A.6) and 
(3.A.7) with respect to D gives:
/ d (L>, e) = c +  a(e) +  m(D — D) (3.A.10)
9d (D, 9) = d + ß(9) +  n(D -  D) (3.A.11)
Using the above equations and (3.A.8), the following relations are available for
9 Assuming that a(e) and ß(9) have zero mean does not lose generality. A non-zero mean is
just like adding a constant number to the parameter c or d, but neither of them enters the final 
expression (3.A.20).
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the fixed coefficients of (3.A.6) and (3.A.7):
= c E 9d { D, 6) = d  fDD(D,e) =  m gDD(D,0) =  n
From (3.A.1) and D = D,
c — d . (3.A.12)
And from (3.A.8) and (3.A. 10), the variance of marginal product is
(fo(D,e)  -  E[fD(D,e)\?  = E (a(e) -  £[«(<■)]) =  <7? . (3.A.13)
S:milarly the variance of the marginal damage is
(9d (D, 0) -  E[gD(D, 9)}) = E (ß(0) -  E[ß(6)])| \2 =  O 9  '
Now consider the price control. From (3.A.10) and (3.A.2), we have
T-.P a P — c — aie) D p = D H-------------- — (3.A.14)
which implies
dDp 1____  r s j  _
dP m
Substituting (3.A. 15) into (3.A.4) yields
(3.A.15)
P ^ E [ g D {Dp (P,£),$)] . (3.A.16)
Replacing D in (3.A.11) by the expression for D p from (3.A.14) and plugging into 
(c.A.16), the following equation is obtained after using (3.A.8)
— Ti —
P = d + — (P -  c) (3.A.17)
m
Fx>m (3.A.12) and the condition m / 0  and n ^ O , (3.A.17) implies
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P = d = c (3.A.18)
Combining (3.A.3), (3.A.14), and (3.A.18),
D p = D — Q(g)
m
(3.A.19)
Now alternately substitute D = D = D and D = D p from (3.A.19) into (3.A.6) 
and (3.A.7). Then plugging the resulting values of (3.A.6) and (3.A.7) into (3.A.5), 
using (3.A.8) and (3.A.9), and collecting terms,
A = -
771 +  n 2
~ 2 m ? ~ Crf
(3.A.20)
3.B Derivation of Policy Rule in General Equilibrium when the Household is Risk 
Averse
With the new objective function (3.7), under a quantity control mode, the household 
selects a quantity level to maximise the expected value of (3.7)
max E[\n{f(D,e) -  g{D))]
The corresponding first order condition is
E
f p ( D, e ) - g ' ( D)
f ( D , e ) - g ( D )
0 (3.B.1)
where D is used to denote that it is a quantity control policy. When a price policy 
is announced, the producer will adjust its production according to the relationship 
(3.A.2) or (3.A.3). Knowing this relationship, the household selects a proper price 
to maximise the expected value of (3.7), that is,
max £[ln(/(T>p (P,e),£) -  g(Dp (P,e)))]
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The first order condition is
E
f D {Dp ( D , e ) , e ) - g '  [Dp ( P , e ) )d D p 
f ( D p , e ) - g ( D p) dP =  0
(3.B.2)
The relative advantage of price over quantity can be written as
A a  E[\n( f (Dp ,e) -  S(DP))] -  E[ln(f (D,e)  -  g(D))] (3.B.3)
It is assumed that both functions are of the following quadratic form within an 
appropriate neighbourhood of D = D:
f ( D , e )S a +  (c +  a(e))(D D f  (3.B.4)
g(D) ä b  + d ( D - D )  + ^ ( D - b f  (3.B.5)
where a, 6, m  and n are fixed coefficients, and a(e) is stochastic function which is 
characterised as:
E[a(e)} = 0 E[{ct(e))2] = a)  (3.B.6)
Differentiating (3.B.4) and (3.B.5) with respect to D, gives (3.A. 10) and
g ' ( D ) ^ d  + n{D -  D) (3.B.7)
Using (3.B.6), (3.B.7) and (3.A.10), the following relations are available for the 
fixed coefficients of (3.B.4) and (3.B.5):
f (D,e)  =  a g(D) = b ^  c
g'(D) = d / dd (A>, e) = m gnoiD)  =  n
From (3.B.1), using D =  D gives
c = d (3.B.8)
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Now consider the price control. Following the previous procedure, from (3.A. 10) 
and (3.A.2), gives (3.A.14), which implies (3.A.15). Substituting from (3.A.15) into 
(3.B.2) yields
E
P - g ' ( D PC(P),e))
f { D p , e ) - g { D p )
2* 0 (3.B.9)
To proceed, it is necessary to use the following approximation of expectation
E[x(a)} =  x(0) +  x'(0)E[a] + (3.B.10)
Replacing D in (3.B.4), (3.B.5) and (3.B.7) by the expression for D p from 
(3.A.14) and plugging into (3.B.9), the following equation is obtained after using 
(3.B.10) and (3.B.6):
P  = c 4- mp1/2, (3.B.11)
, - B  ±  V B 2 -  4AC
where p = ---------- — ---------- ;
and A = - m 2(m — n)3,
B = -cr2(ra — n)(m 2 4- n2) 4- 2m2(m — n)2(a — 6), 
C = (a — b) (cr2(m2 — 3n2) + 2m2(m — n)(a — 6)) .
Combining (3.A.3), (3.A.14), and (3.B.11),
D p ^  D + p1/2 -  ^  (3.B.12)
m
Now alternately substitute D = D = D and D = D p from (3.B.12) into (3.B.4) 
and (3.B.5). Then plugging the resulting values of (3.B.4) and (3.B.5) into (3.B.3), 
using (3.B.10) and (3.B.6), and collecting terms,
^  (m +  n ) ( a - 6 ) a 2
2 m2(a — b + (m — n)p/2)2
4-In a — b 4- (m — n)p/ 2 
a — b
(m2 4- n2)pa2 
4 m 2(a — b +  (m — n)p/2)2
(3.B.13)
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If the definition of relative advantage (3.B.3) is replaced by (3.A.5) for the 
current case to be directly comparable with Weitzman’s rule, the procedure giving 
(3.B.13) leads to the following result
A =  - m  + n 9---------------------- ( J r
2 m 2 f + (3.B.14)
3.C Derivation of Policy Rule in General Equilibrium when Environmental Spend­
ing is Included
With the new objective function (3.11), under a quantity control mode, the house­
hold selects a quantity level to maximise the expected value of (3.11)
mux E[f(D, e) — PD — g(D, 0) +  fi(PD, /i)]
and the price of environmental factor is determined by (3.A.2). The corresponding 
first order condition is
E [ D f DD( D , e ) ( h s ( P D , n ) - l )  + hs (PD,iJ,)fD(D,e)} = E[gD(D,9)} (3.C.1)
where D is used to denote it is a quantity control policy, and hs  denotes the partial 
derivative of h(S,f i) with respect to its first argument S(= PD).
As mentioned above, when a price policy is announced, the producer will ad­
just its production according to the relationship (3.A.2) or (3.A.3). Knowing this 
relationship, the household selects a proper price to maximise the expected value 
of (3.11), that is,
max E [ f ( D p (P,e),e) - P D p - g ( D p (P, e),9) + h ( PDp , ß )}
The first order condition is
E gD (D p (P , e ) , B ) ^ -  + h ( PD p , ß) ( o p + P ^ ) =  0 ,
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which gives
E[gD( P p (P,e),8) dDpß P  + (l -  hs (PDp ,n)) D p] 
E[hs (PDp ,n)dDp/ d P }
The relative advantage of price over quantity can be written as
(3.C.2)
A = E [ f ( D p ,e) -  P D p -  g(Dp ,+ h(PDp ,M)]
~E[ f (D,  e)-  PD  -  g(D,9) +  h(PD,  M)] (3.C.3)
It is assumed that both the production and damage functions are of the quadratic 
form within an appropriate neighbourhood of D = D, expressed as (3.A.6) and 
(3.A.7). However, for simplicity, it is assumed that the cleansing function has a 
linear form of spending:
h(S, m) =  U + 7 (ß))S =  (j + l (ß ) )PD  (3.C.4)
where 7 (/i) is stochastic function and j  are fixed coefficient. The mean and variance 
of the stochastic terms are assumed as expressed in (3.A.8) and (3.A.9), and
E h M \  =  E [ ( t (m))2] =  c
E[a(e)7 (^)] =  o)h , E\ß(0)~f(n)] = a2gh .
Implicitly, the cleansing function has a quadratic form in D too. Differentiating 
(3.A.6) and (3.A.7) with respect to D gives (3.A.10) and (3.A.11), and differentiating 
(3.C.4) with respect to S  gives,
(3.C.6)
Using equations (3.A.8)-(3.A.10) and (3.C.5)-(3.C.6), the following relations are 
available
fDD(D,e) = m,
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E[hs(S, / j )]Si j t
DfDü{D , e)(hs{S, n) -  1) =  Dm(j  -  1),
hs {S,ß)fD(D,£)
9d {D, 9 )
= jc  + afh ,
^  d .
From (3.C.1),
d = m( j  -  l )D + jc  + cr2fh (3.C.7)
Now consider the price control. From (3.A.10), (3.A.11), (3.A.2) and (3.A.14), 
(3.A. 15) is obtained, and
gD(Dp ,e)
d Dp
dP =  — fd +  —(P  — c)1 (3.C.8)m \ m  /
E[DP] = D + P - c
E[hs (PDp ,u)Dp} S  j D  + 3{P c) -  
1 J m m J
hs (PDp ,ii)
p , d D p
dP m
(3.C.9)
(3.C.10)
(3.C.11)
Substituting from (3.C.8)-(3.C.11) into (3.C.2), and using (3.C.7) yield
P ^ c  + 2 mcrjh
2m j  — m — n
(3.C.12)
Combining (3.A.14) and (3.C.12) gives
^ p A  a i s )  
D p = D -------—  + 2crA
m 2mj — m — n (3.C.13)
Now alternately substitute D — D = D and D = D p from (3.C.13) into (3.A.6), 
(3.A.7) and (3.C.4). Then plugging the resulting values of (3.A.6), (3.A.7) and
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(3.B.4) into (3.A.5); using (3.A.8), (3.A.9) and (3.C.5); and collecting terms,
m +  n j2  1_^2 (c -  d)a2fh (m -  n)(a2fh)2
2m 2 f  m  m( j  — 1) m(j  — 1)(2mj  — m — n
- (3.C.14)
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Chapter 4
Effectiveness and Efficiency: An Assessment of 
China’s Environmental Protection Policy
Opinions about China’s pollution control policies have been quite controversial. 
Critics argue that China’s environmental quality tends to worsen, while supporters 
claim China has made great achievements in environmental protection.1 However, 
those discussions are mainly qualitative or based on particular case studies. This 
chapter tries to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of China’s pollution control 
policies in a quantitative way, and is organised as follows. The next section gives a 
brief introduction to policies with the emphasis on the pollution levy system. Section 
4.2 describes simply the data used for this analysis. Then the changes in China’s 
pollutant discharges are decomposed in section 4.3 to analyse the factors underlining 
these changes. The theory of equilibrium pollution is introduced in section 4.4 to set 
up a mechanism for efficiency testing, and the estimation functions of environmental 
supply and demand are specified in section 4.5. The estimation results are presented 
and discussed in section 4.6, after which some concluding remarks are provided.
4.1 Introduction to China’s Pollution Control Policies
One important environmental policy in China is “prevention first” . The popular 
(or official) view has been the slogan of “harmonised development of the economy 
and the environment”. It was argued that the pattern of “control after pollution”
1A comprehensive discussion of the problems and difficulties in China’s environmental protection 
can be found in Sims (1999).
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is only a phenomenon in the capitalist world, whilst economic growth could be 
achieved with an improvement in environmental quality in socialist China. However, 
this view is challenged by the real situation, and the guidelines for environmental 
protection have gradually become more pragmatic. The change can first be found in 
the inaugural speech to the inter-ministerial National Committee of Environmental 
Protection by the then State Counciller Song Jian when he took the office of the 
Committee Chairman in September 1988. He pointed out, “our current task is 
• • • to prevent the environmental quality from further deterioration along with the 
economic development. • • • When the economy develops to a certain level and we 
have enough economic resources later, we will improve the environmental quality 
eventually” (Song 1988).
Another policy, which is more operational, is “whoever causes pollution is re­
sponsible for its elimination” and “polluter pays” . It is argued that, if the industries, 
enterprises and institutions that discharge pollutants shifted responsibility for pollu­
tion control onto the government and society, it would be difficult to raise the funds 
to control pollution (Qu 1991). As will be seen, the requirement that enterprises 
meet discharge standards, the pollution levy system, and the three-synchronisation 
system are all based on this policy.
As the funds for constructing waste treatment and new “clean” production fa­
cilities are not available in the short term, the Chinese government has adopted the 
policy of strengthening environmental management as a realistic and active way 
to control pollution (Qu 1992). The term “environmental management” includes 
a broad range of activities, such as monitoring and enforcement by environmental 
protection authorities and good housekeeping practices at factories.
A set of instruments has been developed to carry out these policies in China. 
They are environmental impact assessment (EIA), pollution levy system, three- 
synchronisation policy, pollution report and discharge permit system, environmental 
responsibility system, centralised pollution control, limited time treatment, and 
assessment of urban environmental quality, etc. Most of them fall into the category
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of command and control regulation.
4.1.1 Pollution Levy System
China’s pollution levy system dates from the late 1970s. A brief introduction to the 
history and implementation of this system is given in the subsection 1.3.1 of this 
thesis.
This system has received heavy criticism. For example, the standard was set 
on the concentration only, and firms could simply dilute their emissions to meet 
the standard. Now quantity control has also been introduced. It is also argued 
that the levy rate is too low to create an incentive for firms to comply with the 
environmental regulation. Thus, from some critics’ point of view, the levy is merely 
a local financing mechanism and is ineffective as a regulation instrument. Moreover, 
the strictness of enforcement is believed to vary widely, so that factories in different 
regions face very different penalties for polluting (Qu 1991; NEPA 1994; Shibli and 
Markandya 1995; Wang and Lu 1997).2
However, a series of papers by World Bank staff show that the pollution levy 
system has played an important role in preventing China’s water environment from 
further deterioration. Using firm level data, Dasgupta et al. (1996) find that the 
current pollution levy system provides an economic incentive to abate. However, 
their results also suggest that changing to a full emissions charge system would 
greatly reduce overall abatement cost. Based on the equilibrium pollution theory, 
an econometric analysis by Wang and Wheeler (1996) finds that the water pollution 
levy system is neither arbitrary nor ineffective. Across provinces, and over time, 
variations in the effective levy rate are well explained by proxies for local valuation of 
environmental damage and community capacity to enforce local norms. But their
2Responding to these critiques, NEPA has been reforming the system in four directions: moving 
from a pollution levy only for over-standard emissions to a levy for total emissions; moving from 
charging the “worst case” pollutant to charging multiple-pollutants; moving from a pollution levy 
based on only concentration standard to both concentration and quantity; moving from static to 
dynamic.
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findings cannot be extended to the area of air pollution control without further 
analysis. Moreover, as the environmental supplies are concurrently determined for 
all elements, consideration of only wastewater may bias the results.
4.1.2 Environmental Impact Assessment
Clause 6 of the 1979 provisional environmental protection law states: “All enter­
prises and institutions shall pay adequate attention to the prevention of pollution 
and damage to the environment during site selection, design, construction, and 
operation. Project design cannot be started until the report on the potential envi­
ronmental effects has been reviewed and approved by the responsible environmental 
protection department and other relevant administrative department • • • ”
Formal implementation of EIA was followed by an administrative order from the 
National Environmental Protection Commission in 1981. New projects are required 
to fill in a simple environmental impact assessment form or carry out a formal EIA 
procedure according to the nature and size of the proposed project, which also 
determines the jurisdiction of evaluating and approving the EIA report between 
environmental protection authorities at different levels. Similar to the practice 
in other countries, an EIA for a proposed project involves assessing the existing 
environmental quality of the project site, predicting the effect on environmental 
quality of the project and raising some recommendations on how to mitigate any 
adverse effects. However, the public in China has little chance of participating in the 
EIA process. The practice of EIA in China is often criticised as “merely following 
the procedure and making a gesture to give the impression of doing something” 
because the proposed projects are usually backed by the government and it is hard 
to reject them merely on the basis of environmental concerns.
4.1.3 Three-Synchronisation Policy
The three-synchronisation policy, or “three simultaneous steps” policy, requires that 
the design, construction and operation of a new production facility be synchronised
96
with the design, construction and operation of appropriate waste treatment fa­
cilities. A production facility cannot be put into operation without passing the 
evaluation of this three-synchronisation requirement by environmental protection 
authorities and line industrial administrative authorities.
This policy has also been criticised as “making a gesture” because firms can just 
shut down the waste treatment facilities after passing the evaluation. Actually this 
has been a common practice for firms, especially township and village enterprises. 
This not only contributes nothing to environmental protection, but also wastes 
resources in building treatment facilities which may never be used.
4.1.4 Other Policy Instruments
Limited time treatment. Every year, environmental protection authorities identify 
some heavily polluting factories in their jurisdictions and set deadlines for these 
firms to treat their pollution to meet the standard. If the requirement is not met 
in time, the firm will be ordered to temporarily halt production, or even be closed 
or relocated.
The pollution report and discharge permit system requires polluting factories to 
report their pollution discharge to local environmental authorities. A discharge 
permit is then issued according to the situation. Although implemented for several 
years, this system is still at the preliminary stage, because it is difficult and costly to 
determine the appropriate number of permits. To date, only a few regional markets 
have emerged for permit trading at experimental stage.
Centralised pollution control. In newly established industrial parks, individual 
firms are encouraged to pipe their emissions into a centralised treatment facility. 
This practice has been promoted because it may provide economies of scale and 
may be cost-efficient.
The environmental responsibility system is usually taken to refer to the environ­
mental protection contract signed by government leaders at different levels. This 
system is mainly designed as a tool to draw more attention to environmental pro-
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tection from government leaders.
An assessment of urban environmental quality is conducted annually and the re­
sults are reported in the media. This creates public pressure on local government 
to improve environmental quality.
A taxation exemption or deduction is granted to firms using or recycling wastes. 
However, this instrument is outside the control of local environmental authorities.
4.2 The Data
4.2.1 Data source
Five-year (1992-6) environmental and economic data for 28 provinces, autonomous 
regions and municipalities directly under the central government in mainland China 
(Tibet and Hainan are excluded due to missing data) are mainly taken from vari­
ous China Environmental Yearbooks (Editorial Committee of China Environmental 
Yearbook 1993-98) and China Statistical Yearbooks (SSB 1990-1998).
However, the pollution emission data in China Environmental Yearbooks include 
only “polluting firms owned by governments at and/or above county level” . In order 
to get the whole picture of emissions, the total emissions are estimated using two 
assumptions: (1) other firms owned by governments at and/or above county level 
are pollution-free, otherwise they would be included in the statistics by requirement 
(and definition); and (2) firms owned by township and village governments and 
private firms have the same pollution emission ratio.3 Therefore, the total emissions 
of one pollutant are calculated as follows:
e* =
ec . .
X xy<>
3Because large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have more advanced technology and are more 
closely monitored by government agencies than  the township and village enterprises (TVEs) and pri­
vate firms, TVEs and private firms tend to  discharge more pollu tants per unit of output. Therefore 
this assum ption may make the estim ated emissions conservative. However, this conservativeness 
may be corrected or perhaps overcorrected by the fact th a t big SOEs may have a high proportion 
of heavily polluting sectors.
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where e*, Yt are, respectively, total emission amount and total industrial output 
value; ec and Yc are, respectively, the emission and output value of firms owned by 
governments at and/or above county level.
There are no data available for waste gas and solid waste emissions violating the 
standard. However, the treated amount of waste gas emissions is identified in the 
statistics. It is assumed that those treated discharges meet the emission standard, 
i.e., the excess waste gas emissions are calculated as the difference between total 
emissions and treated volume.
The environmental regulation indices are calculated as the enforcement rates 
of environmental impact assessment, “three synchronisation” , pollution permit and 
limited time treatment, and the staff numbers in environmental protection author­
ities. The enforcement rate of the pollution permit system is measured in the ratio 
of the number of firms reporting their emissions to the total number of firms in 
each region. The enforcement rate of the pollution control within deadline (lim­
ited time treatment) is measured in the ratio of the number of pollution control 
projects actually completed in the year to the number of projects that should be 
completed. Staff is measured in number per 10,000 RMB yuan of industrial output 
and normalised across regions and over time.
Because the producer price index is not available for every province, the price 
index of firms’ capital investment is used to deflate the output value. The consumer 
price index is used to calculate real per capita income.
4.2.2 A first look at the data
The data show that there are tremendous variations in effective levy rates across 
regions. For example, in 1996 the effective levy rate varies from 0.221 (Shang­
hai) to 0.024 yuan/ton (Hubei) for excess wastewater; from 0.292 (Beijing) to 
0.026 yuan/kg (Shandong) for COD; from 6.458 (Tianjin) to 0.536 yuan/10,000m3 
(Ningxia) for excess waste gas; from 0.637 (Xingjiang) to 0.066 yuan/10,000m3 
(Shandong) for waste gas; from 0.063 (Heilongjiang) to 0.005 yuan/kg (Shaanxi)
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for SO2 ; from 0.152 (Guangdong) to 0.009 yuan/kg (Shaanxi) for smoke dust; from 
0.194 (Tianjin) to 0.015 yuan/kg (Shaaxi) for powder dust; and from 9.295 (Shan­
dong) to 0.020 yuan/ton (Qinghai) for solid wastes (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1). 
Moreover, the difference in effective levy rate across regions has tended to increase 
over time (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2).
Table 4.1: Selected Statistics for Effective Levy Rates
P o l lu ta n ts Y ear M ax M in M ean M e d ia n V a ria n c e
C oeff.
V a r ia tio n
E x cess 1992 0.155 0.028 0.071 0 .064 0.001 45 .485
w a s te 1993 0.165 0.024 0.058 0 .050 0.001 50 .607
w a te r 1994 0.140 0.022 0 .057 0 .047 0.001 51 .115
( y u a n / 1995 0.222 0.014 0.066 0.051 0.002 71 .213
to n ) 1996 0.221 0.024 0.071 0 .043 0 .003 76 .168
C O D 1992 0.292 0.035 0 .117 0 .113 0.003 47 .014
( y u a n / 1993 0.249 0.041 0.106 0 .080 0.003 54 .037
kg) 1994 0.219 0.013 0.098 0.090 0.003 54 .799
1995 0.309 0.025 0.100 0.073 0.006 77 .503
1996 0.292 0.026 0.105 0 .070 0 .006 75.479
E x cess 1992 3.671 0.341 1.845 1.883 0 .500 38 .323
w a s te 1993 3.573 0.655 1.591 1.641 0 .383 38 .862
g as 1994 3.527 0.722 1.625 1.425 0 .506 43.781
( y u a n / 1995 5.732 0.434 1.657 1.448 1.297 68 .724
10000m 3 1996 6.458 0.536 1.812 1.463 1.718 72.346
W a s te 1992 0 .834 0.057 0.377 0 .363 0 .024 40 .626
gas 1993 0 .547 0.118 0.304 0.275 0 .012 36 .334
( y u a n / 1994 0.488 0.102 0.278 0 .233 0.012 40 .216
10000m 3) 1995 0.660 0.087 0 .267 0 .229 0.022 55 .564
1996 0 .637 0.066 0 .258 0 .198 0.022 57 .709
S 0 2 1992 0 .143 0.004 0.035 0 .029 0.001 88 .439
( y u a n / 1993 0.081 0.008 0 .027 0.023 0.000 67.406
kg) 1994 0.070 0.005 0 .024 0.019 0.000 64.481
1995 0.063 0.005 0.023 0 .018 0.000 70.964
1996 0.063 0.005 0 .024 0 .018 0.000 70.600
S m oke 1992 0.085 0.008 0.043 0 .040 0.000 49 .834
d u s t 1993 0.090 0.010 0 .037 0 .034 0.000 54.278
( y u a n / 1994 0.093 0.008 0.036 0.033 0.000 52.845
kg) 1995 0 .157 0.008 0.039 0.030 0.001 82.229
1996 0.152 0.009 0.041 0.032 0.001 75 .469
P o w d e r 1992 0.174 0.016 0.061 0 .049 0.001 54 .360
d u s t 1993 0.178 0.019 0.053 0 .037 0.001 65 .385
( y u a n / 1994 0.165 0.014 0.051 0 .040 0.001 62 .235
kg) 1995 0.241 0.013 0.053 0.038 0 .002 90 .537
1996 0.193 0.015 0.056 0.039 0.002 71 .677
S o lid 1992 12.774 0.000 1.824 0 .987 8.015 155.210
w as te s 1993 7.075 0.001 1.335 0.692 2 .487 118.105
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Table 4.1: Selected Statistics for Effective Levy Rates (continued)
Pollutants Year Max Min Mean Median Variance
Coeff.
Variation
(yuan/ 1994 5.826 0.000 1.409 0.900 1.804 95.321
ton) 1995 15.755 0.010 2.944 1.304 17.223 140.954
1996 9.295 0.020 1.683 0.885 4.343 123.829
This supports the criticism that the stringency of enforcement varies widely 
across regions. However, this disparity in effective rates may reflect the differences in 
conditions across regions, and it may be desirable in order to achieve cost-efficiency. 
Without further study, a judgement cannot be made based only on this observation.
The second observation from the data is that effective levy rates in real terms 
remain at similar levels, or even decline over time (see Figure 4.2). For example, 
the mean of effective rates for excess wastewater was, respectively, 0.0709 in 1992 
and 0.0714 in 1996, while the means rate for COD declined from 0.1174 to 0.1054 
over the same period. A similar result is found for other pollutants. Given this 
trend, the relationship between the effective rate and pollution intensity is quite 
complicated. The difference across regions suggests a negative relationship, while 
the change over time gives the reverse answer since the intensity has declined over 
time).
In contrast to the levy system, other regulation indices vary across regions to 
a much smaller degree, and the variation seems to decrease over time (see Table 
4.2). Except for the permit system, other systems have a much smaller coefficient 
of variation. This is because these systems have been implemented for quite a long 
time. In contrast, the pollution report and permit system is at the preliminary 
stage of implementation and the related data may not be reliable. Therefore the 
index for the permit system is dropped in the following work.
The pollution intensities decrease steadily over time. This shows that China 
has had significant achievement in preventing further environmental deterioration 
along with economic development. This will be discussed in detail in the following 
section. The variance of pollution intensities across regions is slightly higher than
101
Figure 4.1: Effective Pollution Levy Rates, 1996
■  excess wastewater (yuan/t wastewater) 
□  COD (yuan/kg COD)
a) Excess Waste Water & COD
b) Excess Waste Gas & Solid Wastes
■  S02 (yuan/kg)
□  smoke dust (yuan/kg) 
E3 powder dust (yuan/kg)
c) SO2, Smoke Dust & Powder Dust
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Figure 4.2: Average and Variance of Effective Levy Rates
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Table 4.2: Selected Statistics for Regulation Indices
Pollutants Year Max Min Mean Median Variance
Coeff.
Variation
EIA 1992 100.00 1.46 64.93 70.69 641.53 39.01
1993 100.00 1.66 66.67 70.94 581.42 36.17
1994 100.00 14.25 71.36 79.71 546.80 32.77
1995 100.00 23.35 81.25 87.01 314.22 21.82
1996 100.00 43.90 84.47 92.45 232.69 18.06
Three 1992 100.00 43.36 86.72 89.97 144.13 13.84
synchro- 1993 98.53 53.54 84.37 88.55 131.04 13.57
nizations 1994 99.27 69.72 86.64 86.59 57.50 8.75
1995 96.99 31.62 85.10 88.21 151.10 14.44
1996 99.80 77.65 89.60 90.00 36.03 6.70
Deadline 1992 143.36 66.28 88.74 89.11 241.58 17.51
1993 107.26 66.67 85.89 85.00 66.45 9.49
1994 106.27 26.32 83.02 85.04 198.34 16.96
1995 125.68 8.06 79.53 82.88 393.23 24.94
1996 112.00 26.32 78.27 82.28 381.86 24.96
Staff in 1992 8.88 0.86 3.07 3.05 3.16 57.85
environ- 1993 7.55 0.83 2.95 2.82 2.81 56.87
mental 1994 7.18 0.73 2.60 2.23 2.52 61.02
authority 1995 7.67 0.55 2.44 2.04 2.39 63.41
1996 7.56 0.56 2.45 2.30 2.34 62.50
Permit 1992 32.34 0.00 1.66 0.32 35.25 357.66
1993 32.32 0.01 1.63 0.44 35.15 364.65
1994 30.21 0.00 2.55 0.41 55.26 290.97
1995 48.97 0.00 2.35 0.49 81.24 382.91
1996 41.47 0.00 3.65 0.71 70.89 230.89
tha t of effective levy rates, but in contrast to the trend of levy rates, the variance 
of intensities tends to dampen over time (see Figure 4.3 and Table 4.3).
Finally, plotting an effective levy rate against the intensity for each pollutant 
clearly shows there is a negative relation between them (see Figure 4.4). This implies 
tha t there may exist a well-behaved demand function for pollution or environmental 
absorption capacity.
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Table 4.3: Selected Statistics for Pollution Intensities
P o l lu ta n ts Y ear M a x M in M ean M e d ia n V a ria n c e
C oeff.
V a r ia tio n
E x cess 1992 123.778 14.748 57.061 51 .404 868.271 51.640
w a s te w a te r 1993 104.845 9.799 48 .642 43 .995 589 .205 49.903
( to n /1 0 0 0 0 1994 91.493 9.164 40 .943 34.051 473 .644 53.156
y u a n ) 1995 89 .938 5.926 38 .156 30 .648 506 .166 58.963
1996 93 .493 5.669 35.832 28 .377 450 .826 59.256
C O D 1992 102.291 10.583 35.574 32 .715 443 .222 59.181
(k g /1 0 0 0 0 1993 111.826 4.942 28.866 26 .360 394 .373 68 .797
y u a n ) 1994 188.916 6.363 30.308 20 .697 1280.385 118.063
1995 121.001 4.284 28.964 20 .756 570 .506 82.466
1996 94.469 4.056 26.162 23 .523 328 .905 69.321
E x cess 1992 2.733 0.323 1.053 0.894 0.402 60.172
w a s te  g as 1993 2.994 0.242 1.017 0.826 0 .495 69.191
(m 3/y u a n ) 1994 2.789 0.196 0.821 0.674 0 .334 70.444
1995 2 .337 0.125 0.819 0.679 0 .320 69.124
1996 2.157 0.101 0.782 0.611 0 .238 62.394
W a s te  g as 1992 10.806 1.927 4 .867 4.300 5.021 46 .037
(m 3/y u a n ) 1993 10.137 1.582 4 .818 4.241 5 .508 48 .706
1994 9.280 1.758 4.365 3.874 4 .590 49 .076
1995 8.770 1.683 4 .244 3.952 3.785 45 .837
1996 9.676 1.646 4 .796 4.371 5.138 47.258
S 0 2 1992 439.133 19.233 82 .910 51.612 7695.435 105.806
(k g /1 0 0 0 0 1993 254.386 19.320 71 .407 49 .715 3120.368 78.228
y u a n ) 1994 255.456 16.601 66 .973 46 .484 3091.762 83.024
1995 212.278 13.900 61.182 43 .887 2236.278 77.292
1996 225.722 14.122 64 .403 47 .015 2696.252 80.626
S m o k e 1992 332.043 7.997 57 .328 45 .719 3822.622 107.849
d u s t 1993 130.019 8.018 49 .783 44 .696 1088.934 66.285
(k g /1 0 0 0 0 1994 102.265 6.449 41.161 37 .939 773.715 67.578
y u a n ) 1995 93.455 5.134 38.672 34 .842 692 .803 68.062
1996 105.766 5.368 38 .357 34.501 746.195 71.217
P o w d e r 1992 79.762 3.676 33 .417 30 .712 313 .399 52.976
d u s t 1993 70.523 3.564 32 .657 29 .979 300.381 53.071
(k g /1 0 0 0 0 1994 64.138 2.823 28 .017 26 .510 251.375 56.591
y u a n ) 1995 76.838 2.422 27 .790 26.182 286 .178 60.874
1996 51.483 2.413 25 .750 23 .816 192.571 53.892
S o lid 1992 1331.739 6.387 247.801 68 .193 123691.742 141.928
w a s te s 1993 954.771 5.496 192.202 60.501 57974.905 125.274
(k g /1 0 0 0 0 1994 836.640 1.855 150.283 48 .222 41082.631 134.872
y u a n ) 1995 842.621 1.155 152.604 53.641 57013 .677 156.467
1996 764.081 1.379 109.845 50 .467 25644 .420 145.786
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Figure 4.4: Pollution Intensities vs Effective Levy Rates
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4.3 Factors contributing to the fall in pollution density
Let Qu and Qt denote the real output level of sector i and the total output level, 
respectively, in time t; Eu the pollution emission of sector i in time £; eu the emission 
coefficient of sector i in time t (pollution emission per unit of real output value); su 
the output share of sector i in time t. The difference in pollution emission between 
two times can be decomposed into:
E2 -  E\ = 53 i L \ Q i 2 ^ i 2  -  53 i Q i l e i l
=  53 i Q i 2 ? i 2  -  53 i Q i 2 C i l  + 53 i Q i 2 ^ i l  ~  53 i Q i l e i l
= J2iQi2 {ei2 — C*l) + 53i(Qi2 ~ Qil) &il 
53 i(Qi2 — Qil)en — 53 -  Ql̂ il)ei!
— 53i(^2Si2 — Q2SH +  Q2SH — QlSn)en
=  53 i { Q 2 ( S i2 -  S i l )  + ( Q 2 -  Ql)«il] e u
— Q 2 53 i ( s i2 _ sil)etl + (Q2 -  Ql) 53 i s H e H
Therefore, the decrease or increase in emissions consists of three effects: the 
efficiency effect, which is the change in emission coefficient for a given amount of 
output resulting from the economical use of input materials, the structural effect, 
and the growth effect:
E 2 -  E\ — 53iQi2(e*2 — eil) + Q2 53 i(si2 ~  S*l)e*l +  (Q2 -  Q l)J 2 isi2eil •
It should be pointed out that selecting different levels of output, sectoral shares 
and emission coefficients results in different decompositions:
e 2 -  Ei =  53iQi2 (e*2— en) +  Qi 53i(si2 — «a) e*i +  (Q2 -  Qi) 5 3 *s*2 e*i;
E2 — El =  Z i Q i l  (e i2 — e i l )  + Ql 53i(si2 — szl) e i2 + (Q2 ~ Ql) 53isi2ei2!
E2 E\ — 53 tQil (ez2 — eil) + Q2 53 i ( s i2 — S i l )  ei2 + (Q2 — Ql) 53 i s i l e i 2 -
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These results are different in general. The result of the first decomposition 
approach for China pollution data is reported in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.5. It can 
be found that the decline in China’s pollution intensity mainly results from the 
efficiency effect.4 For example, actual wastewater discharge fell by 35695 million 
tons over the period between 1992 and 1996. If the emission rate and industrial 
structure had remained stable, the discharge would have increased by 35362 million 
tons over the same period. The structural effect puts another 275.4 million tons 
on the top of that, which implies that China’s economy moves to a more polluting 
structure.5 Thus the only driving force for reducing that discharge to its actual 
level is the efficiency effect. Most other water pollutants, air pollutants and solid 
wastes show a similar pattern.
Table 4.4: Decomposition of Change in Emission: Three Effects
Effect 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1992-96
W astew ater (10,000 ton) 
efficiency -535656.86 -1162581.46 394995.39 -2266266.96 -3569509.89
stru c tu ra l -73072.52 -21093.66 -59852.88 181555.63 27536.56
grow th 627596.70 1356710.68 577746.33 974101.98 3536155.69
to ta l 18867.33 173035.55 912888.84 -1110609.35 -5817.64
M ercury (ton) 
efficiency -8.84 -15.52 3.28 -12.08 -33.16
stru c tu ra l -3.24 1.54 0.15 0.68 -0.87
growth 5.77 9.79 3.26 5.84 24.66
to ta l -6.32 - 4.19 6.69 -5.55 -9.37
C adm ium  (ton) 
efficiency 5.09 -71.25 85.06 -166.42 -147.53
stru c tu ra l -31.67 61.82 9.71 -37.38 2.48
growth 35.57 80.17 44.26 90.03 250.04
to ta l 8.99 70.74 139.04 -113.77 104.99
C hrom ium  (ton) 
efficiency -170.31 -277.08 45.27 -505.11 -907.22
stru c tu ra l 89.63 9.47 -0.49 -8.80 89.81
growth 115.82 263.46 105.88 174.81 659.96
to ta l 35.14 -4.15 150.66 -339.11 -157.46
4This result is similar to the findings of Zhang (1998b, 2000b) and Garbaccio, Ho, and Jorgenson 
(1999b) about energy efficiency improvement in China.
5A similar result is reported by Garbaccio, Ho, and Jorgenson (1999b) who find that structural 
change actually increased the use of energy in China between 1978 and 1995.
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Table 4.4: Decomposition of Change in Emission: Three Effects (Continued)
E ffec t 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1992-96
L e a d  ( to n )  
e ffic iency 81.26 -551 .29 189.15 -666 .68 -947 .56
s t r u c tu r a l -103 .68 163.44 -62 .22 -126 .79 -129 .25
g ro w th 249.03 628 .90 294.70 487 .06 1659.69
to ta l 226.61 241 .04 421 .62 -306.41 582.87
A rse n ic  ( to n )
effic iency -51 .46 -303 .33 -54.71 -406 .32 -815 .82
s t r u c tu r a l -87 .56 61.39 54.91 50.97 79.70
g ro w th 228.23 527.42 261.08 406 .46 1423.19
to ta l 89.21 285.47 261 .27 51.11 687.07
V o la tile  p h e n o l ( to n )
effic iency -2445 .41 -2096 .85 1974.64 -5806 .93 -8374 .56
s t r u c tu r a l -561 .17 196.42 -515 .49 1094 .44 214.20
g ro w th 1702.80 3121.05 1466.60 2608.39 8898 .84
to ta l -1303 .78 1220.61 2925.74 -2104 .10 738.48
C y a n id e  ( to n )
effic iency -1935 .07 -1150 .42 138.31 -1243 .52 -4190 .69
s t r u c tu r a l -70 .50 26.02 -360 .20 125.25 -279 .43
g ro w th 870 .87 1402.85 614.03 906.38 3794 .14
to ta l -1134 .69 278.45 392.14 -211 .88 -675 .99
O il ( to n )  
effic iency -1874 .84 -61910 .89 16529.77 -48400.21 -95656 .17
s t r u c tu r a l -1613 .43 1559.37 -2927 .02 2824 .07 -157 .00
g ro w th 17403.49 43156.82 14583.18 25734.60 100878.08
to ta l 13915.22 -17194 .70 28185 .93 -19841 .54 5064.91
S u lp h id e  ( to n )
effic iency -35481.11 -23139 .03 2592 .95 -53623 .65 -109650 .83
s t r u c tu r a l -767 .95 -3289 .59 1143.29 6579.32 3665 .07
g ro w th 16583.88 27516.90 11313.10 18444.12 73858.00
to ta l -19665 .19 1088.29 15049.35 -28600.21 -32127 .76
C h e m ic a l o x y g en  d e m a n d  (C O D ) ( to n )
effic iency -2173921 .82 -1737938 .94 2584921.04 -8923791 .65 -10250731 .38
s t r u c tu r a l -228982 .83 -623942 .84 -492529 .73 2221602.01 876146.61
g ro w th 2028720 .56 4205747 .29 2009574 .80 3594841 .23 11838883.88
to ta l -374184 .09 1843865.50 4101966.11 -3107348 .42 2464299 .12
S u s p e n d in g  s u b s ta n c e s  ( to n )
effic iency -4891852 .96 -4309655 .38 3161175.65 -7359262 .07 -13399594 .75
s t r u c tu r a l -496249 .95 284218 .12 72759 .47 726092 .48 586820.12
g ro w th 2507742 .54 4199557 .95 1727918.83 3410924 .50 11846143.82
to ta l -2880360 .37 174120.69 4961853.95 -3222245 .08 -966630.81
W a s te  g a s  (10 ,000  m 3)
effic iency -47811702 -593448644 140699532 -574735559 -1075296372
s t r u c tu r a l -71957522 183691731 72286611 -92419075 91601745
g ro w th 239206245 563494994 253647821 442342302 1498691362
to ta l 119437022 153738080 466633964 -224812331 514996735
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Table 4.4: Decomposition of Change in Emission: Three Effects (Continued)
Effect 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1992-96
SO2 (ton) 
efficiency -1765706.61 -7255569.98 -1543077.52 -8521384.82 -19085738.92
structural -1324223.06 1319202.34 2272202.80 -822015.56 1445166.52
growth 3387470.92 7403765.94 3240301.36 5206731.21 19238269.43
total 297541.26 1467398.30 3969426.64 -4136669.17 1597697.03
Smoke dust (ton) 
efficiency -629528.48 -6772193.29 -1042762.51 -6283097.47 -14727581.75
structural -797192.81 764313.75 1445149.22 -445207.96 967062.19
growth 2238056.06 5145636.25 1937365.25 3105605.14 12426662.70
total 811334.77 -862243.29 2339751.96 -3622700.29 -1333856.85
Powder dust (ton) 
efficiency 293297.73 -10012286.80 5942866.38 -11185367.29 -14961489.98
structural -492312.65 5454467.02 -824015.42 -1672521.51 2465617.45
growth 2213085.27 5589038.86 2433284.79 4929251.06 15164659.99
total 2014070.36 1031219.08 7552135.76 -7928637.74 2668787.45
Solid wastes (10,000 ton) 
efficiency -866.55 -1805.30 444.04 -2066.41 -4294.22
structural -289.04 403.42 159.04 -192.65 80.77
growth 680.03 1265.07 488.88 895.50 3329.49
total -475.56 -136.80 1091.95 -1363.55 -883.96
The fact tha t structural change had a minor or even negative effect on the 
decrease in pollutant discharge is not as surprising as it first seems. Although the 
government is dedicated to encouraging the development of “low-polluting” and 
“pollution-free” industries, it cannot resist the strong demand for goods produced 
by “high-polluting” industries. As the inverted U-shape theory suggests, at the 
initial stage of development, a country’s environmental quality will worsen along 
with the development.6
6For the discussion and empirical work about this theory, see Grossman and Kruegar (1993, 
1995), Seiden and Song (1994), Shafik (1994), Torras and Boyce (1998), de Bruyn, van den Bergh, 
and Opschoor (1998), Rothman (1998), Suri and Chapman (1998), Kaufmann et al. (1998), Unruh 
and Moomaw (1998), Agras and Chapman (1999), and Dinda, Coondoo, and Pal (2000). Most 
authors report an inverted U-shaped curve between environmental quality indicators and devel­
opment. The turning point reported in the literature is between $1,375 to $10,000 of per capita 
income. China’s income level, about US$800 per capita, is well below that point. Dinda, Coondoo, 
and Pal (2000) show that the environmental Kuznets curves are downward sloping for suspended 
particulate matter and SO2 in a broad range of per capita income, i.e. from 0 to more than 
US$8000. However, a closer observation of the lower end of per capita income, probably less than 
US$1000, where China lies, may still reveal a positive relationship between pollution and income 
(Dinda, Coondoo, and Pal 2000, Figure 1).
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Figure 4.5: Decomposition of Pollution Changes: Three Effects
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Figure 4.5: Decomposition of Pollution Changges: Three Effects (Continued)
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However, the above decomposition reveals that actual pollution is well below the 
Laissez-faire case. The government’s goal, to “prevent the environmental quality 
from further deterioration along with the economic development” , has been achieved 
in this sense. In turn this means that the action taken in China has been effective 
in reducing pollution. However, many factors may be related to the favourable 
efficiency effect. In addition to tighter and effective environmental regulation, the 
opening of the economy and increasing competitiveness lead to efficient resource 
allocation and usage, and this may reduce emission intensity due to less wasteful
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use of raw materials. Therefore further study is needed to identify the underlin­
ing factors. A simple approach which further decomposes the efficiency effect is 
presented below.
Let g a  denote the pollutant generation coefficient of sector i  in time t  (amount 
of pollutant generated from the production of each unit of real output value); and 
d a  the pollutant treatment rate of sector i  in time t .  So e u  =  g u {  1 — d u ) .  The 
efficiency effect can be decomposed:
Y 2 i Q i 2  (e i2 — e i l )
=  Y 2  i Q i 2 [Qi2 (1 — d i 2) — gi 1 (1 — d i l ) ]
— Y 2  iQ i2  [di2 (1 — d i 2) — gt2 (1 — d u )  +  9i2 (1 — d u )  — 9 n  (1 — d u ) ]
— Y 2  iQ i2 9 i2  ( d i l  — d i2 ) +  Y l  iQ i2  i.9i2 ~  9 i l) (1 ~ d u )
The first component in the above equation is the effect on pollution discharge of 
the change in treatment rate, which can be termed as treatment effect. The second 
component is the effect of the change in the generation coefficient. As the generation 
coefficient measures the amount of pollutant generated from the production process, 
a decline in the coefficient reflects the improvement in the utilisation efficiency of 
resources, therefore it may be termed the productivity effect. The productivity 
effect is mainly affected by economic policies, whilst the treatment effect is mainly, 
if not solely, the result of environmental policies. Therefore the change in pollutant 
discharge can be decomposed into four parts:
E 2 - E 1 =  Y h i Q i2 9 i 2  ( d u  — d i2 )  +  Y ^ i Q i 2  (<?i2 ~  9 i l )  (1 ~  d u )
+ Q 2 Y 2  i ( s i2 ~  s i l )  9 i l  (1 -  d u )  +  { Q 2 ~  Q l )  Y 2  i s i l 9 i l  (1 ~ <ki)
It is clear that the above decomposition is not the only approach. Selecting 
different levels of output, sectoral shares and emission coefficients results in different 
decomposition approaches. The detailed results are presented in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.6: Decomposition of Changes in Emissions: Four Effects
E ffec t 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1992-96
S O 2 ( to n )  
t r e a tm e n t 29258 .34 -71748 .23 -936843 .68 -1055065 .02 -2034398 .58
p ro d u c t iv i ty -1794964 .95 -7183821 .75 -606233 .84 -7466319 .81 -17051340 .34
s t r u c tu r a l -1324223 .06 1319202.34 2272202 .80 -822015 .56 1445166.52
g ro w th 3387470.92 7403765.94 3240301 .36 5206731.21 19238269.43
to ta l 297541.26 1467398.30 3969426 .64 -4136669 .17 1597697.03
S m oke  d u s t  ( to n )  
t r e a tm e n t  -124993 .69 -2454430 .16 -1110915 .32 -2531033 .98 -6221373 .15
p ro d u c tiv i ty -504534 .79 -4317763 .13 68152.81 -3752063 .49 -8506208 .60
s t r u c tu r a l -797192.81 764313.75 1445149 .22 -445207 .96 967062.19
g ro w th 2238056 .06 5145636.25 1937365.25 3105605 .14 12426662.70
to ta l 811334 .77 -862243 .29 2339751 .96 -3622700 .29 -1333856 .85
P o w d e r d u s t  ( to n )  
t r e a tm e n t  -144163 .53 -683825.81 474375 .89 -6571707 .45 -6925320 .89
p ro d u c tiv i ty 437461 .26 -9328460 .99 5468490 .49 -4613659 .85 -8036169 .09
s t r u c tu r a l -492312 .65 5454467.02 -824015 .42 -1672521 .51 2465617.45
g ro w th 2213085 .27 5589038.86 2433284 .79 4929251 .06 15164659.99
to ta l 2014070 .36 1031219.08 7552135 .76 -7928637 .74 2668787.45
S o lid  w a s te s  (10 ,000  to n )  
t r e a tm e n t  -550 .29 -294 .99 457 .20 -1070 .60 -1458 .69
p ro d u c tiv i ty -316 .26 -1510 .30 -13 .16 -995 .80 -2835 .53
s t r u c tu r a l -289 .04 403.42 159.04 -192 .65 80.77
g ro w th 680.03 1265.07 488 .88 895 .50 3329.49
to ta l -475 .56 -136 .80 1091 .95 -1363 .55 -883 .96
It is easy to see that these results are different in general. If it is acknowledged 
that the output level increases while the pollutant generation coefficient decreases 
over time, J2iQi29n (dn -  d{2) is the highest estimate, while ^ iQ iig a  (da -  d&) 
is the lowest estimate of the treatment effect.
Due to data limitation, the exercise was carried out only for SO2 , smoke dust, 
powder dust and solid wastes, and the results reported in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.6 
are quite encouraging. Except in the case of SO2 , the treatment effect accounts for 
about 34-46% of total efficiency gains. Considering that environmental policies may 
also contribute to the productivity effect, it may be concluded that nearly half the 
pollution reduction comes from environmental policies. Of course, this approach 
is very simple and the conclusion cannot be extended to other pollutants without 
further work. At most, this exercise indicates that the pollution control policies in
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Figure 4.6: Decomposition of Pollution Changes: Four Effects
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China are effective, and does not allow judgements about whether the action taken 
is enough and whether it is efficient. These issues are discussed in the following 
sections.
4.4 Theory of Equilibrium Pollution
To set a framework for the econometric analysis of China’s environmental policy, 
this section introduces the theory of equilibrium pollution, which has been virtually 
discussed in the previous chapters. According to the theory, pollution or environ­
mental absorption capacity can be viewed as a special good which is supplied by 
the government on behalf of households and demanded by firms. The realised level 
of pollution is jointly determined by the demand and supply.
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4.4.1 The environmental demand
A representative firm is assumed to maximise its profit. The firm employs capital, 
labour and environmental absorption capacity to produce its product:
1 = f ( K, L ,  D),(4.1)
where q is the product amount, K  is the capital input, L is labour input, and D is 
a set of environmental inputs (pollutant emissions).
Normalising by the product price, the firm’s problem is:
max /(AT, A, D) — (r K  +  wL + r D )
K’L’D (4.2)
s.t. D < Ds
where r, re, r  are, respectively, cost of capital, wage rate and the effective pollution 
emission levy rate. This approach is different from the usual one in the treatment of 
pollution abatement cost. Most literature assumes an objective function of minimis­
ing abatement cost and pollution levy or tax (for example, Wang and Wheeler 1996; 
Xie 1996). However, it is often difficult to distinguish between “normal” produc­
tion activities and pollution abatement activities even from an engineer’s viewpoint. 
The abatement activity employs capital and labour too, therefore it could be in­
cluded in the “normal” production process as in equation (4.1). Assuming pollution 
abatement cost and levy/tax minimisation may omit the possibility of substitution 
between production activities and abatement activities. Moreover, this kind of 
treatment reduces the data requirement. The usual approach needs disaggregated 
cost accounts and more technical data like influent and effluent concentrations and 
amounts, which are not available in most cases.7 Another distinguishing feature of
7Prom minimising abatement cost and pollution levy, Wang and Wheeler (1996) derive the 
pollution intensity as a function of wastewater amount, output level, influent concentration, con­
centration standard and effective levy rate. But they discard the influent concentration and stan­
dard variables when specifying the pollution demand function. Therefore their specified function 
is rather more ad hoc than the previously assumed firm’s cost minimisation behaviour.
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problem (4.2) is the constraint on pollution emissions. This constraint, although 
not explicitly set in the real world, comes from regulation requirements. It is under­
standable that firms face stringent environmental requirements in regions where the 
regulations are strict and the government authorities put serious effort into imple­
menting these regulations. Thus this feature leaves room for embodying regulation 
variables in the pollution demand function.
Assuming concavity of /(•), the inverse pollution demand function can be derived 
from problem (4.2):8
r  =  -A  +  f D (4.3)
where A is the Lagrangian multiplier of environmental requirement for which the 
regulation strictness may be set as a proxy; fo  is the partial derivative of the 
production function with respect to pollution emission. It is noteworthy to point 
out that the above expression is actually a system of equations because there are 
many pollutants. However, it is difficult to determine whether it is appropriate 
to estimate them simultaneously at the aggregate level. Because an individual 
firm may discharge only some of the pollutants, it is hard to say whether pollution 
emissions are jointly or separately decided by the representative firm at the regional 
aggregation.
There are considerable concerns about the assumption of profit maximisation. 
Chinese firms, especially state-owned enterprises (SOEs), have various objectives set 
by government, which often contradict the goal of profit maximisation. For example, 
local governments desire to provide social welfare, maintain high employment and 
keep economic parity between firms (Ma 1997). However, the profit maximisation 
assumption can be justified on two grounds. First, the share of SOEs in total output 
has been declining over time, and firms with other ownership assumed to be more 
market-oriented (collectively owned and private firms), are playing a more and more 
important role in the economy. Secondly, economic reform has been encouraging
throughout this chapter, it is assumed, unless specified, that the usual properties of production 
and utility functions hold and interior solutions exist.
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SOEs to maximise profits.
4.4.2 The environmental supply
A representative household in the region earns a certain amount of income Y,  which 
can be spent on a consumption good C (the price of consumption good is normalised 
to be one) to meet its various living demands, and owns a certain environmental 
endowment E. Part of the income is from earnings in the industrial activities 
determined by the output price and factor prices P.9 The household could enjoy 
the environment, and also supply it to the firm at the ongoing effective rate and use 
the proceeds for consumption. Therefore the household’s problem is to maximise 
its utility:
max U (C, E — Ds)
Ds V 1 (4.4)
s.t. C < Y ( P ) + r D s
It may be argued that environmental quality constraint E — Ds  > 0 should 
be imposed to construct the problem. However, it is difficult to determine these 
environmental quality constraints and it seems that these constraints, if any, are 
usually not bounded, because there is no evidence that environmental degradation is 
so severe that a whole region like a province is no longer suitable for habitation. Also 
the built-in care about the environment in utility function makes these constraints 
redundant.
The inverse environmental supply function can be derived by solving the above 
utility maximisation problem:
r  =  Ue /Uc (4.5)
where Ue  and Uc are, respectively, partial derivatives of the utility function with 
respect to environmental quality and consumption.
9When specifying and estimating the model, the per capita income is treated as an exogenous 
variable for the following reason. In this partial equilibrium setting, income is only weakly linked 
to the price as some income is earned out of the system. Endogenising income provides no better 
estimation of the system, as many coefficients turn out to be insignificant.
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The environmental supply function (4.5) is also a system of equations, but, unlike 
the demand function, this supply system definitely needs to be estimated simultane­
ously, because all environmental elements are virtually owned by the representative 
household.
System (4.3) and (4.5) jointly determine the equilibrium pollution. Obviously 
this approach is similar to the determination of labour supply and wage. It may be 
argued that the environment is a public good and there is open access to it. The firm 
is a leader in the process setting the pollution level according to its own problem 
and the household a follower with no control over pollution emission and therefore 
the problem (4.4) is misspecified. However, after careful consideration, it may be 
concluded that this is not the case. First, since the state has assumed the rights to 
the environment within its boundaries and controls access to, for example, water 
and air, it should be referred to as state property rights. Therefore the open access 
regime to which no property rights have been assigned is no longer valid in the 
legal sense (Bromley 1991). Second, state property rights enable the representative 
household to actively participate in the game: it can raise the effective levy rate, 
through either more strict regulation or more effective regulation enforcement, if 
it feels environment is more valuable. Of course, institutional concerns are still 
related: whether or not public interests are well represented and realised by the 
government, especially for a country like China.
This kind of equilibrium pollution approach is a partial equilibrium analysis for 
environmental goods. It derives environmental demand from profit maximisation of 
firms, environmental supply from utility maximisation of households and assumes 
market clearing of environmental goods. But it is far too simple to have general 
equilibrium for all factors and products.
Although it is not necessarily true in the general equilibrium case, the equilib­
rium pollution in this setting is a Walrasian equilibrium, because it satisfies both 
profit and utility maximisation and clears the market. It turns out that this can 
be used as an instrument to test the efficiency of pollution control policies. If well-
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behaved demand and supply functions can be recovered from the realised pollution 
and prices following the theory, it may be concluded that the realised quantity 
and price are Walrasian equilibrium, i.e., optimal quantity and price, and that the 
underlying policies are desirable.
4.5 Specification of Functions
4.5.1 Environmental demand function
Assume Cobb-Douglas technology, i.e., for the Zth sector, the production function 
is:
Qi =  A iK ? nL?2‘ Y l D ^
j
then equation (4.3) becomes
Tj + Aj  = & 3 ljQ l~ w
(4.6)
As argued above, A j is affected by the regulation. Thus the above expression 
can be rearranged as:
D ij _  a 3lj
Ql Tj + 9 j (R )
where R  is an index for regulations other than the pollution levy. Therefore the 
pollution intensity can be written as:
D j  _  1Di j  _  a 3lj Q i  _  s la 3lj
Q  Q  i TJ +  9 j {R ) Q  i TJ +  9j (R)  ’
that is, the pollution intensity is affected not only by the pollution levy and regu­
lation, but also by sectoral output shares, Sj , which makes sense. First, different 
sectors employ different levels of technology, i.e., having different production func­
tions. Second, the discharge standards, and thus pollution levy rates, are different 
across sectors. In this study, industry is divided into two sectors: heavy and light 
industries. Due to data limitation, it is impossible to estimate a different produc­
tion function for each region, and therefore, the share of heavy industry in total
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industrial output (H E AVY )  is used as one explanatory variable. Alternatively, 
industry can also be divided according to the size and ownership of firms because 
these factors may also affect firms’ behaviour. Therefore the share of large firms 
(LARGE)  and the share of SOEs (STATE)  also are included in the explanatory 
variables. However, because these three variables are highly correlated (0.73 be­
tween H E A V Y  and L A R G E , 0.80 between H E A V Y  and S T A T E , 0.76 between 
LARGE  and STATE) ,  including all in one equation may cause a collinearity prob­
lem. Therefore only one is included in each estimation.
To sum up, the environmental demand function for j th pollutant in zth region 
could be specified as:10
log eji =  ßoj +  ß i j  log Si  +  ß 2j log T ji  +  ß s j  log R i  +  £ j i  (4.7)
where e* — (eu , e2i , . . . ,  eji , . . .) is a set of pollution intensities measured in pollu­
tant discharges (excess wastewater,* 11 COD, waste gas and solid wastes) per unit of 
industrial output; Si is one of the three share variables (HEAVYi, LARGEi and 
STATEß; p ei  is the effective pollution levy rate per unit of pollutant discharge; 
Ri is a set of regulation indices measured in the implementation ratio of specific 
environmental regulation; Si is the error term.
In the above specification, a positive sign of ß \ j  is expected when the variable 
HEAVYi is used, because heavy industrial firms are usually heavy polluters, or 
when the variable STATEi is used and if the soft budget hypothesis of state-owned 
enterprises holds. When the variable LARGEi is used, a negative sign of ß \ j  will 
be expected if pollution abatement scale economies exist. Negative signs of ß 2j  and 
ßsj ’s are expected if the pollution levy system and other regulations play their roles.
10This specification is similar to that in Wang and Wheeler (1996). However, a profound theo­
retical ground has been provided here for this specification.
11 The term excess pollutant refers to the amount of the pollutant discharged in waste water or 
waste gas where the concentration is above the standard, i.e., violating the standard.
123
4.5.2 Environmental supply function
The inverse environmental supply system (4.5) implies that the environmental sup­
ply is determined by income, environmental endowment and effective pollution levy 
rate, that is, the reduced form is:
Dj = Dj(INC, E , t), (4.8)
where j  denotes the pollutants, i.e., wastewater (or COD), waste gas (or represen­
tative air pollutant) and solid waste.
Note that E  and r  are vectors, i.e., supply of one environmental element is af­
fected not only by its own endowment and price but also by other elements’ endow­
ment and prices. However, it is difficult to measure endowment for various elements. 
One appropriate method is to choose land area as a proxy because nearly all of the 
environmental elements are virtually related to land. Also note that equation (4.4) 
is derived from the representative household’s utility maximisation problem, so E j , 
INC  and ED are in absolute values. In order to avoid the measurement problem 
and to coincide with the variable in demand function, it is natural to scale it down 
by population, that is, in per capita terms,
Ej
emissiorij
population
emission^ output 
output population
= ejIND.
The estimating supply equation for j th  environmental element in ith region is 
therefore specified as follows:
log ep  + log INDi = u>o + cjij log INQ  + u)2j log LANDi + kuj3kj log rki + pp,  (4.9)
where ep  and rki are defined as the same as above; INCi is per capita income; 
LANDi is per capita land area (reciprocal of population density); INDi is per capita 
industrial output; pji is error term.
This specification is similar to that in Wang and Wheeler (1996), but it does
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not include education. Of course education affects people’s willingness to supply 
environmental good, but education itself is not an independent variable which is 
actually affected by the income level, and vice versa. The estimation shows that in­
cluding education variable does not improve the result as the coefficient of education 
variable is insignificant in almost all equations (see Table 4.15).
One problem with (4.9) is that the dependent variable is actually the per capita 
emission, which is not compatible with that in the demand function. However, 
putting the term log IND{ in the right hand side of the equation may face an­
other problem: multicollinearity between IND and INC (actually the correlation is 
0.903). Therefore it is appropriate to drop the per capita industrial output when 
estimating the supply equation. It is partly justified by the fact that the per capita 
industrial output enters into equation (4.9) mainly for a transformational rather 
than behavioural reason.
According to the utility theory, as income rises, the demand for leisure and recre­
ation etc. will rise, i.e., the supply of environmental goods will decrease. Therefore 
a negative sign of u)\j is expected. By contrast, a larger endowment will lead to a 
larger environmental supply, that is, the sign u>2j would be positive. As the price of 
a good rises, the supply for that good will increase, therefore a positive sign of uv ĵj 
will be expected.
4.6 Econometric Results
The estimation has been undertaken in several ways. First, the demand and supply 
functions are estimated for each of the three types of pollutants (water, air and 
solid wastes) to serve as a reference. Secondly, all the demand and supply equations 
for the three types of pollutants are jointly estimated as one system of equations. 
Thirdly, because the levy collected from solid wastes is only a minor part of the total 
amount collected, and there are some missing observations in this series, the system 
is estimated including only equations for water and air pollutants. A reduced form
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function is also estimated by putting all independent variables in one equation. 
During each stage of estimation, both pooled and fixed-effect models are used. 
In addition, different types of specification are also tested in the process. Some 
estimation results are reported in Tables 4.7-4.15.12
4.6.1 Water Pollution
The demand of and supply for excess wastewater looks well-behaved when the sys­
tem is estimated independently of other pollutants. For example, when the inverse 
supply function is specified (lower part of Table 4.7), the coeeficients of L IW W  and 
L P W W  have expected signs and are significant at the 5% level. The price elasticity 
of demand is -1.3142, implying the effective wastewater levy rate has a strong influ­
ence on the demand for wastewater. When the inverse demand function is specified 
and other effective levy rates are added into the supply function (upper part of 
Table 4.7), the relevant coefficients also have the expected sign, but the coefficient 
of L P W W  in supply function become insignificant. The situation worsens when 
the system is estimated jointly with the demand and supply of excess waste gas 
and solid wastes (Tables 4.10-4.13). A well-behaved demand and supply function 
of excess wastewater can rarely be found in these specifications. This suggests the 
levy system may be efficient in single market for wastewater, but is not efficient in 
the whole environmental market, or it may suggest a specification problem in the 
waste gas part of the model.
The pollution levy system is efficient in the single market for wastewater may be 
due to the nature of water pollution. Because water pollution tends to be more local 
than air pollution, local residents are more sensitive to the problem of water pollu­
tion and push harder the government to act. Consequently, the government deals 
with the water pollution problem more actively, e.g., heightening the emission stan-
12Some test statistics are included in these tables. It can be seen that they are moderately 
satisfactory. However, these statistics should be interpreted with caution, as they might be invalid 
when estimating equation systems (White and et al 1997, page 319).
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Table 4.7: Demand and Supply: Excess Wastewater^
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Demand LPWW Supply LIWW
LHEAVY 0.74195 4.756*** LINCOME -0.98893 -3.63***
LEIA 0.1004 2.799*** LLAND 4.2184 2.906***
LTHREE 0.15982 1.254 LPWW 0.26015 1.029
LDDLINE 0.0399 0.5646 LPXGAS -0.0449 -0.7793
LIWW -0.31975 -2.14** LPSOLID -0.00595 -0.2702
D-W= 1.4189 D-W= 2.4280
Demand LIWW Supply LPWW
LHEAVY 1.36400 4.321*** LINCOME 1.6416 1.688*
LEIA 0.05828 0.7185 LLAND -11.605 -3.168***
LTHREE 0.28405 1.605 LIWW 2.0496 2.426**
LDDLINE 0.14571 1.499
LPWW -1.31420 -2.244**
D-W= 1.1263 D-W— 2.3772
f: Demand and supply functions are jointly estimated.
***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%
dards and/or strengthening the monitoring effort to improve enforcement. In other 
words, households’ preferences are more likely to be consulted when formulating 
water pollution control policies.
Even if it is acknowledged that the wastewater market is efficient, there is still 
room for policy improvement. Refer to Figure 4.4, the equilibrium intensities and 
prices are quite diverse across regions. These outcomes are optimal only when each 
region is isolated with each other, there must exist some barrier restricting the 
integration of the pollution market. This “autarky” state leads to unequal levy 
rates, therefore an “opening up” policy may help to get a Pareto improvement. 
For example, industrial relocation may reduce the enforcement cost in the regions 
with higher pollution levy rates, and increase revenue in the regions with lower 
rates. Unfortunately, the current environmental policy may enhance the barrier to 
open up, in addition to other natural and economic considerations. One guideline 
of environmental protection in China is “prohibiting firms from shifting polluting 
workshops or production processes into other regions” . According to the results 
presented here, this guideline needs to be reviewed.
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Table 4.8: Demand and Supply: Excess Waste Gaŝ
C oeffic ien t t - r a t io C oeffic ien t t - r a t io
D e m a n d  L IX G A S S u p p ly  L P X G A S
L H E A V Y 0.56644 5.954*** L IN C O M E -0 .68025 -1 .804*
L E IA -0 .12556 -3 .391*** L L A N D 5.6023 2.814***
L T H R E E 0.42453 3.436*** L P W W 0.46103 4 .16***
L D D L IN E 0.26535 4.08*** L IX G A S -1 .0344 -3 .196***
L P X G A S 2.37E -02 0.2429 L P S O L ID 5.43E -02 1.805*
D -W = 2.0193 D -W = 1.8844
D e m a n d  L P X G A S S u p p ly  L IX G A S
L H E A V Y 0.23177 0.6446 L IN C O M E -0 .67291 -4 .233***
L E IA 0.22223 2.305** L L A N D 3.8943 4 .201***
L T H R E E -0 .50314 -1 .514 L P W W 0.14592 1.885*
L D D L IN E -6 .07E -02 -0 .315 L P X G A S -0 .35195 -3 .487***
L IX G A S 0.15138 0.2796 L P S O L ID 2 .26E -03 0 .1304
D -W = 2.1966 D -W = 1.8005
f: The demand and supply functions are jointly estimated;
***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%
When excess wastewater is replaced by chemical oxygen demand (COD) as the 
representative water pollutant, in most cases the estimated coefficients are not sig­
nificant. This might be the result of a measurement problem. The levy is collected 
from excess wastewater, which violates the discharge standards, but COD is calcu­
lated from all wastewater discharges. Moreover, COD is only one of many water 
pollutants, and other water pollutants may also contribute to the excess wastewater 
levy.
4.6.2 Air Pollution
The demand for and supply of excess waste gas and other air pollutants is not 
well behaved according to the estimation (Tables 4.8, 4.10-4.13). In some cases, 
the coefficients are significant, but have the “wrong” sign. This is partly due to 
the measurement problem, as they are calculated from total emissions no matter 
whether they violate the emission standards, but the levy is only collected for excess 
emissions. However, the main reason is probably that the market for air pollutant 
may not be efficient. More specifically, this is because the price on the supply side
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Table 4.9: Demand and Supply: Solid Wastes^
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Demand LISOLID Supply LPSOLID
LHEAVY 1.4848 6.499*** LINCOME 1.717 0.7618
LEIA -0.12638 -1.384 LLAND 1.062 0.1818
LTHREE 0.29825 0.9941 LPWW 0.97776 2.647***
LDDLINE 0.19108 1.17 LPXGAS 0.37593 2.075**
LPSOLID -0.27548 -2.064* LISOLID -0.0325 -0.0383
D-W= 1.4753 D-W= 1.6415
Demand LPSOLID Supply LISOLID
LHEAVY 0.51779 0.8636 LINCOME -2.2846 -2.739***
LEIA 0.20707 1.4 LLAND 3.6157 1.352
LTHREE -0.43071 -0.8481 LPWW -0.14807 -0.3466
LDDLINE -3.45E-02 -0.1231 LPXGAS 0.0944 0.4413
LISOLID -0.49322 -1.611 LPSOLID -0.21122 -0.4966
D-W= 1.5508 D-W= 1.6274
f: Demand and supply functions are jointly estimated;
***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%.
is set arbitrarily by the environmental authority, and most likely does not take into 
account utility maximisation. This argument can be justified by looking at Figure 
4.3, where the plotting shows a nice demand curve. The reduced form function of 
this system is also estimated separately for each pollutant, and it is found that the 
coefficients of own price are significant and have the “right” sign, and the equations 
fit the data well (Table 4.14). Another piece of evidence is that other coefficients 
in the system are usually significant and have the “right” sign, implying that the 
specification is correct.
4.6.3 Solid Wastes
Similar phenomena for solid wastes (Table 4.9, 4.10, 4.12, 4.13) are observed as for 
air pollutants. Besides data problems, this suggests the levy system does not work 
well for solid wastes. The government does not pay much attention to the solid 
wastes, which could be evidenced by facts th a t revenues of solid wastes levy are 
very small, accounting for about 1 percent of the total levy revenues in recent years 
(Table 1.4), and statistics about solid wastes are often incomplete.
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Table 4.10: Demand and Supply: Excess Wastewater, Excess Waste Gas and Solid 
Wastes (including HEAVY)t
Demand Function Supply Function
LIWW LIXGAS LISOLID LPWW LPXGAS LPSOLID
LHEAVY 1.2763 0.30304 1.3303 LINCOME -3.4404 -2.0317 2.3543
(4.088***) (1.586) (3.295***) (-1.306) (-1.882*) (0.9561)
LEIA 0.01355 -0.28788 0.16798 LLAND 5.6745 3.2744 -7.4864
(0.165) (-3.262***) (0.5488) (0.6408) (0.657) (-0.6651)
LTHREE 0.25298 0.78963 0.16301 LIWW -0.68897
(1.356) (3.155***) (0.2312) (-0.3551)
LDDLINE 0.10733 0.27227 0.13644 LIXGAS -0.31624
(1.035) (2.35***) (0.5355) (-0.4167)
LPW W -1.0101 LISOLID 0.57368
(-1.760*) (0.4373)
LPXGAS 0.79057 LPWW -0.78038 0.23382
(2.414***) (-1.661*) (0.2519)
LPSOLID -0.96522 LPXGAS -1.6477 0.83878
(-1.249) (-2.05**) (2.295**)
LPSOLID 1.9213 1.1658
(2.281**) (2.759***)
D-W = 1.0468 2.3328 1.3683 D-W = 1.6601 1.6374 1.7329
f: D em a n d  a n d  s u p p ly  fu n c tio n s  o f all th re e  p o llu ta n ts  a re  jo in tly  e s tim a te d ; n u m b e rs  in  p a re n th e s e s  a re  t- ra tio s ;  
***: sig n ifican t a t  1% level, **: s ig n ifican t a t  5% level, *: s ig n ifican t a t  10% level.
Table 4.11: Demand and Supply: Excess Wastewater and Waste Gaŝ
Demand Function Supply Function
LPWW LPXGAS LIWW LIXGAS
LHEAVY 0.66972
LEIA
(4.289***)
0.10423
LTHREE
(2.735***)
0.20225
LDDLINE
(1.619)
8.29E-02
LIWW
(1.304)
-0.25299
LIXGAS
(-1.659*)
D-W= 1.4781
-0.1457
(-0.3493)
LINCOME
0.31722 LLAND
( 2.87***) 
-0.72873 
(-1.876*)
LPWW
-0.1855 LPXGAS
(-0.8777)
LPSOLID
0.80652
(1.272)
-0.96635 -0.50592
(-3.381***) (-1.807*)
4.3528 5.0151
( 2.902***) ( 3.425***)
0.26231 0.52821
( 0.9324 ) ( 1.99**)
4.17E-02 -0.40456
( 0.3089 ) (-3.187***)
6.03E-03 1.35E-02
( 0.2194 ) ( 0.5043)
2.4419 1.87322.3164 D-W=
f: The supply and demand functions are jointly estim ated for both pollutants. Numbers in 
parentheses are t-ratios.
***: significant at 1%; **: significant a t 5%; *: significant at 10%
4.6.4 Other Regulations
EIA has a significant negative effect on the demand for pollution in some cases, 
whilst three-synchronisation and limited time treatment have insignificant effects,
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Table 4.12: Demand and Supply: Excess Wastewater, Excess Waste Gas and Solid 
Wastes (including LSTATE) ̂
Demand Supply
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Dependent variable: LIWW Dependent variable: LPWW
LSTATE 0.92342 9.595*** LINCOME -0.61297 -0.4936
LEIA -4.89E-02 -1.357 LLAND -5.3543 -1.396
LTHREE 0.20356 2.268** LIWW 0.36561 0.5005
LDDLINE 0.11253 2.216** LPXGAS 7.84E-02 0.176
LPWW -0.24564 -1.081 LPSOLID 9.87E-02 0.2152
D-W= 1.8188 D-W= 1.9016
Dependent variable: LIXGAS Dependent variable: LPXGAS
LSTATE 0.55056 5.191*** LINCOME -2.6883 -1.495
LEIA -0.13957 -2.588*** LLAND -2.9472 -0.2828
LTHREE 0.54469 3.185*** LPWW -1.8571 -1.003
LDDLINE 0.22992 2.682*** LIXGAS -0.23724 -0.2441
LPXGAS 0.15209 0.892 LPSOLID 1.1599 2.278**
D-W= 2.1330 D-W= 1.6781
Dependent variable: LISOLID Dependent variable: LPSOLID
LSTATE 1.2823 2.926*** LINCOME 2.7848 0.8485
LEIA 0.24162 0.6465 LLAND 6.2042 0.2742
LTHREE 1.60E-02 1.93E-02 LPWW 2.3535 0.9187
LDDLINE 0.18177 0.5507 LPXGAS 0.59571 1.392
LPSOLID -1.0424 -1.067 LISOLID -2.65E-02 -1.23E-02
D-W= 1.5067 D-W= 1.6883
f: Demand and supply functions are jointed estimated;
***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%.
and, in some cases even has a significant positive effect: higher enforcement rate of 
these two systems leads to higher pollution intensity! There are several explana­
tions for this result. First, as noted above, these regulation indices are of similar 
values across regions, therefore it is natural to have an insignificant coefficient in 
the regression. However, this does not mean they are not effective. Secondly, re­
call the origin of these indices (equation 4.3). These indices serve as a proxy of 
the Lagrangian multiplier of environmental supply constraints as these regulations 
put restrictions on the use of environmental good. Therefore there is a mutual 
causality between these indices and environmental demand (in this estimation it is 
the realised intensity or levy rate). It is true that higher regulation enforcement is 
expected to help reduce the demand for environmental good, but the higher indices
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Table 4.13: Demand and Supply: Excess Wastewater, Excess Waste Gas and Solid 
Wastes (including LLARGE) t
D e m a n d S u p p ly
C oeffic ien t t - r a t io C oeffic ien t t - r a t io
D e p e n d e n t v a ria b le : L IW W D e p e n d e n t  v a ria b le : L P W W
L L A R G E -0 .49009 -1 .249 L IN C O M E -3 .1946 -0 .2187
L E IA -0 .22105 -3 .025*** L L A N D 40.743 1.3
L T H R E E -6 .7 2 E -0 2 -0 .2746 L IW W -3 .1407 -0 .4467
L D D L IN E 0.22202 1.627 L P X G A S 3.6384 0 .1633
L P W W 1.0845 2.285** L P S O L ID -0 .49874 -2 .54E -02
D - W = 1.9192 D -W = 1.9756
D e p e n d e n t v a riab le : L IX G A S D e p e n d e n t  v a ria b le : L P X G A S
L L A R G E -0 .38119 -0 .9183 L IN C O M E -1 .4877 -1 .652*
L E IA -0 .25069 -2 .372** L L A N D 6.1438 1.649*
L T H R E E 0.60398 1.749* L P W W -0 .30063 -0 .9031
L D D L IN E 0.28012 1.708* L IX G A S -1 .6 7 E -0 2 -0 .1426
L P X G A S 0.62404 1.493 L P S O L ID 1.2412 3.501***
D - W = 2.2001 D - W = 1.6409
D e p e n d e n t v a ria b le : L IS O L ID D e p e n d e n t  v a ria b le : L P S O L ID
L L A R G E 1.0688 0 .6437 L IN C O M E 1.401 1.577
L E IA 1.2923 1.782* L L A N D -5 .5738 -1 .431
L T H R E E -1 .4323 -1 .039 L P W W 0.32856 0 .877
L D D L IN E -0 .29686 -0 .6663 L P X G A S 0.74333 1.9*
L P S O L ID -4 .2586 -2 .043** L IS O L ID 6 .88E -02 0 .969
D -W = 1.6567 D -W = 1.6427
f: Supply and demand functions are jointly estimated for all three types of pollutants: excess 
wastewater, excess waste gas and solid wastes.
***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level
may well be the reaction to the higher pollution intensity. This may explain why 
they sometimes have significant positive coefficients. One way around this would 
be to endogenise these regulation indices in the system. This is left for the general 
equilibrium analysis in future work. Finally, of course, this may also be due to 
the weak mechanism of these regulations. For example, as pointed out above, the 
three-synchronisation system may be in effect in only one specific time: when the 
firm is waiting for approval of operation. After the approval, the pollution control 
facilities may be shut down and have no effect on pollution control. In this sense, a 
high index does not necessarily represent high or tight enforcement.
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4.6.5 Economic Structure
The share of heavy industry has a significant positive effect on the demand for pol­
lution (Tables 4.7-4.11). This is straightforward and needs no further explanation.
The share of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in industrial output also has a 
significant positive coefficient (Table 4.12). This positive relationship may be due 
to two factors. As noted above, SOEs are more likely to be heavy industrial firms 
which need more pollutants for operation. The other factor is the so called “soft- 
budget hypothesis”. As the enterprises are owned by the government, SOEs lack 
the incentive to maximise their profits and are less efficient, thus producing more 
pollutants due to more wasteful use of resources.
The coefficient of the share of large enterprises is insignificant (Table 4.13). It is 
also quite understandable. Large enterprises are more likely to be heavy industrial 
firms and SOEs, and therefore tend to demand more pollutants. On the other hand, 
large enterprises are well-equipped and have economy of scale for pollution controls, 
and are also closely monitored. These opposing effects cause its coefficient to be 
insignificant.
4.6.6 Other factors
The per capita income and the environmental endowment proxy (per capita land 
area or reciprocal of population density) are crucial for determining the supply of 
environmental good. In most cases, as expected, their coefficients are significant and 
have the “right” sign (even in the case where the pollution levy rate or intensity 
is not significant). The higher the per capita income level, the less willing the 
household to supply the environment; the more environmental endowment, the 
greater the supply. This is especially clear when the supply equation is estimated 
as the normal form (Tables 4.7-4.9 and 4.11). This may enhance the argument that 
the specification is correct and the failure to estimate a well-behaved environmental 
supply function is mainly due to the fact that the levy rate is arbitrarily set by a 
central policy body.
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Table 4.15: Testing Education
Dependent
variable
Coefficient of 
education variable p-value Note
LIWW -0.38323 0.226 Corresponding to the upper part of Table 4.7.
LPWW -0.17449 0.796 Corresponding to the lower part of Table 4.7.
LPXGAS 0.80019 0.096 Corresponding to the upper part of Table 4.8.
LIXGAS -0.36144 0.151 Corresponding to the lower part of Table 4.8.
LPSOLID 0.27382 0.821 Corresponding to the upper part of Table 4.9.
LISOLID -0.33382 0.621 Corresponding to the lower part of Table 4.9.
LPWW -0.25638 0.879 Corresponding to Table 4.10
LPXGAS 0.32057 0.784
LPSOLID -0.24791 0.815
LIWW -0.52847 0.148 Corresponding to Table 4.11
LIXGAS -0.26551 0.458
To compare the result in this chapter with those in other studies, e.g., Wang 
and Wheeler (1996), the system including education factor in the supply functions 
is reestimated. Education is measured as the percentage of people in the total 
population who received high school and higher education. It turns out that the 
parameters of education variable in all the estimations are insignificant except one 
where the parameter is positively significant with 10% confidence (see Table 4.15). 
As pointed out earlier, education might be correlated with income level. The result 
supports the argument that education variable need not be included in the supply 
function.
4.7 Conclusion
This study has shown that China’s pollution control policies are effective in the sense 
that China’s pollution intensity has decreased significantly over time and nearly half 
of the reduction in the discharge of some pollutants is traced from these policies. In 
addition, the well-behaved demand function for pollution justifies that firms have 
responded well to the levy rates.
However, because the supply functions could not be estimated very little can 
be said about the efficiency of environmental regulation in China. This may be
139
due to  data problems, thus, it was not possible to identify supply functions even 
though they exist. On the other hand, it could be the case tha t the government sets 
environmental controls without reference to the preferences of households. Despite 
this disappointing aspect of the results, what can be said is tha t the differential 
effective levy rates across regions in China imply tha t the enforcement cost could 
be reduced and overall welfare raised by withdrawing some restrictions.
The estimation shows that there are well behaved supply and demand functions 
for wastewater, which implies that the pollution levy system works better for water 
pollution than for other pollutants. This might be due to the nature of water 
pollution: it is a more local problem than other pollution, therefore policy makers 
are more likely to set the policy along with local residents.
Appendix to Chapter 4
4.A Variable Definition
Table 4.A: Variable Definition
Variable Definition
IWW Excess wastewater intensity, measured as the amount of wastewater 
discharge which violates the standard per unit of industrial output 
(ton/10,000yuan)
LIWW Log of IWW
PWW Effective levy rate for excess wastewater, obtained by dividing total levy 
collected from excess wastewater discharge by the amount of excess waste- 
water discharge (yuan/ton)
LPWW Log of PWW
IXGAS Excess waste gas intensity, measured as the volume of waste gas emission 
which is not treated per unit of industrial output (m3/yuan)
LIXGAS Log of IXGAS
PXGAS Effective levy rate for excess waste gas, obtained by dividing total levy 
collected from excess waste gas emission by the volume of excess waste gas 
emission (yuan/10,000m3)
LPXGAS Log of PXGAS
ISOLID Solid wastes intensity, measured as the discharge amount of solid wastes 
per unit of industrial output (kg/10,OOOyuan)
LISOLID Log of ISOLID
PSOLID Effective levy rate for solid wastes, obtained by dividing total levy col­
lected from solid wastes discharge by the discharge amount of solid wastes 
(yuan/ton)
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T a b le  4 . A: ( c o n t i n u e d )
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Chapter 5
Policy Choices of International CO2 Emissions 
Control
5.1 Introduction
Since the First World Climate Conference was held in 1979, and especially during 
the 1990s, the possibility of climate change has attracted growing attention be­
cause of its ubiquitous impact on the environment and the global economy. There 
have been some important developments since then. For example, although not 
a binding international agreement, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), established at the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, states that advanced 
industrialised countries (Annex I countries1) will reduce their emissions to 1990 
levels by 2000. In the following Conferences of Parties (COP), countries began to 
negotiate legally binding targets and timetables and feasible mechanisms to limit 
emissions in Annex I countries. Most notably, the COP3, held in Kyoto, Japan, 
reached the 1997 Kyoto Protocol of the Framework Convention. The Kyoto Pro-
1When the Convention was signed, the Annex I countries included the 24 original OECD mem­
bers (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States 
of America), the European Economic Community, and 11 countries with economies in transition 
(Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Roma­
nia, Russian Federation, Ukraine). The Czech Republic and Slovakia later replaced Czechoslovakia.
143
tocol states that the industrialised countries (now Annex B countries2) agree to a 
legally binding reduction in net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that would, on 
average, be 5.2% below 1990 levels by 2008-12. The Protocol also includes several 
flexibility mechanisms to allow nations to meet targets and timetables in a least- 
cost way. These mechanisms, including joint implementation (JI), and the clean 
development scheme (CDM), fall into the broad category of emission trading.
Nevertheless, intense debate about the proposed mechanisms and reliable imple­
mentation of the Protocol emerged following Kyoto, so not enough actual effort has 
been made to implement it. The Protocol will enter into force only after it is ratified 
by 55 countries accounting for at least 55% of developed country emissions (Article 
25). So far, only some small island nations have ratified the Protocol. In 1997, 
only three years from the date when the Annex I countries were meant to stabilise 
their GHG emissions to 1990 levels as specified in UNFCCC, most, except for East 
Europe and the former Soviet Union countries, had higher emissions than in 1990 
(see Table 5.1). The COP6, held in The Hague, December 2000, failed to achieve 
agreement on the mechanisms of implementing the Kyoto Protocol. Recently, the 
Bush Administration announced that it will not proceed to ratify the Protocol.
Amongst others, one issue in the debate is the “meaningful participation” of 
developing countries. There are two reasons why developing countries are being 
pressed to participate. First, developed countries are concerned about the effects of 
a climate agreement on their economies and are reluctant to solely bear the cost. 
For example, as negotiations proceeded toward the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. 
Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel resolution by a vote of 95 to 0. This resolution stated 
that the United States should not accept a climate agreement that did not demand 
comparable sacrifices from all participants (Shogren and Toman 2000). The recent 
movement of the Bush Administration stems from similar grounds.
2Croatia, Liechtenstein, Monaco and Slovenia joined at COP-3, and Belarus and Turkey dropped 
from the list of Annex B countries. Therefore, there are 39 parties in the Annex B list.
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Another reason is that the required extent of GHG abatement cannot be achieved 
without the participation of the developing countries. Developing countries’ GHG 
emissions have been increasing proportionally more than the world average, so that 
their share in world emissions has been steadily increasing (see Figure 5.1). China 
is often taken as an example. China is second only to the United States as the 
largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world. In 1996, China emitted 3363.5 mil­
lion metric tons of carbon dioxide, accounting for 14.8% of world emissions (World 
Bank 2000). Projections show that, if the current trend of economic development 
continues, China will become the largest GHG emitter around 2020 (World Bank 
1994; and some scenarios presented in Chapter 7 of this thesis).
However, global warming is determined by the stock of GHG, i.e., the accumula­
tion of past GHG emissions net of absorption. Developed countries have contributed 
a major part of this stock. In contrast, developing countries have a very low level 
of per capita GDP and per capita GHG emissions (Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2). From 
the point of view of developing countries, developed nations have the greater re­
sponsibility for the solution of global environmental problems—especially because 
they have been, or still are, the greatest polluters—and should therefore support 
the developing countries (Vermeer 1998; Zhang 1998b). Moreover, like other de­
veloping countries, China’s priority is to eliminate poverty and enhance economic 
development. At present, there are about 80 million people in China who do not 
have enough food to eat or clothes to wear (Wu et al. 1998). Even in the field of 
environmental protection, control of greenhouse gas emissions is not a priority task. 
Other more local environmental problems like acid rain, water and air quality, de­
sertification, etc. are more urgent for China to deal with. Therefore China sets its 
framework for environmental protection and international cooperation in this field 
as follows (Wu et al. 1998):
• Environmental protection shall be integrated with the needs of economic de­
velopment;
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Table 5.2: Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy Efficiency
Carbon dioxide emissions Energy
total per capita per PPP$ GDP efficiency
million PPP$ per kg
metric tons metric tons kilogram oil equivalent
1980 1996 1980 1996 1980 1996 1980 1997
China 1476.8 3363.5 1.5 2.8 3.6 1.0 0.7 3.3
United States 4575.4 5301.0 20.1 20.0 1.6 0.7 1.6 3.6
Russia 1579.5 10.7 1.5 1.7
Japan 920.4 1167.7 7.9 9.3 0.9 0.4 3.0 6.0
India 347.3 997.4 0.5 1.1 0.8 0.5 1.8 4.2
Germany 861.2 10.5 0.5 5.2
United Kingdom 583.8 557.0 10.4 9.5 1.2 0.5 2.4 5.3
Canada 420.9 409.4 17.1 13.8 1.5 0.6 1.4 3.0
Korea, Rep. 125.2 408.1 3.3 9.0 1.2 0.6 2.5 3.9
Italy 371.9 403.2 6.6 7.0 0.7 0.3 3.7 7.3
Ukraine 397.3 7.8 2.3 1.1
France 482.1 361.8 9.0 6.2 0.9 0.3 2.7 5.0
Poland 456.2 356.8 12.8 9.2 3.7 1.3 1.0 2.7
Mexico 251.6 348.1 3.7 3.8 0.9 0.5 2.9 5.1
Australia 202.8 306.6 13.8 16.7 1.4 0.8 2.0 4.0
South Africa 211.3 292.7 7.7 7.3 1.3 0.8 2.5 3.3
Brazil 183.4 273.4 1.5 1.7 0.4 0.3 4.4 6.5
Saudi Arabia 130.7 267.8 14.0 13.8 1.3 1.3 2.8 2.1
Iran 116.1 266.7 3.0 4.4 1.1 0.9 2.7 3.0
Korea, Dem. Rep. 124.9 254.3 7.1 11.3
Indonesia 94.6 245.1 0.6 1.2 0.8 0.4 2.0 4.5
Spain 200.0 232.5 5.3 5.9 0.8 0.4 3.5 5.9
Thailand 40.0 205.4 0.9 3.4 0.6 0.5 2.9 4.7
Turkey 76.3 178.3 1.7 2.9 0.7 0.5 3.3 5.7
Kazakhstan 173.8 10.9 2.5 1.8
Netherlands 152.6 155.2 10.8 10.0 1.1 0.5 2.1 4.6
Venezuela, RB 89.6 144.5 5.9 6.5 1.5 1.1 1.7 2.4
Argentina 107.5 129.9 3.8 3.7 0.6 0.3 4.3 6.9
Czech Republic 126.7 12.3 0.9 3.3
Romania 191.8 119.3 8.6 5.3 2.1 0.8 1.4 3.2
Malaysia 28.0 119.1 2.0 5.6 0.8 0.6 3.2 4.0
Belgium 127.2 106.0 12.9 10.4 1.3 0.5 2.2 4.1
Source: World Bank (2000, Table 3.8)
• Developed countries have the main responsibility for environmental deterio­
ration;
• The right of developing countries to develop shall be completely recognised;
• A new and fair international economic order shall be established which sup­
ports the sustainable development of all countries, especially developing ones;
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Figure 5.2: Per Capita Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 1996 (metric tons)
Source: World Bank (2000, Table 3.8).
• International cooperation in the field of environmental protection shall be 
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all countries;
• Developed countries shall provide enough new and additional funds to develop­
ing countries, thus creating the necessary conditions for global environmental 
protection.
These principles have been termed “common but differentiated responsibilities” 
and are reflected in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (United 
Nations 1992, Principle 7):
In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation,
States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed coun­
tries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit 
of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the 
global environment and of the technologies and resources they command.
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The UNFCCC adopted this principle and stated that “the developed country 
Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects 
thereof” (Article 3.1), while the commitment of developing countries is made in 
Article 4.7 conditional on the performance of developed countries:
The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their 
commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementa­
tion by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention 
related to financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into 
account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the 
first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties.
In sum, developed countries tend to plan their control over GHG emissions con­
ditional on participation of developing countries, while the latter insist the former 
should demonstrate their real effort in the first instance. Many authors try to 
solve this dilemma by promoting developing countries’ participation. For example, 
McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2000) propose a coordinated but decentralised system 
of national permit trading systems with a fixed internationally negotiated decen­
tralised price for permits. A permanent endowment of emission right is allocated 
to each country; beyond the endowment, the government of each country could sell 
an annual emission permit to firms at the negotiated price. The endowment for 
developing countries could be set far higher than the current amount they emit. 
Therefore developing countries would not need to buy additional permits in the 
short or medium run. However, at present the endowment has a positive price, 
because the holders of the endowment foresee that as long as the countries keep 
growing, the endowment will eventually become a binding constraint. This gives in­
centives for carbon abatement in developing countries through price signals without 
imposing short or medium term costs in these economies.
Manne (1996) looks at two cases of GHG abatement. In one, the benefits of 
abatement enter directly into the utility functions of the individual regions. In
150
the other, the benefits enter into their production functions. He shows that the 
abatement efforts and global welfare depend on the region’s share of abatement 
costs in the first case. However, it is possible to separate the issue of equity from 
those of economic efficiency in the second case.
Peck and Teisberg (1999) analyse the incentives for participation in international 
CO2 control agreements using tradable emission permits. Their analysis involves 
two aggregate regions: Annex-I and Non-Annex-I. They define a bargaining range 
as the range of permit allocation that leaves each region’s welfare at least as high as 
it would be in a no control solution. From the simulation generated by the CETA- 
M model,3 they find that the bargaining range for Non-Annex-I is 70-115 percent 
of its optimal emissions. They argue that a bargaining range must be fairly close 
to each region’s optimal emissions so that interregional income transfers from the 
emission permit trade could not become large enough to cause one of the regions to 
drop out of the agreement. The asymmetric distribution around optimal emissions 
for Non-Annex-I contradicts the usual perspective that Annex-I could shift more 
permits to Non-Annex-I. They argue this is because Non-Annex-I grows faster than 
Annex-I in both income and population, and its future damage is higher. They also 
find that the Kyoto Protocol produces a large wealth transfer from Annex-I to Non- 
Annex-I, but fails to achieve efficiency. Chao and Peck (2000) characterise general 
conditions under which the Pareto-optimal environmental control will depend on 
the distribution of the cost burden among nations and provide a sufficient condition 
under which a Pareto optimum can be implemented by a market mechanism with 
tradable emission permits.4
Caplan, Ellis, and Silva (1999) analyse several institutional arrangements in a 
world of one winner and one loser due to global warming. They show that only 
in the cases of full decentralisation and full altruism will the allocation be effi-
3CETA stands for Carbon Emissions Trajectory Assessment. Introduction to CETA can be 
found in Peck and Teisberg (1992) while introduction to CETA-M in Peck and Teisberg (1997).
4To avoid confusion, the terms of welfare optimum or the first best outcome will be used in the 
remaining discussion.
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cient. Although they doubt the prospect of international policy agreements on the 
GHG stock level, they suggest agreements that take the current GHG stock as 
given are more likely to be successful than agreements that attempt to change the 
stock. Ulph (2000) analyses the environmental policy (emission permit) assuming 
that environmental damage costs are known only by state governments. He shows 
that asymmetric information narrows the difference in environmental policies across 
states, relative to full information, but does not justify harmonisation (i.e., iden­
tical environmental policy across states). However, as he assumes pollution does 
not cross state boundaries, his findings are not directly applicable in GHG emission 
control.5 Using game theoretical tools within a computable general equilibrium 
framework, Babiker (2001) shows that the international CO2 abatement falls into 
the “Prisoners’ Dilemma” class. In the absence of side payments, international co­
operation may be achieved by suitably designed trade instruments, i.e., imposing 
tariff on energy-intensive imports from those non-cooperative countries.
It is often argued that emission trade and tax systems are identical with perfect 
information (Weitzman 1974). However, it is not guaranteed in a multi-country sys­
tem. It might be true that both instruments will achieve the cost-efficiency to meet 
certain targets of GHG emission control. But the impact of the two instruments on 
economic growth and welfare might be different. In spite of implementability, the 
difference arises from the implicit restrictions on income transfer across boundaries.
This chapter discusses the interaction between China and the rest of the world 
(ROW) in a setting similar to that of Chao and Peck (2000). In addition to analysing 
the bargaining power and set, the focus is on the comparison of emission tax and 
permit trading schemes. In particular, whether a decentralised and differentiated 
emission tax scheme improves global welfare. The rest of the chapter is organised 
as follows. The next section sets up a theoretical model to formally discuss possible 
policy arrangements. Then a stylised numerical analysis is carried in a hypothetical
5However, it is interesting to study the policy implication of information asymmetry about the 
abatement cost of GHG emission.
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two region model (China and ROW). The final section concludes and discusses 
possible extensions.
5.2 The Theoretical Model
Following Chao and Peck (2000), the model is structured as follows. Suppose there 
are N  nations in the world. The social welfare function of nation i could be written 
as
U* = PiU'(Ci,Q)
where Pi and Ci are, respectively, the population and per capita consumption of 
nation i\ and Q is the environmental quality measured by the change in temperature. 
Ul(C{, Q) is thus per capita utility of nation i. As the focus of this chapter is on the 
interaction among different nations, it is assumed that all individuals within one 
nation have the same preferences.
The amount of domestic capital goods owned by each nation is denoted by K{. 
The technology for each nation is represented by a convex and twice-differentiable 
multi-factor production function. For simplicity, it is assumed that the production 
function, Fl(Ki , Ei,Q), has two factor inputs, capital (environmentally benign), K {, 
and energy (causing global climate change), Ei.6 Capital is internationally mobile, 
and energy can be obtained at a price of c for all nations.7 Global climate change 
enters into both utility and production functions because climate change may cause 
damages that can be valued in a market, e.g. crop losses, and damages that do not 
have established market values, e.g. species loss (Chao and Peck 2000). It is further 
assumed that both utility and production functions have usual properties.
6This assumption implies full employment in the general equilibrium setting, i.e. labour is fixed.
7For simplicity, the energy is assumed to be of same quality and carbon content. As the 
production cost of energy is assumed constant, the origin of energy is inessential, i.e., one nation 
could either produce or import the energy needed. These assumptions will be relaxed in Chapters 
6-8 in a numerical dynamic general equilibrium model, G-Cubed-T.
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5.2.1 Competitive Equilibrium Prior to Environmental Control
Because an individual country cannot control Q, and because the utility or social 
welfare function is an increasing function of consumption, the objective of each 
country is simply to achieve the highest possible net output. As the direct marginal 
(extraction) cost of energy is c, the net output for nation i, Yi, can be expressed as:
Yi =  F'(Ki, EQ) -  cEi .(5.1)
The following conditions are satisfied in a competitive equilibrium prior to en­
vironmental control:8
F'K(K i, E i ,Q) = r ; (5.2)
F%(Ki,E i ,Q) = c ; (5.3)
N N
j2Ki = Y,Ki> (5.4)
t=l i=l
Oi = Yi + r ( K i -  Ki)  ; (5.5)
/  N \
Q = G[Y,Ei ■ (5.6)
i=l /
System (5.1)-(5.6) has A N +2 variables in A N +2 equations, therefore the system 
can be solved to get the pre-environmental-control equilibrium values: Ei, Ki, Ci, 
Yi, Q, and r. Consequently, the nation Vs social welfare prior to environmental 
control is V  =  PiUl{Ci,Q).
It is clear that this decentralised competitive equilibrium is not the first best 
outcome, i.e. welfare optimum, because the external cost of using energy is not 
considered by any nation.
8The climate change, Q, is actually a function of all past and current energy uses. However, as 
the model presented here is static, only current energy use is controllable, while historical energy 
uses enter into the process as pre-determined parameters.
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5.2.2 Welfare Optimum
Let Ai denote the utility weight for nation i. The global social welfare maximisation 
problem can be stated as follows:
N
=  (5'7) 
2=1
subject to (5.4), (5.6), and
N N
Y  PiQ = Y  lF^ Ki’ > Q) ~ ■ (5 -8)
i= 1 i=1
Let 7Tfc, 7re and irc be the shadow prices associated with above constraints re­
spectively. Then the first order condition can be written as
\U b(C i,Q ) = nc
nc [F'E(Ki, Ei, Q) — c]
JrcF'k (K UEu Q) = *!*
N N
*e = -  Y  VW&Cj, Q ) - * c Y  Ei ’ Q)
i=1
(5.9)
(5.10)
(5.11)
(5.12)
The last condition (5.12) shows that the shadow price of climate change consists 
of two parts: the values derived from the marginal utility and the marginal product 
of climate change. Condition (5.10) shows that the marginal product of energy 
reflects both the marginal extraction cost and the marginal external cost.
Equations (5.4), (5.6) and (5.8)—(5.12) form a system of 3N +  4 equations with 
3-/V +  4 variables. Therefore they can be solved to get the optimal values of E*, K*, 
C*, Q*, 7r*, 7Tg, 7r£; and the corresponding global welfare is
N
V-  = Y ^ piu ' Q ' )
2=1
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5.2.3 Instruments to Achieve Welfare Optimum in a Decentralised Economy
The above global social welfare maximisation problem is constructed in a cen­
tralised pattern. However, the real world is a decentralised one. Moreover, national 
sovereignty makes the scheme more complicated. For example, the emission tax 
and/or permit trade may require a huge amount of income transfers across bor­
ders. Therefore these two questions need to be answered. How to achieve welfare 
optimum in a decentralised economy? Are the approaches realistic to achieve the 
welfare optimum?
Emission Tax
It seems straightforward to achieve the welfare-optimum in a decentralised economy 
by imposing an emission tax. From equation (5.10), it is known that for a welfare 
optimum,
Fh(K i, Eu Q )  =  c + ^  G'(Y ,  )  •
Therefore the tax rate can be set as: 
/  n  \
‘* = d G '
c \i=i 
N
G' (513)
, 2— 1
Note that the tax rate expressed in (5.13) captures the adverse effects of global 
warming on both utility and production. Clearly the optimal tax rate is affected 
by the welfare weight (A*) assigned to each nation. This result is in line with the 
finding of Manne (1996).
This tax rate may induce firms in each country to use energy at the optimal level 
E* in a partial equilibrium setting. However, it cannot guarantee that each country 
has the optimal consumption C*, because the welfare-optimum for each country 
is achieved with the global income constraint (5.8) rather than individual income 
constraint (5.5). This means that in addition to the emission tax, it is necessary to
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allow income transfers across country borders.
From (5.11) it can be derived that the real interest rate for capital is r* = 7r£/7r*. 
For nation z, the spending on consumption is PiC*, while total disposable income is 
F l(K *, E*, Q*) — cE* +  r*(Ki — K*). It is obvious that only in very rare cases will 
these two terms be equal, although in aggregate they are equal according to equation
(5.8) .9 Therefore, if they are not equal, income transfer is necessary to obtain the 
welfare-optimum. Specifically, if PiC* > F l(K *, E* ,Q*) — cE* +r*(Ki — K*)t nation 
z should receive net income support from the other countries.
It can be derived that a country should be a recipient of such a transfer if 
it has a small capital stock, low productivity and energy efficiency, and therefore 
low product, but a high consumption propensity. It can be seen that developing 
countries fall into this category.
However, this income transfer issue extends beyond the discussion of global 
warming policy, because if there were no global warming externality , it would still 
require income transfers to achieve welfare-optimum as long as countries are not 
identical. Therefore it might be better to isolate a global warming policy from 
the general issue of income distribution. This can be done by replacing constraint
(5.8) in the global welfare maximisation problem with condition (5.5), that is, each 
country should satisfy its own budget constraint. But these new constraints make 
the possibility set smaller, so the solution is of the second best property, which will 
be discussed in more detail in subsection 5.2.4.
Tradable Permit
Now consider a global tradable permit scheme. Two issues should be dealt with 
when such a scheme is designed. First, to determine the optimal number of permits 
(E ), which determines the environmental quality through Q = G(E). Second, to
9It has been shown that Equations (5.4), (5.6) and (5.8)-(5.12) form a system of 3N+A equations 
with 3N  +  4 variables. If PiC* =  Fl (K* , E*,Q*) — cE* +  r*(K{ — K*) were included, the system 
would have N  — 1 more equations. The system would be insolvable unless N  equations in the 
AN +  3 equation system are linearly dependent.
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decide how to allocate these permits. Now the global social welfare maximisation 
problem can be written as follows:
N
max _ U  = xi p i U\ Cu G(E)) 
Ci,Ki,Ei,E ■__ -I
(5.14)
subject to (5.4), (5.8), and
NJ2Ei = E. (5.15)
i=i
Let 7rfc, 7rc and 7re be the shadow prices associated with above constraints re­
spectively. Then, in addition to (5.9) and (5.11), the first order condition can be 
written as 10
TTC [Fß{Ki,E,,Q) -  c] =  77,
7Te = -G '(E ) AiP>UlQ(Ci, (?) +  7rc £ )  F'Q(Ki, (?)
. 1=1 i=l
(5.16)
(5.17)
The above conditions are exactly the same as those given by (5.4), (5.6), (5.8)- 
(5.12), except that ^eG'(^2iLi Eî j in (5.10) and (5.12) is equal to 7re in (5.16) and 
(5.17). It can be drawn from these conditions11 that the initial allocation of permits 
does not affect the optimal value of capital and energy use and consumption as long 
as the number of permits (E ) is set optimally. It can also be seen that the allocation 
of permits may serve as a tool of income transfer to achieve the first best outcome, 
which is problematic with the emission tax scheme. As in the case of the emission 
tax, the permit price and interest rate are set as follows:
P
*
e
Country Vs income other than permit sales is F l(K *, E*, G(E*)) — cE* + r*(Ki~  
K *)] while total consumption is PiC*. Therefore the initial number of permits (Ei)
10Because the environmental quality is uniquely determined by (5.6), Q is used in these conditions 
to avoid excessive notation.
11 Because this is a global optimisation problem, the difference between the actual use and initial 
allocation of permits for individual countries and resulting payments cancel each other out. There­
fore, the initial allocation of permits does not enter the constraints and the first order conditions.
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can be carefully selected such that
pKE, -  ED =  * - F \ K l  E l  G(E*) -  cEt +  r%Ki -  K ‘) ■
However, it is quite possible that the value of the right hand side of the above 
equation is too high and Ei > E * is needed to equate both sides. Therefore, while 
a tradable emission permit scheme may help to achieve the first best outcome, it 
does not guarantee it.
Chao and Peck (2000) claim that the welfare-optimum can be achieved in an 
emission trading system if the initial permits are carefully allocated and provide a 
proof. However, what they dealt with is not what is discussed here. In contrast to 
condition (5.9) in this chapter, equation (24) in their paper states that each country 
should satisfy its own budget constraint, and no income transfer other than emission 
trading is allowed, i.e., what they get is a second best outcome.
In sum, the following statement can be made:
Result 5.1. A pure emission (or energy use) tax can not achieve the first best 
outcome, i.e. maximising global welfare not just emission targets, and emission (or 
energy use) permit trading scheme does not guarantee the achievement of the first 
best outcome.
5.2.4 The Second Best Policy
Now suppose that the individual country should meet its own budget constraint, 
it is necessary to first discuss the emission (or in this case actually energy) tax 
scheme, in a more decentralised way, because the interest rate appears in the con­
straint (5.5). In this decentralised world, it is necessary to distinguish producer 
and consumer (and social planner). The producer chooses capital and energy use to 
maximise profit given the interest rate, energy price and environmental regulation. 
The resultant first order conditions are (5.15) and
FlE(K i,E i,Q ) = c + U . (5.18)
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At the same time, the global social planner chooses energy supply, consumption 
and environmental quality to maximise global social welfare (5.7) subject to con­
straints (5.5) and (5.6). Let 7r* and 7re denote the shadow prices associated with the 
constraints (5.5) and (5.6). Then the first order condition can be written as:
\iU'c (Ci,Q) = 4
1=1 i —1
(5.19)
(5.20)
(5.21)
Condition (5.20), which determines the tax rate of energy use, is equivalent 
to condition (5.15). One important result can be found by comparing condition 
(5.19) with (5.9). Now the weighted marginal utility of consumption differs across 
countries. This verifies that the results are not the first best outcome. One more 
important finding is that the tax rates are different across countries! This seems to 
contradict the usual wisdom that equal emission tax leads to least costs. However, 
a second thought reveals that it is not the case. As individuals in different coun­
tries face a common environmental quality, i.e. global warming, by definition the 
marginal utility from that environmental quality is the same for them. On the other 
hand, because individuals in different countries face different budget constraints, i.e., 
their available consumption differs, their marginal utility from consumption differs 
accordingly. As a result, the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for en­
vironment differs for individuals in different countries, leading to different prices of 
environmental quality, or emission taxes. From (5.20), the tax rate should be set as
As 7Tlc differs across countries, the whole term differs as well . If a uniform tax 
rate is set, then using (5.15), (5.20) can be rewritten as:
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(5.22)
This in turn implies that tt1c should be identical for all i. As the usual optimi­
sation requires different multipliers for different constraints, this restriction causes
the result to deteriorate further. In sum, the following result is found regarding the 
emission tax scheme if income transfer is not allowed, as in the real world situation.
R esu lt 5.2. I f  each country should meet its own budget constraint and an emis­
sion tax scheme is considered, a differentiated tax scheme is the best choice, i.e., a 
uniform tax scheme cannot achieve higher global welfare than a differentiated tax 
scheme.
Now moving to the tradable permit system, the problem can be set as follows. 
The global social planner chooses initial permit allocation, capital, energy, and 
consumption to maximise the global social welfare function (5.14) subject to (5.4)
and
N  N
= and 
i= 1 i=l
(5.23)
PiCi = F i[ K u Ei)G [ Y ^ -  cEi + pe(Ei -  Ei) +  r(K i -  K i). (5.24)
Let 7Tfc, 7Te and 7r* be the shadow prices associated with the above constraints,
respectively. Then, in addition to (5.19), the first order condition can be written as
7Te +  7T lcpe + G \E )
K [F 'e (K i> E i< Q )-C -P e] = * e (5.25)
4[F'K(K i,E u Q )-r ]= T T k (5.26)
N  N
\P iU 'Q(Ci, Q) + <F'q (K„ Eu Q)
i=1 1=1
=  0 (5.27)
F'E(K i,E i, Q ) - c - p e = 0 (5.28)
F ik (Ki ,E i , Q ) - r  = 0 (5.29)
The last two are the first conditions of the profit maximisation problem, which
161
imply that 7re =  =  0 in (5.25) and (5.26). And (5.27) implies that irlc is identical
for all i. Thus these conditions are exactly the conditions given in (5.9), (5.11), 
(5.16), and (5.17). At first glance, it seems that, as argued by many authors (e.g. 
Chao and Peck 2000), the first best outcome can be achieved by carefully choosing 
the initial allocation of permits. However, this is not guaranteed. The “optimal” 
allocation for some countries could be well above the total optimal number of per­
mits. As will be seen, this is exactly the case implied by a numerical model. If 
non-negative restrictions are imposed on allocations, it turns out that a boundary 
solution is reached, i.e., some countries are not allocated any permits. Therefore 
the tradable permit scheme should be designed in a different way.
An alternative method would be to fix the total amount of permits, rather than 
endogenise it. Again, it is possible to get the spurious initial allocation. Another way 
would be to set up certain rules of allocating permits and then to find the optimal 
number of permits. No doubt, there are numerous rules to allocate permits, with 
pro rata population and pro rata current emissions as two important scenarios.
Before moving into numerical analysis, the following statement is presented to 
summarise the above theoretical analysis.
Result 5.3. Even with perfect information, international emission tax and emission 
trading schemes are not identical because the latter allows income transfers across 
borders.
5.3 Numerical Simulation
In this section, a simple numerical model is presented.12 There are two regions in the 
model: China and rest of the world (ROW). In order to illustrate the idea developed 
in the previous sections, the values of parameters for ROW are chosen in such a 
way that they represent a more developed world, which is somehow counterfactual.
12This simple stylised static model is presented because it is easy to handle and enables full 
demonstration of the above theoretical analyses. A much more complicated, dynamic general 
equilibrium model, G-Cubed-T, will be presented later, and some features of the theoretical analysis 
will be simulated and tested using it.
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5.3.1 The Climate Model
Following Oglesby and Saltzman (1990) and Chao (1995), the relationship between 
average global climate change (T) and global energy consumption (E ) can be written 
as follows:
T =  T„log2 ( l  +  g )
where To (= 3 °C) is the increase from the pre-industrial average global temperature 
as a result of doubling the carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere; Xo is 
the pre-industrial level of carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere, which is 
about 280 pprrr, and 7 (=0.30 ppm/exajoules/year) is a transfer coefficient which is 
chosen so that at the rate of emission of about 250 exajoules (energy equivalent), 
the equilibrium carbon concentration will remain at about 335 ppm, therefore 7E  
is the carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere (Chao and Peck 2000).
5.3.2 The Utility Function
Following Chao and Peck (2000), the utility function for each region is assumed to 
be of the Cobb-Douglas form as follows:
U*(Ci,T) = Cf ‘ (Tj — T) l - 0 i
1/2
The parameter Tj is the catastrophic level of average global temperature increase, 
as perceived by nation i, i.e., at that level, the utility becomes zero, which is as 
bad as when consumption drops to zero. The values of parameters, Tj and 0j, 
are highly uncertain and subjective. But one reasonable conjecture is that they 
are higher for the developing countries (China in this case) than for developed 
countries, because developing countries have lower per capita consumption and thus 
care about consumption more than about the environment. Specifically, the values 
are determined in such a way that the utility reduction from a 3 °C rise in average 
global temperature is 2% for China and 4% for ROW, and the utility losses increase 
in a cubic order as the average global temperature increases (Chao and Peck 2000;
163
Table 5.3: Numerical Assumptions (before environmental control)
Parameter China ROW
0 i 0.9720 0.9489
T t 6.03494 6.04728
Production shifter, A i 4.08 29.93
Capital value share, o t i 0.20 0.15
Energy value share, ß i 0.06 0.05
GDP (US$ trillion) 12.00 100.00
Population (billion) 1.78 8.23
Capital stock, K i ,  (US$ trillion) 48.00 300.00
Energy consumption, E i , (exajoules) 160.00 1111.11
Marginal cost of energy, c, (US$/gigajoules) 4.50 4.50
Interest rate 0.05 0.05
Nordhaus 1994a):
(1.00) 01( r i ) 1-01 -  (1.O2)01 ( T i -  3)1-01 =  (1.16)01 (Ti -  6)1-01
(1.00) 02^ ) 1' 02 =  (1.O4)02(T2 -  3)1-02 -  (1.32)02(T2 -  6)1" 02
The resulting values are listed in Table 5.3.
5.3.3 The Production Function
The estimates of the impact of climate change on production are both diverse and 
controversial.13 For example, the impact on agricultural yield varies from —100% 
to 180% (see Table 6.5). Therefore, it is assumed tha t the production is not affected 
by global warming14 and the functional form is Cobb-Douglas as well:
F \ K i,E i,Q) = Ai K ^E f* .
The technologies employed by the two regions are different in the sense that 
China has a higher marginal product of capital and higher energy intensity. The 
assumption of Chao and Peck (2000) is followed about the capital value and energy
13 A collection of these estimates can be found in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
14It is fairly safe to make such an assumption as there is only one aggregated sector in the 
economy. The impact on production of global warming will be introduced later in the G-Cubed-T 
model where the economy has a more disaggregated structure.
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value shares and marginal cost of energy of ROW. However, a different assumption 
is made about the parameters of China. China has a capital/GDP ratio of about 
3.0,15 which implies the capital share is about 0.20. And the energy/GDP ratio is 
about 13.33 megajoule/USD, implying the energy share is about 0.06.16
China’s GDP growth rate was 10.1% per annum between 1980 and 1990, and 
11.2% per annum between 1990 and 1998 (World Bank 2000). It is assumed that 
China will have moderate 5% growth in the next half century, which indicates a 
GDP in 2050 of about 12124.8 US$ billion. The world GDP growth rate was 3.2% 
per annum between 1980 and 1990, and 2.5% per annum between 1990 and 1998 
(World Bank 2000). It is also assumed that the GDP growth of ROW will keep the 
trend, i.e., the ROW GDP will be about 100309.3 US$ billion.17
China’s annual new capital formation growth was 20.7% between 1985 and 1998 
(SSB 1999), while domestic investment growth was 13.4% per annum between 1990 
and 1998 (World Bank 2000). If this trend is maintained, China’s capital stock will 
be as high as 148 US$ trillion by 2050, which is unrealistic. To be in line with the 
assumptions given above, and in Chao and Peck (2000), it is simply assumed that 
the interest rate and marginal extraction cost of energy are, respectively, 0.05 and 
$4.5 per gigajoules. The capital stock and energy consumption are derived from the 
assumption of their shares in GDP. The figure about capital implies no capital flows
15In 1998, the state owned and medium and large non-state-owned enterprises had a capital 
value of 6483.205 RMB billion, and value-added of 1942.193 RMB billion, implying a capital/GDP 
ratio of about 3.3. The interest rate fell from 10.08 percent in 23 August 1996 to 6.39 percent in 
7 December 1998 for a capital investment loan of less than one year; and from 12.42 percent to 
7.56 percent for a loan of more than five years during the same period (SSB 1999)). According to 
Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993), China’s capital/GDP ratio was 2.37 in 1990.
16In 1998, China’s total energy consumption was about 3984.8 exajoules, while GDP was 959.03 
USD billion (SSB 1999). The resulting energy/GDP ratio is as high as 41.55 megajoule/USD. It is 
still 36.63 megajoule/USD even though the energy consumption is net of household use. However, 
the World Bank (2000) estimates that China’s energy efficiency is actually 3.3 PPPS per kg oil 
equivalent. This figure gives a moderate energy/GDP ratio of 13.33 megajoule/USD, which implies 
the energy share is about 0.06.
17Chao and Peck (2000) assume that OECD countries have an annual growth rate of 2.0%, while 
ROW has an annual rate of 3.5%; and the GDP in 2050 is 40 US$ trillion and 25 US$ trillion, 
respectively, for the OECD and ROW.
165
across borders. Plugging these values into the production functions gives the values 
of coefficient A{, which are 4.08 for China and 29.93 for ROW. The difference in 
the values of this coefficient between China and ROW is mainly because the energy 
and capital share of total GDP is only 20-26% and the size of the two economies 
is quite different. However, the marginal product of capital and energy are in the 
same order for both regions.
China’s population was 1238.6 million by the end of 1998, and the average 
annual growth rate was 1.3% between 1980 and 1998. The World Bank estimates 
the annual growth rate will be 0.7% between 1998 and 2015. The world population 
(excluding China) was 4658 million in 1998, and the annual growth rate is assumed 
at 1.1% between 1998 and 2015 (World Bank 2000). Following these assumptions, 
in 2050 the population would be, respectively, 1780.2 million and 8227.3 million for 
China and ROW.
5.3.4 Numerical Results
Without environmental control, global energy consumption would be 1271.111 exa- 
joules in 2050, and global warming would be 3.72 °C. Correspondingly, the per capita 
utility of China and ROW would be 2.482 and 3.252, respectively, and global welfare 
would be 31.19418 if both have the same utility weight (A*) of one (Table 5.4). This 
is the baseline that will be used to compare different policy arrangements.
Introducing environmental control will increase global welfare to 31.655 in a 
global social optimisation pattern (Table 5.4). However, this global optimisation 
is not attainable, because the underlying assumption is that US$ 8.812 trillion, 
amounting to 76.6 percent of China’s GDP, has to be transferred to China from 
ROW. Correspondingly, China’s per capita utility increases to 3.298, while ROW’s 
decreases to 3.133.
Table 5.5 shows the results of imposing energy taxes, assuming that both China
18As utility levels are just for illustrative purpose, the unit is not included. However, it should 
be borne in mind that the figure for global welfare is about a billion times of the per capita level.
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Table 5.4: Non-Cooperative v.s. Competitive Equilibrium
In d ica to rs
p rio r to  
env ironm en ta l 
con tro l
w ith  env iro n m en ta l 
con tro l
A bso lu te  value % change^
C a p ita l used in C h in a 48.000 47.632 -0 .7 6 7
C a p ita l used in R O W 300.000 300.368 0.123
E nergy  used in C h in a 160.000 81.514 -4 9 .0 5 4
E nergy  used in R O W 1111.111 571.137 -4 8 .5 9 8
O u tp u t in C h ina 12.000 11.506 -4 .1 1 7
O u tp u t in R O W 100.000 96.745 -3 .2 5 5
P er c a p ita  co nsum ption  in C h ina 6.337 11.219 77.040
P er c a p ita  co nsum ption  in R O W 11.543 10.370 -1 0 .1 6 2
G lobal w arm ing 3.720 2.295 -3 8 .3 0 6
P er c a p ita  u tility  in C h ina 2.482 3.298 32.877
P er c a p ita  u tility  in R O W 3.253 3.133 -3 .6 8 9
T o ta l g lobal u tility 31.194 31.655 1.475
C h in a 4.418 5.871
R O W 26.776 25.784
t : percentage change to the baseline outcome, i.e. competitive equilibrium prior to environmental 
control.
and ROW have the same bargaining power A. As discussed in the previous section, a 
policy with uniform tax rate creates lower global welfare than one with differentiated 
tax rates, although both policies can achieve global utility higher than the baseline. 
Specifically, China’s utility is lower while ROW’s utility is higher in a uniform tax 
regime than would be the case in a differentiated tax regime.
Figure 5.3 shows the bargaining set with a differentiated tax regime. The bar­
gaining set is larger than would usually be assumed. The tax rate imposed on 
ROW could be as high as $14,328 per gigajoules for ROW to have the same utility 
as the baseline, if China could at the same time impose a tiny $0,319 per gigajoules 
(about 7.09% of the extraction cost of energy). However, the bargaining set is not 
symmetric. The highest tax rate China would accept is only $4.84 per gigajoules, 
on condition that ROW imposes a tax at the rate of $4,108 per gigajoules.
Figure 5.4 compares the uniform tax regime with a differentiated tax regime. 
The optima with varying bargaining power (A*) are depicted. The variance of optima 
with uniform tax is much smaller than that of optima with differentiated tax. All the 
combinations of (C/i, C/2) under a uniform tax regime, as bargaining power varying
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Table 5.5: Outcome of Energy Tax with Equal Bargaining Power
Indicators
Differentiated rate* Uniform rate*
value %change* value % change*
Capital used in China 48.125 0.260 47.628 -0.775
Capital used in ROW 299.875 -0.042 300.372 0.124
Energy used in China 93.045 -41.847 80.880 -49.450
Energy used in ROW 552.165 -50.305 566.750 -48.992
Output in China 11.622 -3.150 11.501 -4.158
Output in ROW 96.558 -3.442 96.708 -3.292
Per capita consumption in China 6.291 -0.726 6.267 -1.105
Per capita consumption in ROW 11.431 -0.970 11.439 -0.901
Global warming 2.274 -38.871 2.281 -38.683
Per capita utility in China 2.490 0.322 2.485 0.121
Per capita utility in ROW 3.281 0.861 3.282 0.891
Total global utility 31.436 0.776 31.434 0.769
China 4.432 4.424
ROW 27.004 27.011
Marginal cost of global warming 0.210 0.136
Energy tax in China 2.994 4.032
Energy tax in ROW 4.244 4.032
* Global optimisation with equal bargaining power and individual budget constraint, 
t Percentage change to the baseline outcome, i.e. competitive equilibrium prior to 
environmental control.
from Ai =  1, A2 =  0 to Ai =  0, A2 =  1, are depicted in the diagram; while only 
a subset of U \ , U 2 are depicted under a differentiated tax regime, with bargaining 
power varying from Ai =  0.375, A2 =  0.625 to Ai =  0.970, A2 =  0.030. It is clear 
from the diagram that the whole utility frontier with uniform tax rate falls into 
the utility frontier with differentiated tax rates, confirming the conjecture that a 
uniform tax regime cannot achieve higher global welfare than a differentiated tax 
regime. Another observation from Figure 5.4 is that, as the bargaining power of 
ROW increases, these two regimes tend to converge. This can be partly explained 
by the different size of China and ROW. When ROW dominates in the negotiation 
of a global energy tax policy, a uniform tax rate is likely to be adopted.
The results of a tradable permit system with equal bargaining power are listed in 
Table 5.6. Two scenarios are reported. One is the global optimisation of choosing a 
total permit number and an initial allocation without prior restrictions, in addition 
to the other control variables like capital and energy use and consumption. As 
discussed in the previous section, a tradable permit system can achieve the welfare
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Figure 5.3: Bargaining Set with Differentiated Tax
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Table 5.6: Tradable Permit with Equal Bargaining Power
In d ica to r
w ith o u t non­
negative  
restriction*
w ith  non­
negative  
restriction*
C a p ita l used in C h ina 47.632 47.682
C a p ita l used in R O W 300.368 300.318
E nergy  used in C h ina 81.514 89.237
E nergy  used in R O W 571.137 624.502
P e rm it a lloca ted  for C h in a 2301.457 713.739
P e rm it a lloca ted  for R O W -1 6 4 8 .8 0 5 0.000
P e rm it price 3.970 3.280
O u tp u t in C h in a 11.506 11.571
O u tp u t in R O W 96.745 97.176
P er c a p ita  consum ption  in C h ina 11.219 7.435
P er c a p ita  consum ption  in R O W 10.370 11.215
G lobal w arm ing 2.295 2.458
P er c a p ita  u tility  in C h ina 3.298 2.699
P er c a p ita  u tility  in R O W 3.133 3.247
T o ta l global u tility 31.655 31.529
C h in a 5.871 4.804
R O W 25.784 26.725
t optimising perm it number and initial allocation with individual budget 
constraint
optimum only if ROW can be allocated a negative amount of permits (—1648.805 
exajoules). If a non-negative restriction is imposed on the initial allocation, it turns 
out that no permits are allocated to ROW. Needless to say, these two scenarios are 
not realistic and are not worth further exploration. Instead, an attempt is made 
to find the optimal number of permits to use energy with different allocation rules. 
The result is depicted in Figure 5.5. It can be seen that both allocation rules, i.e. 
allocating permits proportional to the population or pre-control energy use, are in 
the bargaining set. However, it can also be seen that China benefits less than the 
ROW from these two allocation rules.
Figure 5.6 shows the result of fixing the total amount of permits at the level of 
global optimisation with environmental control (652.651 exajoules). It is clear from 
the diagram that this kind of arrangement is always beneficial to ROW, but not 
necessarily to China.
Both Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show that, for China, an allocation of permits pro­
portional to population is not as favourable as people usually assume. This can
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Figure 5.5: Tradable Permit with Endogenous No. Permits, Varying Initial Allocation
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Table 5.7: Sensitivity Analysis of Preference Assumption
In d ica to rs
D ifferen tia ted  R a te s U nifo rm  R a te
Old* N ew T O ld 1 N ew 1”
T o ta l energy  use (exa.j.) 645.210 790.630 647.630 792.275
G lobal w arm ing  (qC) 2.274 2.656 2.281 2.660
E nergy  ta x , C h in a  (S /g .j.) 2.994 2.016 4.032 2.547
E nergy  ta x , R O W  (S /g .j.) 4.244 2.648 4.032 2.547
P e r c a p ita  u tility , C h in a 2.490 2.470 2.485 2.468
P e r c a p ita  u tility , R O W 3.281 3.331 3.282 3.332
T o ta l g lobal u tility 31.436 31.815 31.434 31.814
* Utility loss from 3 °C warming is 2% for China and 4% for ROW 
t Utility loss from 3 °C warming is 4% for China and 2% for ROW
be explained by the fact that, compared to ROW, China has a higher preference 
for consumption and higher energy intensity in production. A restriction on the 
use of energy will hurt China’s production more than ROW’s even if it is offered a 
seemingly favourable allocation of permits. Because China has to use more energy 
to produce the same output and has to satisfy its own income constraint, China’s 
benefit from this allocation is limited in the production side. On the other hand, 
due to its preference, China’s benefit from improvement in global warming is also 
limited. Of course, this arrangement is more favourable than an allocation of per­
mits proportional to the pre-control situation. Such an arrangement makes ROW 
much better off while leaving China at the margin if the total permit is endogenous 
(Figure 5.5). Given this fact, negotiation of an international agreement on permit 
allocation is a painful process if the developing countries are covered.
5.3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
To test the robustness of the results, two sets of analyses are presented. First, the 
assumptions about parameters are changed in two ways: (1) the assumption about 
the preference is reversed, i.e., the utility loss from a 3 T  rise in average global 
temperature is 4% for China and 2% for ROW, and the utility losses increase in 
a cubic order as the average global temperature increases; (2) it is assumed that 
China has the same technology as ROW. The results are reported in Tables 5.7 and 
5.8.
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Table 5.8: Sensitivity Analysis of Thecnology Assumption
In d ica to rs
D ifferen tia ted  R a tes U nifo rm  R a te
Old* N ew 1” Old* N ew T
T o ta l energy use (exa.j.) 645.210 630.231 647.630 632.183
G lobal w arm ing  (C'C) 2.274 2.233 2.281 2.236
E nergy  tax , C h in a  ( $ /g-j.) 2.994 3.011 4.032 4.063
E nergy  tax , R O W  ($ /g .j .) 4.244 4.240 4.032 4.063
P er c a p ita  u tility , C h ina 2.490 2.505 2.485 2.501
P e r c a p ita  u tility , R O W 3.281 3.282 3.282 3.283
T o ta l global u tility 31.436 31.471 31.434 31.469
* Capital share is 0.2 for China and 0.15 for ROW; energy share is 0.06 for 
China and 0.05 for ROW
t China and ROW have same capital (0.15) and energy shares (0.05)
It is clear from the test that the qualitative result does not change even if the 
parameters change dramatically, i.e., a differentiated tax system is always better 
than a uniform tax system in terms of global welfare. China suffers from a uniform 
tax policy even if China cares more about global warming than PcOW, or has the 
same technology as ROW.
Second, testing the impact of economic size on the result has also been at­
tempted. The world is divided into three economies: China, rich countries (Rich), 
and rest of the world (ROW). It is assumed that China and ROW have the same pref­
erence and production technology, but different population and GDP levels which 
are projected based on current and historical data. Rich countries have higher 
energy efficiency and care more about global warming.
Low- and middle-income countries had an annual growth rate of 3.5% between 
1990 and 1998, and their GDP (excluding China) in 1998 was US$ 5234.831 billion. 
Following this trend, their GDP in 2050 will be US$ 31.32 trillion. Population was 
3772 million in 1998. The growth rate is projected as 1.2 percent between 1998 and 
2050. If this trend extends to 2050, population will be 7014.25 million.
High-income countries had an annual growth rate of 2.3% between 1990 and 
1998 and 3.1% during the period between 1980 and 1990. Therefore it is assumed 
that rich countries will grow at the rate of 2.5 percent. The total GDP in 1998 was 
US$ 22543.577 billion, so the level in 2050 would be US$ 81.41 trillion. Population
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Table 5.9: Numerical Assumptions
Parameter China Rich ROW
0i 0.9720 0.9459 0.9720
Ti 6.03494 6.04728 6.03494
Production shifter, Ai 4.08 25.039 8.038
Capital value share, cq 0.20 0.15 0.20
Energy value share, ßi 0.06 0.05 0.06
GDP (US$ trillion) 12.00 80.00 30.00
Population (billion) 1.78 1.04 7.01
Capital stock, AT*, (US$ trillion) 48.00 240.00 120.00
Energy consumption, E i, (exajoules) 160.00 888.889 400.00
Marginal cost of energy, c, (US$/g.j.) 4.50 4.50 4.50
Interest rate 0.05 0.05 0.50
Table 5.10: Simulation Result for Three Country Groups
Indicators Pre-control Diff. rate Uniform rate
Capital use, China 48.000 48.861 47.652
Capital use, Rich countries 240.000 236.369 241.218
Capital use, ROW 120.000 122.770 119.130
Energy use, China 160.000 111.603 61.836
Energy use, Rich countries 888.888 334.984 347.798
Energy use, ROW 400.000 298.388 154.590
Output, China 12.000 11.785 11.318
Output, Rich countries 80.000 76.016 76.391
Output, ROW 30.000 29.612 28.295
Per capita consumption, China 6.337 6.315 6.211
Per capita consumption, Rich 73.077 71.811 71.893
Per capita consumption, ROW 4.023 4.014 3.943
Global warming 4.056 2.540 2.046
Per capita utility, China 2.477 2.492 2.477
Per capita utility, Rich 7.755 7.810 7.842
Per capita utility, ROW 1.986 2.000 1.986
Total global utility 26.394 26.575 26.486
China 4.408 4.436 4.409
Rich 8.065 8.122 8.155
ROW 13.921 14.017 13.922
in 1998 ws 886 million. The growth rate is estimated as 0.3 percent between 1998 
and 2015. If this trend extends to 2050, the population in rich countries will be 
1035.1 million. The detailed assumption of parameters is listed in Table 5.9.
Some stylised results are reported in Table 5.10. Again the qualitative results
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do not change after the regrouping of world economy. The differentiated tax system 
is better than the uniform tax system. China and Rest of the World suffer from 
the introduction of uniform tax, while rich countries benefit. The welfare-optima 
cannot be achieved without income redistribution.
5.4 Conclusion
The theoretical and numerical models show that an emission tax and tradable per­
mit policies are quite different. This is mainly because a tradable permit policy 
allows income transfer across borders while a tax does not. However, neither policy 
can achieve the first best, i.e. welfare maximising, outcome. In order to achieve the 
first best, an emission tax policy should be accompanied by a net transfer of income 
from rich to poor countries, while a tradable emission permit policy requires that 
rich countries be allocated a negative number of permits. It is clear that neither 
arrangement is realistic.
In terms of achieving the second best outcome, it is found that a differentiated 
tax system is better than a uniform tax system across countries. The difference in 
tax rate is justified by the fact that China and rest of the world (or poor countries 
and rich countries) have different preferences regarding the environment and con­
sumption and have different production technologies. Because China (or developing 
countries) prefers consumption more than developed countries and its energy inten­
sity is higher, a lower emission tax (or energy tax) would provide a more favourable 
environment to produce what it consumes. And because rich countries care more 
about environment, their willingness to pay for a clean environment is higher, there­
fore they could afford a higher tax rate. Thus, overall welfare could be enhanced 
by this arrangement.
Another benefit from a differentiated tax system is that it could gradually im­
prove mutual trust and international cooperation because a small unilateral tax 
could improve an individual nation’s welfare in addition to the global welfare. If 
the tax system could be carefully designed in the sense of combining global welfare
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with each nation’s interest, the prisoner’s dilemma could be solved.
Theoretically, a tradable permit system could produce higher global welfare if 
the initial allocation is carefully chosen. However, this is a centralised system, 
involving higher administrative demands. Moreover, the allocation of permits is a 
very sensitive issue, making it very difficult to reach an international agreement.
The above results should be interpreted cautiously. The numerical model pre­
sented here is very simple and is best interpreted as providing illustrative cases. 
For example, the Cobb-Douglas production function may not be the best functional 
form, as it allows substantial substitution between capital and energy input. After 
an environmental control is imposed, energy consumption falls by about half the 
previous level. Because global warming is related to the stock of GHG, a natural 
extension to the model is to introduce dynamics. Another extension could be to 
divide energy into several categories to allow energy switching and substitution.
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Chapter 6
A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of 
China’s Economy
6.1 introduction
Pioneered by Johansen (1960), computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling 
has been rapidly applied in various areas of economics and policy studies because 
it has profound theoretical grounds and can provide systematic and comprehensive 
inquires of studied topics. There is a huge amount of literature about CGE modeling 
and application, making it impossible to conduct a complete survey, even in one 
particular area.1 This chapter will briefly discuss the application of CGE modeling 
in CO2 emission control policies.
Since Nordhaus (1977) first brought the problem of CO2 to the attention of 
mainstream economists, and Edmonds and Reilly (1983) first built a large scale 
multi-country energy model, the literature applying CGE model to CO2 emission 
control analysis has been rapidly growing. The reason is obvious: CO2 emission con­
trol policies have economy-wide effects (Zhang 1998a, p.92). However, early CGE 
models had some drawbacks. Some lacked industry detail while more attention was
le a v e r  (1993) compares the structure of 14 models included in the Energy Modeling Forum 
(EMF) 12. Xie (1996, Ch.2) discusses the definition and clarification of CGE models, and gives 
a review of environmental CGE models. He also mentions some surveys, for example, de Melo’s 
(1988) survey on trade policy, Bergaman’s (1988) survey on energy policy and Devarajan’s (1988) 
survey on natural resources. McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1992) discuss the evolution of general 
equilibrium analysis of controlling CO2 emissions, and Zhang (1998a, p.94) lists some examples of 
such application at national and global levels. Pezzey and Lambie (2001) systematically evaluate 
G-Cubed and the other three major models of greenhouse policies used in Australia.
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given to energy, e.g. Edmonds and Reilly (1983), Global 2100 (Manne and Richels 
1990, 1992), CRTM model (Rutherford 1992) and Whalley and Wigle (1990). Some 
are one-country models, or ignore the international trade and flows of capital and 
assets, e.g. Cline (1992), Global 2100, CRTM, DICE model (Nordhaus 1994b), Jor­
genson and Wilcoxen (1991a, 1991b), Goulder (1991), Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw 
(1996), GREEN model (Burniaux et al. 1992b) and Whalley and Wigle (1990). 
Some are recursive models, in which agents lack foresight, e.g. CRTM, GREEN, 
and Whalley and Wigle (1990). Most have restricted functional form with parame­
ters chosen by judgement (or guesstimation) rather than by econometric estimation. 
The G-Cubed2 model was developed to address these problems.
G-Cubed is a multi-country, multi-sector, intertemporal general equilibrium 
model which includes detailed energy producing sectors as well as financial sec­
tors, international trade and capital flows. Most parameters in G-Cubed are econo- 
metrically estimated. It has been used to study a variety of policies in the areas 
of environmental regulation, tax reform, monetary and fiscal policy, international 
trade and currency crisis.3
There is also a growing literature on the application of general equilibrium mod­
els to the analysis of environmental policies in China. Xie (1996) and Xie and Saltz- 
man (2000) present a static neo-classical environmental CGE model of the Chinese 
economy in which world prices are set exogenously. Seven production sectors in 
the model use intermediate inputs and two primary factors, capital and labour, 
whose supplies are also exogenously determined. Three general types of pollution, 
wastewater, smog dust and solid wastes, are included. The model is calibrated us­
ing an environmentally extended social accounting matrix (ESAM) based on the 
1990 input-output table of China. Using the model, Xie (1996) simulates several 
environmental policy options, e.g. pollution emission taxes, subsidies for pollution
2G-Cubed stands for “Global General equilibrium Growth model”.
3See, for example, McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1992, 1999) for a general introduction of G-Cubed 
model, and McKibbin (1997, 1998), McKibbin, Shackleton, and Wilcoxen (1999) and McKibbin 
et al. (1999) for application on global warming issues.
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abatement activities, household waste disposal tax, government purchase of pollu­
tion cleaning services, and the five-year environmental protection program launched 
by Chinese government in 1994.
Zhang (1998a, 1998c) presents a recursive CGE model to analyse China’s energy 
and environmental policies. This model is also a single country model which takes 
the rest of the world as given. It disaggregates energy into coal, oil, natural gas and 
electricity, in addition to six other production sectors. The production technology is 
represented by nested CES-Cobb-Douglas-Leontief functions. It includes the rate 
of autonomous energy efficiency improvement in production functions to capture the 
effect of economic growth on energy use independent of changes in energy prices. 
Hicksian equivalent variation can be calculated to measure welfare changes.
Garbaccio, Ho, and Jorgenson (1999a) develop a dynamic single country CGE 
model of the Chinese economy to examine the use of carbon taxes to reduce CO2 
emissions. They consider the dual feature of plan and market institutions in their 
model—a fixed amount of total output is sold at the plan price, while the remainder 
is sold on the market.4 The model is built using the official Chinese input-output 
tables for 1992 and assuming Cobb-Douglas production functions. 29 sectors are 
included in the model, of which 4 are energy sectors. Using the model, they simulate 
a 5, 10 and 15 percent reduction in carbon emissions and find that a carbon tax can 
produce a “double-dividend”—a decrease in CO2 and a long run increase in GDP 
and consumption.
In order to examine China’s CO2 policy choices and the interaction between
4There is a moderate literature on CGE modeling of the Chinese economy with two-tier plan and 
market structure, which can be traced to Byrd (1987, 1989) for the Chinese economy and Sicular 
(1988) for theoretical analysis of the Chinese agricultural sector. Following them, many authors 
have devoted their efforts to model this peculiar feature during the transition period of the Chinese 
economy. An incomplete list includes Martin (1993), Xu (1990, 1993, 1996), Garbaccio (1994, 
1995), and Xiaoguang Zhang (1998). However, after more than twenty years of economic reform, 
this system is no longer a common practice. The price of almost every commodity has been freed. 
In the energy sector, for example, the government freed all coal prices by 1994, subsidy rates fell 
from 37% in 1990 to 29% in 1995, and the petroleum subsidy rates fell from 55% to 2% during the 
same period (Zhang 1998b). Therefore, the G-Cubed-T model described in this chapter does not 
consider the two-tier price.
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China and other countries on climate change issues, an aggregated G-Cubed model, 
G-Cubed-T, is constructed. It differs from the original model in three respects. 
Firstly, the original eight regions have been aggregated into three, China, the United 
States and the rest of the world, so as to focus on the China issue.5 Secondly, the 
dynamics of climate change is included in the model. The impacts of climate change 
on the economy can be examined via revised production functions. Thirdly, some 
of the parameters for the Chinese economy are re-estimated using a new data set.
Compared to existing CGE models of China’s economy and environment, G- 
Cubed-T provides two additional features. Firstly, it is a multi-country model in 
which interaction between different countries can be explicitly examined. This is 
especially important for the issue of global warming. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
controlling greenhouse gas emission is an international game—each country chooses 
its best policy given the expectation of actions taken in other countries. A multi­
country model provides a tool to run game theoretic simulations. Secondly, the 
model has an intertemporal optimisation structure where agents have foresight, 
and it is solved in annual interval of time, so that both short and long run effects 
of certain policy options can be examined.
This chapter will give a brief introduction about the structure of the G-Cubed- 
T model and its parameter estimation and calibration. A large number of China 
equations of the model is given in the Appendix to this chapter.
6.2 The Structure of G-Cubed-T Model
The original G-Cubed model developed in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999) has eight 
regions: United States, Japan, Australia, rest of OECD, Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, China, oil exporting developing countries and other developing 
countries. In the current G-Cubed-T model designed for the purpose of analysing 
the interaction between China and the rest of the world on global warming issues,
5This is achieved at the cost of overlooking some emission trading potentials as a large amount 
of trading would happen among countries in the ROW.
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Figure 6.1: Production Nesting
output
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Note: D—domestic output; M—imported good; Ml, M2—imports from country 1 and 2 respectively.
the regions are aggregated into three: China, the United States of America (USA) 
and the rest of the world (ROW). USA is separately included in the model because 
of the obvious fact that it is an important, and in most cases, dominant player in 
the world. Also relevant is the controversial stand of the USA in various issues of 
climate control, e.g. the Bush Administration’s decision not to proceed to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol.
Each region has three types of agents: firms in the 12 production sectors, a 
representative household and a government. The 12 production sectors include 
5 energy sectors (electric utilities; gas utilities; petroleum refining; coal mining; 
and crude oil and gas extraction) and 7 non-energy sectors (mining; agriculture, 
fishing and hunting; forestry/wood products; durable manufacturing; non-durable 
manufacturing; transportation; and services). Two additional sectors are embodied 
in the model: investment and consumption good production.
6.2.1 Firms
It is assumed that each of the 12 production sectors is represented by a price-taking 
firm which chooses inputs and investment to maximise the firm’s value. Each firm’s 
production technology is represented by a nest of constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) functions (see Figure 6.1).
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At the top of the production nesting, the firm’s output (1*, i 6 { 1 ,... ,  12}) is 
a function of capital (X{k ), labour (Xu,), composite energy (X ie) and composite 
material (Xio)-
where A \  is a shifter representing industry z’s technology level, which is affected by 
climate change and will be detailed later; 6 the share (or weight) of different inputs 
in production; and cr the elasticity of substitution.
At the second level of the nesting, the inputs of composite energy, XiE , and 
material, X io , are CES aggregation of individual goods and services. X ie is the 
aggregate of 5 energy goods (electricity through crude oil), and Xio  is the aggregate 
of 7 non-energy goods and services (mining through services). The functional form 
used for these aggregations is identical to equation (6.1) except that the parameters 
are different, namely, superscript Y  is replaced by E  in the energy aggregation 
function and by O in the material aggregation function, and the domain for j  is 
changed accordingly.
At the third level of the nesting, each good or service is an aggregate of domestic 
output and foreign good. The CES functional form represents the fact that domestic 
and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes.
At the bottom of the nesting, the composite imports of one good is, again, a 
CES aggregation of imports from different origins.
Following the conventional treatment, it is assumed the production process pro­
duces a by-product, the carbon dioxide emission, proportional to the use of partic­
ular types of energy, which will be discussed later.
Because of the nature of CES nesting production, the firm’s production plan 
in each sector is determined in a multi-step manner. First, the firm’s demand for 
labour, composite energy and materials and investment is determined according to 
an intertemporal optimisation problem. Second, once the demand for the composite 
factor is determined, the firm decides the demand for individual inputs according
(6 .1)
j = K , L , E , 0
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to a cost minimization problem.
At the top tier, each industry’s composite capital stock (Ki) increases by the 
new capital formation («/*), but decreases by the rate of depreciation (Si):
K x = J i -  SiKi. (6.2)
Because of the adjustment cost of installing capital (Lucas 1967a; Lucas 1967b; 
Tobin 1969; Treadway 1969; Uzawa 1969), more investment is required than the 
capital formation:
/*= ( i + f 4 ) j" (6-3)
where fa is a non-negative parameter, fa = 0 implies that no installation cost 
occurs.
The firm’s instantaneous profit can be defined as:6
n  =  (1 -  T2)(P^Yi -  WiLi -  P f X iE -  FfXio),
where t2 is corporate income tax; P'  is the producer price of firm’s output;
P[J and Pp are, respectively, the wage rate and the prices for composite energy 
and materials. The market value of the firm can then be defined as the profit net 
of investment:
Vi =  'Ki — (1 — T4) P 7/ i ,
where r4 is the investment tax credit, and P 1 is the price of investment good.
Thus the problem of each firm can be characterised as choosing a path of in­
vestment and inputs of labour, composite energy and material to maximise its 
intertemporal market value:7
Kj e-lR(s)- nl(s- ,)ds, (6.4)
6To save space the time subscription is suppressed in all equations.
7R(s) is the long-term interest rate between period t and s, see equation on page 49 for details.
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subject to (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3). Solving this problem gives the firm’s demand for 
inputs of labour, energy and other materials:
Xij  =  $ (A T yX -'Y i ( j C \  j  e E, 0} (6.5)
and the motion of the shadow value of an additional unit of investment in industry 
i, Ai, which is the multiplier of (6.2) when constructing the Hamiltonian:
\ = U  + 4> ] (1 -  r4)P‘
A, =  (r +  *). A, -  (1 -  r2) / f  H  "  (X “  T̂ P ’ j  ( j t )
Ai is related to Tobin’s q in the following way8:
—
q i~  (1 - u ) P r
Using this relationship, (6.6) can be written as:
(6 .6)
(6.7)
Plugging this into (6.3) gives the firm’s demand for investment good:
h  = T (g,2 -  1 )Kt (6.8)
To be in line with the empirical evidence that actual investment is partly driven 
by cash flows (Hayashi 1982b), it is assumed that some firms are forward looking, 
that is, they follow the course defined by (6.8), and others are backward looking, 
that is, they decide investment based on the history of cash flows. Because the q 
measures the value of a firm, it is equivalent to model the investment of the second 
type of firms as a function of previous q in a similar way to (6.8). Therefore the 
demand for investment can be written as:
8see Tobin (1969), Abel (1979) and Hayashi (1982b) for details.
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(6.9)h t  — a i 7r r ( Q i t ) K i t  +  (1 ~  ^ 1)7r rW t2)^«»
where a\  is the share of forward looking firms in all firms; and q*t is the backward 
looking q, which follows the following rule:
This approach is superior to the previous treatment (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 1999, 
eqn.13) in the sense that it guarantees that these two types of firms act identically in 
the steady state, although the second type adjusts more slowly towards the steady 
state.
The investment good in turn is produced by a thirteenth sector whose functional 
form is identical to the 12 production sectors in production nesting. At the top, 
labour, capital, composite energy and materials are used to produce the good by 
CES technology; then the composite inputs are again CES aggregates of individual 
inputs.
Once the demand for composite input is determined by a rule like (6.5), the 
demand for individual inputs can be determined in a similar way. The firm chooses 
an appropriate amount of individual inputs to maximise the cost of producing the 
composite input, and the solution for this problem is:
where X  is the amount of a composite input; X *. the demand for individual input 
k] 6k and 07-, respectively, the share of and the elasticity of substitution between 
individual input k to produce the composite; and Px  and P*,, respectively, the prices 
of composite X  and individual input Xk- It is clear that the above demand function 
is similar to (6.5). At the second level of nesting, X  is E  or O while Xk is one of 
the 12 goods; at the third level, X  is one of the 12 goods, while Xk is domestic 
production or imports.
Qit Qi,t—1 ~b Qi,t—l)'
(6.10)
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6.2.2 Household
There is a representative household in each region. The household chooses labour 
supply, saving and consumption to maximise its intertemporal utility:
r oo
Ut = j ' [In Cs +  In Gs\e~e(s~^ds  (6.11)
where Cs is the household’s composite consumption at time s, Gs government con­
sumption at s, and 6 the rate of time preference; subject to the budget constraint 
that the present value of its consumption is equal to human wealth (H ) plus initial 
financial asset:
P f C s e - ^ - ^ - ^ d s  = Ht +  Ft. (6.12)
Human wealth is defined as the expected present value of future after-tax labour 
income plus government transfers:
Ht + T R e - [R {s ) -n ) { s - t ) d s
where t\ is the labour income tax rate, W  the wage rate, T R  government transfers, 
and Lc, L i , and Li are, respectively, labour used in consumption good pro­
duction, investment good production, government employment and in sector i. The 
financial asset is the sum of real money balances, M O N / P , government bonds, B , 
net holding of foreign asset, A , and the value of capital in different sectors:
F  = M O N
P + B + A + q,K, + qc K c  +  E l i t e s )
The solution of this dynamic optimisation problem gives the household’s aggregate 
consumption in the usual form:
P c C = 0(F + H)
Following Hayashi (1982a), it is assumed that some consumers are liquidity-constrained 
and consume a fixed proportion 7 of their after-tax income (INC):
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P c C = a2d(F +  H) +  (1 -  a ^ I N C , (6.13)
where a2 is the share of first type households in all households. Households’ current 
income is the sum of net government transfer, after tax labour income, interests of 
bond and foreign assets and after tax profit of investment and consumption goods 
production:
The aggregate consumption good is assumed to be produced by a fourteenth 
sector with a technology almost identical to (6.1), that is, a CES aggregation of 
household capital service (C/f), labour, energy and material. And demands for 
capital service, labour, composite energy and materials to produce the consumption 
good and individual goods to produce the composite good are similar to those given 
by (6.5) and (6.10).
Household capital services consist of the service flows of consumer durables 
and residential housing. The supply of household capital services is determined by 
consumers who invest in household capital K c  in order to generate a desired flow 
of capital services C/c, which is determined by the following production function:
And, similar to (6.2) and (6.3), the formation of new household capital is also 
subject to an adjustment cost. Thus the household’s investment decision is to 
choose household investment, /c , to maximise:
where P CK is the imputed rental price of household capital. The solution to this 
problem is similar to (6.8).
I N C  =  T R  +  (1 -  n  )W[l g
(6.14)
+R(t)(B + A) +  (1 -  t2)tti +  7tc
Ck  =  aKc-
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Because leisure does not enter into household’s utility, labour supply in the long 
run is exogenously given, being determined by the population growth rate, and 
the wage adjusts to ensure full employment. However, in the short run the wage 
adjusts slowly and short run under or over full employment equilibria may arise. G- 
Cubed-T assumes that labour is perfectly mobile among sectors within a region but 
immobile across regions. Therefore wages are equal within a region but can differ 
across regions. This assumption may not be a good representation of the current 
situation in China. For example, China still implements the residence registration 
system, which prevents people living in rural areas from moving freely into cities. 
However, the primary focus is not on the labour market and income issues and this 
necessary assumption does not much affect the discussion of other issues.
6.2.3 Government
It is assumed government spending is exogenous and is allocated among inputs in 
fixed proportions. Government income comes from corporate tax, labour income 
tax, sales tax, issues of new government bonds, and carbon taxes, while outlays 
include purchase of goods and services, interest payment on government bond, in­
vestment tax credits and transfers to households. The budget deficit is financed by 
issuing new bonds:
Bt = rtB t +  Gt +  TRt — Tt
where B  is the stock of debt, G is total government spending on goods and services, 
T R  is transfer to households, and T  is total tax revenue net of investment tax 
credits. However, the No-Ponzi-Game condition should be applied to government 
debt to prevent the per capita government debt from forever growing faster than 
the interest rate:
lim B se~[R(s)- n]s = 0
s — > o o
Therefore current government debt is always the present value of future budget 
surpluses:
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r oo
Bt =  j  (T - G -  TÄ)e“ [Ä(a)“n](s_t)ds
6.2.4 International trade
Once the demand for import of one good, Mi , is determined, the demand for import 
of this good from different origins, Mij , is determined by:
Mij = öijMi
p M 1 o*
where 5ij is the share of imports from country j  in total imports of good i; Oi is 
the elasticity of substitution between importing good i from different origins; P{M is 
the price of composite imports of good i\ P *  is country f  s export price of good i\ 
and £?, t\ and tf* are, respectively, carbon import tax, BTU import tax and import 
tariff rates for good i .9 Eju and Ecu are, respectively, the exchange rates of the 
currencies of country j  and China with respect to the US dollar.
6.2.5 Financial markets and the balance of payments
The current account deficit is financed by the surplus on the capital account. The 
model distinguishes between the financial asset and physical capital. The asset 
market is assumed perfectly integrated globally. That is, expected returns on loans 
denominated in the currencies of various regions are equalized according to the 
following interest arbitrage relation:
Ü +  Hk =  ij +  ßj +  ~rp~~
Ejk
where ik and ij are interest rates in countries k and j , ßk and fij are exogenous 
risk premiums demanded by investors, and Ejk is the exchange rate between the 
currencies of the two countries.
However, the physical asset is immobile and costly to adjust. As a shock occurs
9Carbon and BTU taxes are identical for all imported goods. However as the contents of carbon 
and/or energy in goods are different, the excise tax rate are different.
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in a sector, the amount of physical capital stock in that sector remains unchanged 
initially, but the value of the stock will change accordingly.
6.2.6 Money demand
The demand for real money balances is assumed to be a function of the value of 
aggregate output and the short-term nominal interest rate:
where Y  is the aggregate output and P  is a price index for Y, i is the nominal 
interest rate, and e is the interest elasticity of money demand, which is set to be 
—0.6 following McKibbin and Sachs (1991).
6.2.7 Energy use and carbon emissions
G-Cubed-T does not endogenise technological innovation and energy efficiency, 
which are simply treated as exogenous shocks under different assumptions and sce­
narios. Therefore, the demand for composite energy given by (6.5) can be slightly 
revised as:
where Aß  is the energy efficiency shock which is assumed to be identical across 
sectors in one simulation, and Bi is the production shock of sector i. The energy 
demands in investment and consumption good productions are the same as (6.15).
The carbon emission in each region is calculated as a fixed proportion of the 
energy use of each sector—energy production, Qi , plus import, M*, minus export, 
X i—of the region:
M O N = Y i t
P
(6.15)
4
E M r — ^   ̂Sir(Qir +  Mir — X{r) r € {(7, U, N }
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6.2.8 Climate change and impacts
The common procedure for modeling the impact of climate change is as follows. 
First, the atmospheric CO2 concentration is calculated according to the CO2 emis­
sions and the decay rate of CO2 stock. Then the radiative force is determined 
according to the carbon concentration and other factors. Once the radiative force is 
determined, the temperature change in different boxes (atmosphere, sea surface and 
deep sea etc) can be modeled by a set of dynamic functions. And finally the dam­
age is expressed as functions of temperature changes (for example, see Nordhaus 
1994b, 1996; and Pizer 1999).
However, given the facts that a detailed general circulation model (GCM) can 
not be employed here and that most literature discusses the impact of doubling 
carbon concentration (see next section), the model can be simplified by linking 
carbon concentration to the economy directly.
Emissions of CO2 accumulate in the atmosphere according to:
COt = ßEM t -  Sm(COt -  590), (6.16)
where COt is the atmosphere concentration of CO2 in billions of tons of carbon 
equivalent, ß  is the retention rate of emissions, 5m is the decay rate, and EM (=  
Y^r E M r) is the total world emission of carbon dioxide.10 The constant 590 in the 
above equation is the pre-industrial level of atmospheric concentration of CO2 (in 
Gtc).
The next step is to link the increase in carbon concentration to damage to 
the economy, which is perhaps the most elusive aspect in the discussion of global 
warming. There is some agreement in academia that global warming affects the pro­
duction of agriculture, forestry, fishery and agroindustry, energy demand and hydro­
electricity production, human population health and settlement, and recreational 
activities, and that it causes sea-level rise which in turn increases the cost of pro-
10According to Nordhaus (1994b, Chapter 3), ß — 0.64 and =  1/120 =  0.00833 per year.
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tecting transportation infrastructure and industrial plants located in coastal regions 
and provides a market opportunity for the construction industry (Watson, Zinyow- 
era, and Moss 1996; IPCC 2001). However, there are diversified opinions about the 
degree of these impacts, and especially the monetary assessment of them.11
In relation to the treatment of these impacts in the current model, they can be 
divided into two types: direct and indirect impacts. The former includes impacts 
on agriculture, forestry, fishery, agroindustry and hydroelectricity production, while 
the latter includes all other impacts.12
The direct impacts can be measured as changes in output of specific sectors. 
Define the change in the atmospheric carbon concentration as CCt — C O t/590. The 
global warming is linked to the economy by affecting the shifter Ä [  in equation 6.1:
Alt = n(CCt)A&
In addition to the diverse estimation of impacts, one more difficulty emerges re­
garding the definition of fl(CCt): most current literature reports estimation of 
damages in only one equilibrium climate situation, e.g. doubling CO2 concentra­
tion (2 XCO2) or 2.5X3 increase of temperature. For simplicity, the relationship 
between global warming and output loss is assumed to be as follows,13
fi(CC«) =  C C f . (6.17)
11 For example, see the debate about the impact of global warming on agriculture (Mendelsohn, 
Nordhaus, and Shaw 1994; Cline 1996; Mendelsohn and Nordhaus 1996); and the critiques (Mendel­
sohn 1998; Demeritt and Rothman 1999; Ekins 1999) and defense and extensions (Fankhauser, Tol, 
and Pearce 1997; Cline 1998; Reilly 1998; Tol 1998; Fankhauser and Tol 1999) of the social cost 
chapter (Pearce et al. 1996) in IPCC’s second assessment report (Bruce, Lee, and Haites 1996).
12It is clear that this classification is different from that of market and non-market impacts. 
Some indirect impacts, for example, the impact on building and infrastructure in coastal regions, 
have market values.
13Cline (1992, p.100) proposes a mildly non-linear relation between warming Tt and damage: 
Dt =  kTt '2. In DICE, the shifter is related to both global warming and the reduction in GHG 
emissions level: f2 =  (l — 0.686^2'887)/(l +  0.00144T2) , where nt is the fractional reduction in 
emissions.
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The value of parameter £ 1  will be discussed in the next section. The results of 
considering the direct impact on production will be compared with the results of 
not accommodating this impact in the Appendix to Chapter 7.14 It will be seen 
that this seemingly small change in treatment makes a huge difference.
The indirect impacts affect the whole economy, not just specific sectors. There­
fore, it is proper to model them as a proportion of GDP. Most studies assume that 
the ratio of damage to output is a non-linear function of temperature change, for 
example, the DICE and FUND models assume that it is a quadratic function of the 
temperature change (Nordhaus 1994b, eqn. 2.11; Tol 1999, eqn. 4a and 4b), while 
the CETA model assumes a cubic function (Peck and Teisberg 1995, eqn. 4), Cline 
(1992, p.100) assumes the power to warming is about 1.2. Following these studies, 
the indirect damage, defined as the ratio of GDP,15 is determined as follows:
A
GDPt (6.18)
where Dt is the loss due to indirect impacts, and £ 2  is a parameter which will be 
discussed in the next section.
Finally, because the indirect impacts include costs of preventing adverse effects 
of global warming as well as some ethical, non-market costs, they are equivalent 
to a reduction in consumption goods available to the household. Given the high 
uncertainty of the indirect impacts, it is assumed that do not directly affect the 
household’s behaviour in the business as usual scenarios, and will be used as a
14The comparison is postponed because the prerequisite of making such a comparison is level 
projections which will be the topic of the next chapter.
loThis approach has been criticised as unjust because the evaluation depends on income, and, 
in absolute terms, the damage imposed on a poor person or country is less important than the 
same damage imposed on a rich person or country. Therefore it is proposed to use uniform values 
(as at the level of developed countries) for all countries (Erkins 1995; Meyer and Cooper 1995). 
However, Fankhauser, Tol, and Pearce (1997) point out that this approach is also problematic 
because it causes inconsistencies of risks from different sources for developing countries—damage 
from climate change is valued higher than domestic risks. They argue that differentiated value in 
absolute terms is not unfair per se because income disparities are possible and people have different 
preferences for environmental goods. The disparities provide important and necessary signals for 
decision makers.
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reference to figure out possible gains under different policies.
6.2.9 Emission taxes and permits
G-Cubed-T can examine environmental policies in the form of carbon tax or tradable 
emission permits. The treatment of carbon tax is straightforward as the tax is a 
component of product prices (see next subsection for details) and the demand for 
energy changes in response to changes in taxes. However, emission trading involves 
more complicated treatment. The emission permit is set as an emission target for 
each region and permit price—in the form of emission taxes in the model—adjusts 
to achieve the target. If the permits trade within one region, the permit price in 
that region will be identical. If the permits trade across regions, the price will be 
identical in the involved regions due to arbitrage.
The revenues from carbon emissions taxes or permits go into the pool of gov­
ernment income which will be allocated according to the government’s problem as 
discussed in sub-section 6.2.3.
6.2.10 Price linkage
Each good in the model has an associated price. The linkages among prices are 
illustrated by Figure 6.2.
The description can be started from the production side. As previously dis­
cussed, the nominal wage rate is identical across sectors within one region because 
of the mobility assumption. However, to be in line with other factor prices in coding, 
the nominal wage rate in each sector is given a different name, which is set to be 
equal to an endogenously determined value through a set of assignment equations 
(equations 12, 13, 24 and 25 in Appendix 6.B). The (next period’s) nominal wage 
is calculated as:
Wt = ir?+1n ]~a
where Wt and wt are, respectively, next period and current nominal wage rates at 
time t. 7Tf+i is the expected inflation at time t + 1 while 7r* is the inflation rate at
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Figure 6.2: Price Links in the Model
Consumption Investment
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time t, a is the weight on expected inflation, Lt is the total employment, ß  reflects 
the effect of labour market conditions on wage setting.
The price of capital used in sector z is determined by:
p?=p?(jtyr (d ')~ "r  (6.i9)
where P f  is the producer price of good i which will be discussed below; /i(  is the 
supply shock (including the impact of climate change) of good z; a j : as in eq. (6.1), 
is the elasticity of substitution between capital, labour, energy and other material 
to produce good i.
Because the composite energy and material are CES aggregations of individual 
energy goods and materials, the prices of energy and material used in sector z, P f
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and Pf*, are calculated as:
&ij ( pJ ) * ^  otherwise
(6.20)
j  e  {6,7, • • • , 12} if k = O
where <5’s and cr’s are shares and elasticities of substitution; P j  is the price of final 
product j , which will be discussed below.
Next, because output is again a CES aggregation of labour, capital, energy and 
materials, the producer price of good i is determined similar to (6.20):
price of input j ,  which is determined above, clearly P f  = w\ n f  (identical across 
sectors) and /li f  are shocks to energy efficiency and labour supply, respectively, and 
l i f  =  [if  =  l ;16 and others are the same as those in eq. (6.1).
Adding carbon and energy (BTU) taxes, and t\, to producer price gives the 
price of domestic product:
The price of the final product is a combination of the prices of domestic product 
and imported product:
otherwise
(6.21)
where P f  is the producer price of individual good i ; P /, j  € {P, L, K, O}, is the
(1 + t l){PiD) s‘ (PiM) 1 s-
(i + ti) k  { p f p “ + a  -  «*) (p f ) 1 ~ ° ri
if  (Ji =  1
otherwise
16The model takes all price variables in the log term, so is for shocks (see Appendix 6.B). 
Therefore the value of 1 denotes zero shocks in log term.
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where P AI is the price of imported good i, which is in turn determined by:
PiM =  (1 + t? )CIFi  +  t™c +  t ^ b
where tAI is the tariff rate; t AIc and tAIb are tax rates of carbon and energy, respec­
tively; C /Fi, the price of imported good i when it enters the region, is a combination 
of export prices from the other two regions:
C I F n  = 1/(1 - o
j, r € {c, u, n}
if CT V =  1
otherwise
where CIFri is region r ’s price of imported good i;17 c, it, n denote China, the 
United States and rest of the World, respectively; e’s are exchange rates; <5’s are 
shares of imports from different regions; cr is the elasticity of substitution between 
imports from different origins; and Pjf is region j ’s export price of good i, which 
is j ’s price of final good i adjusted by sectoral tax, tji, carbon and energy export 
taxes, t^ c and t*b:
P Y
d X  __ 1 j i  , , +Xb
j i  ~  l  +  t  +  +
From the individual prices, PP, P YI and P * , the indexes of domestic product, 
imports and exports, P D, P AI and P x , can be calculated as:
1 2  <Tj
p j = n ( ^ )  > } £ { D , M , X } .
2=1
The prices of inputs in consumption good production are calculated in a similar 
way to the 12 production sectors, although only two tiers of prices are calculated. 
The prices of energy and materials in consumption are determined from prices of 
individual final output P j  using eq. (6.20). The determination of the price of
17The subscript r is suppressed from previous expressions for simplicity, which enters into one 
expression only when several regions are involved.
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Figure 6.3: Curvature and Position of Production Frontiers
capital in consumption is identical to eq. (6.19) in form, except that Yi is replaced 
by C and Ki by K c , the producer price P f  is replaced by the consumer price 
index C P I , and the parameters are replaced accordingly. The real wage rate in 
consumption is the same as the rate in production sectors because labour is mobile. 
The calculation of the consumer price index C P I  is identical in form to that of the 
producer price given by eq. (6.21).
The prices in investment production are determined in exactly the same way 
as in consumption good production. Two tiers of prices are calculated: prices of 
energy, material, capital and labour are calculated first using formulas similar to 
(6.19) and (6.20). Then the price of the investment good is calculated using (6.21).
6.3 Parameters Estimation and Calibration
Parameters in G-Cubed-T can be divided into three categories: elasticities, shares or 
weights, and other parameters. Most parameters for the US economy are economet- 
rically estimated using data from the detailed benchmark US input-output transac­
tions tables produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis for the years 1958, 1963, 
1967, 1972, 1977 and 1982. The detailed procedure of estimation can be found in
198
Table 6.1: Elasticities in G-Cubed-T
Sector i
1.Electric utilities 0.7634 0.2000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
2.Gas utilities 0.8096 0.9325 0.2000 1.0000 1.0000
3.Petroleum refining 0.5426 0.2000 0.2000 1.0000 1.0000
4.Coal mining 1.7030 0.1594 0.5294 1.0000 1.0000
5.Crude oil and gas extraction 0.4934 0.1372 0.2000 1.0000 1.0000
6.Mining 1.0014 1.1474 2.7654 1.0000 1.0000
7.Agriculture, fishing and hunting 1.2830 0.6277 1.7323 1.0000 1.0000
8.Forestry/wood products 0.9349 0.9385 0.1757 1.0000 1.0000
9.Durable manufacturing 0.4104 0.8045 0.2000 1.0000 1.0000
lO.Non-durable manufacturing 1.0044 1.0000 0.0573 1.0000 1.0000
11. Transportation 0.5368 0.2000 0.2000 1.0000 1.0000
12. Services 0.2556 0.3211 3.0056 1.0000 1.0000
Y.Firm investment 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Z.Household consumption 0.8000 1.0000 1.0000
McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1994).18 Because of limitation of data availability, the 
elasticities for China are adopted from US values in consultation with other studies; 
while the shares are calculated from the latest input-output data (SSB Department 
of National Accounts 1999).
The rationale of this approach is illustrated by Figure 6.3. On the supply side, 
an economy can be characterised by three sets of parameters: the curvature of 
the frontier (i.e. elasticity), the height of the frontier (i.e. output level) and the 
specific position in the frontier (i.e. inputs shares in the output). The last two, 
which are correlated, determine the position of an economy at a specific point of 
time, e.g. point C in A'B' and the points U on AB. The shares of individual inputs 
can easily be observed for both country C and country U. The curvature of AB 
can be estimated by observation of the U points. However, the curvature of the 
curve passing through point C cannot be estimated because there are not enough 
data  (it is possible to have an infinite number of curves passing through point C). 
Therefore, it is natural to assume that the curve A'B' has the same curvature as
18Most studies follow the approach developed in Mansur and Whalley (1984). However, McK­
ibbin and Wilcoxen (1994, 1999) point out that estimating production parameters should account 
for the fact that capital is fixed in the short run. Their result shows a significant difference if this 
fact is considered.
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Table 6.2: Elasticities Used in Other China Models
P ro d u c tio n 6 A rm in g to n c C E T d Incom ee
S ecto rs“ Xie Zhang Xie Z hang Xie Zhang Z hang
1996 1998a 1996 1998a 1996 1998a 1998a
M ining 1.0 n.a. 0.75 n.a. 1.1 n.a. n .a .
E nergy 1.0 n.a. n .a. n.a. 0.5 n.a. n .a .
E lec tric ity n.a. 0.3 n.a. n .a. n .a. n .a. 0.9
C oal n.a. 0.3 n.a. 0.7 n.a. 1.5 0.7
Oil n .a . 0.3 n.a. 0.7 n.a. 1.5 0.8
N a tu ra l G as n.a. 0.3 n.a. n.a. n .a . n .a. 0.8
A gricu ltu re 1.0 0.3 2.0 0.6 2.0 0.9 0.7
H eavy In d u s try 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.05 0.6
L ight In d u s try 1.0 0.3 0.75 0.7 1.1 0.3 1.0
T ra n sp o rta tio n  & 
T elecom m unication
n.a. 0.3 n.a. n.a. n .a. 0.9 1.1
C o n stru c tio n 1.0 0.3 n.a. n .a. n .a. n .a. 0.9
Services 1.0 0.3 n.a. 0.6 0.5 0.3 1.1
“Sectors in the CGE model of Xie (1996) include agriculture, mining, light industry, heavy in­
dustry, energy, construction and services; while those in the model of Zhang (1998a) include 
agriculture, heavy industry, light industry, transport and communication, construction, services, 
coal, oil, natural gas and electricity.
bXie’s (1996) model uses Cobb-Douglas production, therefore the elasticity of substitution between 
inputs are one; while the elasticity of substitution is between value added aggregate and energy 
aggregate in Zhang (1998a).
“The price elasticity of substitution between imported and domestically-produced goods.
dThe price elasticity of transformation between foreign and domestic sales of good (in the CET 
export supply function).
“The income elasticity of consumption of consumer good by household.
AB. And empirical studies find that the hypothesis that A'B' and AB have same 
elasticity can not be rejected (Kim and Lau 1995).
6.3.1 Elasticities
The elasticities used in the G-Cubed-T model are listed in Table 6.1. e r f  is the 
elasticity of substitution between capital, labour, aggregate energy and aggregate 
material in the production of good i; e r f  is the elasticity of substitution between 
individual energy to produce aggregate energy used in sector Vs production; e r f  
is the elasticity of substitution between individual material to produce aggregate 
material used in sector Vs production. e r f M is the elasticity of substitution be­
tween domestically produced and imported good i , while erf1 is the elasticity of 
substitution between different origins of imported good i .
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Table 6.3: Sector Classification
G -C u b ed -T  Sector In  124-sector 1997 I /O  T ab le
1.E lec tric  u tilities 86, 87
2 .G as u tilitie s 88
3.P e tro leu m  refining 36
4 .C oal m ining 6, 37
5.C ru d e  oil an d  gas ex trac tio n 7 ,8
6.M ining 9— 12
7.A gricu ltu ra l, fishing and  hun ting 1, 3-5
8.F o res try /w o o d  p ro d u c ts 2, 13, 30
9 .D urab le  m anufac tu ring 31, 48-81, 83, 84
lO .N on-durab le  m an u fac tu rin g 14-29, 32-35 , 38-47 , 85
11. T ra n sp o rta tio n 91-96, 102-105
12. Services 82, 89, 90, 97-101 , 106-124
Some related elasticities used in other studies (Xie 1996 and Zhang 1998a) are 
listed in Table 6.2. Because of differences in model structure, e.g., production 
tiers, sector classification, and consumption, etc., these parameters are not directly 
comparable.
6.3.2 Shares and weights
The latest input-output table of the Chinese economy (SSB Department of National 
Accounts 1999) has been used to calculate the shares or weights of different goods 
used in each sector. Based on the 1997 economic data, this input-output table 
includes 124 sectors, of which there are 5 agricultural sectors, 12 energy sectors, 
70 other industrial sectors, 1 construction sector, 10 transportation sectors and 26 
services sectors. The classification of sectors in the 1997 input-output table into 
G-Cubed-T sectors is detailed in Table 6.3 and the resulting shares and weights are 
reported in Table 6.4.
6.3.3 Impact of climate change
As discussed in the previous section, two sets of parameters are related to the impact 
of climate change: in eq. (6.17) and £2 in eq. (6.18), which, respectively, describe
the impacts on individual sectors and on the overall economy. For the first type of 
impacts, two sectors, agriculture and forestry, are investigated.
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Table 6.5 is an incomplete collection of estimates of the impact on agriculture of 
climate change. Although the results are diverse, a careful reading of these studies 
finds that the damage to US agriculture is more severe than to the China’s agricul­
ture, and the damage to the rest of the world is the least severe because favourable 
impacts in some regions offset adverse impacts in others. More specifically, the cen­
tral estimate of yield change caused by a doubling of CO2 concentration is —11.6% 
for China, —15.8% for USA and —5.305% for the rest of the world. Most General 
Circulation Models (GCMs) predict that a doubling of CO2 concentration leads to 
about i°C  warming, so the above figures suggest £ i’s in agriculture are -2.90,-3.95 
and —1.326, respectively, for China, USA and ROW (see Table 6.8).
Table 6.6 lists the estimates of impacts on forest area and wood production of 
climate and land use changes cited in IPCC’s Second Assessment Report (Watson, 
Zinyowera, and Moss 1996). The values in these estimates are so diverse that a 
convincing figure for climate change impacts cannot be concluded. In the same 
report, Kirschbaum et al. state, “although net primary productivity may increase, 
the standing biomass of forests may not increase because of more frequent outbreaks 
and extended ranges of pests and pathogens and increasing frequency and inten­
sity of fires (medium confidence)” (Kirschbaum et al. 1996, p.97). Therefore it is 
assumed that the overall impact of climate change on forestry is zero.
As illustrated by Table 6.7, empirical studies also show a wide range of global 
warming damage to the whole economy, but the degree of diversity is smaller than 
that in the case of agriculture and forestry. Because only two of these studies 
(Fankhauser 1995 and Tol 1995, which are also cited by the SAP) estimate damages 
to the three regions of interest here, they are used to calculate the central estimates. 
It should also be pointed out that the impact on agriculture and forestry should be 
extracted from their estimates because those effects are separately addressed. From 
their results, the values of £ 2  are calculated and reported in Table 6.8.
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o§ to"0 2  ĵ-•  ̂ bo|H
” § I I § ! 0  .  
§| I I e2s2 | | ^  b
3 3 S.9 d g
§ "§ D 05
0  ?  '-'in 
= ! |  +
s 101
1 o g j
rt- s  ° -
G3 §
Ü 
a;
03 0)
& pS
3
13
zn
' —v Ch 
LO O
•ä>̂  ö"2c h -2 § 
Q) ß
S o IS
S 2 ■>1 i l
"§ V u O
w a I T5
Tg g scd 3 fc cö
■̂'s5 s 3
<U 05 ' S
■sill
~ i r °
t-H
*8
w 
J ^
■s.§n *
13 «S 
^  §
13 iö
<15 03>>=3 3
1 .2 ^
PI 1312 JJ 
, S l ^
f g l l
M i l
} | l | j S .■§ -g 5 S §
-3 IS g - «fiQcc.SO _ w‘5b 13 ’S
i l
< T
^  3 3 
a 3  0
o j-Q c 3  <! CÖ
| 5 'B- | !
I “
s
I
!
§ £ S 2 2 3 <O « ^  ̂3
2? T) o ^3 3 3
05 (d M 05Pi
e g
CO 
CM
d
a 0  u o
ef § 1  I  a ^
Ö3 3 13 "Ö
<D u 16 a ®
05
1 I  2 .a
i ° g S
3 l i tj  s s | ! 1 111
* 0 H £ 0 0 0  ̂ a
05 CM
d j  
of Q 
3 0
3
 ̂s
1 3
«fa
s  ’S
"O
a 
13
05 
05
! 1(Ö o XI 30 0  S Jj; ■« -<-i jc
Q Cfa 
0 
ho hO
a  3
■3 *33 3s  s3 3
? -a  
- 3 9  
• s i  S ”  I , ̂ « X ^  I  
o § o |  g
n i p11 M i
® g l !  -
aj xN
S
s
3 Ö5 
 ̂ rH O 3
“ 'SSi ^
X  3  
3 Jl«2
40 03 0
a; 0 5  33 ® 3
s i
| E
5 l  
o SZ a
206
Table 6.6: Selected Estimations of Impacts on Forestry of Climate and Land Use Change
Study Scenario and Model Indicator
Percentage Change
Tropical Temperate Boreal Global
Kirschbaum BIOMEa,b, MAPSSc,b Area — 14.4e 4.5 -17.1
et al. 1996 and IMAGE-TVMd - 9 . 3 f
Solomon et al. BIOME 1.0“, GCMs9 Areab 10.3 25.5 -49 .7 0.9
1996 l16.6
l
51.9
l
-19 .2
l
9.4
IMAGE 2.0* Area-7 -47 .8 -1 .9 10.9 -25.2
IMAGE 2.0* Volume^ -47 .9 -1 .7 10.8 -22 .0
“BIOME (Prentice et al. 1992).
b2xC 02 equilibrium cliamte change scenario generated by GFDL.
cMapped Atmosphere-Plant-Soil System (Neilson 1993).
^Terrestrial Vegetation Model (TVM) (Leemans and van den Born 1994) from Integrated Model to 
Assess the Greenhouse Effect (IMAGE 2.0) (Alcamo 1994) generates the climate change internally, 
based on comparable assumptions about greenhouse gas concentrations and land-use changes.
eValue for tropical rain forest.
f Value for tropical dry forest.
9GFDL, GISS, OSU and UKMO.
^Percentage changes are the projected changes in forest areas with different GCMs relative to the 
modeled areas.
l Under a single, self-generated future climate and land-use scenario, using the IMAGE 2.0 model 
(from data of Zuidema et al. 1994).
J Projected changes in forest areas in 2050 relative to the 1990 level.
k Projected changes in volume in 2050 relative to the 1980 level.
Table 6.8: Damage Parameters Used in the Model
Parameter China USA ROW
6 G-Cubed-T sector 7 -0.17788
(11.5984“)
-0.24811
(15.7987“)
-0.07864
(5.3060“)
G-Cubed-T sector 8 0.0 0.0 0.0
£2 0.00616
(3.865b)
0.00192
(1.200b)
0.0024
(1.5006)
“Corresponding percentage change in output with 2x CÜ2 - 
bCorresponding percentage change in output with 2.5°C warming.
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Table 6.7: Selected Estimation of Global Warming Damages
S tu d y
D a m a g e  (%  o f  G D P )
G lo b a l W a rm in g
C h in a U S A W o rld
N o rd h a u s  1991a +3°C 1 .0b
0 .9 8 c
C lin e  1992 2 x C 0 2 (+ 2 .5 °C ) i . r *
0 .7 3 c
V ery  long  te r m 6 .0 4 d
w a rm in g  (d-lO V )) 4 .2 1 c
T i tu s  1992 4°C 2 .5 e
1 .70c
F a n k h a u s e r  1995 2 x C 0 2 ( + 2 . 5 ^ ) 4.7-f
2 .5 C
1 .3 /
1 .13c
1.35A9
1.17c’9
T o l 1995 2 x C 0 2 (+ 2 .5 °C ) 8 .6 m
5 .2 3 c,i
1.5h'i
1 .30C,J
1.70h'k
1.85c,fc
M e n d e lso h n  e t  a l. 1996 + 2 .5 ^ ) - 0 .0 8
F a n k h a u s e r , T o l, a n d  P e a rc e  1997 B a se d  on  F a n k h a u s e r 1 .0 9 ~ 2 .1 2 z
(1995) 1 .38m
0 .3 3 ~ 1 .1 7 n
B a se d  on  T ol (1995) 2 .0 3 ~ 5 .2 2 z
3 .03m
0 .4 4 ~ 1 .6 4 n
“Transformed to 1990 base as cited in Pearce et al. (1996).
bOriginal estim ate in Nordhaus (1991) includes impacts on farms, energy and real estate damage 
from sea level rise. Pearce et al. (1996) assumes an additional 0.75 percent of GDP for other 
damage categories.
“Excluding impact on agriculture, fishery, and /or forestry, if applicable.
^Including agriculture, forest loss, species loss, sea-level rise, electricity requirements, nonelectric 
heating, human life, migration, hurricanes, leisure activities, water supply, urban infrastructure, 
air pollution.
“Including impact on agriculture, forest, sea level rise, electricity, human life, water supply, air 
pollution, and mobile air condition.
•^Including damages of agriculture, forestry, fishery, energy, water, coastal protection, dryland loss, 
wetland loss, ecosystem loss, health/m ortality, air pollution (tropical O3 , and SO2 ), migration and 
hurricanes, and fishery.
9Value for Rest of the World.
^Including coastal defense, dryland loss, wetland loss, species loss, agriculture, amenity, 
life/mortality, migration and natural hazards.
1Value for Region 1 (USA and Canada).
JValue for Region 2 (South and South East Asia).
^Excluding Regions 1 (USA and Canada) and 7 (South and South East Asia).
1 Damage corrected for inequality according to utilitarian welfare function with e varying from 0.5 
to 1.5, where e is the param eter in the iso-elastic utility function th a t depends solely on income 
T: u  =  a y 1“ e/ (  1 - e ) .
mDamage corrected for inequality according to Bernoulli-Nash welfare function whose weights are 
independent of e, and corresponding to the case e =  1 of the utilitarian welfare function. 
"Dam age corrected for inequality according to maximin welfare function with e varying from 0.5 to 
1.5.
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Appendix to Chapter 6
6 .A Variable and Parameter Definition
The variable name consists of 8 characters. The first four denote the name of the 
variable, and the third and/or fourth denote sector (1 to 9 and A, B, C, Y, Z) 
where applicable. The fifth and sixth characters are region code (CC for China, UU 
for USA and NN for rest of the world; CU denotes a variable relating China to USA, 
and so on). The seventh character denotes the type of a variable, and the last one 
denotes timing of the variable. The detail of codes is given in Table 6.A, variable 
name in Table 6.B, and parameter definition in Table 6.C.
Table 6.A: Codes for Sector, Region and Variable Type
Sector Code
1 Electric Utilities
2 Gas Utilities
3 Petroleum Refining
4 Coal Mining
5 Crude Oil and Gas Extraction
6 Mining
7 Agriculture, Fishing and Hunting 
Region Code 
CC,C China 
Type Code
Y Lead of state variable 
D Expected endogenous 
C Control variable
8 Forestry/Wood Products
9 Durable Manufacturing
A Non-Durable Manufacturing 
B Transportation 
C Services
Y Investment good production 
Z Consumption good production
NN,N Rest of the World
J Jumper and Ljumper 
X Exogenous variable 
N Endogenous variable
UU,U USA
S State variable 
E Expected state 
T Target variable
Timing Code
L Lead variable C Current variable B Lagged and Ljumper
Table 6.B: Definition of Variables
Variable Eqn.
NodName TypeT
ASSExy NC.YL.SC Region x holdings of region y asset, % x’s GDP 124,125
BOND YL, SC Government debt, % GDP 96
CAPi YL,SC Capital stock of sector i, % GDP 26
CAPY YL,SC Capital stock of investment production, % GDP 33
CAPZ YL,SC Capital stock of consumption good production, % GDP 54
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Table 6.B: (Continued)
V ariable Eqn.
N am e T y p e T
L / c l l I l l  L lU l l
N od
CNCAWW NC C a rb o n  co n cen tra tio n  in a tm osphere , % U S G D P 127
CNCOWW YL,SC Difference of ca rb o n  dioxide c o n cen tra tio n  betw een  c u r­
re n t and  p re -in d u stria l levels, % U S G D P
126
CNCRWW NC R atio  of ca rbon  concen tra tion  to  p re -in d u s tr ia l level, % 128
CNPRWW XC P re -in d u stria l carbon  co n cen tra tio n  in a tm o sp h ere , % 
U SG D P
CONE NC C onsu m p tio n  of energy, % G D P 61
CONG NC T o ta l governm ent consum ption , % G D P 95
CONi NC C onsu m p tio n  of good i ,  % G D P 63
CONK NC C onsum ption  of cap ita l, % G D P 58
CONL NC C onsu m p tio n  of labou r, % G D P 60
CONO NC C onsu m p tio n  of o th e r goods, % G D P 62
CONP NC T o ta l p riv a te  consum ption , % G D P 51
CURA NC C u rre n t accoun t (m odel), % G D P 82
CURN NC C u rre n t accoun t (nom inal), % G D P 80
CURR NC C u rre n t accoun t (d a ta ) , % G D P 81
DAMG NC In d irec t dam age caused  by global w arm ing , % G D P 129
DEFI NC,XC B udge t deficit (in flation  ad ju s t) , %  G D P 93,94
DEFN NC B udge t deficit, % G D P 92
EMCO NC C arb o n  dioxide em issions, % G D P 110
EMCOWW NC W orld carb o n  dioxide em issions, % U S G D P 114
EMCOZZ NC R est o f th e  w orld carb o n  dioxide em issions, % U S G D P 117
EMIS NC,TC,XC C arb o n  em issions, % G D P 108,112
EMISWW NC W orld carb o n  em issions, % U S G D P 113
EMISZZ NC R est of th e  w orld ca rbon  em issions, % U S G D P 116
ENEi NC Sector i  energy  dem and , % G D P 8
ENER NC E nergy  use, % G D P 109
ENERWW NC W orld  energy  use, % U SG D P 115
ENERZZ NC R est o f th e  w orld energy use, % U S G D P 118
ENie NC Sector i dem and  of energy good e, % G D P 9
EXCHxU NC E xchange ra te  of x ’s cu rrency  to  U SD, % 119
EXCR XC E xchange risk p rem ium , %
EXNA NC E x p o rts  (N ational A acoun t), % G D P 102
EXPi NC T o ta l e x p o rts  of good i ,  % G D P 5
EXPT NC T o ta l ex p o rts , % G D P 4
GCEi XC G overnm ent spend ing  on sector i ,  % G D P
GCEL XC G overnm ent consum ption  of labou r, % G D P
GDP2 NC G ross D om estic  P ro d u c t, % G D P 76
GDPN NC N om inal G D P, % G D P 77
GDPR NC G ross D om estic P ro d u c t 75
GNPR NC G N P, % G D P 79
IINE NC D em and  for energy in investm ent, % G D P 39
IINi NC Investm en t d em and  for good i, % G D P 41
IINL NC D em and  for labou r in investm ent, % G D P 38
U N O NC D em and  for o th e r m ate ria ls  in investm en t, % G D P 40
IMNA NC Im p o rts  (N ational A ccount), % G D P 101
IMPixx NC T o ta l im p o rt of good i  of region x, % G D P 2
IMPixy NC x ’s im p o rt o f good i  from  y, % G D P 2
IMPT NC T o ta l im p o rts , % G D P 3
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Table 6.B: (Continued)
V ariab le E qn.
N am e T y p e T
lyt/llIlltlUIl
No.*
INAS NC N om inal asset paym en ts, % G D P 53
INCM NC H ousehold  incom e, % G D P 50
INFL NC In fla tion  C P I, D 72
TC,XC In fla tion  ta rg e t, D 111
INFP NC In fla tion  P P I , D 73
INSi XC C hange in stock, sector i ,  % G D P
INTN NC,XC N om inal in te rest ra te , D 70
INTR NC R eal in te rest ra te , D 71
INVi NC Sector i  gross investm en t, % G D P 27
INVT NC T o ta l investm en t, % G D P 32
INVY NC G ross investm en t of investm en t good  p ro d u c tio n  secto r, 
% G D P
34
INVZ NC G ross investm en t of consum ption  good  p ro d u c tio n  sec­
to r, % G D P
55
IRAS NC R eal asset paym ents, % G D P 52
JNVi NC Sector i  cap ita l increm ent, % G D P 28
JNVY NC C a p ita l increm ent of investm en t good  p ro d u c tio n  secto r, 
% G D P
35
JNVZ NC C a p ita l increm ent o f consum ption  good p ro d u c tio n  sec­
to r, % G D P
56
LABi NC Sector i  labou r dem and , % G D P 12
LABO NC T o ta l em ploym ent, % G D P 13
LOGY TC Log of gross o u tp u t, % 68
MONE NC M oney balance, % 69
MPOL XC M oney supply, %
NEER NC N om inal effective exchange ra te , % 122
OINi NC Sector i o th er dem and , % G D P 10
Olim0 NC Sector i dem and  for non-energy  sec to r m, % G D P 11
OUPi NC D om estic  o u tp u t of sector i, % G D P 7
OUTP NC G ross o u tp u t, % G D P 49
OUYi NC T o ta l o u tp u t of secto r i ,  % G D P 1
PBAL XC V alue of n e t ex p o rt of p e rm its , % U S G D P
PGDP NC G D P  deflator, % 78
PMTi NC P rice  of im p o rt of good i  it, % 17
POIi NC P rice  of o th e r m ate ria l used in  sec to r i ,  % 20
PRCE NC P rice  of energy in consum ption  good  p ro d u c tio n , % 66
PRCO NC P rice  of o th e r m ate ria ls  in con su m p tio n  good  p ro d u c tio n ,
%
C onsum er price index, %
67
PRCT YC,EL,SB 65
PRDi NC P rice  of dom estic  o u tp u t of good  i ,  % 21
PREi NC P rice  of energy in sector i ,  % 19
PREI NC P rice  of energy in investm en t, % 43
PRID DC,YC,DL,SB D om estic  o u tp u t price, % 46,74
PRII NC P rice  of investm en t good, % 45
PRIM NC P rice  of im ports , % 48
PRIX NC P rice  of expo rts , % 47
PRKi NC P rice  of cap ita l in secto r i ,  % 23
PRKY NC P rice  of cap ita l in investm en t good  p ro d u c tio n , % 37
PRKZ NC P rice  of cap ita l in consum ption  good  p ro d u c tio n , % 59
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Table 6.B: (Continued)
V ariab le Eqn.
N am e T y p e T
lyCllIllllUIl N od
PRMi NC P rice  (C IF ) of im p o rted  good i ,  % 18
PROi NC P ro fit in sector i ,  % G D P 30
PRO I NC P rice  of o th e r m a te ria l in investm en t, % 44
PROY NC P ro fit of investm en t good p ro d u c tio n  secto r, % G D P 42
PROZ NC P ro fit of consum ption  good p ro d u c tio n  sec to r, % G D P 64
PRPi NC P ro d u ce r price of good i ,  % 22
PRRi NC P rice  of resource, secto r i ,  % 15
PRXi NC P rice  of ex p o rt in secto r i ,  % 6
PRYi NC P rice  of final o u tp u t good i ,  % 16
REER NC R eal effective exchange ra te , % 123
RESi NC Sector i  dem and  for secto r specific resource, % G D P 14
REXCxU NC,JL,JC R eal exchange ra te  of cu rrency  x to  US do llar, % 121,120
RISE XC R isk shock -equ ities, D
SAVI NC P riv a te  saving (in flation  a d ju s te d ), % G D P 97
SAVN NC P riv a te  saving, % G D P 98
SAVT NC N atio n a l saving, % G D P 99
SHEF XC E nergy  efficiency shock, %
SHKC XC P riv a te  consum ption  shock, % G D P
SHKI XC P riv a te  investm en t shock, % G D P
SHKM XC M oney d em and  shock, %
SHYi XC S upp ly  shock secto r i  ( i  includes Y ,Z), %
SHLi XC L ab o u r supp ly  shock sector i  ( i  includes Y ,Z), %
STMi NC S hare  m ark e t value of sector i, % G D P 31
TAXC NC,XC T o ta l com pany ta x  revenue, % G D P 89
TAXE NC T o ta l ca rb o n  ta x  revenue, % G D P 88
TAXH NC T o ta l household  taxes, % G D P 90
TAXi XC T ax  ra te  on  secto r i ,  %
TAXI XC L um p sum  taxes, % G D P
TAXL NC,XC L um p sum  taxes, % G D P 93,94
TAXM NC T o ta l im p o rt ta x  revenue, % G D P 86
TAXT NC T o ta l taxes, % G D P 87
TBAL NC T rad e  balance, % G D P 104,105
TBNA NC T rad e  balance (N A ), % G D P 103
TCAR XC C arb o n  tax -dom estic , c /u n i t
TCAI NC C arb o n  tax -im p o rts , c /u n it 106
TCAX NC C arb o n  ta x -ex p o rts , c /u n i t 107
TBFD XC B T U  tax -dom estic , c /u n i t
TBFI XC B T U  ta x -im p o rts , c /u n i t
TBFX XC B T U  tax -ex p o rts , c /u n i t
TCOR XC C o rp o ra te  ta x  ra te , %
TFIX XC N on-linear ta x  fix-, % G D P
TIMi XC T ax  on secto r i  im p o rts , %
TITC XC Investm en t ta x  c red it, %
TINC XC H ousehold  incom e ta x  ra te , %
TOBi JL,NC,YL 
JC,SC
T o b in ’s q of sector i ,  D 29
TOBY JL,NC,YL 
JC,SC
T o b in ’s q of investm en t good p ro d u c tio n , D 36
TOBZ JL,NC,YL T o b in ’s q of consum ption  good  p ro d u c tio n , D 57
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Table 6.B: (Continued)
Variable Eqn.
Name TypeT UtUlIllLlUIi No.*
TRAN
JC,SC
NC Total household transfers, % GDP 91
TXMi
XC
NC
Lump sum transfers, % GDP
Total import tax revenue from good i, % GDP 85
WAGE YL, SC Nominal wage, % 24
WAGi NC Nominal wage in sector i, % 25
WELH JL,NC,JC Human wealth, % GDP 84,100
WELT NC Total wealth, % GDP 83
0: m = 1, 2,  . . . .  7
f: Possible types the variable can have.
f: The equation number in Appendix 6.B defining the variable; Exogenous variable X and 
state variable (SC) do not have definition function.
dpl-CnHr}
dp2{r>
Pi
p2
p4
p5
p8
plO
pl3
pl6
p!7
pl8
p22
p25
p26
p27
p40— p42
cl{n}{r>, wcl{n>{r>
c2{eHr}, wc2{e}{r} 
c3{j}{r>, wc3{j>{r> 
i l{ n } { r > , wil-CnHr}
i2{e}{r}, wi2{e}{r} 
i3{j}{r>, wi3{j}{r>
Table 6.C: Parameter Definition
direct damage parameter of sector n in region r  
indirect damage parameter of in region r 
rate of time preference plus real wage rate 
risk premium used in discounting future income streams 
share of consumption determined by wealth 
propensity to consume out of current income 
ratio of money to final output 
interest elasticity of the demand for money 
constant in final output production function 
rate of depreciation of private capital stock 
parameter for the cost of adjustment of private sector cap­
ital stock
share of private investment determined by forward looking 
firms
investment tax credit
weight on expected inflation in wage setting 
effect of labour market conditions on wage setting 
elasticity of government net transfers with respect to in­
come
weights used in calculating effective exchange rates 
shares of composite good n (l=capital, 2=labour, 3=en- 
ergy, 4=material) in production of the consumption good 
in region r
shares of individual energy e to produce composite energy 
in the production of consumption good in region r 
shares of individual material j to produce composite energy 
in the production of consumption good in region r  
shares of composite good n (l=capital, 2=labour, 3=en- 
ergy, 4=material) in production of the investment good in 
region r
shares of individual energy e to produce composite energy 
in the production of investment good in region r  
shares of individual material j to produce composite energy 
in the production of investment good in region r
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Table 6.C: (Continued)
m l{n}{sH r}, wml{n>{s}{r> share of imports from region s in region r ’s total imports
of good n
m2{n}{r}, wm2{n}{r> 
m4{n}{r}, wm4{n}-{r} 
o{n}{j>{r>, wo{n}{j>{r>
share of import of good n in region r ’s total imports 
share of good n in region r ’s total exports 
share of individual material j  to produce the composite 
material used in sector n in region r
q{n}{e}{r>, wq{n}{jM r} share of individual energy j to produce the composite ma­
terial used in sector n in region r
sl{n }{r} , wsl{n}{r} share of domestic output in total available output of sector 
n in region r
s2{n}{r>, ws2{n>{r} 
s3{n>{r>, ws3{n}{r}
carbon emission coefficient for sector n in region r  
share of energy in total domestic production of sector n 
good in region r
s4{n>{r>, ws4{n>{r> share of labour in total domestic production of sector n 
good in region r
s5{n}{r}, ws5{n}{r> share of materials in total domestic production of sector n
s6{n>{r}, ws6{n}{r}
good in region r
share of capital in total domestic production of sector n 
good in region r
s7{n>{r}, ws7{n}{r} share of sector specific resource in total domestic production 
of sector n good in region r
s8{n}{r}, ws8{n>{r} share of domestic production of sector n good in region r ’s 
total domestic output
s9{n}{r>, ws9{n}{r} ratio of investment to capital stock in sector n good in re­
slO{n>{r>, wslO{n>{r> 
zl{n}{r} , wzl{n}{r}
gion r
BTU coefficient for sector n good in region r
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods in sector n in region x
z2{n}{r>, wz2{nHr} elasticity of substitution between foreign goods in sector n
z3{n>{r}, wz3{n}{r}
in region r
elasticity of substitution between L, E, M, K to produce 
good n in region r
z4{n}{r>, wz4{nHr} elasticity of substitution between individual energy to pro­
duce composite energy used in sector n in region r
z5{n}{r}, wz5{n>{r} elasticity of substitution between individual material to 
produce composite material used in sector n in region r
z6{r}, wz6{r> elasticity of substitution between L, E, M, K to produce 
investment good in region r
z7{r>, wz7{r> elasticity of substitution between individual energy to pro­
duce composite energy used in investment good production
z8{r}, wz8{r>
in region r
elasticity of substitution between individual material to 
produce composite energy used in investment good produc­
tion in region r
z9{r}, wz9{r} elasticity of substitution between L, E, M, K to produce 
consumption good in region r
z010{r}, wz010{r} elasticity of substitution between individual energy to pro­
duce composite energy used in consumption good produc­
tion in region r
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Table 6.C: (Continued)
z011{r>, wz011{r} elasticity of substitution between individual material to
produce composite material used in consumption good pro­
duction in region r
a l—a3 shares of external assets by region
grl long run potential growth rate
n=l,2,...,12; e=l,2,...,5; j=l,2,...,7; r=c,u,n
6.B Equations of the China part
It is worth to point out the conventions used in the following equations. Both i  
and n denote the sector, but the former is used in variables while the latter in 
parameters. Unless otherwise specified, i  = 1, 2, . . . ,  9,  A, B, C; and n = 1,
2,  . . .  , 12. i  and n have one by one correspondence, that is, they together in 
one expression represent 12 rather than 12 x 12 =  144 varieties. In some cases, e 
(=1, 2, . . . , 5) is used in both variable and parameter to denote energy sectors, 
while m (=6, 7, 8, 9, A, B, C) and j (=1, 2, . . . , 7) are, respectively, used 
in variables and parameters to denote non-energy sectors. Note that lower case 
character in curly brackets and can be replaced by any value in its domain 
and that curly brackets and “} ” themselves are not components of variables 
and parameters.
1 /******** Energy sector (i = 1.... 5): ********/
OUY-[i>CCNC=CON{i>CCNC+IIN{i>CCNC+INS{i>CCXC+GCE{i>CCXC+EXP{i>CCNC+
ENl{i>CCNC+EN2{i>CCNC+EN3{i>CCNC+EN4{i>CCNC+EN5-[i>CCNC+EN6-[i>CCNC+
EN7{i>CCNC+EN8-Ci>CCNC+EN9{i>CCNC+ENA{i>CCNC+ENB-Ci>CCNC+ENC-[i>CCNC;
/******** Non-energy sector (i = 6,..., 9, A, B, C): ********/ 
OUY-[i>CCNC=CON-[i>CCNC+IIN{i>CCNC+INS-[i>CCXC+GCE{i>CCXC+EXP-Ci>CCNC+
0Il{i}CCNC+0I2U>CCNC+0I3{i}CCNC+0I4{i}CCNC+0I5ti>CCNC+0I6{i}CCNC+
0I7U}CCNC+0I8{i>CCNC+0I9{i}CCNC+0IA{i}CCNC+0IBti}CCNC+0IC-[i}CCNC;
2 IMP{i}CCNC=(l-wsl{n}c)*OUYtt}CCNC*(exp(PMT{i}CCNC)*(l+TAX{i}CCXC)/exp(PRY{i}CCNC))“(-zl{n}c); 
IMPtt}CUNC=wml{n}lc*IMP{i}CCNC*((s2{n}c*TCAICCNC+slO{n}c*TBFICCXC+(l+
TIM-CilCCXC)*exp(EXCHUUNC-EXCHCUNC+PRX{i}UUNC))/exp(PMT{i}CCNC))“(-z2{n}c); 
IMP{i}CNNC=wml{n}2c*IMP{i}CCNC*((s2{n}c*TCAICCNC+slO{n}c*TBFICCXC+(l+
TIM{i}CCXC)*exp(EXCHNUNC-EXCHCUNC+PRX{i}NNNC))/exp(PMT{i}CCNC))~(-z2{n}c);
3 IMPTCCNC=exp(PMTlCCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP1CCNC+
exp(PMT2CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP2CCNC+exp(PMT3CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP3CCNC+ 
exp(PMT4CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP4CCNC+exp(PMT5CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP5CCNC+ 
exp(PMT6CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP6CCNC+exp(PMT7CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP7CCNC+ 
exp(PMT8CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP8CCNC+exp(PMT9CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP9CCNC+
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exp(PMTACCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMPACCNC+exp(PMTBCCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMPBCCNC+ 
exp(PMTCCCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMPCCCNC;
4 EXPTCCNC=exp(PRXlCCNC-PRIDCCDC)*EXP1CCNC+
exp(PRX2CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*EXP2CCNC+exp(PRX3CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*EXP3CCNC+ 
exp(PRX4CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*EXP4CCNC+exp(PRX5CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*EXP5CCNC+ 
exp(PRX6CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*EXP6CCNC+exp(PRX7CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*EXP7CCNC+ 
exp(PRX8CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*EXP8CCNC+exp(PRX9CCNC-PRIDCCDC)»EXP9CCNC+ 
exp(PRXACCNC-PRIDCCDC)*EXPACCNC+exp(PRXBCCNC-PRIDCCDC)*EXPBCCNC+ 
exp(PRXCCCNC-PRIDCCDC)♦EXPCCCNC;
5 EXP{i}CCNC=IMP{i}UCNC+IMP{i}NCNC;
6 PRX{i}CCNC=ln(exp(PRY{i}CCNC)/(l+TAX{i}CCXC)+s2{n}c*TCAXCCNC+slO{n}c*TBFXCCXC);
7 OUPU}CCNC=wsl{n}c*OUYU}CCNC*(exp(PRD{i}CCNC*(l+TAX{i}CCXC)/exp(PRY{i}CCNC))‘(-zl{n}c);
8 ENE{i>CCNC=(exp(SHEFCCXC)‘(z3{n>c-l))*(exp(SHY{i>CCXC)‘(z3{n>c-l))*
(exp(-dpl{n}c*CNCRWWNC))“(z3{n>c-l)*ws3{n>c*0UP{i>CCNC*
(exp(PRE{i}CCNC-PRP{i>CCNC))'(-z3{n>c);
9 /******** e = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 ********/ 
EN{iHe}CCNC=wq{nHe}c*ENE{i}CCNC*(exp(PRY{e}CCNC-PREU>CCNC))‘(-z4{n}c) ;
10 OIN{i>CCNC=(exp(SHY{i>CCXC)*(z3{n}c-l))*(exp(-dpl{n}c*CNCRWWNC))*(z3{n}c-l)
*ws5{n}c*0UP{i}CCNC*(exp(P0I{i}CCNC-PRP{i>CCNC))~(-z3-(n}c);
11 /**** m = 6, 7, 8, 9, A, B, C; j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 ***♦/ 
0I{iHm}CCNC=wo{nHj}c*0IN{i}CCNC*(exp(PRY{m}CCNC-P0I{i}CCNC))‘(-z5{n}c);
12 LAB-Ci>CCNC=(exp(SHL-[i>CCXC)'(z3{n>c-l))*(exp(SHY{i>CCXC)“(z3{n>c-l))*
(exp(-dpl-tn>c*CNCRWWNC))‘(z3{n>c-l)*ws4-Cn>c*0UP{i>CCNC 
*(exp(WAG{i}CCNC-PRP-Ci}CCNC))‘(-z3{n}c);
13 LAB0CCNC=IINLCCNC+C0NLCCNC+GCELCCXC+LAB1CCNC+LAB2CCNC+LAB3CCNC+LAB4CCNC+
LAB5CCNC+LAB6CCNC+LAB7CCNC+LAB8CCNC+LAB9CCNC+LABACCNC+LABBCCNC+LABCCCNC;
14 RESU>CCNC=(exp(SHY{i>CCXC) ‘(z3-[n>c-l))*(exp(-dpl{n>c*CNCRWWNC)) “(z3{n}c-l)
*s7{n}c*0UP-(i}CCNC*(exp(PRR{i}CCNC-PRP{i}CCNC))*(-z3{n>c);
15 PRR{i}CCNC=PRP{i}CCNC+z013{n}c*ln(RES{i}CCNC);
16 if zl{n}c==l;
PRY{i}CCNC=ln(l+TAX{i}CCXC)+sl{n}c*PRD{i}CCNC+(l-sl{n}c)*PMT{i}CCNC; 
else;
PRY-ti>CCNC=ln(l+TAX{i>CCXC) + (l/(l-zl{n>c))*(ln(sl{n>c*exp(PRD-[i>CCNC)~(l-zl{n>c) + 
(l-sl{n}c)*exp(PMT{i}CCNC)“(l-zl{n}c)));
endif;
17 PMT{i>CCNC=ln(s2{n>c*TCAICCNC+slO-[n>c*TBFICCXC+exp(PRM{i>CCNC)*(l+TIM{i>CCXC));
18 if z2{n>c==l;
PRM{i>CCNC=(ml{n>lc*(EXCHUUNC-EXCHCUNC+PRX{i>UUNC)+ml{n>2c*(EXCHNUNC-EXCHCUNC+PRX{i>NNNC)); 
else;
PRM{i}CCNC=(l/(l-z2{n}c))*ln(ml{n}lc*exp(EXCHUUNC-EXCHCUNC+PRX-(i}UUNC)~(l-z2{n}c)+ 
ml-(n>2c*exp(EXCHNUNC-EXCHCUNC+PRX{i>NNNC)*(l-z2{n>c));
endif;
19 if z4{n}c==l;
PRE-[i>CCNC=q{n>lc*PRYlCCNC+q{n>2c*PRY2CCNC+q{n>3c*PRY3CCNC+
q-Cn}4c*PRY4CCNC+q-(n}5c*PRY5CCNC;
else;
PRE{i}CCNC=(l/(l-z4{n}c))*ln(q{n}lc*exp(PRYlCCNC)“(l-z4{n}c)+
q{n}2c*exp(PRY2CCNC)“(l-z4{n}c)+q{n}3c*exp(PRY3CCNC)“(l-z4{n}c)+ 
q{n}4c*exp(PRY4CCNC)~(l-z4{n>c)+q{n}5c*exp(PRY5CCNC)~(l-z4{n}c));
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endif;
20 if z5-Cn}c==l;
P0I{i}CCNC=o{n}lc*PRY6CCNC+o{n}2c*PRY7CCNC+o{n}3c*PRY8CCNC+o{n}4c*PRY9CCNC+
o{n}5c*PRYACCNC+o{n}6c*PRYBCCNC+o{n}7c*PRYCCCNC;
else;
P0I{i>CCNC=(l/(l-z5-Cn>c))*ln(o{n>lc*exp(PRY6CCNC)“(l-z5{n>c)+
o{n}2c*exp(PRY7CCNC)"(l-z5{n}c)+o{n}3c*exp(PRY8CCNC)“(l-z5{n}c)+ 
o{n>4c*exp(PRY9CCNC)‘(l-z5{n>c)+o{n>5c*exp(PRYACCNC)‘(l-z5{n>c)+ 
o{n}6c*exp(PRYBCCNC)“(l-z5{n}c)+o{n}7c*exp(PRYCCCNC)*(l-z5{n}c));
endif;
21 PRD{i}CCNC=ln((exp(PRP{i}CCNC)+s2-Cn}c*TCARCCXC+slO{n}c*TBFDCCXC));
22 if z3{n}c==l;
PRP-Ci}CCNC=-SHY{i}CCXC+dpl{n}c*CNCRWWNC+s3{n}c*(PRE{i}CCNC-SHEFCCXC)+ 
s4{n}c*(WAG{i>CCNC-SHL{i>CCXC)+s5{n}c*P0I{i}CCNC+ 
s6{n}c*PRK-Ci}CCNC+s7{n>c*PRR{i}CCNC;
else;
PRP{i}CCNC=-SHY{i}CCXC+dpl{n}c*CNCRWWNC+
(l/(l-z3{n>c))*ln((s3{n>c)*(exp(PRE{i>CCNC-SHEFCCXC)'(l-z3{n>c))+
(s4{n>c)*(exp(WAG{i>CCNC-SHL{i>CCXC)*(l-z3{n}c))+
(s5{n>c) *exp(P0I{i}CCNC) “ (l-z3-(n}c) +
(s6{n>c)*exp(PRK{i}CCNC)'(l-z3{n>c)+(s7{n>c)*exp(PRR{i}CCNC)~(l-z3{n}c));
endif;
23 PRK{i}CCNC=PRP{i}CCNC+(l/z3{n}c)*ln(s6{n}c*(0UP{i}CCNC/CAP{i}CCSC)*
exp(SHY{i}CCXC)'(z3{n}c-l)*exp(-dpl{n}c*CNCRWWNC)~(z3{n}c-l));
24 WAGECCYL=WAGECCSC+p25c*(PRCTCCEL-PRCTCCYC)+(l-p25c)*(PRCTCCYC-PRCTCCSB)+p26c*ln(LAB0CCNC);
25 WAG{i>CCNC=WAGECCSC;
26 CAP{i>CCYL=JNV{i>CCNC+(l-pl6c-grl-gr2)*CAP-[i>CCSC;
27 INlKi}CCNC=(pl8c) *( (1+.5* (T0B{i}-CCNC-l))*(T0B{i}CCNC-l) *CAP-(i}CCSC/pl7c) +
(l-pl8c)*((1+.5*(T0B-[i}CCSC-l))*(T0B{i}CCSC-l)*CAP{i}CCSC/pl7c)+SHKICCXC;
28 JNV{i}CCNC=(l/(l+pl7c*s9{n}c))*(INV{i}CCNC+pl7c*0.5*(s9{n}c~2)*CAP{i}CCSC);
29 TOB{i}CCJL=(1.0+INTRCCNC+RISECCXC+pl6c)*TOB{i}CCJC-(l-TCORCCXC)*exp(PRP{i}CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*
(s6{n}c*(OUP{i}CCNC/CAP{i}CCSC)*exp(SHY{i}CCXC)“(z3{n}c-l)
*exp(-dpl{n}c*CNCRWWNC)~(z3{n}c-l))“(l/z3{n}c)
-(1-TITCCCXC)*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*.5*pl7c*(JNV-[i>CCNC/CAP{i>CCSC)'2; 
T0B{i}CCNC=T0B{i}CCJC*exp(PRIDCCDC-PRIICCNC)/(1-TITCCCXC);
T0B-Ci}CCYL=T0B{i}CCSC+pl3c* (T0B{i}CCNC-T0B-Ci}CCSC) ;
30 PRO-(i>CCNC=(OUP{i>CCNC*exp(PRP{i>CCNC)-ENE{i>CCNC*exp(PRE{i>CCNC)-
LAB{i}CCNC*exp(WAG{i}CCNC)-OIN{i}CCNC*exp(POI{i}CCNC)- 
0*RES-[i>CCNC*exp(PRR{i>CCNC)-INV{i>CCNC*exp(PRIICCNC))/exp(PRIDCCDC);
31 STM{i>CCNC=TOB{i>CCNC*CAP{i>CCSC*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC);
32 INVTCCNC=INVYCCNC+INVZCCNC+INV1CCNC+INV2CCNC+INV3CCNC+INV4CCNC+INV5CCNC+
INV6CCNC+INV7CCNC+INV8CCNC+INV9CCNC+INVACCNC+INVBCCNC+INVCCCNC;
33 CAPYCCYL=JNVYCCNC+(l-pl6c-grl-gr2)*CAPYCCSC;
34 INVYCCNC=JNVYCCNC*(1+0.5*pl7c*JNVYCCNC/CAPYCCSC);
35 JNVYCCNC=CAPYCCSC*(pl8c*T0BYCCNC+(l-pl8c)*T0BYCCSC-l)/pl7c;
36 TOBYCCJL=(1.0+INTRCCNC+RISECCXC+pl6c)*TOBYCCJC-(1-TCORCCXC)*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*
(illc*(INVTCCNC/CAPYCCSC)*exp(SHYYCCXC)*(z6c-l)*exp(-dpll3c*CNCRWWNC)“(z6c-l)~(l/z6c) 
-(l-p22c)*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*.5*pl7c*(JNVYCCNC/CAPYCCSC)‘2;
217
T0BYCCNC=T0BYCCJC*exp(PRIDCCDC-PRIICCNC)/(l-p22c);
T0BYCCYL=T0BYCCSC+pl3c*(TOBYCCNC-TOBYCCSC);
37 PRKYCCNC=PRIICCNC+((z6c-l)/z6c)*(SHYYCCXC-dpll3c*CNCRWWNC)
+(l/z6c)*ln(illc*INVTCCNC/CAPYCCSC);
38 IINLCCNC=(exp(SHLYCCXC)~(z6c-l))*(exp(SHYYCCXC)“(z6c-l))*(exp(-dpll3c*CNCRWWNC)*(z6c-l))
*vil2c*INVTCCNC*(exp(WAGECCSC-PRIICCNC))~(-z6c);
39 IINECCNC=(exp(SHEFCCXC)“(z6c-l))*(exp(SHYYCCXC)*(z6c-l))*(exp(-dpll3c*CNCRWWNC)~(z6c-l))
*wil3c*INVTCCNC*(exp(PREICCNC-PRIICCNC))“(-z6c);
40 IINOCCNC=(exp(SHYYCCXC)~(z6c-l))*(exp(-dpll3c*CNCRWWNC)‘(z6c-l))
*wil4c*INVTCCNO(exp(PROICCNC-PRIICCNC)) “ (-z6c);
41 /**** Investment demand for energy i=l,2,...,5; e=l,2,...,5 **♦*/ 
IIN-(i>CCNC=wi2{e>c*IINECCNC*(exp(PRY{i>CCNC-PREICCNC))-(-z7c);
/♦Investment demand for material i=6>7,8,9,A,B,C; j=l,2,...,7*/ 
IIN{i>CCNC=wi3{j>c*IIN0CCNC*(exp(PRY-[i>CCNC-PR0ICCNC))“(-z8c);
42 PR0YCCNC= (INVTCCNC*exp (PRIICCNC) -IINECCNOexp (PREICCNC) -IINLCCNOexp (WAGECCSC) -
IINOCCNC*exp(PROICCNC)-INVYCCNC*exp(PRIICCNC))/exp(PRIDCCDC);
43 if z7c==l;
PREICCNC=i21c*PRYlCCNC+i22c*PRY2CCNC+i23c*PRY3CCNC+i24c*PRY4CCNC+i25c*PRY5CCNC; 
else;
PREICCNC=(l/(l-z7c))*ln(i21c*exp(PRYlCCNC)‘(l-z7c)+i22c*exp(PRY2CCNC)~(l-z7c)+
i23c*exp(PRY3CCNC)“(l-z7c)+i24c*exp(PRY4CCNC)~(l-z7c)+i25c*exp(PRY5CCNC)~(l-z7c));
endif;
44 if z8c==l;
PR0ICCNC=i31c*PRY6CCNC+i32c*PRY7CCNC+i33c*PRY8CCNC+i34c*PRY9CCNC+
i35c*PRYACCNC+i36c*PRYBCCNC+i37c*PRYCCCNC;
else;
PR0ICCNC=(1/(l-z8c))*ln(i31c*exp(PRY6CCNC)~(l-z8c)+i32c*exp(PRY7CCNC)~(l-z8c)+
i33c*exp(PRY8CCNC)~(l-z8c)+i34c*exp(PRY9CCNC)"(l-z8c)+i35c*exp(PRYACCNC)“(l-z8c)+ 
i36c*exp(PRYBCCNC)‘(l-z8c)+i37c*exp(PRYCCCNC)'(l-z8c));
endif;
45 if z6c==l;
PRIICCNC=-SHYYCCXC+dpll3c*CNCRWWNC+illc*PRKYCCNC+il2c*(WAGECCSC-SHLYCCXO+ 
il3c*(PREICCNC-SHEFCCXC)+il4c*PR0ICCNC;
else;
PRIICCNC=-SHYYCCXC+dpll3c*CNCRWWNC+(l/(l-z6c))*ln(illc*exp(PRKYCCNC)~(l-z6c)+ 
il2c*exp(WAGECCSC-SHLYCCXC)“(l-z6c)+il3c*exp(PREICCNC-SHEFCCXC)~(l-z6c)+ 
il4c*exp(PR0ICCNC)“(l-z6c));
endif;
46 PRIDCCDC=s81c*PRDlCCNC+s82c*PRD2CCNC+s83c*PRD3CCNC+s84c*PRD4CCNC+s85c*PRD5CCNC+
s86c*PRD6CCNC+s87c*PRD7CCNC+s88c*PRD8CCNC+s89c*PRD9CCNC+s810c*PRDACCNC+
s811c*PRDBCCNC+s812c*PRDCCCNC;
47 PRIXCCNC=wm41c*PRXlCCNC+wm42c*PRX2CCNC+wm43c*PRX3CCNC+wm44c*PRX4CCNC+
vm45c*PRX5CCNC+vm46c*PRX6CCNC+wm47c*PRX7CCNC+wm48c*PRX8CCNC+ 
wm49c*PRX9CCNC+wm410c *PRXACCNC+wm411c *PRXBCCNC+wm412c♦PRXCCCNC;
48 PRIMCCNC=wm21c*PMTlCCNC+wm22c*PMT2CCNC+wm23c*PMT3CCNC+wm24c*PMT4CCNC+
wm25c*PMT5CCNC+wm26c*PMT6CCNC+wm27c*PMT7CCNC+wm28c*PMT8CCNC+
wm29c*PMT9CCNC+wm210c*PMTACCNC+vm211c*PMTBCCNC+wm212c*PMTCCCNC;
49 OUTPCCNC=(exp(PRDlCCNC-PRIDCCDC))*0UP1CCNC+
(exp(PRD2CCNC-PRIDCCDC))*0UP2CCNC+(exp(PRD3CCNC-PRIDCCDC))*0UP3CCNC+
(exp(PRD4CCNC-PRIDCCDC))*0UP4CCNC+(exp(PRD5CCNC-PRIDCCDC))*0UP5CCNC+
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(exp(PRD6CCNC-PRIDCCDC))*0UP6CCNC+(exp(PRD7CCNC-PRIDCCDC))*0UP7CCNC+ 
(exp(PRD8CCNC-PRIDCCDC))*0UP8CCNC+(exp(PRD9CCNC-PRIDCCDC))*0UP9CCNC+ 
(exp(PRDACCNC-PRIDCCDC))*OUPACCNC+(exp(PRDBCCNC-PRIDCCDC))*OUPBCCNC+
(exp(PRDCCCNC-PRIDCCDC))♦OUPCCCNC;
50 INCMCCNC=TRANCCNC-TAXLCCNC+INTRCCNC*BONDCCSC+IRASCCNC/exp(REXCCUNC)+
(1-TC0RCCXC)♦PR0YCCNC+PR0ZCCNC+(1-TINCCCXC)*
(exp(WAGECCSC-PRIDCCDC)*1INLCCNC+exp(WAGECCSC-PRIDCCDC)*C0NLCCNC+ 
exp(WAGECCSC-PRIDCCDC)♦GCELCCXC)+
((1-TINCCCXC)♦exp(WAG1CCNC-PRIDCCDC)»LAB1CCNC+(1-TC0RCCXC)*(PRO1CCNC)+
(1-TINCCCXC)*exp(WAG2CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LAB2CCNC+(1-TCORCCXC)*(PR02CCNC)+
(1-TINCCCXC)♦exp(WAG3CCNC-PRIDCCDC)♦LAB3CCNC+(1-TCORCCXC)*(PR03CCNO +
(1-TINCCCXC)*exp(WAG4CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LAB4CCNC+(1-TCORCCXC)♦(PR04CCNO+
(1-TINCCCXC)*exp(WAG5CCNC-PRIDCCDC)♦LAB5CCNC+(1-TCORCCXC)*(PR05CCNC)+
(1-TINCCCXC)*exp(WAG6CCNC-PRIDCCDC)♦LAB6CCNC+(1-TCORCCXC)*(PR06CCNC)+
(1-TINCCCXC)*exp(WAG7CCNC-PRIDCCDC)♦LAB7CCNC+(1-TCORCCXC)*(PR07CCNC)+
(1-TINCCCXC)*exp(WAG8CCNC-PRIDCCDC)♦LAB8CCNC+(1-TCORCCXC)*(PR08CCNC)+
(1-TINCCCXC)♦exp(WAG9CCNC-PRIDCCDC)♦LAB9CCNC+(1-TCORCCXC)*(PR09CCNC)+
(1-TINCCCXC)*exp(WAGACCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LABACCNC+(1-TCORCCXC)*(PROACCNC)+
(1-TINCCCXC)*exp(WAGBCCNC-PRIDCCDC)♦LABBCCNC+(1-TCORCCXC)*(PROBCCNC)+
(1-TINCCCXC)♦exp(WAGCCCNC-PRIDCCDC)♦LABCCCNC+(1-TCORCCXC)*(PROCCCNC));
51 C0NPCCNC=p4c*(plc-grl)*WELTCCNC*exp(PRIDCCDC-PRCTCCYC)+
(1-p4c)+p5 c♦INCMCCNC» exp(PRIDCCDC-PRCTCCYC)+SHKCCCXC;
52 IRASCCNC=INTRUUNC*((-ASSEUCSC))+INTRNNNC*exp(REXCNUNC)*((-ASSENCSC));
53 INASCCNC=INTNUUNC*((-ASSEUCSC))+INTNNNNC*exp(REXCNUNC)*((-ASSENCSC));
54 CAPZCCYL=JNVZCCNC+(l-pl6c-grl-gr2)*CAPZCCSC;
55 INVZCCNC=JNVZCCNC*(1+0.5*pl7c*JNVZCCNC/CAPZCCSC);
56 JNVZCCNC=CAPZCCSC*(pl8c+T0BZCCNC+(l-pl8c)♦TOBZCCSC-l)/pl7c;
57 TOBZCCJL=(1.0+INTRCCNC+RlSECCXC+pl6c)»TOBZCCJC-0.15+exp(PRKZCCNC-PRIDCCDC)
-U-p22c)*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*0.5*pl7c*(JNVZCCNC/CAPZCCSC)‘2; 
T0BZCCNC=T0BZCCJC*exp(PRIDCCDC-PRIICCNC)/(l-p22c);
T0BZCCYL=T0BZCCSC+pl3o (TOBZCCNC-TOBZCCSC) ;
58 C0NKCCNC=0.15*CAPZCCSC;
59 PRKZCCNC=PRCTCCYC+((z9c-l)/z9c)t‘SHYZCCXC-((z9c-l)/z9c)+dpll4c*CNCRWWNC+
(l/z9c)*ln(wcllc*C0NPCCNC/C0NKCCNC);
60 CONLCCNC=(exp(SHLZCCXC)*(z9c-l))*(exp(SHYZCCXC)*(z9c-l))*(exp(-dpll4*CNCRWWNC)"(z9c-l))
*wcl2c*C0NPCCNC*(exp(WAGECCSC-PRCTCCYC))“(-z9c);
61 C0NECCNC=(exp(SHEFCCXC)-'(z9c-l))*(exp(SHYZCCXC)"(z9c-l))f(exp(-dpll4*CNCRWWNC)‘(z9c-l))
♦wcl3c*C0NPCCNC*(exp(PRCECCNC-PRCTCCYC))~(-z9c);
62 CONOCCNC=(exp(SHYZCCXC)~(z9c-l))♦(exp(-dpll4^CNCRWWNC)“(z9c-l))
♦wcl4c*C0NPCCNC*(exp(PRC0CCNC-PRCTCCYC))“(-z9c);
63 /♦♦♦* Consumption demand for energy i=l,2,...,5; e=l,2....5
CON{i>CCNC=wc2{e>c*CONECCNC*(exp(PRY{i>CCNC-PRCECCNC))‘(-z010c);
/♦♦Consumption demand for material i=6,7,8,9,A,B,C; j=l,2, .. . ,7**/ 
CON{i>CCNC=wc3{j>c^CONOCCNC^(exp(PRY{i>CCNC-PRCOCCNC))~(-zOHc);
64 PROZCCNC=(CONPCCNC*exp(PRCTCCYC)-CONECCNC*exp(PRCECCNC)-CONLCCNC+exp(WAGECCSC)-
CONOCCNC*exp(PRCOCCNC)-INVZCCNC*exp(PRIICCNC))/exp(PRIDCCDC);
65 if z9c==l;
PRCTCCYC=-SHYZCCXC+dpll4c+CNCRWWNC+cllc*PRKZCCNC+cl2c^(WAGECCSC-SHLZCCXO+
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cl3c*(PRCECCNC-SHEFCCXC)+cl4c*PRC0CCNC;
else;
PRCTCCYC=-SHYZCCXC+dpll4c*CNCRWWNC+(l/(l-z9c))*ln(cllc*exp(PRKZCCNC)‘(l-z9c)+ 
cl2c*exp(WAGECCSC-SHLZCCXC)“(l-z9c)+cl3c*exp(PRCECCNC-SHEFCCXC)~(l-z9c)+ 
cl4c*exp(PRC0CCNC)'(l-z9c));
endif;
66 if z010c==l;
PRCECCNC=c21c*PRYlCCNC+c22c*PRY2CCNC+c23c*PRY3CCNC+c24c*PRY4CCNC+c25c*PRY5CCNC; 
else;
PRCECCNC=(l/(l-z010c))*ln(c21c*exp(PRYlCCNC)*(l-z010c)+
c22c*exp(PRY2CCNC)‘(l-z010c)+c23c*exp(PRY3CCNC)‘(l-z010c)+ 
c24c*exp(PRY4CCNC)"(l-z010c)+c25c*exp(PRY5CCNC)~(1-zOlOc));
endif;
67 if z011c==l;
PRC0CCNC=c31c*PRY6CCNC+c32c*PRY7CCNC+c33c*PRY8CCNC+c34c*PRY9CCNC+
c35c*PRYACCNC+c36c*PRYBCCNC+c37c*PRYCCCNC;
else;
PRC0CCNC=(l/(l-z011c))*ln((c31c)*exp(PRY6CCNC)~(l-z011c)+
(c32c)*exp(PRY7CCNC)~(l-z011c)+(c33c)*exp(PRY8CCNC)‘(l-z011c)+ 
(c34c)*exp(PRY9CCNC)~(l-z011c)+(c35c)*exp(PRYACCNC)“(l-z011c)+ 
(c36c)*exp(PRYBCCNC)‘(l-z011c)+(c37c)*exp(PRYCCCNC)~(1-zOllc));
endif;
68 LOGYCCNC=ln(OUTPCCNC);
69 MONECCNC=PRIDCCDC+LOGYCCNC+plOc*INTNCCNC+SHKMCCXC;
70 INTNCCNC=(1/(-plOc))*(PRIDCCDC+LOGYCCNC+SHKMCCXC-MPOLCCXC);
/*
Henderson-McKibbin rule
INTNCCNC=1.5*(INFPCCNC-INFLCCXC)+1.5*(LOGYCCNO+INTNCCXC;
*/
71 INTRCCNC=INTNCCNC-PRIDCCDL+PRIDCCDC;
72 INFLCCNC=PRCTCCYC-PRCTCCSB;
73 INFPCCNC=PRIDCCYC-PRIDCCSB;
74 PRIDCCYC=PRIDCCDC;
75 GDPRCCNC=C0NPCCNC+C0NGCCNC+INVTCCNC+TBNACCNC+INS1CCXC+INS2CCXC+INS3CCXC+INS4CCXC+
INS5CCXC+INS6CCXC+INS7CCXC+INS8CCXC+INS9CCXC+INSACCXC+INSBCCXC+INSCCCXC;
76 GDP2CCNC=exp(PRCTCCYC-PRIDCCDC)*(C0NPCCNC)+C0NGCCNC+
exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*INVTCCNC+TBALCCNC+
exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*INSlCCXC+exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*INS2CCXC+ 
exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*INS3CCXC+exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*INS4CCXC+ 
exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*INS5CCXC+exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*INS6CCXC+ 
exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*INS7CCXC+exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*INS8CCXC+ 
exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*INS9CCXC+exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*INSACCXC+ 
exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*INSBCCXC+exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*INSCCCXC;
77 GDPNCCNC=exp(PRCTCCYC)*(CONPCCNC)+exp(PRIDCCDC)*(CONGCCNC)+
exp(PRIICCNC)*INVTCCNC+TBALCCNC*exp(PRIDCCDC)+exp(PRIICCNC)*INS1CCXC+ 
exp(PRIICCNC)*INS2CCXC+exp(PRIICCNC)*INS3CCXC+exp(PRIICCNC)*INS4CCXC+ 
exp(PRIICCNC)*INS5CCXC+exp(PRIICCNC)*INS6CCXC+exp(PRIICCNC)*INS7CCXC+ 
exp(PRIICCNC)*INS8CCXC+exp(PRIICCNC)*INS9CCXC+exp(PRIICCNC)*INSACCXC+ 
exp(PRIICCNC)*INSBCCXC+exp(PRIICCNC)fINSCCCXC;
78 PGDPCCNC=ln(GDPNCCNC/GDPRCCNC);
220
79 GNPRCCNC=GDPRCCNC+(PBALCCXC+IRASCCNC)/exp(REXCCUNC);
80 CURNCCNC=TBALCCNC+(PBALCCXC+INASCCNC)/exp(REXCCUNC);
81 CURRCCNC=PBALCCXC+TBALCUNC+IRASCCNC;
82 CURACCNC=TBALCUNC+(PBALCCXC+IRASCCNC)/exp(REXCCUNC);
83 WELTCCNC=B0NDCCSC+ASSECCNC+p8c*exp(M0NECCNC-PRIDCCDC)+WELHCCNC+
TOBYCCNC*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*CAPYCCSC+TOBZCCNC*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)+CAPZCCSC+ 
(T0BlCCNC)*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*CAPlCCSC+(T0B2CCNC)*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*CAP2CCSC+ 
(T0B3CCNC)*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*CAP3CCSC+(T0B4CCNC)*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)+CAP4CCSC+ 
(T0B5CCNC)*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*CAP5CCSC+(T0B6CCNC)*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*CAP6CCSC+ 
(T0B7CCNC)*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*CAP7CCSC+(T0B8CCNC)*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*CAP8CCSC+ 
(T0B9CCNC)*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)+CAP9CCSC+(TOBACCNC)*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)+CAPACCSC+ 
(TOBBCCNC)*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)*CAPBCCSC+(TOBCCCNC)*exp(PRIICCNC-PRIDCCDC)+CAPCCCSC;
84 WELHCCJL=(l+p2c+INTRCCNC-gr1)+WELHCCJC-(-TAXHCCNC-TAXLCCNC+TRANCCNC+
exp(WAGECCSC-PRIDCCDC)*IINLCCNC+exp(WAGECCSC-PRIDCCDC)*CONLCCNC+ 
exp(WAGECCSC-PRIDCCDC)*GCELCCXC+exp(WAG1CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LAB1CCNC+ 
exp(WAG2CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LAB2CCNC+exp(WAG3CCNC-PRIDCCDC)+LAB3CCNC+ 
exp(WAG4CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LAB4CCNC+exp(WAG5CCNC-PRIDCCDC)+LAB5CCNC+ 
exp(WAG6CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LAB6CCNC+exp(WAG7CCNC-PRIDCCDC)+LAB7CCNC+ 
exp(WAG8CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LAB8CCNC+exp(WAG9CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LAB9CCNC+ 
exp(WAGACCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LABACCNC+exp(WAGBCCNC-PRIDCCDC)+LABBCCNC+ 
exp(WAGCCCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LABCCCNC);
85 TXM{i}CCNC=TIM{i}CCXC*(exp(EXCHUUNC-EXCHCUNC+PRXlUUNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP{i}CUNC)+
TIM{i>CCXC*(exp(EXCHNUNC-EXCHCUNC+PRXlNNNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP{i>CNNC);
86 TAXMCCNC=TXM1CCNC+TXM2CCNC+TXM3CCNC+TXM4CCNC+TXM5CCNC+TXM6CCNC+
TXM7CCNC+TXM8CCNC+TXM9CCNC+TXMACCNC+TXMBCCNC+TXMCCCNC;
87 TAXTCCNC=TAXCCCNC+TAXHCCNC+TAXLCCNC+TAXECCNC+TAXMCCNC;
88 TAXECCNC=-TFIXCCXC+(s21c*TCARCCXC+sl01c*TBFDCCXC)* QUY1CCNC+
(s21c*TCAICCNC+s101c*TBFICCXC)*IMPlCCNC+(s2lc*TCAXCCNC+s101c+TBFXCCXC)+EXP1CCNC+ 
(s22c*TCARCCXC+slO2c*TBFDCCXC)*0UY2CCNC+(s22c*TCAICCNC+sl02c*TBFICCXC)*IMP2CCNC+ 
(s22c*TCAXCCNC+s102c*TBFXCCXC)+EXP2CCNC+(s23c*TCARCCXC+s103c*TBFDCCXC)+0UY3CCNC+ 
(s23c*TCAICCNC+sl03c*TBFICCXC)*IMP3CCNC+(s23c*TCAXCCNC+sl03c*TBFXCCXC)+EXP3CCNC+ 
(s24c*TCARCCXC+sl04c*TBFDCCXC)*OUY4CCNC+(s24c*TCAICCNC+sl04c*TBFICCXC)*IMP4CCNC+ 
(s24c*TCAXCCNC+sl04c*TBFXCCXC)*EXP4CCNC+(s25c*TCARCCXC+sl05c*TBFDCCXC)*OUY5CCNC+ 
(s25c*TCAICCNC+sl05c*TBFICCXC)*IMP5CCNC+(s25c*TCAXCCNC+sl05c*TBFXCCXC)*EXP5CCNC+ 
(s26c*TCARCCXC+sl06c*TBFDCCXC)*OUY6CCNC+(s26c*TCAICCNC+sl06c*TBFICCXC)*IMP6CCNC+ 
(s26c*TCAXCCNC+sl06c*TBFXCCXC)*EXP6CCNC+(s27c*TCARCCXC+sl07c*TBFDCCXC)+0UY7CCNC+ 
(s27c*TCAICCNC+sl07c*TBFICCXC)*IMP7CCNC+(s27c*TCAXCCNC+sl07c*TBFXCCXC)+EXP7CCNC+ 
(s28c*TCARCCXC+sl08c*TBFDCCXC)*OUY8CCNC+(s28c*TCAICCNC+sl08c*TBFICCXC)*IMP8CCNC+ 
(s28c*TCAXCCNC+sl08c*TBFXCCXC)*EXP8CCNC+(s29c*TCARCCXC+sl09c*TBFDCCXC)*OUY9CCNC+ 
(s29c*TCAICCNC+sl09c*TBFICCXC)*IMP9CCNC+(s29c*TCAXCCNC+sl09c*TBFXCCXC)*EXP9CCNC+ 
(s210c*TCARCCXC+sl010c*TBFDCCXC)*0UYACCNC+(s210c*TCAICCNC+s1010c+TBFICCXC)+IMPACCNC+ 
(s210c*TCAXCCNC+sl010c*TBFXCCXC)*EXPACCNC+(s211c*TCARCCXC+sl011c*TBFDCCXC)*OUYBCCNC+ 
(s211c*TCAICCNC+sl011c*TBFICCXC)*IMPBCCNC+(s211c*TCAXCCNC+sl011c*TBFXCCXC)+EXPBCCNC+ 
(s212c*TCARCCXC+s1012c*TBFDCCXC)*0UYCCCNC+(s212c*TCAICCNC+s1012c+TBFICCXC)*IMPCCCNC+ 
(s212c*TCAXCCNC+sl012c*TBFXCCXC)*EXPCCCNC;
89 TAXCCCNC=-TITCCCXC*exp(PRIICCNC)*(INVTCCNC-INVZCCNC-INVYCCNC)/exp(PRIDCCDC)-
p22c*(INVZCCNC+INVYCCNC)+TCORCCXC*PROYCCNC+
TCORCCXC*(PR01CCNC)+TAXlCCXC*(exp(PRPlCCNC-PRIDCCDC)*0UPlCCNC+ 
exp(PMTlCCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMPlCCNC)+TC0RCCXC*(PR02CCNC)+
TAX2CCXC*(exp(PRP2CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*0UP2CCNC+ 
exp(PMT2CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP2CCNC)+TC0RCCXC*(PR03CCNC)+
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TAX3CCXC*(exp(PRP3CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*0UP3CCNC+
exp(PMT3CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP3CCNC)+TCORCCXC*(PR04CCNC)+
TAX4CCXC*(exp(PRP4CCNC-PRIDCCDC)+0UP4CCNC+ 
exp(PMT4CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP4CCNC)+TC0RCCXC*(PR05CCNC)+
TAX5CCXC*(exp(PRP5CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*0UP5CCNC+
exp(PMT5CCNC-PRIDCCDC)+IMP5CCNC)+TCORCCXC*(PR06CCNC)+
TAX6CCXC*(exp(PRP6CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*0UP6CCNC+
exp(PMT6CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP6CCNC)+TC0RCCXC*(PR07CCNC)+
TAX7CCXC*(exp(PRP7CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*0UP7CCNC+
exp(PMT7CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP7CCNC)+TCORCCXC*(PR08CCNC)+
TAX8CCXC*(exp(PRP8CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*0UP8CCNC+
exp(PMT8CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP8CCNC)+TC0RCCXC*(PR09CCNC)+
TAX9CCXC*(exp(PRP9CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*0UP9CCNC+
exp(PMT9CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMP9CCNC)+TCORCCXC*(PROACCNC)+
TAXACCXC*(exp(PRPACCNC-PRIDCCDC)*0UPACCNC+
exp(PMTACCNC-PRIDCCDC)»IMPACCNC)+TCORCCXO(PROBCCNC)+
TAXBCCXC*(exp(PRPBCCNC-PRIDCCDC)*OUPBCCNC+ 
exp(PMTBCCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMPBCCNC)+TCORCCXC*(PROCCCNC)+
TAXCCCXC*(exp(PRPCCCNC-PRIDCCDC)*OUPCCCNC+ 
exp(PMTCCCNC-PRIDCCDC)*IMPCCCNC);
90 TAXHCCNC=TINCCCXO(exp(WAGECCSC-PRIDCCDC)*IINLCCNC+
exp(WAGECCSC-PRIDCCDC)*CONLCCNC+exp(WAGECCSC-PRIDCCDC)»GCELCCXC)+ 
TINCCCXC*(exp(WAG1CCNC-PRIDCCDC)♦LAB1CCNC+
exp(WAG2CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LAB2CCNC+exp(WAG3CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LAB3CCNC+ 
exp(WAG4CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LAB4CCNC+exp(WAG5CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LAB5CCNC+ 
exp(WAG6CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LAB6CCNC+exp(WAG7CCNC-PRIDCCDC)»LAB7CCNC+ 
exp(WAG8CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LAB8CCNC+exp(WAG9CCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LAB9CCNC+ 
exp(WAGACCNC-PRIDCCDC)*LABACCNC+exp(WAGBCCNC-PRIDCCDC)»LABBCCNC+ 
exp(WAGCCCNC-PRIDCCDC)«LABCCCNC);
91 TRANCCNC=TRANCCXC-p27c*QUTPCCNC-,
92 DEFNCCNC=CONGCCNC+TRANCCNC-TAXTCCNC+INTNCCNC*BONDCCSC;
93 /******** Endogenous fiscal deficit ********/ 
DEFICCNC=CONGCCNC+TRANCCNC-TAXTCCNC+INTRCCNC*BONDCCSC; 
TAXLCCNC=INTRCCNC*BONDCCSC+TAXICCXC;
94 /******** Exogenous fiscal deficit ********/ 
TAXLCCNC=CONGCCNC+TRANCCNC-DEFICCNC+INTRCCNC*BONDCCSC-
(TAXCCCNC+TAXHCCNC+TAXECCNC+TAXMCCNC);
DEFICCNC=DEFICCXC;
95 CONGCCNC=GCELCCXC*exp(WAGECCSC-PRIDCCDC)+GCElCCXC*exp(PRYlCCNC-PRIDCCDC)+
GCE2CCXC*exp(PRY2CCNC-PRIDCCDC)+GCE3CCXC*exp(PRY3CCNC-PRIDCCDC)+ 
GCE4CCXC*exp(PRY4CCNC-PRIDCCDC)+GCE5CCXC*exp(PRY5CCNC-PRIDCCDC)+ 
GCE6CCXC*exp(PRY6CCNC-PRIDCCDC)+GCE7CCXC*exp(PRY7CCNC-PRIDCCDC)+ 
GCE8CCXC*exp(PRY8CCNC-PRIDCCDC)+GCE9CCXC*exp(PRY9CCNC-PRIDCCDC)+ 
GCEACCXC*exp(PRYACCNC-PRIDCCDC)+GCEBCCXC*exp(PRYBCCNC-PRIDCCDC)+ 
GCECCCXC*exp(PRYCCCNC-PRIDCCDC);
96 B0NDCCYL=DEFICCNC+B0NDCCSC*(l-grl-gr2);
97 SAVICCNC=INVTCCNC+DEFICCNC+CURRCCNC/exp(REXCCUNC);
98 SAVNCCNC=INVTCCNC+DEFNCCNC+CURNCCNC/exp(REXCCUNC);
99 SAVTCCNC=INVTCCNC+CURNCCNC/exp(REXCCUNC);
100 WELHCCNC=WELHCCJC;
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101 IMNACCNC=exp(PMTlCCNC-PRIMCCNC)*IMPlCCNC+
exp(PMT2CCNC-PRIMCCNC)*IMP2CCNC+exp(PMT3CCNC-PRIMCCNC)*IMP3CCNC+ 
exp(PMT4CCNC-PRIMCCNC)*IMP4CCNC+exp(PMT5CCNC-PRIMCCNC)*IMP5CCNC+ 
exp(PMT6CCNC-PRIMCCNC)*IMP6CCNC+exp(PMT7CCNC-PRIMCCNC)*IMP7CCNC+ 
exp(PMT8CCNC-PRIMCCNC)*IMP8CCNC+exp(PMT9CCNC-PRIMCCNC)*IMP9CCNC+ 
exp(PMTACCNC-PRIMCCNC)*IMPACCNC+exp(PMTBCCNC-PRIMCCNC)*IMPBCCNC+ 
exp(PMTCCCNC-PRIMCCNC)*IMPCCCNC;
102 EXNACCNC=exp(PRXlCCNC-PRIXCCNC)*EXPlCCNC+
exp(PRX2CCNC-PRIXCCNC)*EXP2CCNC+exp(PRX3CCNC-PRIXCCNC)*EXP3CCNC+ 
exp(PRX4CCNC-PRIXCCNC)*EXP4CCNC+exp(PRX5CCNC-PRIXCCNC)*EXP5CCNC+ 
exp(PRX6CCNC-PRIXCCNC)*EXP6CCNC+exp(PRX7CCNC-PRIXCCNC)*EXP7CCNC+ 
exp(PRX8CCNC-PRIXCCNC)*EXP8CCNC+exp(PRX9CCNC-PRIXCCNC)*EXP9CCNC+ 
exp(PRXACCNC-PRIXCCNC)*EXPACCNC+exp(PRXBCCNC-PRIXCCNC)*EXPBCCNC+ 
exp(PRXCCCNC-PRIXCCNC)*EXPCCCNC;
103 TBNACCNC=EXNACCNC-IMNACCNC;
104 TBALCCNC=EXPTCCNC-IMPTCCNC;
105 TBALCUNC=(EXPTCCNC-IMPTCCNC)*exp(REXCCUNC);
106 TCAICCNC=TCARCCXC;
107 TCAXCCNC=-TCARCCXC;
108 EMISCCNC=1000*(s22c*(0UP2CCNC+IMP2CCNC-EXP2CCNC) +s23c*(0UP3CCNC+IHP3CCNC-EXP3CCNC) +
s24c*(0UP4CCNC+IMP4CCNC-EXP4CCNC));
109 ENERCCNC=1000*(s104c*(0UP4CCNC+IMP4CCNC-EXP4CCNO+S105c*(0UP5CCNC+IMP5CCNC-EXP5CCNC));
110 EMC0CCNC=EMISCCNC*44/12;
111 INFLCCTC=PRCTCCYC-PRCTCCSB;
112 EMISCCTC=EMISCCNC-EMISCCXC;
113 EMISWWNC=EMISUUNC+EMISNNNC+EMISCCNC;
114 EMC0WWNC=EMISWWNC*44/12;
115 ENERWWNC=ENERUUNC+ENERNNNC+ENERCCNC;
116 EMISZZNC=EMISUUNC;
117 EMC0ZZNC=EMISZZNC*44/12;
118 ENERZZNC=ENERUUNC;
119 EXCHNUNC=REXCNUNC-PRIDNNDC+PRIDUUDC;
EXCHCUNC=REXCCUNC-PRIDCCDC+PRIDUUDC;
120 REXCNUJL=REXCNUJC-INTRNNNC+INTRUUNC+EXCRNNXC; 
REXCCUJL=REXCCUJC-INTRCCNC+INTRUUNC+EXCRCCXC;
121 REXCNUNC=REXCNUJC;
REXCCUNC=REXCCUJC;
122 NEERUUNC=-(p41u*EXCHNUNC+p42u*EXCHCUNC);
NEERNNNC=-(p40n*(-EXCHNUNC)+p42n*(EXCHCUNC-EXCHNUNC));
NEERCCNC=-(p40c*(-EXCHCUNC)+p41c*(EXCHNUNC-EXCHCUNC));
123 REERUUNC=-(p41u*REXCNUNC+p42u*REXCCUNC);
REERNNNC=-(p40n*(-REXCNUNC)+p42n*(REXCCUNC-REXCNUNC));
REERCCNC=-(p40c*(-REXCCUNC)+p41c*(REXCNUNC-REXCCUNC));
124 ASSEUUNC=(ASSEUNSC+ASSEUCSC);
ASSENNNC=(-ASSEUNSC)+exp(REXCNUNC)*(ASSENCSC);
ASSECCNC=(-ASSEUCSC)+exp(REXCNUNC)*((-ASSENCSC));
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125 ASSEUNYL=(1-grl-gr2)*(ASSEUNSC)-CURRNNNC+exp(REXCNUNC)*(ASSENCYL)-
(l-grl-gr2)*(exp(REXCNUNC)*(ASSENCSC));
ASSEUCYL=(1-grl-gr2)*(ASSEUCSC)-CURRCCNC+expCREXCNUNC)*((-ASSENCYL))- 
(1-grl-gr2)*(exp(REXCNUNC)*((-ASSENCSC)));
ASSENCYL=(1/exp(REXCNUNC))*a2c*(-CURRCCNC)+ASSENCSC*exp(REXCNUNC)*(1-gr1-gr2);
126 CNC0WWYL=0.64*EMC0WVNC+(1-0.00833-grl-gr2)»CNC0WWSC;
127 CNCAWWNC=CNCOWWSC+CNPRWWXC;
128 CNCRWWNC=ln(CNCAWWNC/CNPRWWXC);
129 DAMGCCNC=dp2c*exp(TEMSWWSC)‘2;
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Chapter 7
Projections of China’s CO2 Emissions
In this chapter, the G-Cubed-T model developed in Chapter 6 is used to project 
China’s future energy consumption and CO2 emissions. These projections are busi­
ness as usual (BAU) or non-intervention projections without including any climate 
change policies or measures to reduce emissions, although different scenarios of un­
derlying assumptions about economic, population and technological growth may 
emerge. They serve as the baseline projections for the discussion of different envi­
ronmental policies which is the topic of the next chapter.
The projections presented in this chapter consider CO2 emissions from energy 
use only. They seek to refine the existing analysis in two respects. First, the model 
described in the previous chapter has important advantages. It is a dynamic mul­
tiregion general equilibrium model with both macroeconomic and microeconomic 
details as well as the interaction between the economic activity and climate change. 
Second, the scenarios developed in this chapter utilise the new findings about the 
underlying driving forces and future development paths in China.
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section briefly introduces the 
development and projections of energy consumption and CO2 emissions in China. 
Section 7.2 discusses the driving forces of different scenarios, and section 7.3 quan­
tifies the scenario assumptions and presents the results of these scenarios. The last 
section gives some concluding remarks.
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7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Energy Consumption and CO2 Emissions in China
Since the late 1970s, China has experienced rapid growth at an annual real rate 
of about 10%. Along with this rapid economic growth, total energy consumption, 
and thus GHG emissions, have increased sharply. Between 1980 and 1998, total 
energy consumption more than doubled, with an annual rate of increase of 4.63% 
(see Table 7.1), while carbon dioxide emissions increased at an annual rate of 5.28% 
between 1980 and 1996 (see Table 5.2). Zhang (1998b) decomposes the change 
in China’s CO2 emission between 1980 and 1997 into five components. He finds 
that, although economic growth and population expansion would have caused CO2 
emissions to increase by 799.13% and 128.39%, respectively, the total increase in 
emissions was only 488.65%. This is because China’s energy efficiency has improved 
during the same period. In 1997, China’s energy efficiency, measured in PPP GDP 
per unit of energy use, was $3.3 per kilogram of oil equivalent, while it was only $0.7 
in 1980 (World Bank 2000). Zhang (1998b) finds that the change in energy intensity 
reduced total emissions by 432.32%. Switching between alternative energy sources 
also played a moderate role, reducing total emissions by 6.51%. This can be very 
clearly seen from the pattern of energy consumption in Table 7.1. From the 1950s 
to 1970s, China had a major change in the composition of energy consumption. Due 
to the discovery and exploration of several big oil fields, the share of oil increased 
steadily from 5% to 20% and, consequently, the share of coal decreased from more 
than 90% to around 70%. However, the pattern has not changed significantly since 
the late 1970s.
Although population growth contributes to the increase in CO2 emissions, China’s 
rigorous and controversial population policy does play an important role in the 
change of emissions. Since the 1970s, due to continuous family planning activities 
over a long period, China has reduced what otherwise would have been the growth 
of its population by 300 million people (Wu et al. 1998, page 548). If the popula-
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Table 7.1: China's Energy Consumption
Year
Total
(million tee)
Per C apita  
(kgee)
Share(% )
Coal Petroleum N atural gas Hydro-power
1957 96.44 14.92 92.3 4.6 0.1 3.0
1962 165.40 24.58 89.2 6.6 0.9 3.2
1965 189.01 26.06 86.5 10.3 0.9 2.7
1970 292.91 35.29 80.9 14.7 0.9 3.5
1975 454.25 49.15 71.9 21.1 2.5 4.6
1978 571.44 59.36 70.7 22.7 3.2 3.4
1980 602.75 61.07 72.2 20.7 3.1 4.0
1985 766.82 72.44 75.8 17.1 2.2 4.9
1986 808.50 75.20 75.8 17.2 2.3 4.7
1987 866.32 79.26 76.2 17.0 2.1 4.7
1988 929.97 83.76 76.2 17.0 2.1 4.7
1989 969.34 86.01 76.0 17.1 2.0 4.9
1990 987.03 86.33 76.2 16.6 2.1 5.1
1991 1037.83 89.60 76.1 17.1 2.0 4.8
1992 1091.70 93.17 75.7 17.5 1.9 4.9
1993 1159.93 97.87 74.7 18.2 1.9 5.2
1994 1227.37 102.41 75.0 17.4 1.9 5.7
1995 1311.76 108.30 74.6 17.5 1.8 6.1
1996 1389.48 113.53 74.7 18.0 1.8 5.5
1997 1381.73 111.77 71.5 20.4 1.7 6.2
1998 1322.14 105.93 69.6 21.5 2.2 6.7
1999* 1220.00 96.90 67.1 23.4 2.8 6.7
f: Data for 1999 are Estimates.
Source: State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
tion policy had not been implemented, China’s total CO2 emission would had been 
4203.4 million metric tons in 1996, 25% higher than the actual level.
One of the important factors that have improved China’s energy efficiency is 
price reform. In order to expand industry, China underpriced energy for a long 
time. The price of coal was set so low that even the best coal mines could not make 
a profit (Laffont and Senik-Leygonie 1997; Smil 1998). This low price system hurt 
the economy in two ways: inefficient production and over consumption of energy. 
In 1984 the Ministry of Finance introduced a two-tier price system and by 1994 
the government finally freed all coal prices. Subsidies for energy consumption have 
been reduced significantly. Coal subsidy rates fell from 61% in 1984 to 37% in 1990 
and to 29% in 1995; and petroleum subsidy rates fell from 55% in 1990 to 2% in 
1995 (Zhang 1998b). However, China’s energy prices are still lower than those of 
the resource-rich United States (World Bank 1997, Table 4.4, page 53).
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Although China has significantly improved energy efficiency, it still has a long 
way to go. First, the current level of energy efficiency is still quite low compared to 
industrialised countries (see Table 5.2).1 Second, a coal dominant energy structure, 
which may be responsible for the low energy efficiency and high CO2 emissions, will 
likely last for a very long time due to the fact that China has relatively abundant 
coal reserves. China’s global rank of coal deposits is third behind Russia and the 
United States. In any case, its coal resources could last for several hundreds of years 
at the mid-1990s rate of extraction. In terms of verified coal reserves, China again 
ranks third in the world, with roughly 115 billion tons (Gt) or one-ninth of the 
world’s total. In contrast, at the end of 1996, China’s proved oil reserves amounted 
to just over 2% of the global total; and proved natural gas reserves are much smaller, 
amounting to a mere 0.8% of the global total (Smil 1998).
Another issue is that China will likely experience an energy shortage in the near 
future. Using Engle-Granger’s error correction model and data between 1954 and 
1994, Chan and Lee (1997) find that China’s coal demand would exceed the official 
output target by 5% in the year 2000 under the most optimistic scenario.2 Accord­
ing to The Study on China’s Energy Strategy reported on Industry and Commerce 
Times, 30 November 1999, total energy demand will be 1.9 billion ton standard coal 
in 2010, and be as high as 3.5-4.4 billion ton standard coal in 2050. Among the de­
mand in 2010, coal is 1.86 billion tons, petroleum 0.25-0.27 billion tons, and natural 
gases 60-100 billion cubic meters; while the supply of petroleum is only 0.16-0.21
^ h is  cross country comparison of broad energy efficiency might be inappropriate because the 
resource endowment differs significantly across countries. However, it still gives some rough idea 
about the gaps between China and other countries. A more appropriate approach would be the 
direct comparison of physical output level per unit of energy use for specific products. This com­
parison shows that China’s factories typically use 20% more energy to produce chemicals, building 
materials and electricity, and 40% more energy to produce iron and steel than their counterparts 
in industrialised countries. For a collection of such comparisons, see Zhang (1998a, Section 3.5).
2The Chinese government has planned to supply 1.40 billion tons for the year 2000 in its Ten 
Year’s Social and Economic Development Strategy and the Eighth Five-Year Plan. Assuming 
the economy growing at 8% per annum, coal price rising 4% per annum and the share of heavy 
industry’s output in national income declining 1% per annum between 1996 and 2000, Chan and 
Lee (1997) forecasted the coal demand would be 1.48 billion tons, 5.7% higher than the official 
supply target.
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billion tons, and natural gases 51.6-71.3 billion cubic meters. The petroleum supply 
will be 40-80 million tons in 2050, leaving a shortage of about 600-700 million tons.
7.1.2 Existing Projections of CO2 Emissions in China
The literature about CO2 emissions projection is huge. The writing team of IPCC’s 
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) conducted an comprehensive litera­
ture review with over 400 scenarios examined (Naki'cenovi'c and Swart 2000, Chapter 
2).3 Due to differences in methodology and model structure, data source and def­
inition, understanding of driving forces and assumption of scenarios, the resulting 
projections of future CO2 emissions have been quite disparate (see Figure 7.1).
Based on a review of these scenarios, SRES (Naki'cenovi'c and Swart 2000) iden­
tifies population growth, economic development, and structural and technological 
change as the main scenario driving forces. Four scenario families with a total 
of 40 scenarios are developed in the report. The A1 family “describes a future 
world of very rapid economic growth, low population growth, and the rapid in­
troduction of new and more efficient technologies. Major underlying themes are 
convergence among regions, capacity building, and increased cultural and social 
interactions, with a substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita in­
come.” It consists of three scenario groups characterising alternative developments 
of energy technologies: A1FI (fossil fuel intensive), A1B (balanced) and AIT (pre­
dominantly non-fossil fuel). The A2 family “describes a very heterogeneous world. 
The underlying theme is self-reliance and preservation of local identities. Fertil­
ity patterns across regions converge very slowly, which results in high population 
growth. Economic development is primarily regionally oriented and per capita eco­
nomic growth and technological change are more fragmented and slower” . The B1 
family “describes a convergent world with the same low population growth as in 
the A1 storyline, but with rapid changes in economic structures toward a service
3This is the second review undertaken by the IPCC. The first was conducted to evaluate the 
IPCC Scenarios 1992 (IS92) set of scenarios in comparison to other GHG emissions scenarios found 
in the literature (Alcamo et al. 1995)
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Figure 7.1: CO2 Emissions Projections in Literature
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Source: Excerpt from Naki'cenovi'c and Swart (2000, Figure 2-1)
and information economy, with reductions in material intensity, and the introduc­
tion of clean and resource-efficient technologies”. The B2 family describes “a world 
with moderate population growth, intermediate levels of economic development,
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and less rapid and more diverse technological change than in the B1 and A1 sto­
rylines. While the scenario is also oriented toward environmental protection and 
social equity, it focuses on local and regional levels” (Naki'cenovi'c and Swart 2000, 
Box TS-1). The scenarios are quantified by six modeling teams.4 56 The projected 
global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels vary from 7.8 to 14.7 Gtc per year in 2020, 
from 8.5 to 26.8 Gtc/yr in 2050, and from 3.3 to 36.8 Gtc/yr in 2100 (Naki'cenovi'c 
and Swart 2000, Table SPM-3a).
There are 144 scenarios of China’s CO2 emissions in the IPCC Scenario Database 
(Morita and Lee 1998a; Morita and Lee 1998b; Morita 1999),5,6 of which 69 are iden­
tified as intervention scenarios, 45 are non-intervention scenarios, and 30 are not 
classified. As with global scenarios, the ranges of projections of China’s CO2 emis­
sion are very wide (Figure 7.2). For example, projected non-intervention emissions 
vary from 4.486 GtC/year to 0.185 Gtc/year in 2050 and from 13 GtC/year to 0.15 
Gtc/year in 2100 (see Table 7.2). The upper bound of the non-intervention scenar­
ios is the highest, while the upper bound of the intervention scenarios is the lowest 
among the three categories. However, the lower bound values of these categories are 
more or less similar. The histograms (Figure 7.3) show that the frequency distribu-
4These models are: Asian Pacific Integrated Model (AIM) from the National Institute of Envi­
ronmental Studies in Japan (Morita et al. 1994); Atmospheric Stabilization Framework Model 
(ASF) from ICF Consulting in the USA (Lashof and Tirpak 1990; Pepper et al. 1992, 1998; 
Sankovski, Barbour, and Pepper 2000); Integrated Model to Assess the Greenhouse Effect (IMAGE) 
from the National Institute for Public Health and Environmental Hygiene (Alcamo, Kreileman, and 
Leemans 1998; de Vries et al. 1994, 1999, 2000) in connection with the Dutch Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis WorldScan model (de Jong and Zalm 1991), the Netherlands; Multiregional Ap­
proach for Resource and Industry Allocation (MARIA) from the Science University of Tokyo in 
Japan (Mori and Takahashi 1999; Mori 2000); Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and 
their General Environmental Impact (MESSAGE) from the International Institute of Applied Sys­
tems Analysis(IIASA) in Austria (Messner and Strubegger 1995; Riahi and Roehrl 2000); and Mini 
Climate Assessment Model (MiniCAM) from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) 
in the USA (Edmonds, Wise, and MacCracken 1994; Edmonds et al. 1996a; Edmonds et al. 1996b).
5This database was developed for IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios. The main sources 
of data are from the International Energy Workshop Poll (Manne and Schrattenholzer 1995, 1996, 
1997), Energy Modeling Forum (e.g. Weyant 1993), and previous database for IPCC Supplement 
Report (Alcamo et al. 1995) as well as direct individual contact.
6The number of available Chinese scenarios in database is different from that reported in IPCC 
SRES (Naki'cenovi'c and Swart 2000, Table 2-1) which used the Database version 0.1.
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Table 7.2: Scenario Statistics of China’s CO2 Emissions Projections
Scenarios Year M aximum M inimum Mean M edian
S tandard
D eviation Num ber
All scenarios
2000 3.186 0.2265 0.9810 0.8863 0.5119 140
2010 1.853 0.156 1.0792 1.1107 0.3075 130
2050 4.486 0.1049 1.8868 1.8238 0.9837 114
2100 13.000 0.033 3.5241 2.6295 2.9287 88
N on-intervention scenarios 
2000 3.186 0.241 1.0233 0.8915 0.5963 42
2010 1.853 0.2191 1.1113 1.1184 0.3610 38
2050 4.486 0.1846 2.5025 2.533 1.1195 31
2100 13.000 0.1509 5.5751 5.1073 3.2863 28
Intervention scenarios
2000 2.700 0.2343 0.9174 0.8921 0.3497 68
2010 1.379 0.1560 1.0513 1.0556 0.2597 65
2050 3.241 0.1049 1.5555 1.6430 0.6678 63
2100 5.236 0.1000 2.0050 1.5730 1.5717 39
U ncertain scenarios
2000 3.078 0.2265 1.0661 0.8705 0.6717 30
2010 1.853 0.1912 1.1013 1.1107 0.3374 27
2050 4.486 0.1718 1.9759 2.0607 1.1536 20
2100 9.100 0.0330 3.6105 3.4312 2.7643 21
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data extracted from IPCC SRES Database version 1.0 main­
tained by the National Institute of Environmental Studies in Japan (http://www-cger.nies.go.jp/cger- 
e/db/ipcc.htm l).
tion of emissions projections is asymmetric: about 63% of all scenarios project that 
CO2 emissions in 2050 will be less than three times the 1990 level, while the highest 
projection extends to 6.6 times; and about 56% of scenarios project that emissions 
in 2100 will be less than 4 times of the 1990 level, while the highest value reaches 
20 times. In the case of non-intervention scenarios, the variance across scenarios is 
even larger (Table 7.2 and Figure 7.4). This is understandable because the emission 
levels are targets set exogenously in some of the intervention scenarios.
The scenarios come from 40 sources, where most studies are conducted by re­
search teams in developed countries and do not focus specifically on China. Only 
four scenarios can be identified as the work of a Chinese team. (Jiang et al. 1999) 
have argued that this collection of studies does not sufficiently reflect the circum­
stances of developing countries. They develop four storylines of future Chinese and
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Figure 7.2: Projections of China's CO2 Emissions in Literature
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Source: Author’s construction based on the data extracted from IPCC SRES Database 
version 1.0 maintained by the National Institute of Environmental Studies in Japan 
(http://www-cger.nies.go.jp/cger-e/db/ipcc.html).
world demographic, economic and technological situations. Using the AIM/emission 
linkage model, they project that China’s C 0 2 emissions from energy use will be 1.95- 
5.4 Gtc in 2050, and will decline to 0.8—5.1 GtC in 2100, while total C 0 2 emissions 
will be slightly higher than those figures, i.e. 2.0-5.5 GtC in 2050 and 0.85-5.2
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Figure 7.3: Frequency Distribution of China's CO2 Emissions
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Note: The number of scenarios for index is less than the number of projections due to 
missing values in 1990.
Source: Author’s construction based on the data extracted from IPCC SRES Database 
version 1.0 maintained by the National Institute of Environmental Studies in Japan 
(http://www-cger.nies.go.jp/cger-e/db/ipcc.html).
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Figure 7.4: Frequency Distribution of China's Non-Intervention CO2 Emissions
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Note: The number of scenarios for index is less than the the number of projection scenarios 
due to missing values in 1990.
Source: Author’s construction based on the data extracted from IPCC SRES Database 
version 1.0 maintained by the National Institute of Environmental Studies in Japan 
(http://www-cger.nies.go.jp/cger-e/db/ipcc.html).
GtC in 2100. Their major finding is that “it is possible for China to pursue high 
economic growth while maintaining GHG emissions at a lower level” . However, this
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result relies heavily on their assumptions, especially that of the decline in China’s 
population in the second half of 21st century.
7.2 Scenario Driving Forces
A popular way to organise the discussion of the scenario driving forces, as followed 
by SRES (Naki'cenovi'c and Swart 2000), is through the Kaya Identity. The identity 
states that CO2 emissions are a multiple of population growth, per capita income 
(GDP), energy efficiency and emissions per unit of energy use (Kaya 1990; Yamaji 
et al. 1991). It is implicitly assumed that policies are underlying factors affecting 
population growth, economic development and technological change.
7.2.1 Population
Population is an important driving force of emissions scenarios. This is especially 
true for dynamic models like G-Cubed-T because the variables at the steady state 
grow at a rate being equal to the sum of population and productivity growth rates 
which are set exogenously. Therefore a reliable population projection is crucial to 
the result of emission projections.
The widely used world population projections are those by the World Bank (up 
to 2015), the United Nations (up to 2150), the International Institute for Applied 
System Analysis (IIASA, up to 2100) , and the U.S. Bureau of the Census (up to 
2050). These projections, which are summarised in Figure 7.5, give large differences 
in future world population due to different assumptions.
United Nations (2000) revised downward its previous results (United Nations 
1998). For example, the figure for the world population in 2100 was reduced by 
about 10%. Seven scenarios are considered in the UN projections. Despite the 
constant-fertility scenario where the world population will surge to 14.4 billion in 
2050, 52.5 billion in 2100 and 255.8 billion in 2150, the other six scenarios project 
the world population will vary from 5.15 to 16.18 billion in 2100 and from 3.24 to 
24.83 billion in 2150. The IIASA projection (Lutz 1996) considers 9 scenarios with
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Figure 7.5: World Population Projections
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Note: IIASA-high refers to the scenario with high fertility and low mortality, IIASA-cental 
refers to the scenario with central fertility and mortality, and IIASA-low refers to the sce­
nario with low fertility and high mortality.
Source: Author’s construction based on United Nations (2000), World Bank (2000), U.S. 
Bureau of the Census (2000c), Lutz (1996).
different fertility and mortality rates, and the range of projections is even wider 
than the six UN projections, varying from 3.94 to 22.74 billion in 2100. However, 
the central projection of IIASS and the medium projection of UN are close to each 
other. Both the World Bank (2000, 2001) and the U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000c) 
provide projections which are close to the medium or central projections of UN and 
IIASA.
China’s population has doubled in the past 50 years. The recent national census 
reveals that about 1.27 billion people live in mainland China (SSB 2001), which is 
close to previous projections (e.g. 1.28 billion by Tian 1998; 1.28-1.30 billion by the 
United Nations 2000, 1.26 billion by the U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999). However, 
due to the strict “one-child” policy, the population growth rate in China has been 
steadily declining since 1987 (Figure 7.6).
The UN projections show that China’s population will be 1.25-1.686 billion in 
2050, 0.71-2.09 billion in 2100 and 0.395-2.926 billion in 2150. Unlike the trend 
for world population under the constant fertility scenario, China’s population under
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Figure 7.6: Population and Population Growth Rate in China
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Figure 7.7: China Population Projections
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this scenario will slowly grow up to 1.509 billion in 2050, before declining to 1.121 
billion in 2150, lower than the current level (United Nations 2000). The other 
projections are much shorter in period than the UN projections. Projections by the 
World Bank (2000, 2001) and the U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000a) are very close 
to the UN-Medium projection, while the projections by a Chinese scholar (Tian 
1998) approach the high value of UN projections (see Figure 7.7).
These projections also show that an aging population is a common feature of 
demographic dynamics in both China and the world. China will experience the most 
rapid aging among the developing countries because fertility has already declined 
dramatically (Lutz 1996). The current population above age 65 in China is 88.11 
million, accounting for 6.96% of the total population, which is about 1.39 percentage 
point above the 1990 value revealed by the Fourth National Census (SSB 2001). The 
percentage of people above age 60 in the total Chinese population is projected by 
the United Nations (2000) to rise from only 9% in 2000 to 19-31% in 2050, 25- 
48% in 2100, and 28-54% in 2150 (Table 7.3). An aging population may affect the 
economy and emissions in several aspects. First, the supply of labour per head of 
population might decline. Second, the higher elderly dependency ratio may imply 
a lower saving rate and higher government spending on social security and health 
care programs.
Another demographic trend is urbanisation. Currently 36.09% of Chinese people 
live in the urban area (defined as cities and townships, SSB 2001). The figure 
will be 55-69% in 2020 (Tian 1998). Urbanisation will lead to the expansion of 
infrastructure and transportation services. In addition, urban people in developing 
countries tend to use more fossil fuels than rural people (Naki'cenovi'c and Swart 
2000) .
7.2.2 Economic Development
As discussed in Bagnoli, McKibbin, and Wilcoxen (1996) and McKibbin and Huang 
(1997), a country’s sources of economic growth include increases in the supply and
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Table 7.3: Percentage of Aging Population0
Sources /  Scenarios 2000 2025 2050 2100 2150
W orld
U n ited  N ations 2000
Low 11.00 18.00 32.00 49.00 56.00
M edium 11.00 17.00 26.00 36.00 40.00
H igh 11.00 16.00 22.00 27.00 31.00
L u tz  1996
Low fertility , high m o rta lity 13.706 23.40 33.40
H igh fertility , low m o rta lity 12.806 17.00 17.20
C h in a
U n ited  N ations 2000
Low 9.00 15.00 31.00 48.00 54.00
M edium 9.00 14.00 24.00 34.00 39.00
H igh 9.00 13.00 19.00 25.00 28.00
U.S. B u reau  of th e  C ensus 2000a 10.20 19.69
T ia n  1998 12.80 14.836
“Percentage of the population above age 60 except the values in Tian (1998) which refer 
to population above age 65. 
hValue in the year of 2020.
quality of labour, capital and other inputs; improvements in technology which affect 
the way inputs are used; and structural change affecting the way inputs are allo­
cated. All of these sources will be explicitly considered in the model, exogenously or 
endogenously. The labour supply in the long run is determined by population which 
has been discussed in the previous subsection. The production functions used in G- 
Cubed-T allow for improvements in labour quality or labour augmenting technical 
change. The model determines material use and the evolution of the capital stock 
endogenously. Structural change, induced by changes in the price level, is also mod­
eled endogenously. This subsection discusses the achievement and future prospects 
of economic growth in China and the world to shed light on the assumptions about 
economic growth sources specified elsewhere.
China has experienced rapid growth in the past two decades. China’s GDP 
growth rate was 10.1% per annum between 1980 and 1990, and 10.7% per annum 
between 1990 and 1999. Growing 6% a year over the past 40 years, China has 
increased its GDP per capita more than sevenfold (World Bank 2001, p i85).
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Figure 7.8: China GDP Growth Rate
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Source: World Bank Development Indicators, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues
Figure 7.8 clearly shows the growth rates of GDP and per capita GDP in China 
have fluctuated over time. These variation have been closely associated with the 
political situation in China. This suggests appropriate assumptions about future de­
velopment growth are highly dependent on expectation about the political situation 
in China.
Maddison (1998) projects that per capita GDP growth in China will be 4.5% 
during the period 1995 to 2015. The per capita GDP growth potential for the USA 
and the world would be 1.3% and 1.73%, respectively. The Chinese government 
wants the per capita GDP level in 2050 to be the same as the middle income coun­
tries. If that target is the current level of $2,000, fulfilling the task requires annual 
growth rates to 2050 of 1.9% for per capita GDP and 2.9% for GDP (assuming 
population growth is 1% per annum). If it means catching up and if middle income 
countries follow the same path as before, i.e. 1.5% per annum, the annual growth 
rates to 2050 should be 3.4% and 4.4%, respectively, for per capita GDP and total 
GDP.
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7.2.3 Technology and Energy Efficiency
The literature about technological change and energy efficiency in China is diverse, 
especially as it relates to quantitative estimation. Jefferson, Rawski, and Zheng 
(1996) find that collectively owned enterprises have a higher total factor produc­
tivity (TFP) growth rate than state owned enterprises (SOEs): during the period 
between 1980 and 1992, the former had 7.15% TFP growth, or 3.43%, if applying 
the price index for state-sector industrial output, while the latter had 2.50% TFP 
growth during the same period. Li (1997) observes that TFP growth of China’s 
SOEs between 1980 and 1989 was 4.68%, and nearly half of this growth is at­
tributed to incentives and competition and more than a third to reallocation. Both 
Li et al. (1993) and Ezaki and Sun (1999) explore the TFP growth of the whole 
Chinese economy. Li et al. (1993) find that TFP growth between 1981 and 1990 
was about 2.73%. Ezaki and Sun (1999) find that TFP growth between 1980 and 
1995 was 3.8%. However, Kong, Marks, and Wan (1999) analyse Chinese SOEs in 
four sectors between 1990 and 1994, and find no evidence of technological change 
in the building materials, chemicals and textiles industries, a neutral technological 
progress in the machinery industry, and significant reduction of technical efficiency 
in chemicals, machinery and textiles. Consequently, chemicals and textiles expe­
rienced a negative TFP growth, while building materials and machinery displayed 
negligible FTP change. The detailed results of these studies are reported in Ta­
ble 7.4. From examining the table, it might be concluded that the TFP growth in 
China was around 3% in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Closely related to the technological change, autonomous energy efficiency im­
provement (AEEI) is also important for the projection of CO2 emissions. AEEI “ac­
counts for all but energy price-induced energy conservation” (Zhang 1998a, p.123). 
Higher AEEI means lower emissions to achieve a given level of economic growth. 
Assumptions about AEEI in China used by some studies are given in Table 7.5. 
Most are around 1% per annum, however, Zhang (1998a) claims the figure was too 
low compared to the significant achievement of 3.6% per annum AEEI over the
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Table 7.4: Selected Estimations of China TFP Growth
S tu d y
Year
E zaki-
Sun
K ong et al Li Jefferson e t al
Li
et al
N ation BM  C hem M ach T extile SO E SO E Col C ol-R N ation
1981 - 0 .1 - 2 .1 8 2.24 3.29 2.80 - 0 .6
1982 3.4 6.18 2.24 3.29 2.80 4.4
1983 5.3 6.26 2.24 3.29 2.80 3.4
1984 8.1 10.75 2.24 3.29 2.80 7.8
1985 4.9 2.15 3.68 8.73 4.52 4.9
1986 0.7 4 .08 3.68 8.73 4.52 0.7
1987 3.4 8.36 3.68 8.73 4.52 4.5
1988 3.2 7.35 3.68 8.73 4.52 4.4
1989 - 2 . 0 - 0 .1 2 1.58 9.44 2.98 - 1 .7
1990 - 1 .1 1.58 9.44 2.98 - 0 .1
1991 4.3 - 0 .0 1 9  -0 .0 5 9 0.001 -0 .0 5 3 1.58 9 .44 2.98
1992 9.2 - 0 .0 0 4  0 .020 0.124 -0 .0 1 6 1.58 9.44 2.98
1993 7.6 - 0 .0 1 9  -0 .0 2 3 -0 .0 0 5  -0 .0 3 4
1994 5.6 0.018 -0 .0 7 3 - 0 .0 6 0  -0 .0 4 9
1995 3.7
A verage 3.8 - 0 .0 0 6  - 0 .0 3 3 0.015 -0 .0 3 8 4 .68 2.50 7.15 3.43 2.7
Note: Nation—national economy; BM—building materials; Chem—chemicals; Mach—machinery; 
SOE—state owned enterprise; Col—collectively owned enterprise; Col-R—revised calculation for Col; 
Average—average for the studied period.
Source: Ezaki and Sun (1999), Kong, Marks, and Wan (1999), Li (1997), Jefferson, Rawski, and Zheng 
(1996), Li et al. (1993).
period between 1980 and 1990.
From the above discussion, changes in the energy demand in production can be 
considered into two categories: price induced and non-price induced effects. The 
former may be characterised by the elasticity and the latter by AEEI. These two 
effects have been estimated, assuming a CES functional form of production, and 
the estimation process is given in the Appendix and the results in Table 7.6.
Table 7.6 shows that energy conservation in most sectors is predominantly at­
tributed to the price-induced changes. Only three sectors have an AEEI significantly 
different from zero. However, this result is not as surprising as it first seems. As 
pointed out in the introduction, the period from which the data are obtained wit­
nessed significant price reform. Moreover, the specification that implicitly assumes 
instant adjustment of capital may overstate the elasticity (see discussion in McK- 
ibbin and Wilcoxen 1999).
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Table 7.5: AEEI Assumption for China in Selected Studies
S tu d y P eriod Sector A nnual A E E I (%)
M anne 1992° 1.00
B agnoli, M cK ibbin , and  W ilcoxen 1996 1990-2020 0.00
Rose e t al. 1996 1990-2000 2.50
2000-2010 1.50
2010-2025 1.00
M cK ibbin  an d  H uang  1997 1990-2019 1.00
Z hang  1998a 1987-2000 Fossil fuels 1 .0~4 .5
E lec tric ity 0 .0 ~ 0 .3
2000-2010 Fossil fuels 1 .0 ~ 2 .7
E lec tric ity 0 .0 ~ 0 .2
J ian g  e t al. 1999 1990-2100 0 .8 ~ 1 .8
E M F 1 4 6 1990 0.87
1990-2000 0.85
2000-2050 0.92
2050-2100 0.64
“Cite from Zhang (1998a).
^Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 14 Common Assumptions Scenario, from IPCC 
SRES Database (Morita 1999).
7.3 Scenarios and Results
7.3.1 Scenarios
As discussed above, there are three major types of exogenous inputs for G-Cubed- 
T to produce baseline projections: population growth, productivity growth and 
the autonomous energy efficiency index (AEEI). It turns out that the number of 
possible combinations of these factors is huge.7 However, it is unnecessary to explore 
all of these possibilities. For example, the number of scenarios can be significantly 
reduced by assuming that the USA and the rest of the world follow a similar path 
of population, economic growth and technological change to enable a detailed study 
of China. From the above discussion, the following scenarios can be developed
7If considering two possible situations for each driving force in each country region, there will 
be (23) =  512 scenarios. If considering three possibilities for each factor, the number of scenarios
will be 19683!
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Table 7.6: Estimated Elasticity of Substitution and AEEI
Sectors E lasticity“
Implied 
AEEI (%)“ R 2
D urbin-W atson 
S ta tistics“
N um ber of 
O bservations
M etallurgy6 0.4880 9.866 0.2542 2.0849 15
(0.237) (0.208) (0.4440)
Electricity 3.4741 1.487 0.3563 2.3669 16
(0.015) (0.341) (0.7607)
Coal and coke 3.4295 -1.625 0.2639 1.7941 15
(0.050) (0.046) (0.3858)
Petro leum 5.7364 -0.724 0.7130 2.7391 15
(0.000) (0.248) (0.9238)
Chem ical 0.6931 17.833 0.2386 2.6116 13
indu stry 6’0 (0.010) (0.028) (0.8092)
M achinery 1.9486 -4.101 0.5089 2.0630 15
(0.003) (0.383) (0.4672)
Food 0.9821 1.007 0.5576 2.7352 12
industry0 (0.005) (0.992) (0.8914)
Textile0 0.5700 3.983 0.8676 1.4951 14
(0.000) (0.050) (0.1308)
Tailoring0’4* 2.6341 6.083 0.6061 1.8987 6
(0.068) (0.247) (0.6314)
P ap e r0 0.3982 4.195 0.4295 1.6806 14
(0.011) (0.164) (0.2312)
“Numbers in parentheses are p-values. Low p-values of elasticity and implied AEEI denote that 
they are significantly different from zero, while high p-value of Durbin-Watson statistics denotes 
that the hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the residuals cannot be rejected. 
b Including dummy variable for samples after 1990.
“Outlier deleted.
dOnly seven samples available before deleting outliers.
Source: Author’s estimation.
(Table 7.7).8
Rapid Growth—R. So called both because China’s productivity will have a high 
growth rate and population growth will be high or moderate. It is assumed China’s 
population growth will follow the path of UN high or medium scenario projections 
to 2150 (see Figure 7.7) and then stabilise. The productivity growth rate, starting 
from 5.6% which is slightly lower than the upper bound of estimated TFP growth 
rates reported in Table 7.4, will gradually approach the US level (1.6%, Figure 7.9). 
Accompanying this rapid growth, AEEI may be high or low. Thus, this scenario 
family is in turn divided into three scenarios:
8These scenarios typically represent possible ranges of individual factors. However, they are not 
assumed to be associated with higher probabilities.
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Figure 7.9: Productivity Growth Assumptions
China-High
5.0 --
4.5 --
4.0
3.5 --
3.0 --
2.5 --
China-Moderate
2.0 - -
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200
• R l—High population and productivity growth and high AEEI. In this sce­
nario, the AEEI is set to be 3% per year, which is close to the upper bound 
of assumptions in the literature (Zhang 1998a).
• R2—High population and productivity growth and low AEEI. This scenario 
sets AEEI to be 1% per year which is a common assumption in most studies.
• 7?5-Moderate population growth, high productivity growth and zero AEEI.
Healthy Growth—H. So called because it assumes China will have low or mod­
erate population growth (the UN low scenario, see Figure 7.7), high productivity 
growth, and low AEEI. This scenario family is divided into two scenarios:
• HI—Low population growth, high productivity growth and low AEEI.
• H2—Moderate population growth, high productivity growth and low AEEI.
Moderate Growth—M. Contrary to the rapid progress scenarios, this scenario 
family assumes a moderate productivity growth rate starting from 3.97% (Fig­
ure 7.9). To be consistent with the moderate productivity growth, AEEI is assumed 
to be zero. However, the population could grow rapidly or slowly. Therefore, this
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Table 7.7: Scenario Assumptions
Scenarios
R1 R2 R3 HI H2 M l M2 M3
Population Growth H H M L M H M L
Productivity Growth H H H H H M M M
AEEI (%) 3 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Note: H—High, M—Moderate or Medium, L—Low
family is also divided into three scenarios: High population growth (Ml), moderate 
population growth (M2) and low population growth (M3).
The assumption for US population is drawn from the middle series of USBC 
projections (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2000b), while that for ROW population is 
drawn from the medium scenario of UN projections (United Nations 2000). It is 
assumed that the US has a constant productivity growth rate (1.6%) and ROW 
productivity growth rate is slightly lower than the US rate at the beginning and 
then gradually catches up (Figure 7.9). Their AEEI is assumed to be 1%.
7.3.2 Results
The results of simulating these scenarios are reported in Tables 7.8-7.12 and Fig­
ures 7.10-7.12. The demand for coal in China will be 61.28-64.4 EJ in 2010 and 
265.5-432.1 EJ in 2050. The demand for crude oil and natural gas will be 35.2-38.1 
EJ in 2010, and 191.2-250.8 EJ in 2050. China’s CO2 emissions under these scenar­
ios will be 1.47-1.53 Gtc in 2010, 2.38-2.62 Gtc in 2020, and 6.63-10.88 Gtc in 2050. 
The real GDP will be $1.73-1.97 trillion in 2010, $2.76-3.51 trillion in 2020, and 
$7.07-14.58 trillion in 2050, implying annual growth of 3.96-5.45%. However, the 
carbon intensity, defined as the carbon emission per unit of real GDP, will change 
only marginally.
China’s share in total world CO2 emissions will steadily increase in all scenarios. 
The share will be 15.75-17.03% in 2010, 18.95-21.41% in 2020, and 26.78-35.59% 
in 2050. The R2 and R3 scenarios suggest China could surpass the United States to 
become the world’s number one CO2 emitter as early as in 2019. Even if China has
247
450 -
Figure 7.10: China’s Demand for Coal
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Figure 7.11: China’s Demand for Crude Oil and Natural Gas Extraction
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200 -
a moderate growth, it may catch up to the United States in 2023 as suggested by 
the M3 scenario. These results support the point that China will be an important 
player in the climate change policy debate and will be pressed more vigorously to 
participate in international actions.
On the other hand, China’s per capita CO2 emission and per capita GDP level 
will still be quite low compared to the industrialised countries represented by the 
United States. The per capita emission in China is only one fourth to one third of 
that in the US in 2020, and increases to about 40-60% in 2050. The gap of per
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Figure 7.12: Projections of Carbon Emissions in China
Table 7.8: Projected Carbon Emissions (Mtc)
Year R1 R2 R3 HI H2 Ml M2 M3
China
2000 874.20 878.03 879.16 876.16 877.24 875.07 874.31 873.27
2010 1511.67 1529.62 1532.43 1506.28 1523.46 1506.64 1491.69 1466.01
2020 2604.39 2616.94 2621.74 2576.21 2615.47 2492.81 2456.93 2386.73
2050 10879.64 10756.44 10133.24 9340.30 10194.83 8102.21 7465.55 6634.19
United States 
2000 1605.74 1599.36 1596.75 1600.57 1599.94 1597.63 1598.01 1598.44
2010 2134.79 2039.16 2006.43 2070.33 2054.25 2027.75 2037.36 2048.03
2020 2747.76 2518.01 2447.51 2609.42 2562.38 2508.48 2536.48 2567.39
2050 5706.30 4606.25 4312.02 5127.65 4862.04 4638.16 4793.91 4962.98
Rest of the World 
2000 4148.50 4129.52 4119.60 4128.62 4129.09 4118.98 4118.69 4118.37
2010 5948.41 5633.99 5457.85 5594.48 5615.06 5430.18 5417.75 5403.74
2020 8392.13 7619.37 7173.91 7496.69 7560.29 7088.80 7050.64 7008.10
2050 19922.00 16228.26 14026.50 15511.97 15873.37 13604.69 13396.11 13176.48
capita GDP between both countries is even wider: China’s per capita GDP level is 
only 5% of the USA level in 2020 and 7.7-11.6% in 2050.9 These results suggest 
tha t economic development will remain a top priority for China for a very long 
period and it will be very hard to convince China to adopt any rigorous efforts of 
reducing CO2 emissions which may hinder its economic growth.
9The current figure is about 2.5%.
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Table 7.9: Projected GDP (2000 US$ billion)
Year R1 R2 R3 H I H2 M l M2 M3
C hina
2000 1047.07 1046.28 1044.31 1042.69 1044.70 1038.58 1037.23 1035.49
2010 1968.72 1912.87 1859.18 1847.61 1887.11 1801.11 1772.32 1730.38
2020 3511.10 3339.97 3186.52 3160.61 3272.09 2953.08 2873.86 2755.53
2050 14578.94 13545.08 11815.03 10860.47 12331.96 9185.28 8212.84 7067.29
U nited S tates 
2000 9205.11 9190.28 9181.98 9188.43 9189.39 9180.93 9180.35 9179.70
2010 12249.11 11935.51 11806.71 11992.21 11963.51 11845.03 11861.69 11879.34
2020 15860.98 15006.63 14691.78 15233.90 15118.95 14833.98 14900.94 14971.95
2050 34005.70 29446.32 27833.62 30774.67 30113.31 28561.24 28935.63 29325.90
R est of the  W orld 
2000 20629.26 20593.13 20576.03 20595.17 20594.10 20577.60 20578.25 20579.02
2010 28952.33 27943.01 27369.89 27800.62 27874.56 27271.14 27226.73 27176.99
2020 40495.62 37630.70 35939.25 37095.97 37371.71 35573.11 35408.92 35228.24
2050 92358.15 77017.27 67535.11 73408.09 75205.55 65561.74 64544.65 63507.36
Table 7.10: Projected Per Capita Carbon Emission (ton)
Year R1 R2 R3 H I H2 M l M2 M3
China
2000 0.691 0.694 0.695 0.692 0.693 0.691 0.691 0.690
2010 1.103 1.116 1.137 1.145 1.131 1.099 1.107 1.114
2020 1.754 1.763 1.828 1.884 1.823 1.679 1.713 1.745
2050 6.453 6.380 6.856 7.472 6.898 4.806 5.051 5.307
U nited S tates 
2000 5.833 5.809 5.800 5.814 5.811 5.803 5.804 5.806
2010 7.119 6.800 6.691 6.904 6.851 6.762 6.794 6.830
2020 8.457 7.749 7.532 8.031 7.886 7.720 7.806 7.901
2050 14.135 11.410 10.682 12.702 12.044 11.489 11.875 12.294
Rest of the  World 
2000 0.921 0.917 0.915 0.917 0.917 0.915 0.915 0.915
2010 1.180 1.117 1.082 1.110 1.114 1.077 1.075 1.072
2020 1.511 1.372 1.292 1.350 1.361 1.277 1.270 1.262
2050 3.042 2.478 2.141 2.368 2.423 2.077 2.045 2.012
The first impression from comparing the results of these scenarios is that they are 
very close, especially during the period of the next twenty years. For example, the 
dispersion ratio of China’s CO2 emissions, defined as the ratio of difference between 
the maximum and minimum values over the minimum value of projected CO2 emis­
sions, is only 9.85% in 2020. This result is understandable because the underlying
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Table 7.11: Projected Per Capita GDP (2000 US$)
Y ear R 1 R 2 R 3 H I H2 M l M 2 M 3
C h in a
2000 827.2 826.6 825.0 823 .7 825.3 820.5 819 .4 818 .0
2010 1436.1 1395.4 1379.7 1404.4 1400.4 1313.8 1315.3 1315.3
2020 2365 .0 2249 .7 2221 .4 2311.5 2281.1 1989.1 2003.5 2015 .2
2050 8647.1 8033 .9 7993.9 8688 .4 8343.7 5448 .0 5556 .7 5653.8
U n ite d  S ta te s  
2000 33435 .9 33382.1 33351.9 33375.3 33378.8 33348.1 33346.0 33343 .6
2010 40849 .2 39803.3 39373.8 39992.4 39896.7 39501.6 39557.2 39616 .0
2020 48814 .0 46184 .6 45215.6 46884.1 46530 .3 45653 .3 45859 .3 46077 .9
2050 84237 .8 72943.4 68948.5 76234.0 74595.7 70751 .0 71678.4 72645.1
R e s t o f th e  W o rld  
2000 4582 .2  4574 .2 4570 .4 4574 .7 4574 .4 4570 .8 4570 .9 4571.1
2010 5742 .2 5542 .0 5428.4 5513.8 5528.5 5408 .8 5400 .0 5390.1
2020 7292.6 6776 .6 6472.0 6680.3 6730.0 6406.1 6376.5 6344 .0
2050 14100.5 11758.4 10310.7 11207.3 11481.8 10009.4 9854.1 9695 .8
Table 7.12: Projected Carbon Emission Intensity
Y ear R 1 R 2 R 3 H I H 2 M l M 2 M 3
C h in a
2000 0 .8349 0 .8392 0.8419 0 .8403 0 .8397 0 .8426 0 .8429 0 .8433
2010 0 .7678 0 .7996 0.8243 0 .8153 0.8073 0 .8365 0 .8417 0 .8472
2020 0 .7418 0 .7835 0.8228 0.8151 0.7993 0.8441 0 .8549 0 .8662
2050 0 .7463 0.7941 0.8577 0 .8600 0 .8267 0.8821 0.9090 0 .9387
U n ite d  S ta te s  
2000 0 .1744 0 .1740 0.1739 0.1742 0.1741 0 .1740 0.1741 0.1741
2010 0 .1743 0 .1708 0.1699 0 .1726 0 .1717 0 .1712 0 .1718 0 .1724
2020 0 .1732 0 .1678 0.1666 0 .1713 0.1695 0.1691 0.1702 0 .1715
2050 0 .1678 0 .1564 0.1549 0 .1666 0.1615 0 .1624 0 .1657 0 .1692
R e s t o f th e  W o rld  
2000 0 .2011  0 .2005 0.2002 0.2005 0 .2005 0.2002 0.2001 0.2001
2010 0.2055 0 .2016 0.1994 0.2012 0 .2014 0.1991 0 .1990 0 .1988
2020 0 .2072 0 .2025 0.1996 0.2021 0.2023 0 .1993 0.1991 0 .1989
2050 0 .2157 0 .2107 0 .2077 0 .2113 0.2111 0 .2075 0 .2075 0 .2075
assumptions, especially about population, are close during this period (Figure 7.7). 
However, the underlying assumptions generate greater differences among scenarios 
over a longer period of time, so that the projections differ significantly in long run. 
The ratio of maximum to minimum projected emissions increases to 64% in 2050. 
Similarly, the standard deviation of these projections is 0.09 in 2020, and increases
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to 1.60 in 2050. Although the dispersion is in the same range as those of previous 
projections in terms of standard deviation (see Figure 7.3), it is still too high to 
provide a concrete reference. Therefore, the interpretation of long run projections 
should be very cautious and they are at best used for illustrative purposes.
The underlying assumptions about future productivity, population and energy 
efficiency growth lead to the dispersion of CO2 emission projections, but their contri­
butions are different. The largest contributor is productivity growth. For example, 
the scenario R3 differs from M2 only in productivity growth. The difference in CO2 
emissions between these two scenarios is 2667.69 Mtc in 2050, accounting for about 
62.8% of the total dispersion of projected emissions among all scenarios. Different 
assumptions about population growth also make a significant difference to projec­
tions. For example, R2 and HI differ only in the population growth, which changes 
from high to low growth, as do Ml and M2. The difference of projections in the first 
group accounts for about 33.4% of total dispersion, while the second accounts for 
about 34.6%. However, differences in the assumption about energy efficiency im­
provement make a much smaller difference in projected emissions. For example, R1 
differs from R2 only in AEEI which changes significantly from 3% to 1% per annum, 
but their projected emissions in 2050 are very close, with the difference accounting 
for less than 3% of the total dispersion. The reason for this seemingly controversial 
result is that the demand for energy and economic growth are endogenous in each 
scenario. Under the scenario with higher AEEI, it pays for the economy to consume 
more energy (and thus produce more emissions) to achieve higher economic growth 
as evidenced by the higher GDP level ($14578.94 trillion versus $13545.08 trillion, 
Table 7.9). However, higher AEEI enables the economy to use less energy (thus less 
CO2 emissions) to achieve a given GDP level, i.e. the carbon emission intensity of 
higher AEEI scenarios is lower than that of lower AEEI scenarios (0.7463 versus 
0.7941, Table 7.12).
Comparing with other projections, it is found that the projected emissions in 
2010 and 2020 fall in the range reported by other studies. However, the emissions
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in the later period exceed the upper bound of other studies (comparing Tables 7.2 
and 7.8). Because the underlying assumptions of most studies are not given in the 
database, it is hard to trace the source of this difference. However, it can be con­
jectured that the differences come from the different views about the future paths 
of productivity, population and technological growth (Zhang 1998c). For example, 
many studies assume some kind of backstop technologies in the future while G- 
Cubed-T does not make such an assumption. Without significant improvement in 
technology, the energy consumption and thus the CO2 emissions may grow along 
with the economic growth. However, given the fact that the picture of future tech­
nology is not clear, making assumptions about backstop technology is somehow 
arbitrary.
Before concluding this chapter, it is useful to discuss the impact of linking cli­
mate change to the economy in the current model. The detailed discussion is given 
in the Appendix 7.B to this chapter.
It is found that, with the same assumptions about future population, produc­
tivity and energy efficiency growth, considering the direct adverse impact of global 
warming on the production of the agricultural sector will significantly reduce the 
projected level of agricultural output and total output in the long run (Figures 7.A- 
7.B). For example, the annual growth rate of China’s agricultural output decreases 
from 3.3% to 1.4%, leading a 85% decline in agricultural output by 2100. On the 
other hand, because of decline in the agricultural sector, resources are relocated 
to other sectors, leading to higher total output levels for a shorter period of time. 
Because other sectors have higher CO2 emission rates than the agricultural sector, 
the projected world CO2 emissions are slightly higher till 2095, which is mainly 
driven by higher emissions in the US.
The patterns of emission changes are different across regions. This is because 
the final emissions are affected by two opposing effects and the degree of these 
effects are different for individual countries. One is the above mentioned “expand­
ing effect” that tends to increase CO2 emissions because other sectors with higher
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emission rates will boost. The other one is the “feedback effect”: higher emissions 
will have higher adverse impact on agricultural sector. If the agricultural sector 
accounts for a very small share of an economy, as in the US, the adverse impact 
would be overlooked and the expanding effect would paly a dominant role, and the 
emissions would increase. In contrast, the agricultural output has a higher share 
in China’s total output, more attention would be paid to the feedback effect. As a 
result, China’s “with feedback” projection of CO2 emissions fall below the “with­
out feedback” projections after 2076 and is 44% lower than the “without feedback” 
projections in 2100.
7.4 Concluding Remarks
Eight scenarios are developed based on the analysis of the existing literature and 
Chinese data. These scenarios give very different projections about China’s future 
energy consumption and CO2 emissions. Although the projections presented in this 
chapter mainly serve as the baseline for policy discussions in the following chapter, 
some insights can still be drawn.
First, given the information available today, as long as the economy continues 
to grow, it is not likely that China will have lower emissions than the current level.
Second, China’s share in total world CO2 emissions will steadily increase and 
China could surpass the United States to become the number one emitter in the 
world in the first half of the 21st century. However, the per capita emission, and 
especially the per capita GDP level in China, will still be quite low compared to 
the industrialised countries. This implies that it is not likely for China to compro­
mise too much economic development to achieve emission stabilisation or reduction 
targets.
Third, the projection results are mainly determined by the underlying scenario 
assumptions. Assuming different population and productivity growth leads to sig­
nificant difference in long-run emissions. Therefore long term projection can at 
best be illustrative because knowledge about the future is limited and thus the
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assumption are more or less arbitrary.
Some improvements can be made to refine the scenario assumptions. First, more 
effects of demographic dynamics such as aging and urbanisation could be embedded 
into the scenario assumptions. For example, aging may lead to a reduction in 
savings, and urbanisation may lead to an increase in household demand for energy. 
These effects can be captured by introducing a negative shock to saving and a 
positive shock to household energy demand. Second, elimination of trade protection 
could be an alternative scenario, given the fact that China has been admitted to 
the World Trade Organisation.
Appendix to Chapter 7
7.A Estimation of Elasticity and AEEI
This Appendix describes the identification of price- and non-price-induced changes 
in energy conservation in the Chinese economy through the estimation of elastici­
ties of substitution between energy, labour, capital and materials and autonomous 
energy efficiency index (AEEI).
Data
It is useful to discuss the Chinese data before detailing the estimation procedure. 
Despite the accuracy problem, the sector classification in China statistics varies over 
time. The statistics in the early 1980s have a simpler and broader classification 
which prevents perfect mapping from Chinese sectors to G-Cubed sectors.
Table 7.A contrasts the new sector classification (post-1993) in Chinese energy 
statistics against the pre-1985 classification. There were also minor changes in the 
classification between 1985 and 1993. It is clear that the pre-1985 classification can 
not be transformed to G-Cubed sectors without bias. However, it is possible to map 
the post-1985 classification to the previous one. In order to use all available data,
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it was decided to aggregate the sectors into the pre-1985 sectors.
Table 7.A: Evolution of Sector Classification in Chinese Statistics
Pre-1985
C lassification New C lassification  (P ost-1993)
1997 I /O  
S ectors
A g ricu ltu re A gricu ltu re , forestry, an im al h u sb an d ary , fishery and  
w ate r conservancy
1-5
M eta llu rg ica l Ferrous m eta l m in ing  an d  p rocessing 9
in d u s try N onferrous m eta l m in ing  and  processing 10
Ferrous m eta l sm elting  and  p ressing 55-58
N onferrous m eta l sm elting  an d  pressing 59, 60
Pow er in d u s try E lectric ity , s team  and  h o t w a te r p ro d u c tio n  and  
supp ly
86, 87
C oal an d  coking C oal m in ing  and  processing 6
in d su try G as p ro d u c tio n  and  supply 88
P e tro leu m  in d u s try C ru d e  oil and  n a tu ra l gas e x tra c tio n 7 ,8
P e tro leu m  processing and  coking 36, 37
C hem ical R aw  chem ical m a te ria ls  and  chem ical p ro d u c ts 38-43
in d u s try M edical and  p arm aceu tica l p ro d u c ts 44
C hem ical fibres 45
R u b b er p ro d u c ts 46
P las tic  p ro d u c ts 47
M achinery O rd in a ry  m achinery 62-64
E q u ip m en t for special pu rposes 65-66
T ra n sp o rta tio n  equ ipm ent 67-72
E lec tric  equ ipm en t an d  m ach inery 73-75
E lectron ic  and  te lecom m unica tion  eq u ip m en t 76-79
In s tru m e n ts , m eters, c u ltu ra l an d  office m ach inery 80, 81
O th e r m an u fac tu rin g  in d u stry 84
M eta l p ro d u c ts 61
B uild ing N on-m eta l m inerals m ining an d  dressing 11,
m a te ria ls non -m eta l m ineral p ro d u c ts 12 (p a rt)  
48-54
F o restry  in d u s try T im b er and  bam boo  logging an d  tra n s p o r ta t io n 13
T im b er processing, bam boo , cane, p a lm  fiber and  
s traw  p ro d u c ts
30
F ood processing Food processing 14-17
Food p ro d u c tio n 18
B everage 19, 20
T obacco processing 21
T extile T extile 22-27
T ailoring G arm en ts  and  o th e r fiber p ro d u c ts 28
L ea th e r L ea th er, furs, dow n and  re la ted  p ro d u c ts 29
P a p e r  in d u s try P ap e rm ak in g  and  p a p e r p ro d u c ts 32
C u ltu ra l, educa- P rin tin g  an d  record  m edium  rep ro d u c tio n 33
tio n a l h a n d ic ra ft C u ltu ra l, ed u ca tio n a l and  sp o rts  artic les 34, 35
artic les 83
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Table 7.A: Evolution of Sector Classification, continued
Pre-1985
C lassification New C lassification  (P o s t-1993)
1997 I/O 
Sectors
O th e r in d u stry O th e r m inerals m in ing  an d  dressing  
T ap  w ater p ro d u c tio n  an d  supp ly  
F u rn itu re  m anufac tu ring
12 (p a rt)  
89 
31 
82
C o n stru c tio n C o n stru c tio n 90
T ra n sp o rta tio n  
a n d  services
T ra n sp o rta tio n , s to rage, p o s ta l an d  te lecom m unica­
tions services
91-99,
102-105
W holesale, re ta il tra d e  an d  ca te rin g  services 100, 101
O th e rs O th e rs 106-124
Data available are output value, producer price indexes, and energy use in each 
sector between 1980 and 1996. Energy is aggregated according to the coal equiva­
lence, and the price index for energy used in each sector is calculated by
p f  = n w
3
where p f  is the price index of aggregate energy used in sector i, pEi is the price 
index of individual energy j, S{j is the share of individual energy j  in total energy 
used in sector i.
Specification of Estimation Functions
From eq. (6.5) and (6.15), the demand for energy in each sector can be obtained:
Eu =  SKe  (P ^Y u) { P S Y ° J (7.A.1)
Eit-i =  STe  {P it-iYu-i) { P L i Y T~1 (P i-i)~ " r  (7.A.2)
where Ei is the amount of energy used in producing good i, Y{ is the output of 
good i , P j  and P E are, respectively, prices of output and aggregate energy used in 
sector i, SfE is the share of energy in the production of good i , erf is the elasticity 
of substitution between energy and other inputs, and A f  is the shifter. Dividing 
(7.A.1) by (7.A.2), taking log of both sides and collecting terms lead to:
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Ine« -  ln yü +  \npyü -  crf (lnpyit -  lnpeit) + (crf -  l) ln (Ä(t /Ä ft_ i) ; (7.A.3)
where e« is the index (the growth rate plus one) of demand for energy in sector i 
at time t, yu is the index (the growth rate plus one) of sector Vs output value (not 
physical amount), pyt and pPit are, respectively, the price indexes of product i and 
energy. From eq. (7.A.3), the change of energy use per unit of output is attributed 
to two factors: price induced changes and non-price induced changes.
To capture the autonomous change, it is assumed that the shifter Ä[t has the 
form Ä feXit, where A is the autonomous change ratio. Therefore eq. (7.A.3) becomes
lne« -  In yit +  Inpyit = a j  (Inpyit -  Inpeit) + (erf -  l) A*.
It can be used to estimate the elasticity of substitution between labour, energy, 
capital and other materials, and the AEEI or more precisely, the autonomous change 
in the shifter. The results are reported in Table 7.6.
7.B Impact of Linking Climate Change to Production
This section compares the results of considering the direct impact of climate change 
on production (denoted “with feedback”) with the results of not considering the 
impact (denoted “without feedback”). As discussed in Chapter 6, it is assumed 
that global warming adversely affects the production of sector 7 (agriculture, fishing 
and hunting). The scenario M3 is chosen to make such a comparison based on the 
following considerations. First, as discussed in this chapter, the results of all eight 
scenarios are very close during the period between 2000 and 2020, so that it will not 
make much difference to choose from one of these scenarios. Second, referring to the 
other long-run projections in the literature, the projected emission of M3 is one of 
the closest projections. Third, the underlying assumptions seem reasonable. Zero 
AEEI assumption is consistent with the findings of historical energy conservation
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Figure 7 .A: Agricultural Output Relative to "Without Feedback” Level
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as discussed in Appendix 7.A. Low population growth could be achieved if China 
sticks to the current strict “one-child” policy. Although the moderate productivity 
growth assumption seems conservative to some people, it is consistent with the 
findings in the literature (Table 7.4).
As expected, the output level of sector 7 differs quite significantly between these 
two treatments, however, the degree of these effects is different across regions (Fig­
ure 7.A). China’s agricultural output projection changes the most: the output 
predicted by the model with feedback will be 13.4%, 39.4% and 84.6% lower than 
that by the model without feedback in 2020, 2050 and 2100, respectively. The 
changes in the US’s output projections are the lowest: the output is about 57% of 
the level without feedback effect in 2100. The change in the rest of the world is 
close to that of the US: the output is about 53% of the “without feedback” level in 
2100.
The changes in the total output projections follow a similar pattern but to 
a smaller extent than the agricultural output projections (Figure 7.B). This is an 
understandable result if other sectors are not affected. Moreover, as the agricultural 
sector is adversely affected by global warming, resources move to other sectors where 
the marginal returns are higher, thus boosting other sectors. In fact, the resource 
relocation effects are so high for China and the US that the total output level will
259
â
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Figure 7.C: Carbon Emissions (Gtc)
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be slightly higher for a while than that without considering the feedback effect of 
climate change.
Because of the expansion of other sectors, a paradoxical result is derived: con­
sidering the adverse effect of global warming may even increase the projected carbon 
emissions during a certain period of time (Figure 7.C)! This could be explained by 
looking at the different patterns of China and the US emissions which in effect come 
from the fact that the share of agricultural output in total output differs for regions. 
China is affected the most because its agricultural share is the highest. At the begin­
ning, the shares are 12.5% and 2.6% for China and the US, respectively. Because the 
agricultural sector is relatively important in the Chinese economy, China eventually 
reduces its emissions to prevent the agricultural sector from further deterioration. 
On the other hand, agricultural output accounts for only a very small part of the 
US’s total output, and boosting of other sectors leads to higher CO2 emissions.
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Chapter 8
Policy Options of CO2 Emissions Control in 
China
This chapter uses the G-Cubed-T model developed in Chapter 6 to analyse pos­
sible policy options for CO2 emissions control in China. The simulation results 
of policy options are mainly represented as the deviation from the baseline pro­
jections. Eight scenarios for baseline projections were presented in the previous 
chapter. However, to save space, only one scenario, i.e. the M3 scenario assuming 
low population growth, medium productivity growth and zero AEEI, will be used 
for the analysis. As shown in Chapter 7, the eight scenarios produce very close CO2 
emissions during the period to 2020, so, over this time horizon, it will not make much 
difference to choose one from those scenarios. In regard to long term projection, 
M3 is closest to the projections in the literature, although as discussed in Chapter 
7, caution should be exercised when interpreting them. Moreover, the underlying 
assumptions of M3 seem reasonable. The zero AEEI assumption is consistent with 
the findings of historical energy conservation as discussed in Appendix 7.A. Low 
population growth could be achieved if China sticks to the current strict “one-child” 
policy. Although the moderate productivity growth assumption seems conservative 
to some, it is consistent with the findings in the literature (Table 7.4).
This chapter compares the effects of different climate change policy targets and 
instruments on Chinese economy. It is organised as follows. The next section dis­
cusses possible CO2 emission targets China could adopt. The discussion focuses on 
the impact of these targets on China’s economic development and the interaction
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between regions. It is followed by the analysis of policy instruments, i.e., uniform 
international emission tax, differential tax and emission trading, for achieving the 
targets. It will be shown that, as predicted by the theoretical analysis, especially 
Chapter 5, different instruments have different outcomes, and a differential emission 
tax produces better outcome for China.
8.1 Policy Targets
Although developing countries have not been specifically required to set CO2 emis­
sion targets in the international negotiation, discussion of such targets is not rare 
in the literature. As discussed in Chapter 5, setting such targets is a sensitive is­
sue. Developing countries wish to negotiate a relaxing term so that their economic 
development will not be hindered. For example, Gupta and Bhandari (2000) argue 
that targets set on the basis of per capita emissions are the most equitable, effective 
and implementable.
As regards China, the discussion has focused on the measures of achieving some 
pre-determined targets rather than on how to determine such targets. For example, 
using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the Chinese economy 
with a sub-model of the health effects of burning fossil fuel, Garbaccio, Ho, and 
Jorgenson (2001) estimate the required level of a carbon tax that reduces carbon 
emissions from the base case by 10% in each year. Rose et al. (1996) simulate 
several abatement strategies to achieve a 20% reduction in year 2000 baseline CO2 
emissions in China.1 However, Zhang (2000a) implicitly suggests some possible tar­
gets by listing the following strategies at the climate change negotiations for China 
in ascending order of stringency. First, China could regard its active participation 
in CDM as meaningful participation. Second, China could commit demonstrable 
efforts towards slowing its greenhouse gas emissions growth at some point between
lrThey are: change in sectoral mix, mandated conservation, interfuel substitution with current 
technology, interfuel substitution with technological advances, and combination of strategies.
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the first commitment period and 2020. Third, China could make voluntary commit­
ments to specific policies and measures to limit greenhouse gas emissions at some 
point between the first commitment period and 2020. Such policies and measures 
might include abolishing energy subsidies, improving the efficiency of energy use, 
promoting renewable energies, and increasing the R&D spending on developing en­
vironmentally sound coal technologies. Fourth, China could voluntarily commit to 
total energy consumption or total greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP at some 
point around or beyond 2020. Fifth, China could make a voluntary commitment 
to an emission cap on a particular sector at some point around or beyond 2020. 
Finally, the bottom line for China is to offer a combination of a targeted carbon 
intensity level with an emission cap on a particular sector at some point around or 
beyond 2020.
From the above discussion, there are several ways that the target could be set. 
First, the target could be set in the form of a cap, that is, each country is required 
to stabilise its emissions at a certain level. In turn, this cap will be determined or 
negotiated according to certain principles. As one extreme, it could be determined 
according the current emission levels. However, this would be strongly opposed by 
the developing countries because such targets would impose a very heavy burden 
on them. For example, suppose the target is to stabilise the emissions at the year 
2000 level. Under the most conservative scenario (M3) as discussed in Chapter 7, 
China would have to cut its emissions by 40.4% in 2010, and by 63.4% in 2020. On 
the other hand, the corresponding figures for the US would be 22.0% and 37.7%. 
This case will be analysed in the experiment Cl.
At another extreme, the cap could be set in terms of per capita emissions. The 
base year CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in the United States is 4840483 giga- 
grams (1320.13 Mtc). The US agreed to a target of 93% of the base year emissions in 
the commitment period (2008 to 2012) (Table 8.1). Suppose this target is achieved 
at the end of the commitment period (2012). By that time, the US population will 
be 304.764 million (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2000c). This means the per capita
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Table 8.1: CO2 Emission Target under Kyoto Protocol and Per Capita Emissions^
C o u n try
B ase  y ea r 
em iss io n s  
(g ig ag ram )
T a rg e t 
% o f  
b a se  y e a r
P o p u la tio n *  
(m illio n ) 
2010 2015
P e r  c a p i ta  
e m iss io n s ( t)  
2010 2015
A u s tr a l ia 265289 108 20.4 21.5 14.021 13.326
A u s tr ia 46685 92 8.2 8.0 5 .249 5.369
B e lg iu m 104190 92 10.1 10.3 9 .513 9.306
B u lg a r ia 95495 92 7.9 7.3 11.115 12.035
C a n a d a 415690 94 34.3 33.5 11.399 11.664
C r o a t ia 95 4.6 4 .3
C z e c h  R e p u b lic 160073 92 10.5 9.9 14.082 14.875
D e n m a rk 51516 92 5.5 5.4 8.691 8.777
E s to n ia 37184 92 1.3 1.3 25.741 26.315
F in la n d 53889 92 5.2 5.3 9 .590 9.354
F ra n c e 357723 92 59.7 61.1 5 .517 5.386
G e rm a n y 986832 92 81.0 79.4 11.207 11.434
G re e c e 77292 92 11.0 10.3 6 .474 6.904
H u n g a ry 80089 94 10.0 9.4 7.556 8.009
Ic e la n d 1674 110 0.3 6 .416
I re la n d 29577 92 3.8 4 .3 7.142 6.328
I ta ly 398320 92 55.3 54.8 6 .627 6.687
J a p a n 1052964 94 127.1 124.3 7.785 7.963
L a tv ia 24209 92 2.2 2.2 10.350 10.124
L ie c h te n s te in 92
L ith u a n ia 37332 92 3.5 3.6 9.782 9.540
L u x e m b o u rg 12133 92 0.5 24 .587
M o n a c o 106 92
N e th e r la n d s 159040 92 16.2 16.8 9 .009 8.709
N ew  Z e a la n d 22397 100 4.0 4.2 5 .559 5.333
N o rw ay 26370 101 4.6 4 .7 5.829 5.667
P o la n d 462998 94 39.9 38.8 10.900 11.217
P o r tu g a l 39020 92 9.6 9.9 3 .723 3.626
R o m a n ia 185575 92 22.3 21 .3 7.660 8.015
R u s s ia n  F e d e ra t io n 2298900 100 143.9 134.5 15.974 17.092
S lo v ak ia 56691 92 5.6 5.4 9 .254 9.658
S lo v en ia 13294 92 2.0 1.9 6.190 6.437
S p a in 205673 92 39.2 38.1 4 .830 4.966
S w ed en 51328 92 9.1 8.7 5.181 5.428
S w itz e r la n d 39673 92 7.4 7.1 4 .965 5.141
U k ra in e 672075 100 47.6 44 .0 14.122 15.274
U n ite d  K in g d o m 557666 92 58.0 59.8 8.842 8.579
U n ite d  S ta te s  o f  A m e ric a 4840483 93 299.9 312 .3 15.012 14.416
T o ta l 13919445 94.7# 1167.0 1159.4 11.296 11.370
t CO2 emissions from fuel combustion
*2010 population from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1999), 2015 population from World Bank 
(2000). Figures for the US population are drawn from U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000b).
*base year emission weighted average
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carbon emissions would be 14.771 megagrams (4.028 tc). If applying this standard 
and using the current Chinese population level in order not to encourage population 
growth, China would be allowed to emit 5115.56 Mtc per year. According to the 
baseline projections presented in the previous chapter, China would reach this cap 
around year 2033/34 (Rl) to year 2040/41 (M3). This case will be analysed in the 
experiment C2.
Alternatively, the cap could be set according to the principle of cost sharing. 
That is, the target could be set such that it has the same impact on the economy 
(same reduction in output level) for each country. Two experiments will be con­
ducted in this regard. The first one supposes that the US will stabilise its emissions 
at the year 2000 level (C3) and the second supposes that the US will stabilise its 
emissions at the Kyoto target after year 2012 (C4). China will be set a target 
such that its reduction in production will be in line with that of the US in the two 
situations.
The target may take the form of a percentage reduction in emissions, that is, each 
country commits to the same or similar percentage reduction relative to its baseline 
emission level. Although some studies discuss emission control in this way, it might 
not be practical as it is set against a hypothetical basis.2 Three experiments will be 
conducted: 5% (PI), 10% (P2) and 20% (P3) reduction from baseline emission level. 
These experiments are summarised in Table 8.2. Results from these experiments 
are reported in Figures 8.1-8.3.
Among these experiments, stabilising emissions at the year 2000 level (Cl) has 
the most severe impact on China’s economy. The output level will decrease more 
than 8 percent from the baseline (M3) level around the year 2030. As expected,
2The target could also be set at the form of emission intensity as implied by Zhang (2000a). 
However, as revealed by Table 7.12, China’s projected carbon emission intensity, measured as the 
ratio of carbon emission to GDP, is about 5 times the US level, and about 4 times the ROW 
level. And the intensities are more or less the same over time and across scenarios. This implies 
huge difficulties to achieve an emission intensity target. Moreover, this broad definition is not 
technically a good measure of emission intensity. As the emissions are controlled, the GDP level is 
also reduced, leading to a much smaller change in the ratio. Therefore, this type of target will not 
be analysed in this study.
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Table 8.2: Target Options for China’s CO2 Emission Control
Form Targets Code
Cap Stabilised at year 2000 level Cl
Per capita emission at the US level (Kyoto target) C2
Same impact as the US whose emissions stabilised at 
year 2000 level
C3
Same impact as the US whose emissions stabilised at 
the Kyoto target after year 2012
C4
Percentage 5% reduction in baseline level PI
10% reduction in baseline level P2
20% reduction in baseline level P3
Figure 8.1: Change to China's Output Level
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Figure 8.2: Reduction in China’s Emissions from Baseline Level
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setting the cap according to per capita emissions at the US level is a more favourable 
option. The output level increase slightly3 until 2043 when the emission is capped. 
After that, it declines rapidly, but to a lesser extent than C l—the deviation from 
baseline level is less than 5.5 percent (Panel (a), Table 8.1).
Although setting a target in per capita terms has strong ground, as argued by 
Gupta and Bhandari (2000), the international community will not let China stay
3This is because resources are attracted from other countries where emissions are controlled.
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away from emission control for so long period. In this case, cost sharing may be 
a better approach. Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 8.1 contrast the output losses of 
China against those of the US under certain targets. Panel (c) shows that the 
US stabilises its emissions at the level of year 2000. As the growth rate of CO2 
emissions in the US is relatively small, the required emission control is not very 
strict in the early days, and because the resources are attracted from the rest of 
the world, the US actually boosts its output slightly. If China argues that its CO2 
emissions control target can be set such that its economic loss is no larger than 
that of the US, it will start to control its emissions around 2019, and then gradually 
increase the control strength such that the reduction from baseline emissions will be 
about 8.4 percent around 2040. That reduction will stay virtually the same—from 
8.4 to 9.3 percent—over a longer period (Figure 8.2).4
Panel (d) shows a similar idea. But this time it is assumed the US will meet its 
Kyoto obligation in 2012 but not do anything before that time. That is why there 
is a abrupt and severe decline in output level after 2012.5 In this case, China would 
have to cut emissions by almost 40 percent in 2012, but would lessen the control to 
about 11 percent by around 2023 (Figure 8.2). If a smarter strategy were taken by 
the US to meet the Kyoto target, this abrupt and severe control could be avoided. 
The corresponding target for China would be to gradually strengthen its control on 
emissions.
The required carbon tax rates for China to meet these targets are reported in 
Figure 8.3. The order of tax rates is in line with the strength of CO2 emission 
control targets and therefore the economic losses. Concentrating on the period 
before 2040, Cl has the strictest target and requires the highest carbon tax. On 
the other hand, C2 represents the most relaxing target—with no actions necessary 
before 2040, that is, the tax rate is virtually zero. In between these two extremes
4It should be noted that the experiments C3 and C4 are approximative, that is, the evolution 
of China’s output paths roughly follows that of the US.
5Clearly it is not a practical approach because early actions would have been taken to smooth 
the paths. At that case, the lines will be of similar shape as those of C3, but with a lower position.
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are, in order of strength, P3, P2 and C3. If C4 could be done in a smooth way, it 
could lie between P3 and P2 in terms of required tax rate.
As discussed in Chapter 5, China and other developing countries set economic 
development as their first priority and argue that the industrialised countries have 
contributed the most to the global CO2 stock and thus have the responsibility and 
ability to rigorously control their emissions. From this stance, China can not adopt 
a target that would hinder its economic growth more severely than the developed 
countries. Therefore, it could be concluded from the above experiments that the 
bottom line for China would be a target close to C3 and/or C4 if early actions were 
taken to smooth the path. That is, China would commence the control on CO2 
emissions between the end of the first commitment period and 2020 and gradually 
increase the extent of emission cut to around 10 percent in 2040. Consequently, it 
would start to impose a carbon tax between 2012 and 2020 and gradually increase 
the rate to about US$5-7 per tee in 2040. This kind of target is broadly in line with 
the suggestion by Zhang (2000a).
Another conclusion drawn from the above analysis is the need for early action. 
The required cut in the US’s emissions in 2012 of C3 (stabilising at year 2000 level) 
and C4 (meeting Kyoto obligation) are close, however, delaying the control activity 
until 2012 would bring about a much more severe loss to the economy (comparing 
panels (c) and (d) in Figure 8.1).
8.2 Uniform Taxes vs Differential Taxes
This section discusses the effect of a carbon tax. First, a uniform international 
carbon tax is analysed and it is found that this has different impacts on China and 
other countries and that a differential tax system is needed, which is in line with 
the discussion in Chapter 5 and the previous section. Second, the discussion is 
brought into the domestic arena to ask whether a differential tax system is justified 
in domestic policy design. It is found that a uniform domestic tax is preferred 
because the domestic economy is integrated.
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Table 8.3: Effects of a Uniform Carbon Tax of $10/tce^
V a ria b le
C h in a U S A R O W
2010 2015 2010 2015 2010 2015
C a rb o n  em iss io n s - 1 5 .0 5 - 1 5 .0 8 - 0 .9 6 - 0 .9 7 - 0 .9 4 - 0 .9 6
W o rld  em iss io n s - 4 .7 2 - 4 .7 6 - 4 .7 2 - 4 .7 6 - 4 .7 2 - 4 .7 6
T o ta l  o u tp u t - 2 .8 5 - 2 .0 6 - 0 .1 4 0.01 - 0 .4 3 - 0 .2 2
T o ta l  w e a lth - 1 2 .0 5 - 6 .7 4 0.73 2.26 - 1 .6 1 - 0 .4 9
T o ta l  p r iv a te  c o n su m p tio n - 0 .4 9 - 0 .4 2 - 0 .0 2 0.01 - 0 .1 0 - 0 .0 9
T o ta l  sav in g - 0 .0 3 0.02 0.10 0 .16 - 0 .0 5 0.05
T o ta l  in v e s tm e n t - 0 .0 5 0.14 0.10 0 .17 - 0 .0 5 0.05
C u r re n t  a c c o u n t 0 .04 0.05 0.01 0.01 - 0 .0 1 - 0 .0 1
P ro d u c e r  p r ic e  in d e x 1.24 0.84 0.10 - 0 .0 2 0.26 0.12
C o n su m e r  p r ic e  in d ex 0.59 0.22 0.00 - 0 .1 2 0.21 0 .07
t The tax, in 1999 US dollar, is imposed from 2010 onwards. The effects are expressed 
as the percentage change from the baseline.
8.2.1 Impact of a Uniform International Carbon Tax
It is here assumed that a uniform carbon tax of $10 per tee will be imposed from 
2010.6 The simulation results generated by G-Cubed-T are reported in Table 8.3 
and Figures 8.4 and 8.5.
With this tax, China’s carbon emissions drop by 15%, while emissions from the 
United States and the rest of the world are reduced by less than 1%. Consequently, 
world emissions decline by about 5% (Figure 8.4). This is often presented as an 
evidence to justify permit trading. Because a small amount of carbon tax induces 
a large amount of reduction in emissions in China, or developing countries by and 
large, emission trading is said to be a cost-efficient way to control CO2 emissions.
However, the $10 carbon tax only measures the direct costs of controlling emis­
sions. Total domestic output declines by 2.85% in China, but only by 0.14% and 
0.43%, respectively, in the United States and the rest of the world.7 Moreover, the 
total wealth of Chinese people drops by 12.05% in the first year of implementing
6This figure is drawn from the McKibbin-Wilcoxen Proposal (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2000), 
which is close to the required tax rates in experiments C3 and C4 discussed above, and moderate 
compared to other studies, e.g. $8-20 in GREEN (Martins et al. 1993), $18-35 in Zhang (2000a), 
and $58-166 in GLOBAL 2100 (Manne 1992).
7China is a bigger loser even in absolute terms. For example, in 2010, China will lose output 
by $49.3 billion, while the US will lose only $16.6 billion. In the long run, the US will experience 
an increase in output, while China and the ROW will remain at a net loss in output.
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Figure 8.4: Emissions Reduction Caused by a Uniform Tax of $10 per tee
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Figure 8.6: W ealth Changes Caused by a Uniform  Tax o f $10 per tee
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Figure 8.7: Consum ption Changes Caused by a U niform  Tax o f $10 per tee
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the tax. In contrary, total wealth decreases by only 1.61% in the ROW, and even 
increases by 0.73% in the US (Figure 8.6). This imbalance in the economic impact 
of a uniform carbon tax is mainly due to the fact that the world market is not fully 
integrated. This uniform tax causes different relative prices (of emission control) in 
different countries, which can be seen from the change in price indices. The pro­
ducer price index increases by more than 1 point in China, but only by 0.1 point in 
the US and 0.26 point in the ROW. Therefore, a uniform tax damages the Chinese 
economy more severely than others.
8.2.2 How About a Tax on a Particular Sector?
Zhang (2000a) suggests that, in response to the pressure from developed countries, 
China could make a demonstrative effort in one particular sector. It is an attractive 
suggestion because it could limit the adverse effect of carbon emission control on 
growth to a specific scope. And it seems a natural extension and application of the 
idea of a differentiated tax system to the domestic context. However, as the income 
transfer is not, or assumed to be not, restricted within the boundary of one nation, 
and people’s preference and firms’ technology do not differ, this appeal is not in 
line with the principle of the differentiated tax proposal. In fact, because it adds 
further distortions to the economy it may further deteriorate the adverse effect on 
growth. The following experiment demonstrates this argument.
Suppose China proposes a 10% increase in its tax on coal from 2010. This mea­
sure would bring the CO2 emissions down by about 6.5% from the baseline (Figure 
8.8). An alternative way to achieve the same amount of reduction in emissions is 
to adopt a uniform carbon tax. G-Cubed-T shows that it would require an carbon 
tax of $4.3 per tee (Figure 8.9).
Although both policies can achieve same reduction of CO2 emissions, their ef­
fects on output level are different. Despite that its initial impact on output is 
slightly larger than a 10% tax increase in coal production (—1.16% versus —1.09%), 
a uniform carbon tax results lower reduction in output level over a long period
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Figure 8.8: Emissions Reduction of 10% Increase in Coal Tax
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Figure 8.9: Carbon Tax to Achieve Emissions Reduction of 10% Increase in Coal Tax
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between 2013 and 2098 (Figure 8.10).
Because coal has a very high proportion in China’s energy structure, a tax on 
coal production is closer to a uniform carbon tax than other energy taxes. In other 
words, the difference in output between a carbon tax and taxes in other energy 
sectors would be larger for a similar cut in emissions.
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Figure 8.10: Output Deviation from Baseline
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8.3 Emission Permit Trading
The previous sections focus on the use of carbon taxes. This section discusses 
the issue of emission permit trading and compares it with emission taxes. As no 
uncertainty and no domestic distribution and transfers are considered in the model, 
the tax rate is virtually the permit price in the domestic market. Therefore, the 
discussion will concentrate on international trading. Moreover, as the current model 
is highly aggregated, with three country regions included, a full scope of discussion of 
emission trading is impractical and inaccurate. Rather, the analysis focuses on the 
examination of previous theoretical arguments, especially those made in Chapter 5. 
To that end, two sets of stylised experiments are conducted (Table 8.4).
Both experiments try to stabilise CO2 emissions at a certain level over the period 
between 2010 and 2020,8 but differ in the specific level of emission stabilisation. In 
the first experiment, the USA and the ROW are allocated permits equivalent to 
their emissions at the year 2000 level, while China is allocated permits equivalent 
to the year 2010 level. In the second experiment, the USA is assigned a harder
sBecause of the uncertain nature of long term projection of CO2 emissions, the stabilisation 
target is kept for only ten years. An emission tax being equal to the permit price or tax rate at 
2020 will be imposed after 2020.
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Table 8.4: Emission Trading Experiments
Experiment 2000-2009 2010-2020 2021 onwards
1 no control CO2 emission allocation: 
USA: 1598.44 mtc;
ROW: 4118.37 mtc; 
China: 1466.02 mtc
an emission tax same 
as previous year’s permit 
price or emission tax im­
posed
2 no control CO2 emission allocation: 
USA: 1227.72 mtc;
ROW: 4118.37 mtc; 
China: 2386.78 mtc
an emission tax same 
as previous year’s permit 
price or emission tax im­
posed
Table 8.5: Emission Permit Prices and Tax Rates (US$)
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Year Permit Uniform Differential Tax Permit Uniform Differential Tax
Price Tax China USA ROW Price Tax China USA ROW
2010 31.29 31.03 0.00 40.74 50.81 21.47 21.03 0.00 72.46 51.08
2011 35.11 34.82 3.80 43.69 54.98 25.62 25.13 0.00 74.44 55.28
2012 38.97 38.66 7.57 46.55 59.23 29.74 29.23 0.00 76.56 59.53
2013 42.79 42.49 11.30 49.45 63.45 33.84 33.29 0.00 78.73 63.74
2014 46.59 46.25 15.08 52.27 67.62 37.83 37.28 0.00 80.81 67.86
2015 50.25 49.90 18.83 54.99 71.56 41.73 41.15 0.00 82.82 71.80
2016 53.82 53.47 22.57 57.65 75.42 45.53 44.93 0.00 84.78 75.60
2017 57.31 56.96 26.30 60.21 79.12 49.23 48.63 0.00 86.68 79.27
2018 60.71 60.36 30.03 62.68 82.70 52.84 52.26 0.00 88.51 82.81
2019 64.04 63.70 33.75 65.09 86.16 56.36 55.81 0.00 90.21 86.23
2020 67.24 66.92 37.45 67.40 89.36 59.78 59.23 0.33 91.95 89.42
target than in the first one, meeting the Kyoto requirement, i.e., stabilising its 
emissions 7 percent lower than the base year level. On the other hand, China is 
given a more favourable deal, being allocated permits equivalent to its projected 
emissions in 2020. The rest of the world has the same target or emission allocation 
as that in the first experiment. Three instruments, i.e., an emission trading system, 
a uniform international emission tax and a decentralised differential emission tax, 
are tested to obtain these targets in each experiment. The differential emission tax 
is different from that discussed in Chapter 5 in the sense that it does not intend 
to maximise the world welfare, but simply induce each country meet its emission 
control target. The results of these experiments are reported in Tables 8.5-8.6 and 
Figures 8.11-8.13.
The first observation from these results is that an emission tax and an emission
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Table 8.6: Emission Permit Trade Volume (mtc) and Revenue (US$ billion)^
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Year China USA China USA
Volume Revenue Volume Revenue Volume Revenue Volume Revenue
2010 586.46 18.35 -108.16 -3.38 1307.08 28.06 -586.18 -12.59
2011 605.07 21.24 -100.70 -3.54 1324.46 33.93 -578.00 -14.81
2012 621.13 24.21 -91.96 -3.58 1339.79 39.85 -568.94 -16.92
2013 635.74 27.20 -82.41 -3.53 1354.80 45.85 -558.62 -18.90
2014 650.62 30.31 -71.60 -3.34 1368.47 51.77 -548.01 -20.73
2015 663.75 33.35 -60.82 -3.06 1381.51 57.65 -536.75 -22.40
2016 676.06 36.39 -49.62 -2.67 1393.68 63.45 -525.12 -23.91
2017 687.50 39.40 -37.83 -2.17 1404.76 69.16 -513.14 -25.26
2018 697.59 42.35 -25.60 -1.55 1414.80 74.76 -500.69 -26.46
2019 706.55 45.25 -12.65 -0.81 1423.65 80.24 -487.77 -27.49
2020 712.90 47.94 0.36 0.02 1431.01 85.55 -474.35 -28.36
t Positive (negative) figures are for sale (buy) of CO2 emission permits.
trading system are not equivalent. From Table 8.5, it can be seen that permit prices 
are slightly higher than the tax rates under a uniform tax system although both 
systems try to obtain the same emission control target. The difference arises from 
income transfers associated with an emission trading system. The income of China 
from permits sales boosts the economy, partly offsetting the contracting effect of 
an emission tax (permit price). Therefore a higher permit price is needed to obtain 
the same control target.
As discussed in Chapter 5 and the previous section of this chapter, a differential 
emission tax system is better for China than a uniform tax system, which can be 
seen from Figure 8.11. The dashed lines depicting the relationship between these 
two taxes he above zero, indicating that a differential tax system generates higher 
wealth, private consumption and gross national product (GNP) than a uniform tax 
system.
In fact, a uniform emission tax is the worst instrument for China among the three 
instruments discussed. It is also worse than an emission trading system, which can 
be evidenced by Figure 8.11. The solid lines depicting the relationship between the 
emission trade and the uniform tax also he above zero, indicating that the emission 
trading system produces higher wealth, private consumption and GNP than the
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Figure 8.11: Effects of Different Policy Instruments on China
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uniform tax system. Although the permit price is slightly higher than the emission 
tax rate, revenues from selling permits boost the economy, leading to higher welfare 
as indicated by consumption and GNP.
On the contrary, an emission trading system is the best instrument for China 
among the three instruments. As shown in Figure 8.11, solid lines lie above dashed 
lines in panels (al), (b l), (a3) and (b3), indicates that the emission trading gener­
ates higher wealth and GNP to China than the differential tax system. Although 
the wealth is higher under an emission trading system, the private consumption is 
smaller (solid lines in (a2) and (b2) of Figure 8.11 lie below dashed lines), because 
of the assumption of backward-looking household behaviour. Private consumption 
is determined by two factors: present value of future wealth and the current income 
(see equation 6.13 in Chapter 6). Net government transfer is a part of the current in­
come (equation 6.14 in Chapter 6) and is exogenously fixed in current experiments. 
That is, the revenue of permit sales is at the hand of the government and is not 
transferred to the household accordingly. In addition, other income components are 
depressed by the higher effective emission tax rate as indicated by the higher permit 
price. Consequently the private consumption is smaller under the emission trading 
regime than under the differential tax regime. However, as the private consumption 
does not capture the effect of increase in government revenue and household wealth, 
it is not a good indicator for welfare in this case.9 A better one would be the sum of 
private and public consumption as expressed by equation 6.11 in Chapter 6. GNP 
is such an indicator because it includes private and government consumptions and 
investment.
However, the difference in GNP between the emission trading and the differential 
tax is not very big, being less than 2.5 percentage points in the experiment 1 and 
less than 3.5 percentage points in the experiment 2. There are two reasons for 
this. First, the regions in the model are highly aggregated, so the potentials from
technically it is possible to make private consumption a better indicator by introducing positive 
shocks to the government transfer along with the emission trading.
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Figure 8.12: Share of Permit Sales Revenue in China’s GDP (%)
Experiment 2
---- Experiment 1
2000 2005 2010
emission trading are lessened. Second, after 2020, China is given a more favourable 
treatment, i.e., the tax rate imposed after 2020 is smaller, under the differential tax 
regime than under the emission trading or uniform tax regimes (see Tables 8.4 and 
8.5).10 Therefore, cautions should be exercised when interpreting the results.
Consequently, the estimated emission trading volumes and revenues may be 
smaller than those predicted by a more disaggregated model. However, these “con­
servative” estimates still show that a large amount of cash flows. In the experiment 
1, China’s emission permit sales revenue accounts for 1.1 to 1.7 percent of GDP, 
and in the experiment 2, the corresponding figures are 1.6 to 3.1 percent of GDP 
(Figure 8.12). The US’s trade deficit was US$371 billion in 2000 (The Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative 2001). A Kyoto-like arrangement (experiment 2) would 
add about 4-8 percent more to the deficit. Consider the Sino-US trade relationship, 
the payment for purchasing permits would be equivalent to one sixth to one third 
of the current US deficit with China.* 11 Clearly it is not a desirable outcome to the
10It might be a more “reasonable” experiment design that the same tax rate is imposed on the 
three regions after year 2020 to make the results “comaprable”. However, this design has its own 
problem. As the tax rates under a differential tax regime are different for the three regions, imposing 
an identical tax rate after year 2020 would cause an abrupt change in tax rates in at least two 
regions, no matter what level the tax rate is set. Therefore the current design is legitimate—that 
is what the “differential tax” means.
11 According to U.S. Bureau of the Census (2001) and The Office of the U.S. Trade Represen-
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Figure 8.13: Experiment 1 vs Experiment 2 under Emission Trading
(Percentage points of Experiment 2 above Experiment 1)
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US.
Finally, needless to say, China is better off in the experiment two than in the 
experiment one because it is allocated a larger amount of emission permits. As 
shown in Figure 8.13, China has higher private consumption, wealth and output in 
the experiment two than in the experiment one.
In a word, the experiment results presented in this section confirm the findings 
of theoretical analysis in Chapter 5. An emission trading system is the best policy 
for China and a differential emission tax is a better choice for China than a uniform 
tax.
8.4 Conclusion
This chapter discusses the climate change policy arrangement for China, which con­
sists of two parts: setting a proper policy target and choosing efficient instruments 
to meet the target. As regards to the first components of policy design, several 
alternative options for a CO2 emission control target in China have been examined. 
These options are designed according to certain principles, such as stabilising emis-
tative (2000), the trade deficit of the US with China was US$68.7 billion and US$ 83.83 billion, 
respectively, in 1999 and 2000.
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sions at year 2000 level, reducing emissions by a certain percentage from baseline, 
and setting the emission cap according to principles of equal per capita emissions 
(i.e., the cap is calculated based on the population and a standard of per capita 
emissions which is set as the same as that of the US at one point of time), or sharing 
economic losses (i.e., the target will be set such that the percentage change to output 
level would be the same for both China and the US). As expected, the simulation 
shows that stabilising emissions at year 2000 level has the most severe impact on the 
Chinese economy, with the output level reduced by more than 8 percent. Clearly 
China will not accept such a target. On the other hand, a target set according to the 
equal per capita emissions principle is the most favourable for China. China would 
not have to do anything until 2040. Equally clearly, this target is not acceptable 
to other countries. A better argument for China would be to adopt an emission 
control target which would bring about economic losses no larger than developed 
countries. According to this principle, the experiment finds that China could start 
its control on CO2 emissions between the end of the first commitment period and 
2020 and gradually increase the reduction in emissions to about 10 percent in 2040. 
Consequently, the required carbon tax to fulfill this task would be around US$5-7 
per tee in 2040.
As regards the second component, the analysis compares emissions tax and emis­
sion trading systems. Simulations confirm that a differential international carbon 
tax system is better than a uniform one if wealth transfer is restricted. However, 
as the economy is assumed to be integrated and transfers are not restricted within 
one country, a uniform domestic carbon tax achieves better results than a differen­
tial one. It is also shown that an emission trading system is the best instrument 
for China among the three instruments discussed. However, the large amount of 
cash flows may cause resistance from countries buying permits, e.g., the US, be­
cause it will worsen its trade balances. Moreover, as the current model aggregates 
the world into only three regions and may overlook emission trading potentials, 
cautions should be exercised when interpreting these results. An extension to the
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analysis in this chapter would be to disaggregate the ROW further to enable a full 
exploration of the emission trading.
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion
Economic instruments (Els) for environmental policy have gained popularity in 
the last two decades because of their flexibility and cost-effectiveness. There are 
two basic categories of Els: price-based instruments exemplified by an emission tax 
and quantity-based instruments exemplified by an emission permit trading system. 
Economic theory suggests that these two El categories are equivalent under some 
assumptions, such as no distortion, no transaction cost, and no uncertainty. How­
ever, these perfect assumptions are hardly justified in the real world. Therefore 
choosing appropriate Els is an important task of designing environmental policies. 
Although there is a vast literature on this issue, some areas are yet to be further 
explored, for example, the use of pollution charges, instrument choices under uncer­
tainty and for international cooperation. This study provides both theoretical and 
empirical analyses of these topics.
9.1 Major Findings
Els may differ in the way they generate revenues for a government. A pollution tax 
can generate revenues, while a permit trading scheme cannot, unless the permits 
are auctioned by the government. If an environmental policy generates revenues, 
how to use the revenues is thus an integral part of that policy. The current litera­
ture suggests using these revenues to replace pre-existing distorting taxes to achieve 
the so-called “double dividend”: sound environment and less distortion. This the-
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sis argues that another possible use of such revenues should be considered, i.e. 
earmarking for environment-related activities. In fact, both replacing pre-existing 
taxes and earmarking are special cases of a general tax-income scheme which sets 
no prior restriction on the use of revenues. According to the optimisation principle, 
these two special arrangements are usually welfare-decreasing except under certain 
circumstances. Nevertheless, it is also found that a fully earmarked scheme might 
be a better choice than a pure tax scheme if the marginal utility of environment is 
high, relative to that of consumption, and the pollution tax revenue is small.
Considering the possibility of earmarking necessitates reexamination of the Pigou- 
vian tax. Under the principle of the Pigouvian tax, the tax rate is set equal to the 
marginal damage cost of the pollution in order to internalise the external cost. 
However, it is not necessarily the case if the pollution tax revenues can be used for 
environmental purposes. In a partial equilibrium setting, as a pollution tax affects 
the output level, the optimal tax rate may be higher (smaller) than the marginal 
external cost if the output level is inelastic (elastic) to the tax. In a general equi­
librium setting, the optimal tax rate should be set equal to the marginal cost of 
producing environmental good and services, but not necessarily the marginal cost of 
pollution. This may imply that less information is required than thought to design 
an environmental policy, and partly justifies some common practices, i.e. employ­
ing “schedules of fees that generate revenues sufficient to cover the cost of public 
pollution-abatement programs” .
Another difference between price- and quantity-based economic instruments is 
their consequence with the presence of uncertainty. Weitzman’s rule of choosing pol­
icy instruments was developed in a partial equilibrium setting. This thesis explores 
this issue in a general equilibrium framework. It is found that Weitzman’s rule is 
not valid in the general equilibrium setting, except when restrictions on consumer’s 
preference are imposed. Such restrictions include risk neutrality and utility sepa­
rability. Introducing risk aversion and environmental spending changes the relative 
advantage of one policy instrument over the other. A quantity-based instrument is
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more likely to be favourable in these two situations, ceteris paribus.
It is more complicated to design a policy to address global environmental issues 
such as climate change. One of the complications is related to national sovereignty. 
Centralised instruments such as international emission permit trading and interna­
tional emission tax require the establishment of international agencies administering 
such schemes, and result in huge wealth transfers across national boundaries. In 
addition, both developed and developing countries fear that combating CO2 emis­
sions would hurt their economy. These concerns make it very difficult to reach an 
international agreement. This study finds that the first best outcome, i.e. wel­
fare maximum, are usually not achievable in reality because the underlining wealth 
transfer is too big to be realistic. For example, under an international permit trad­
ing scheme all emission permits would be allocated to developing countries. In 
terms of achieving the second best outcome, and acknowledging the restriction on 
income transfers, a differentiated emission tax scheme is found to be better than a 
uniform tax scheme because countries have different technology and different prefer­
ence over environment and consumption. This result deviates from the conventional 
recommendation that a uniform price signal is required to minimise the abatement 
cost. This is because a different objective is set in this study, i.e. maximising the 
welfare, or minimising the overall cost of reducing CO2 emissions, including both 
direct abatement costs and indirect impact on production. Consistent with the pre­
vious discussion of the emission tax rate, it is found that a smaller emission tax rate 
should be imposed on developing countries than on developed countries, because 
their output level is more elastic to a CO2 emission tax than that of developed 
countries, i.e., CO2 emission tax has a higher impact on developing countries.
China’s pollution control policies have been criticised as inefficient and ineffec­
tive, but in contrast this study finds they are effective. This conclusion is backed by 
two pieces of evidence. First, China’s pollution intensity has decreased significantly 
over time, and the decomposition process shows that nearly half of the reduction in 
the discharge of some pollutants could be attributed to pollution control policies.
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Second, an econometrically estimated demand and supply system of pollution rights 
shows that firms respond well to the pollution levy rates. However the pollution 
supply functions are not well-behaved, suggesting that the government sets environ­
mental controls without reference to the preference of households. In that sense, the 
policies may not be efficient and could be improved. It is also found that policies 
tackling more local problems (e.g. water pollution) tend to be more efficient. This 
is not surprising because the government and local public pay more attention to 
these problems when designing the policies.
In addition to the overview of China’s pollution control policy, the empirical 
analysis has concentrated on developing a dynamic general equilibrium model of 
the Chinese economy and applying it to run baseline projections of China’s future 
CO2 emissions and to examine the effects of different policy arrangements. The 
projection shows that, given the currently available information, it is not likely for 
China to have lower emissions than the current level as long as GDP continues to 
increase, which appears inevitable, unless the population declines significantly to 
offset the efficiency growth of the economy. It is also shown that, in most scenarios, 
China’s share in total world CO2 emissions will steadily increase and could surpass 
the United States to become the number one emitter in the world in the first half 
of the 21st century. However, the per capita emissions and GDP level will still be 
quite low compared to the industrialised countries. This implies that China will not 
compromise too much economic development to achieve CO2 emission stabilisation 
or reduction targets.
Several alternative options for a possible CO2 emission control targets in China 
have been examined. These options are designed according to certain rules, such as 
stabilising emissions at year 2000 level, reducing emissions by a certain percentage 
from baseline, setting the cap according to the same per capita emissions as the 
US, or sharing economic losses. As expected, the simulation shows that stabilising 
emissions at year 2000 level has the most severe impact on the Chinese economy, 
with the output level reduced by more than 8 percent. Clearly China will not accept
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such a target. On the other hand, a target set according to the equal per capita 
emissions principle is the most favourable for China. China will not have to do any­
thing until 2040. Equally clearly, this target is not acceptable to other countries. 
A better argument for China would be to adopt an emission control target which 
would bring about economic losses no larger than the developed countries. Accord­
ing to this principle, the experiment finds that China could start its control on CO2 
emissions between the end of the first commitment period and 2020 and gradually 
increase the reduction in emissions to about 10 percent in 2040. Consequently the 
required carbon tax to fulfill this task would be around US$5-7 per tee in 2040.
Simulation also confirms that a differential international carbon tax system is 
better than a uniform one if wealth transfers are restricted. However, as the domes­
tic economy is assumed to be integrated and transfers are not restricted within one 
country, a uniform domestic carbon tax achieves better results than a differential 
one. It is also found that international emission trading could improve the welfare 
even further to a differential tax system. However, the wealth brought about cross 
borders may cause resistance in the permit-buying countries.
9.2 The Direction for Future Work
The current work could be extended in the following aspects.
First, the empirical model could be improved to fully examine the theoretical 
findings made in this thesis. For example, the emission abatement activity could be 
explicitly modelled to facilitate the analysis of earmarking of emission tax revenues. 
Uncertainties about climate change effects and CO2 emission control costs could also 
be introduced in the empirical model to examine the McKibbin-Wilcoxen Proposal. 
The model could be disaggregated to accommodate the analysis of emission trading. 
In addition to the geographical allocation of permits, the allocation of permits over 
time, i.e., permit banking, could also be explored.
In addition, efforts should be made to estimate more of the parameters used in 
the model. As mentioned previously, most behavioural parameters are estimated
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from the US data. Although calibration is a common approach, and the only feasible 
approach in many circumstances, direct econometric estimation of parameters on 
Chinese data should always be tried to increase the credibility of results. The first 
step forward would be to refine the estimation of elasticities of substitution between 
energy, labour, capital and materials as presented in Appendix 7.A.
Second, further efforts should be put on the analysis of other economic instru­
ments, i.e., joint implementation and clean development mechanism. They should 
be compared with an emission tax and/or a tradable permit system.
Moreover, the analysis of climate change policies should be linked to the discus­
sion of other policies. An obvious extension would be to analyse policies addressing 
more local environmental problems from energy use, e.g. acid rain. A climate 
change policy would have more chance to be adopted and succeed if it could incor­
porate individual countries’ domestic environmental policies. As the climate change 
problem affects the whole world, economic policies, e.g. trade policies, should also 
be considered to design a global warming policy. World trade not only is affected 
by climate change policies, but also can serve as means of achieving international 
cooperation on global warming, as suggested by Babiker (2001).
Third, technological progress and resource endowment could be introduced in 
the analysis to better model energy production and consumption and greenhouse 
gas emissions. The current work covers only CO2 emissions from energy use, and 
the analysis could be extended to cover other GHGs and those from other sources, 
e.g. land use and land use change.
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